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FEBRUARY 26, 1951

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FREE MAN

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UNIVERSAL TRAINING: A FRAUD

Hoffman Nickerson

THE MENACE OF USURPATION

Edna Lonigan

SOVIET UNDERGROUND, U. S. A.

Paul Crouch

ENGLAND'S SOCIALIST ORDEAL

George Winder

THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE

An Editorial

Editors: John Chamberlain • Henry Hazlitt • Suzanne La Follette

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FEBRUARY 26, 1951

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A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

HOFFMAN NICKERSON's views on universal military training are based on experience in two wars. He was with the General Staff of the AEF in 1918, and later became a member of the U. S. Section of the Interallied Armistice Commission. In World War II he served as a major. His most recent books are "The New Slavery," "Arms and Policy" and "The Armed Horde." . . . GEORGE WINDER is a British financial writer and a frequent contributor to the *City Press* in London. . . . The inside story of the U. S. Communist Party's preparations for going underground is told for the first time by PAUL CROUCH, former district organizer for the party and director of its work among the U. S. armed forces. In 1927 he was sent to the Soviet Union, where he was made an honorary commander of the Red Army. Mr. Crouch broke with communism in early 1942, and is now completing a book on his years in the party's higher echelons. . . . GERALDINE FITCH has spent most of her adult life in China, where she became well acquainted with Chiang Kai-shek and other outstanding personalities. Just before the Korean War she spent two years in Korea as a journalist, covering United Press and International News Service part of the time, and contributing to magazines. . . . CHARLES YALE HARRISON is the well-known satirist whose "Generals Die in Bed" was a best seller in the late twenties. His "Meet Me on the Barricades" satirized the Communist party line of the mid-thirties. His latest book is "Thank God for My Heart Attack." . . . DON MILLER is a free-lance writer who has been on a number of newspapers, most recently the *Pittsburgh Press*.

Forthcoming

Another article by Lawrence R. Brown, author of "Why Stalin Needs Asia" (January 22) will contribute to the argument over sending American troops to Europe. Oliver Carlson will report on the questionable political aspects of the billion-dollar irrigation project for Central Arizona. Why the CIO and the AFL should favor higher profits will be discussed by Harold Loeb, whose article "Profits = Efficiency" appeared in the *Freeman* of November 27.

the FREEMAN

NEW YORK, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1951

THE FORTNIGHT

Former President Hoover's speech of February 9 was remarkable for its command of economics and logistics, but most of all it was noteworthy for its hopeful breadth of view. Far from being "defeatist" or "isolationist" (the two epithets commonly hurled at Hoover), it set the American struggle against Stalin into the proper framework of its world setting. By comparison with Hoover, the Administration spokesmen are almost parochial in their aims: apparently they would let the whole of the East go Communist up to the very gates of Suez, Australia and the Hawaiian Islands in their one-sided concentration on a Europe that has both the manpower and the machine-power to save itself. In advocating that America funnel the flower of its army into Europe when Stalin may very well elect to move south or east, not west, the Administration spokesmen remind us of the panicky Atlantic seaboard citizens of Spanish War times who wanted the U. S. fleet strung out in front of our harbors from Maine to Georgia — a disposal which of course would have left the Spanish fleet free to go practically anywhere else.

The essence of the Hoover speech comes down to this: America, as the protector of the whole free world, must be able to concentrate its power for use where it may be most needed. But to be truly free to save the West, America needs Europe's self-help; hence the reminder implicit in Hoover's words, that western Europe has its own obligations under the North Atlantic Pact. If it will begin to get some ponderable divisions under arms while the U. S. concentrates on building up its air and sea power, Stalin will hardly dare his worst in any direction.

The Administration's economic policy becomes more incredible every day. On the one hand it actively promotes a reckless inflation. President Truman throws at Congress a fantastic \$71,600,000,000 expenditure budget. He not only proposes unparalleled non-defense expenditures, but dares Congress to cut them. Then he does what he has not a shadow of legal right to do. He calls the Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve System before him, tells them they must support government bonds at existing levels, and gives out statements announcing that they have "pledged" themselves to do this. This is in ef-

fect demanding further inflation. For the policy he proposes can only monetize the public debt, and by increasing the supply of money and credit further depreciate the value of the dollar. Then, to "protect" the American public with his right hand against the inflation that he is ordering with his left, he has his price controllers throw a general ceiling (which quickly develops leaks) over prices and wages. Price ceilings never give long-run protection against the consequences of monetary debasement. They merely unbalance and distort production while diverting public attention from the government's own inflationary activities.

Preventing prices from reflecting changed conditions eliminates the guide by which millions of enterprisers, each of them expert in his own field, govern their actions. Instead of businessmen reacting to the market, government officials must make the requisite decisions. Not only are such decisions usually faulty since they are based on inadequate information — the human mind can not balance all factors as does a free market — but they are difficult to initiate, revise and revoke. Thus, freezing prices changes the economy from one of nearly reflex actions to the stream of events, to an administered system. Wars come to an end. But it seems foolhardy to make this shift in time of peace because the defense effort may go on for several generations.

Now that the latest railway strike appears to be withering away, probably Congress will cool off and nothing will be done toward forestalling a recurrence. What nobody seems to appreciate is that strikes are now endemic on the railroads. They come at increasingly frequent intervals, each one a little more severe than its predecessor. When a strike occurs, some Congressman usually proposes some absurdly drastic punitive measure — but, as soon as the strike is over, it seems impossible to get the legislators to consider the subject at all. As a matter of fact, right after the mid-December strike, Congress enacted a "union-shop" and "check-off" bill for the railway unions. When intransigence is thus rewarded and never punished, how can the unionists be expected to behave any differently than they do? The Railway Labor Act has been a dead letter since 1941 as an instrument for maintaining labor peace on the railroads — and in all that time Congress has not done a single thing to remedy this

dangerous situation. The Railway Labor Act as it now stands is pretty much of a Wagner Act. There has been no "Taft-Hartley" for the railroads — and these strikes will continue in frequency and severity until the law restores the capacity of management to combat strikes or withdraws the "seniority" and pension privileges of unionists who walk off the job in defiance of "emergency board" awards.

After the last war the playwright Arthur Miller got a lot of kudos for a "patriotic" drama called "All My Sons." The play was about a manufacturer who made defective airplane parts and so condemned his own soldier-aviator offspring to death in a "flying coffin" scandal. Capitalists, said Miller in effect, just can't be trusted to be patriotic or even good fathers in a crisis whenever their profits are at stake. The Miller "message" was, of course, genuine Grade A hokum, but we'll let that pass for the moment. What we want to suggest to Mr. Miller at this point is that the recent railway strike offers him a subject for a new patriotic drama. By staging their preposterous "sick" call at the moment when our newest defense effort was hanging in the balance, the railway switchmen effectively interrupted the movement of critical materials to the Korean front. This means that the GI sons of many a good American father and mother were placed in extra jeopardy in the midst of a cold and deadly winter. . . . We trust that Arthur Miller will seize time by the forelock and go about writing a new "All My Sons" based on the moral collapse of a railway switchman who put the demands of his union ahead of the demands of his boys who were crying for a steady flow of ammunition and food to the battlefield.

The conviction of William W. Remington, accused of perjury in having denied that he was ever a member of the Communist Party, once more brings into question the efficiency and seriousness of the Administration's loyalty boards. These boards have access to such information as the government investigative agencies possess on federal employees whose cases come before them. Most of the evidence that convicted Remington must therefore have been before the Review Board which cleared him. Under the Presidential order, an employee is to be discharged when "reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the person involved is disloyal." In other words, the case does not even have to be proved, as does a case before a jury. If evidence which convinced 12 disinterested American citizens that Remington was a perjurer — and by implication disloyal — was not sufficient to warrant belief in his disloyalty on the part of the loyalty boards, then of what earthly use are they in defending their country against foreign agents in the government?

Writing in the British *Everybody's Weekly* for January 6, 1951, Sir Ernest Benn has turned up some interesting correlations between convictions for crime in England and the growth of the Welfare State. In 1910, when Britain was still a nation of free men who were largely entrusted with the duty of taking care of themselves, there were only 12,000 convictions for all types of criminal offense. Britain then had a population of 36 million — which means that there was one criminal conviction for

every 3000 citizens. In 1948, however, the convictions were 520,000 — or one for every 96 of the 50 million population.

Does this mean that the modern Britisher is a more depraved creature than his grandfather? The editors of the *Freeman* refuse to believe it. It seems to us that what has happened in England is this: practically all manifestations of vitality have been made crimes now that socialism has been enacted into law. As Sir Ernest Benn indicates, you can go to jail or pay a fine in modern England for buying a pair of stockings abroad, or for failing to stick some stamps on a form, or for ordering a few feet of lumber without getting a license, or for planting barley when some one in London says you must plant rye. Under the circumstances the only non-criminal people in England are the Caspar Milquetoasts. Indeed, the rising incidence of criminal convictions in Britain's Welfare State is evidence not so much of moral decay as it is of good sturdy British independence. When 50,000,000 Britishers are sent to jail in a single year for infractions of the Welfarists' ideas of law it will be a sign that sanity — and good morals — have returned to the globe.

Crime is not the only thing that has been going up in England under socialism; the death rate has been increasing, too. According to a recent INS news report from London, more than 800 Britishers have been dying each week from influenza. A reputable Harley Street physician, Dr. Nevil Leyton, ascribes the mounting death toll to the lack of proteins and fats in the British diet. The Laborite Health Ministry has, of course, scoffed at Dr. Leyton's charge. Well, maybe it would be impossible to prove any absolute connection between the influenza fatalities and the British diet. But it may be pertinent to note that there is a school of dietary thinking which insists that amino acids are absolutely necessary to the maintenance of human health — and the main source of amino acids is the very meat which the Britisher is no longer permitted to eat even in quantities sufficient to sustain a good-sized flea. As between Dr. Leyton, the British champion of proteins, and "Drs." Aneurin Bevan and John Strachey, who apparently think that calories tell the whole dietary story, we'd take Dr. Leyton's advice any time. Calories like patriotism, are not enough.

There is something dirgelike in the news about the stolen Stone of Scone. The closing of the Scottish border for the first time in four centuries rustled old ghosts — and was that bell heard above the shivers of Westminster tolling the demise of an empire? With Scottish separatism gathering force, one lesson becomes clear. While an empire may be put together piece by piece over the generations, when it comes to liquidation it liquidates in a hurry: first Eire, then India, then Burma and tomorrow Scotland. Will the Fabians of Whitehall find themselves presently attempting to administer something like the Saxon heptarchy? Two trends are visible today in the decentralization of Britain and the aggregation of Soviet power. We wouldn't be against the first trend if it were not so inextricably bound up with the success of the second. If only for the sake of an illusion, let Scotland remain in the Empire at least until the Kremlin, like Hitler's Reichschancellery, has been reduced to dust.

THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE

In sending Ike Eisenhower on his three-week tour of the North Atlantic Treaty countries, the Administration undoubtedly felt that it was taking no chances. Eisenhower was sent as a soldier under orders from his Commander-in-Chief. He was sent to see what he was sent to see; he talked with the Truman-Acheson-Marshall "opposite numbers" from all of the West European capitals. The strange joker in the whole arranged business, however, is that Ike came back and made a speech to Congress that might have been made by Knowland of California, or by Taft of Ohio, or even by Herbert Hoover!

If this sounds a bit thick, let us refresh our readers' memories for a moment. It will be recalled that Knowland has argued that we must limit American soldiers stationed in Europe in accordance with a "matching ratio" of one United States division to six European divisions. Taft is also for going slow about committing the United States reserve before a battle starts; though he has called for an American declaration of war upon Soviet Russia the moment Stalin violates West European territory, he wants to retain for our arms the privilege of choosing our point of retaliatory attack upon Stalin. (It might, for example, be more feasible to hit at Russia through Yugoslavia and Turkey than to engage the Soviet infantry in Poland.) As for Herbert Hoover, he has not at any point said that he is for letting Europe go down the drain: the whole design of his famous speech was to get the more faltering of the West Europeans to stand up on their hind legs, like men! For Hoover realizes that American strength can not tip the balance across two wide oceans unless both Europeans and Asiatics can first be galvanized into action on their own behalf.

Carefully inspected, Ike Eisenhower's words seem almost like a paraphrase of the Knowland-Taft-Hoover position. Said Ike: The "great and crying need today" is armaments and aviation. (Sounds like Taft to us.) Said Ike, in denying that we can afford to tie down the bulk of our forces in Europe or anywhere else: "We must largely sit here with a great, mobile, powerful reserve, ready to support our interests wherever they may be endangered in the world." (Sounds like Hoover to us.) Said Ike on the subject of "matching" European contributions of fighting manpower: We must send to Europe "certain of our units carefully gauged in their ratio to what Europe is doing, so that there would be a going-forward together, and no one suspicious of the other." (Sounds like Knowland to us.)

To sum up, Ike Eisenhower does not think as a political sloganizer when he is discussing questions of high military strategy. His statement, carefully analyzed, is full of a very non-Achesonian common sense. The Administration and its journalistic supporters, however, seized upon Ike's appearance before Congress to make it seem as though a great political victory had been won over the Taft and Knowland senatorial forces. Chronicling the events of the week, the *New York Herald Tribune* proclaimed that Eisenhower's "reports constituted a powerful repudiation of the position taken by former President Hoover and Senator Taft." What the *Herald Tribune*

should have said in all honesty is that Eisenhower's reports constituted a repudiation of an isolationism and defeatism that have been falsely attributed to Taft and Hoover by politicians and journalists not distinguished for fairness, accuracy or candor.

Since the *Freeman* has also been falsely attacked as "isolationist," it may be appropriate at this moment to make our own position clear. As regards the immediate question of aid to Europe, the *Freeman* was the first publication to propose a matching ratio of American to European soldiers in Europe (see our editorial, "For a new Foreign Policy," in the issue of January 8). Our position was taken up by Knowland in the Senate some days after it had appeared in our columns. Eisenhower is against fixing any mathematical ratio by law, which would be all right with us if we had any reason to trust the Administration to see that the dispatch of United States units to Europe is, in Eisenhower's words, "carefully gauged in their ratio to what Europe is doing." But we have no trust in an Administration that has made such a sorry record in its planning to "stop Stalin."

Both State Department and Pentagon seem to have no viable conception of the ends and purposes of strategy. The Administration proposition is that we must "contain" Stalin in accordance with whatever may be imposed upon us by the maturing of the Soviet timetable. This means that we can have no real strategy of our own. The philosophy of "containment" is necessarily highly wasteful of means — which is why the *Freeman* would prefer a sober Congress to be the judge of the "matching" ratio of American soldiers to European soldiers in Europe. Left to their own devices, the men of the Administration might bring about a situation in which our whole army would be immobilized in Germany at the very moment that Stalin was preparing a three-way coup directed against Alaska, Iran and Singapore!

To the *Freeman's* way of thinking, the mistake of the Administration is to conceive World War III in the exact image of World War II. Both Truman and Acheson, along with Britain's Attlee, seem to think that the West can freely choose whether to make its primary effort against Stalin in Europe or in Asia. Britain and America had alternative choices in 1941, but in 1951 the situation is entirely different. Both the geopolitical situation and the nature of the enemy has changed. In World War II two loose coalitions faced each other. It was the Axis versus the Allies. But neither Axis nor Allies had a central position. The Japanese wing of the Axis was separated from the German-Italian wing by Russia and China; Britain and America, in turn, were separated from Russia and China by Japan on one side and by Germany on the other. Each coalition had its problem of giving priority to one front at the expense of another. Each side had to fight a holding war with one hand while waging an aggressive war with the other.

The difference in 1951 is that the Communist world is organized as a bloc under centralized planning and control while the West is a loose coalition with divided aims.

Unlike the Axis of World War II, the Communist bloc is geographically a unit. The Communist colossus sits compactly astride the "heartland" of the Eurasian continent, defended in the West by the depth of the European plain, in the East by the Pacific Ocean, in the North by the Arctic ice cap, and in the South by deserts and great mountains. The colossus can freely choose in which direction it prefers to move unless the Western allies can figure out a counter-strategy that will reduce the Soviet enemy to virtual immobility in its own turn.

How is this to be done? The means that suggest themselves are various, and they include everything from counter-subversion to the military organization and supply of guerrillas in China and the creation in Europe of a foreign legion composed of the DPs. (See the Lodge proposal, which is still hanging fire in Congress.) Our object should be to build up a force of Europeans in Europe sufficiently strong to keep Stalin worried on that flank while we are causing disruption by organizing subversion on his eastern flank in Asia. While all this is going on we should be raising a still uncommitted flexible striking force at home. Meanwhile we should be preparing in the event of all-out war to make a shambles of Russia's internal communications — the trans-Siberian railroad system, the fuel supply points of the Baku oil region — from bases that are as close up to Russia as it is possible for us to get. The trans-Siberian rail complex can be struck at *under fighter protection* from Japan; Baku could be hit from bases in North Africa. Indeed the recent news that France has placed five military air bases in French North Africa at our disposal is a better guarantee of Europe's safety than anything since our production of the atomic bomb.

The policy which the *Freeman* urges might be written off as armchair thinking by military amateurs were it not for the fact that its elaborators are themselves military men — to wit, General Bonner Fellers, Major Malcolm Wheeler-Nicholson, and others who must be nameless because they are still connected in one capacity or another with the United States Department of Defense. We would feel more tentative about offering military advice if we were not convinced that Eisenhower himself is dubious of any general commitment of United States forces to points which Stalin might elect to bypass in his campaign for the world. If the fight against communism is to be decided in our favor, the full thrust of United States power must eventually be devoted to battling Stalin where it will mortally hurt him, not where it will merely serve to deflect his attention elsewhere.

The reasons why the United States — or any nation — must keep the bulk of its forces in a state of concentration have been set forth by practically every good military writer from Napoleon to Major Wheeler-Nicholson in the last issue of the *Freeman*. Battles are won by using a preponderance of force at the crucial spot at the critical moment. If the United States does not propose to invade Russia (a most hazardous venture), our reserve must be held out to engage the main Soviet armies wherever they chance to move away from their home base on the great half circle that stretches from Europe to Alaska. We can not beat the Russians with ground forces alone — but we can tear their supply lines to pieces. The half admitted, half veiled significance of the recent atomic explosion in the Nevada desert would seem to prove that

we have a terrible means for destroying Stalin's supply lines the moment they become stretched to the point where they can not be defended by mere human hordes.

The chances are, of course, that Stalin will not begin a war by committing Russia's own reserves at the outset. The most likely Soviet move would be to send satellite Hungarians, Rumanians and Bulgarians against Yugoslavia, or satellite East Germans against West Germans. We have the power to forestall any such war provided we make it plain to the whole world that our newest atomic weapons will be placed at the disposal of any nation that is attacked by a Soviet satellite or by the Soviet Government itself.

There are both constitutional and moral reasons why Congress should have a say in our military commitments. But beyond this, Congress should take a hand in our strategical planning for the simple reason that it has the brain power in its ranks which the Administration so conspicuously lacks. Our commitment in Korea would have made sense on one condition: that the Administration had up its sleeve a whole vital program for the rewinning of Asia for the forces of democracy. As part of a campaign to unseat Mao Tse-tung in China, the decision to hold on in Korea would be intelligible. But if we merely intend to sit in Korea and feed more and more Americans as a continuing blood sacrifice into the maw of the Chinese dragon, then what is to be said for our brains? The GIs in Korea are already asking that question; indeed, a letter from Korea to a friend of ours raises the problem of just how long a soldier can maintain his morale when his whole endeavor seems to be pointless. The GI can not go on fighting forever in Korea merely to save somebody's face in Washington or in the UN.

Our thinking in relation to Europe should all be done in the light of the ultimate objective, which is to remove Stalin as a threat to the world by breaking up his blood-stained and insatiably revolutionary regime at home. Our thinking in relation to Asia should also be done with the same end in view. Why, then, do we hobble ourselves in our Korean venture? Why do we use the Seventh Fleet in Formosan waters to guarantee Mao Tse-tung against being harassed on his middle and southern flanks while our armies take it on the chin as Mao hits us in the North? And how is it that both Mao and Stalin can continue to be assured that Chiang Kai-shek's armies will not be used against them along the China coast while GIs are dying around Seoul? These questions should be asked in season and out; the *Freeman* proposes to ask them from here on in.

President Truman, dedicating a chapel in Philadelphia the other day, took a crack at those Americans who "would withdraw from Korea and from Europe." He spoke of "quitters." But who is the "quitter" in Korea if it is not an Administration that refuses to go after the enemy that has struck us in Korea — to wit, Red China? And who is the quitter in relation to Europe if it is not an Administration that refuses to try every means available in 1951 to get Stalin off Europe's neck? Sixty American and West European divisions in 1953 are not going to save Europe from the 175 Soviet divisions which Stalin has ready for deployment in eastern Europe now; other means of diverting Stalin from Europe must be found. The means of diversion point immediately to the creation of United States air bases in Africa and to threatening to widen, not to limit, the war in Asia.

EVIL COMMUNICATIONS

It took the United Nations 106 days, while Chinese Communist troops were slaughtering American boys, to adopt a watered-down resolution declaring that Stalin's Chinese puppet had "engaged in aggression" in Korea. Even so, a number of delegates, among them Sir Gladwyn Jebb, voted for the resolution only with reservations which made it certain that there would be no sanctions. India and Burma voted with the Iron Curtain countries against the resolution; and among the countries abstaining was our government's protege, Tito.

This unimpressive result was obtained only after Mr. Austin, on behalf of the State Department, had in effect promised that there would be no demand that the UN untie General MacArthur's hands, or that the aggressor be punished. Moreover, a number of ECA beneficiaries who voted for the resolution obviously did so with one eye on the demands of both House and Senate for such action, and in the fear that future handouts might be endangered by an adverse vote. To make matters worse, the action was taken only after Mao Tse-tung had scornfully rejected a UN "cease-fire" proposal — accepted by the State Department — which Senator Taft immediately and rightly branded as a shocking measure of appeasement.

Some commentators, among them Mr. Walter Lippmann, at once complained that it was a mistake in the first place to try to get the resolution through the UN. It showed, said Mr. Lippmann, that Asia is against us. Just what was to be gained by continuing the myth of Asian friendship, or even of unity in the UN, escapes us. If Asia is really against us, one would think that the sooner we faced that fact, the better. "Things and actions are what they are," wrote Bishop Butler, "and the consequences of them will be what they will be; why then should we desire to be deceived?"

What those who desire to be deceived naturally did not ask was: Of what earthly use is the UN if it does not carry out the purposes stated in its charter, one of which is "to insure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest"? What such people are demanding, in essence, is that the UN, like the League of Nations before it, render itself impotent by confining its disciplinary action to the small fry among the nations.

What the disgraceful spectacle at Lake Success proves — if it needed proving — is that the UN was founded on a fallacy common to all "one-worlders": the supposition that a world organization of governments with conflicting principles and interests becomes, by the mere fact of organization, a means of securing international harmony and peace. The United Nations were not really united during the war — in purpose, which in the last analysis is what really counts. The Western nations were fighting to defeat Germany and Japan; they permitted themselves no other definite objective. But Stalin was engaged in a war with Hitler for hegemony of the Eurasian continent. It was this divergence of objectives, plus the incessant Western appeasement of the Soviet Union, which made the UN impotent from the start.

The cold fact is that the UN is an international Harvey. Like the six-foot rabbit of that name in the play, it has no

real existence; yet the *belief* in its existence keeps General MacArthur from attacking the Chinese Communists at their sources of supply and piles up U. S. casualties in Korea; it keeps the United States Navy in the position of preventing relief to the United States Army; it puts Formosa, by United States initiative, on the UN agenda, with the predictable result that Free China's last stronghold will be turned over to the Communists. This Harvey has become, thanks to Mr. Acheson's assumption of the role of Elwood P. Dowd, the outstanding instrument of Soviet appeasement; it does not keep the peace, but obstructs it.

This is borne out by the fact that Mr. Acheson plays the Dowd role only where Asia is concerned. Harvey has had precious little to say about the Atlantic Pact or the current plans for a European Army. If Mr. Acheson were through with his policy of appeasing Stalin in Asia, he would listen not to Harvey but to Generals MacArthur and Wedemeyer and other authorities who propose an American policy for that part of the world.

The non-Communist nations are suffering from a moral sickness which comes from the contagion of total evil. Under the leadership of President Roosevelt, they made it possible for Stalin to win *his* war. They encouraged and promoted a world-wide propaganda representing Stalin's bloody dictatorship as a democracy. They betrayed the principles of freedom to which they gave lip service. That is precisely what former President Hoover, in his prophetic speech of June 29, 1941, warned would happen. "War alongside Stalin to impose freedom," he said, "is more than a travesty. It is a tragedy."

Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, the betrayal of the Polish Resistance leaders to Stalin, Mihailovich to Tito, Chiang Kai-shek to Mao — these were all acts in that tragedy, which threatens to engulf the whole world. Now the states of western Europe are plagued by powerful Soviet fifth columns, American soldiers are paying with their lives for their government's policy of appeasement and betrayal, and it is left to the representative of a small nation, Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines, to remind his colleagues in the UN that there is such a thing as principle and that they are supposed to uphold it.

The chief architects of this tragedy have been Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman. As heads of the most powerful nation in the world they could have averted it; instead, they courted it. The genesis of the evil they have wrought was in the Communist infiltration of the Administration during the thirties — an infiltration tolerated by President Roosevelt and actively if ignorantly aided by Mrs. Roosevelt. An Administration surrounded by the agents of evil can hardly be expected to bring forth good works. Through Communist infiltration our government has been corrupted and our people confused. If today such prestige as we have left abroad is financial, not moral, it is because our government has gravely compromised the principles of freedom and human decency which America has traditionally represented in the minds of other nations. Now at last an aroused people is trying to find a way to re-establish those principles. And it is just as well that we first try to cast out the beam from our own eye before we worry about the mote which is in our neighbor's.

OUR OWN

The cradle words of patriotism are two — *Our Own*. Do we realize how much of their meaning has been surrendered?

There is an American army in Korea. It is not our own. It is a United Nations army. An American general commands it. But in that capacity he is not our own general. He belongs to the United Nations.

It follows from this that responsibility for the fate of the American army in Korea is not our own. Shall it stay there or come out? If it stays shall it be permitted to attack the Red Chinese at their sources of power? These are questions to be decided by the United Nations. If again an American army goes to Europe it will not be our own, as it was twice before; it will be an Atlantic Pact army. Even if an American general commands it, nevertheless it will be the Atlantic Pact Command: and it could happen by vote of the treaty nations that an American army would pass under command of a European general. The general staff will be a mixed body, not our own.

All of that is abroad, and flows from the fact that American defense is no longer our own defense but defense of the free world, so that even the decision to go to war is not our own to make. By the Atlantic Pact an attack upon any treaty nation shall be treated as an attack upon us, and in that case we are obliged to make war whether we wish to do so or not; it isn't even debatable.

You may suppose that our domestic laws are our own, as they always were. That is not so. American courts have decided that our state laws are null and void if they are in conflict with the Charter of the United Nations. A foreigner may appeal from our state laws to the United Nations Charter. That is what happened recently to the alien land law of California, which had repeatedly been upheld by our own courts.

The supreme statement of our heritage of freedom is the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. That is still our own. But even that now is threatened. There will come presently before the United States Senate from the United Nations an International Covenant on Human Rights, and if the Senate ratifies it as a treaty we shall have a new bill of rights and it will not be our own. Whether or not this International Covenant would supersede our own Bill of Rights is a speculative question. In any case, as a treaty it would be the supreme law of the land and could be invoked as such.

Our own Bill of Rights says:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

Simply that. The corresponding paragraph of the International Covenant reads:

Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief shall be subject only to such limitations as are pursuant to law and are reasonable and necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

On that paragraph the American Bar Association makes the following comment:

Today, when an atheistic ideology of great power and proportions confronts the religious groups of the world, an organ of the United Nations presents the doctrine

of state regulations of religion, and a codification of the right of regulation, and complete destruction of the freedom of religion if laws based on alleged public safety and order of the state shall so provide.

And for that and other reasons the American Bar Association recommends that the United Nations Covenant be rejected; that we shall keep at least the American Bill of Rights as something of our own.

GOES THE COMRADE

When a new refugee from Stalin's Utopia joins the millions who preceded him, he has to be at least a cabinet minister to make the papers. But any refugee traveling in the opposite direction is news. One of this tiny number is Dr. Margaret Schlauch, who has given up a 27-year professorship of English at New York University to take a job in Warsaw. With the announcement the University released a curious letter from Dr. Schlauch to a colleague, explaining her action. She is afraid, she says,

that the economic and political future at home is not auspicious, not even for a Chaucer specialist, if such a person has been and still is a Marxist (no matter how undogmatic) and doesn't intend to deny it; and if she moreover condemns the foreign policy leading to war for the control of Asia through Chiang Kai-shek, and feels an obligation, sooner or later, to engage in active opposition to that policy.

Of a country where Marxists of all types are a dime a dozen, a country whose government is almost as anti-Chiang as even Stalin could wish, this statement seems disingenuous. It seems particularly so from a confirmed Stalinist apologist who has never been made to suffer for her political activities — not even by her university.

Dr. Schlauch in 1941 told the Rapp-Coudert Committee investigating subversive activities in New York schools that she was not and never had been a member of the Communist Party. Yet for at least 17 years she has faithfully followed the tortuous windings of the party line, lending such weight as her name might carry to Communist fronts — 93 according to one list — and Communist manifestoes, including the notorious defense, in 1938, of Stalin's murder of the Old Bolsheviks. She sponsored the Communist "Peace Conference" at the Waldorf Astoria in March 1949. And she is a trustee of the Jefferson School, a Communist "educational" institution.

Her removal to Poland, she said in her letter,

may mean an irrevocable step; at least a long absence until international affairs have ameliorated [through what intermediary stages one hesitates to contemplate].

One wonders whether that letter means what it seems to mean: that Dr. Schlauch is afraid America may become less comfortable for fifth columnists as Stalin becomes more aggressive; that "amelioration" means a sanguinary Communist victory over the free world. It looks as if Dr. Schlauch had absconded in a blue funk.

Whatever her reasons, we heartily endorse her action. Living in a free country, she preferred and ardently supported the slave state, bloody purges and all. Now she has chosen to throw in her lot with the gang she has so long admired. We hope that many of her kind will follow her example. Indeed, we would cheerfully undertake to act as custodians of a fund to buy every Communist and fellow-traveler a ticket to a Soviet point of no return. Their country needs them — behind the Iron Curtain.

UNIVERSAL TRAINING: A FRAUD

By HOFFMAN NICKERSON

COMPULSORY universal military training without automatic liability for service is an absolute fraud. Universal military training and service are frauds as far as the present emergency is concerned because it is physically impossible to start such a system quickly. Universal liability for service and compulsory selective service are necessary evils in an emergency.

On the other hand, since compulsion is at best a necessary evil, and since one of the worst features of our time is the widespread enthusiasm for clubbing people into uniformity, lovers of liberty should do their level best to make certain that the present emergency shall not be used to put our country into a permanent strait-jacket. The iron logic of military necessity and military efficiency should be our sole guide, and the "mania for compulsion" — as a recent number of the *Freeman* aptly called it — should be shunned like the plague.

Of course a minimum of compulsion is necessary in every organized society; there must be laws and policemen to enforce those laws. In war and in preparing for war this compulsion must take a harsh form; the members of the armed services must be protected against their natural weaknesses, such as dislike for hardships and fear of getting hurt, by knowing that they will be heavily punished in one way or another if they yield to those weaknesses. In other words war is a communal thing, and the great wars of our time make huge doses of compulsion necessary. Thus war has been the food on which the monstrous Leviathan states of today have grown so great. Historically, the longest single invasion of individual liberties was perpetrated when the Revolutionary French Republic proclaimed the levy in mass not merely for home defense but for general military service. Napoleon continued the system; after his fall Prussia added compulsory and universal peacetime training, and after 1870 all Europe more or less copied Prussia. Oddly enough, although "sociologists" are now as thick as flies in summer time, the relation between war and the social order has been little studied. If the statement that mass armies and great wars have been a chief factor in pushing Europe towards Marxism seems a little bold, at least they have not prevented most of Europe from going Marxist.

For years past an active propaganda has tried to blur the truth that compulsion is at best a necessary evil. The ink was hardly dry on the German and Japanese surrenders before the War Department began hollering for universal compulsion; not for any emergency then visible to the public or — apparently — to our leaders, but just for the hell of it. In the first place, a peacetime mass army is inappropriate to the geographical situation and therefore to the national strategy of the United States — a fundamental point to which we shall return later in this article. In the second place, the raising of a mass army would have flatly contradicted the wholesale demobilization of our ground forces then in progress, which demobilization was based upon the idea that the

Soviets would honor their obligations. Nor is there the slightest reason to believe that the High Command of our Army was more foreseeing than our political leaders as to what the Soviets would actually do, for not one army officer risked his career in order to protest publicly against the general demobilization of 1945, as various naval officers afterward protested against what now appears to have been a subsequent error in military policy, i. e. overemphasis upon that form of wholesale baby-killing politely known as "strategic bombing."

The high point of compulsion plus military inefficiency was reached in the 1947 Report of the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training. That military monstrosity would have forced all our young men into uniform for six months without adding a single recruit to any of the active services, and would have increased the civilian components only slowly and uncertainly by means of a complicated series of options, which in many cases could have been juggled around until the cows came home. This feat of now-you-see-it-and-now-you-don't prestidigitation would have been accomplished by setting up an enormous "training corps" not under military law but only under a watered-down version thereof. The resulting need for a considerable army of instructors and caretakers from the regular services would have seriously diminished the available striking power of those services. The scheme also sprouted a lush crop of political jokers, all calculated to increase centralized federal power without even a pretense of genuine military advantage. Congress rightly refused to enact the absurd proposal, but its soul still goes marching on — or rather lurching on — as we shall see in a moment.

Instead, in 1948, Congress enacted a sensible selective service law under which the drafted men, after a necessary minimum of recruit training, go directly into organized, regular units where they can learn from their more experienced comrades as well as from their instructors. A notable merit of such a system is that it is flexible. Within wide limits it permits the speeding up or slowing down of recruitment according to the evident necessities of the near future.

So matters stood when our President took the doubtful step of scrapping the Defense Department War Plan which called for only the use of American naval and air forces in case of an invasion of South Korea.

The hell which promptly broke loose after the landing of U. S. ground troops in Korea has at least had the melancholy merit of reminding us of realities.

Alas, our military age of innocence is not yet over. Only the other day Oscar Ewing proposed "high school universal military training." That apostle of socialized medicine said that "if . . . necessary the high school period might be . . . five years instead of the present four in order to achieve the basic training goal," and that under his plan "the young would be kept out of

army camps almost until the time they were ready for field service." In other words, near-readiness for field service is to be developed on the athletic fields of high schools! Similarly, the senior high school students of a *New York Times* Youth Forum unanimously agreed that "Universal military training should be instituted now."

Disregarding these straws in the wind, a sinister symptom of the attempt to rivet permanent compulsions upon us under cover of the present emergency appears in the current circular of the Military Training Camps Association. That body is the successor of the so-called Plattsburg group which, in collaboration with the late General Leonard Wood, did admirable work in training prospective officer candidates just before our entry into World War I. Today its letter paper is headed by the names of three civilian aides to the Secretary of the Army, and its Executive Committee includes a number of eminent and greatly respected men, most of them from the New York area and practically all of them of a conservative sort.

Unfortunately, however, they consider that permanent universal military training and service would strengthen our institutions and our social order, and seem blind to the social aspect of the matter as a step toward socialism by increasing the already excessive powers of our nominally federal government. Accordingly their circular recommends "a durable military manpower law suited as well for times of peace as for partial and for total mobilization." The first of their alternative proposals is "universal military training at eighteen for one year with service only if called"; their second "universal military service at nineteen for two years," and only in third place do they speak of "selective service at ages nineteen to twenty-six for two years."

Proposal number one is unrealistic in itself and unrelated to the present emergency. As far as purely military policy is concerned, training without liability for service is only a complicated mumbo-jumbo which would produce a minimum of actual military results at a maximum cost in money and loss of manpower. Number two, although not a sham like number one, is nevertheless unsatisfactory in point of age, and still more because it would be an inflexible, rigid method of raising a large army. The average Company Commander would much prefer to have a sprinkling of men in their early twenties and even in their late twenties as ballast for his nineteen-year-old recruits. The Personnel Section of any General Staff would like to be able to regulate the flow of recruits according to the need for them instead of having to train an annual "class" of fixed numbers.

The same fault of rigidity characterizes the plan proposed by President Conant of Harvard, who would like to see all valid young men drafted for two years or 27 months of military service at eighteen or at the end of high school, whichever is later. He also suggests that those physically incapable of armed service should be drafted for such duties as they can perform. Those familiar with his political attitudes, his scandalous tolerance of fellow-traveling professors, his enthusiasm for raising the already confiscatory rates of the inheritance tax, his desire to put our universities under federal control by grants of federal tax monies, and his repetitions of the Communist slogan of "a classless society," will not be astonished at his desire to regiment even those physically handicapped.

Fortunately the Conant plan has been promptly attacked by the Executive Committee of the Association of Colleges and Universities of the State of New York, which committee has pointed out the educational and military unwisdom of calling up entire age groups at one time. General Hershey's Selective Service Scientific Advisory Service Committee has done even better. Under the leadership, so it is said, of President Charles W. Cole of Amherst, that body has opposed universal training altogether, and is advocating extended Selective Service instead.

When counsels are divided, it is wise to go back to first principles. First, where and for what purposes was universal training developed? Next, how does geography necessarily affect our national strategy? Finally, what is — so far — the nature of the present emergency?

Universal training originated in Europe among nations separated only by land frontiers across which men can walk, or by rivers across which bridges can be thrown. Under these conditions military efficiency meant the cheapest possible method of raising the largest possible trained army which could be hurled into action at the utmost possible speed. Before World War I every valid Frenchman was trained and kept with the colors for three years, while other countries followed the same pattern a little less strenuously. The essence of the system was the enormous mass of trained reserves, of which the younger classes in various countries were kept up to scratch by frequently recalling them for maneuvers. After about twenty years of universal training, a general mobilization would call up a tenth of the entire population, say roughly a fifth of all males. Every reservist knew the exact place at which he must report within a few hours, and at that place his entire equipment was waiting for him. Next to numbers, the prime necessity was speed. One day saved in mobilizing might well make all the difference between triumph and disaster. For instance, in 1914 it was the Germans' ability to use reserve divisions from the first days of mobilization which brought France to the ragged edge of immediate and total defeat. But note well that in order to get the full benefit from such a system you must have land frontiers, numbers rather than highly specialized equipment must be decisive, and the system must have been practiced continuously for the better part of a generation.

Now as far as all other great powers are concerned, the United States is strategically an island. Flying has indeed altered the applications of this truth, but the basic truth remains. If anyone thinks that airplanes have abolished the effect of distance and salt water upon strategy, he should get his head examined. In any great war we or our opponents must cross either vast oceans or almost uninhabitable Arctic wastes. Command of the sea, insofar as the sea and the air over it can be commanded, is vital.

Thus the bottle neck of military effort on either side can not be merely the number of trained men available. It must be the fighting and carrying capacity of the available planes and ships. Since shipping and plane tonnage are the necessary foundation of all U. S. strategy, the ideal U. S. Army would be a sort of glorified Marine Corps, an elite body which strives for quality rather than quantity for the simple reason that one good shot makes at least as many hits on the enemy as two bad shots, and

requires only half as much cargo-carrying tonnage to support him overseas. Of course there must also be a cadre of officers and non-coms to train replacements and reserves. But no U. S. mass army, even if complete to the last button, could ever be rushed into action like the continental European armed hordes. The reader may ponder the title of a book on the supply system for the Normandy campaign, "Ten Million Tons to Eisenhower."

Finally, even the outlines of the present emergency are not clear. This is by no means a plea for sitting back and taking things easy — far from it. It is a mere statement of fact that our chief possible enemy, who is known to hold strong cards, has not yet fully shown his hand, and that there is grave doubt as to who would really be on our side in a show-down, and to what extent.

These uncertainties demand the utmost elasticity in our own military policy. In any case we must be strong at sea and in the air — the two are today inextricable. We must also be much stronger on the ground than we now are; the idea of getting a military decision by air alone against an enemy who holds a vast continental land mass is too doubtful to bother about. The real questions are: How much of our total resources should go into armed preparedness and how much into strengthening our own economy? Also, what proportion of our armed preparedness should go into a ground army?

The present emergency results from the clash between Communist expansion and Soviet imperialism on one side and the Truman Doctrine of "containing communism

everywhere" on the other side. Since the United States has only about 6 per cent of the world's population, the Simon-pure Truman Doctrine is bunk — if any sufficiently large local group of the remaining 94 per cent choose or permit themselves to go Communist, we could not stop them with U. S. armed force alone. Even if we made ourselves a semi-Sovietized slave state, still our resources would be insufficient if we did not have strong non-American support.

If we do not limit our military commitments we should prepare our minds for a series of bigger and worse Koreas. In the Far East we have little choice except either to get off the Asiatic mainland or to use armies of Asiatics to do most of the fighting. In Europe General Eisenhower, as Hanson Baldwin truly says, commands only a "shadow force" of 19 Western divisions, whereas the Soviets have 30 divisions in eastern Germany, 60 in their European satellites and 145 in the USSR, a total of 235. Should the Red Army march we would be lucky if any European front forward of the Pyrenees could be held.

The proposition is up to the West Europeans. If they can not begin promptly to do a great deal more for themselves than they have been doing, then our only logical moves will be: either back to Pan-Americanism or the holding of minimum footholds in the Old World, from which future offensives could be launched. For such strategies, sea and air power plus a moderate-sized army would suffice. The existing situation puts a premium on the flexibility which selective service can give, and universal service by "classes" can not.

THE MENACE OF USURPATION

By EDNA LONIGAN

Washington
THE MOMENTARY hope that the Fair-Deal PAC faction, which steers the Democratic Administration, would forego political warfare for the duration, is now in the discard. The Fair Dealers have been busy working out new political stratagems since the morning of November 8. What is news is that Congress, as a body, is no longer willing to bow to their demands.

The great Senate debate on foreign policy is part of Congress's declaration of independence from executive domination, but equally important — perhaps more important in terms of political power to resist domination — was the contest in the House over the rules to be used by the new Congress.

As recently as last summer, able and courageous members of Congress, who wanted to stop the march to one-party government, were hopeless, even broken-hearted. They believed that Congress as an institution had lost its last chance to act independently. They knew that the Fair Deal could count on a large bloc of Senators and Representatives whose only hope of re-election lay in obeying the orders of PAC pressure groups. Administration strategists could also defeat independent Members who opposed their wishes, by building up mass pressure groups in the recalcitrant Congressmen's districts. This

was all done under the surface, and the public had little chance to know what was going on.

It is a fine thing, you will say, for Congressmen to be willing to go down to defeat for a principle. But, if the electors do not know what the contest is about, a good Representative will be defeated only to make room for one more Congressional errand-boy of the executive power.

When members of a law-making body can be retired by the central government and its party apparatus, rather than by the voters in their constituencies, representative government is lost, and we have in its place the self-steering executive — responsible to no one, and able to use the legislative body as a sounding-board for whatever "laws" it wants.

The mortal struggle over representative government, which now centers in this country, has three phases. In the districts, individual voters are struggling to win more political strength than the mass voters drilled by the central power. In the relations between Congress and the executive, Congress is trying to re-establish its primacy in policy making. Within the Congress itself, the true Representatives of free communities are attempting to take back management of Congress from the pseudo-Representatives, vassals of the executive arm.

The shape of the struggle within Congress, between pressure group "democracy" and the representative principle, could be clearly seen on the first day of the new session, in the debate over the rules under which the House of Representatives was to carry on its work.

Hardly had the opening words about national unity been spoken before Representative Sabath of Illinois introduced the innocent-sounding resolution which was to lay bare the cleavage between two irreconcilable political philosophies. He proposed that the House adopt the same rules they used in the last session.

Here we must digress. Seen in two dimensions the debates in Congress often look like technical minutiae or factional disputes. Only by looking below the surface can we see the struggle between two systems of power as dramatic as in the First Continental Congress, the Estates General, or the Long Parliament of Charles Stuart's reign.

For nearly thirty years the House has had a Rules Committee whose duty it was to regulate the "traffic" when too many bills awaited the attention of the Members. The Fair Dealers took away its power over this traffic after the victory of 1948. Now they wanted to keep the 1948 procedures in the new Congress.

Administration leaders argued that the old Rules Committee had violated the will of the majority by bottling up bills that a majority of the Members favored. There was no particle of evidence for this charge, though it was repeated fervently by Administration supporters in the press. The Rules Committee's control of the traffic in bills originated in the revolt against Speaker Joseph Cannon, led by Representative George W. Norris of Nebraska, hardly a "reactionary." The majority had two simple ways to override the Rules Committee whenever they wanted to do so. On "Calendar Wednesdays" the chairmen of committees could call up bills the Rules Committee had blocked, or a petition signed by 219 Members could bring about the discharge of any bill.

Obviously the real issue lay elsewhere. The trouble was, as the *Washington Star* said:

Pressure group tactics have been perfected to such an extent that some House Members, for the sake of their own political fortunes, would feel compelled to vote for certain Fair Deal measures which they secretly oppose. But if these measures can be kept from reaching the floor, they will not have to record their vote.

Now we can see more clearly. Under the 1948 rules individual Members could be coerced by the Administration; under the earlier rules they could not be coerced. The old Rules Committee had not been opposing the will of the majority. It had been opposing the will of the pressure groups, at the behest of the majority.

In the Eightieth Congress, the Rules Committee had blocked the bills of the Fair Deal-PAC leaders, not against the will of the majority, but to take the Members off a political hot spot in their districts.

Enraged at this unexpected barrier to the passage of their blueprint for federal domination of all American life, the PAC-ADA-Fair Dealers waged the 1948 Presidential campaign on the issue of the Do-Nothing Eightieth Congress. The Republicans did not oppose their strategy (although Truman's slogans almost paralleled those in the *Daily Worker*). The combine which rules the Democratic Party swept in, with the Fair Deal-PAC

victorious over the rest of the Administration and over Congress.

Representative Cox, a Democrat, tells us what happened in the 1948 Congress:

When we assembled here two years ago, fresh as we were from a great victory, there was demand for the scalps of people who had stood in the way of reform measures advocated by many prominent figures in this House and the country. The Rules Committee had incurred the displeasure of many because it had, in keeping with what it believed to be the good of the country, refused to stampede under the lash of the whip applied by strong unofficial minority groups.

Relentlessly the winners set to work to change the rules of the House so that the Rules Committee could not bar their way. Under their proposal any bill could be brought out in 21 days by a militant minority, even though the majority wanted it buried. The Fair Dealers put through the 1948 rules, as Representative Herter said, "under very peculiar circumstances. The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Sabath) moved that the rules of the previous session be adopted with an amendment; that amendment was not in type; it was not printed; nobody had a chance to read it. Then the gentleman from Illinois moved the previous question so there could be no debate on it." This in the name of "democracy!"

The difference between the Eightieth Congress, aided by the Rules Committee, and the Eighty-first, with no checkrein, is nicely reflected in the budget. Freed from all restraints, the Eighty-first Congress passed every possible spending bill. Only a few "civil rights" bills escaped because the Administration did not want to count heads on those measures.

Representative Allen of Illinois, former chairman of the Committee, said:

During the Eightieth Congress . . . I invited the attention of the members of the Rules Committee in session to the standing committees of the House, which approved bills appropriating at least \$20,000,000,000 more than the revenue estimated to be received.

We felt that something should be done about it, that the budget must be balanced even though it was necessary to hold up several bills with considerable merit. As a result of the rules adopted by the Eightieth Congress that Congress saved the taxpayers considerable money and for the first time in eighteen years, the income of the Federal Government was larger than its outgo. In other words, since 1933, it was the first Congress that balanced the budget.

This is the record which was so bitterly denounced in the 1948 Presidential campaign! And defended by no one.

In contrast, the Eighty-first Congress, under Fair Deal-PAC control, voted to spend deficit funds for all the old stand-bys of the welfare state, and new projects like the federalization of science. In two years it authorized a total of \$135 billion and raised the debt to the highest point in our history. The Korean War sent the total higher, but even without the war Mr. Truman's Fair Deal outran New Deal welfare spending. With the Korean War, he and his pressure bloc have received \$266 billion in six years. It took Roosevelt 12 years to spend \$372 billion. With two more war years to go, the Truman Administration may well spend more than all our Presidents together since 1789.

It is significant that in the 1950 campaign the Republican Party again studiously refrained from any really unkind words about the record of the Eighty-first Congress in hurrying us down the road to financial chaos, in a world preparing for all-out war.

Obviously the Administration wanted to keep the rules under which they could make Congressmen vote for spending they did not believe in. In the new Congress Fair Dealers argued for the 1948 rules because they helped the "common people," while the opposition, according to Mr. Sabbath, "uses its power to defeat liberal and progressive legislation and . . . it invariably supports and votes for all legislation advocated by the vested interests."

Hallack of Indiana summarized the case for the insurgents:

Let us get this matter out in the open. Let us quit shadow-boxing about it . . . The reason the proponents of the 21-day rule are so vigorous and so active is that they think they see in the Committee on Rules something of a balance wheel in the way of unwise, unsound, and ill-timed, spendthrift socialistic measures.

There is some question, however, whether economic ruin and Socialist regimentation are the only issues in this contest between the Fair Dealers and the "reactionaries." It is a sad commentary on our political blindness that the Fair Deal, so much more subtle and dangerous than the New Deal, has received so little of the attention it deserves.

President Truman has always hewn closely to the program laid down by the PAC-ADA-Farmers' Union. His legislative messages have always urged socialized medicine, federal control of education, public housing, federalized "civil rights," Point Four, and a social security system designed to bring the whole population under a plan meant for proletarian wage earners.

We have heard vigorous debate on the question whether the proposals would bring welfare, but there was another, more serious, problem. The separate "parts" of this program all fitted together to make an oddly definite political pattern. They all led to spending ourselves into bankruptcy with money we did not have. They all helped to condition our people to centralized controls in peace time, and to federalization of activities like voting, police and justice which, in Anglo-Saxon tradition, had always been left to private or local direction. It is the subtlety of this program which is most disturbing. The parts seem so precisely fitted to a blueprint for our undoing.

If all the parts of the program, including price control, rent control and rationing, had been adopted we would now be a thoroughly regimented people, with all power centered in Washington, with the debt far higher than it is today, and with deep and incurable divisions among our people.

Perhaps this is only socialism, but perhaps it is something more. We know the Communists were present at the birth of the PAC program. We know they supported every part of it in their propaganda. We may well ask what better plan could saboteurs have devised to keep our people divided, to spend us into bankruptcy, and to put restraints on our habit of improvisation, so we could not win a long war?

Looking back, we can be profoundly grateful to the Eightieth Congress that this straitjacket of the perma-

nent war economy was not put into effect just before we had to prepare for a great war.

Obviously the men on opposite sides of such a debate did not hear each others' arguments with their minds. There was no room for conciliation. The issue was settled by the Southern Democrats. They voted for the old rules.

The Fair Dealers knew they had met a major defeat. Their existing power over Congress was broken. Representative Sabbath bitterly denounced

some of the gentlemen of the Democratic Party, whose responsibility it is to carry out the program of the majority in power, [who] do not work with the leaders, and although we have a so-called majority on the Rules Committee here, it is only a paper majority . . . In fact only yesterday . . . I am informed that these three Democratic members of the Committee on Rules, elected by the Democrats, were in conference with Republican leaders for the purpose of arranging for the defeat of the resolution I have presented here today.

The Southern Democrats recognized that they were faced with a constitutional, not a party, issue. PAC-Fair Deal domination of our congressional districts is not a party issue but the death of representative government. The impending conflict between irresponsible executive power with its own money and its own voting blocs, and representative government, with control of law-making and of the purse firmly in the hands of agents of the people, can not be settled by any compromise.

The Southern Democrats have not yet made any decision about coalition, nor have the Republicans. There are deep technical and psychological barriers to coalition for most purposes. But there is reason for rejoicing when on a clear constitutional issue Republicans and Southern Democrats join together and fight through to victory.

This is not the last contest over representative government in this session. The Fair Dealers are scared, but they will not quit. The President's message was, on the surface, a compromise between the Fair-Deal-PAC faction and the old-line Democrats, who occupy most of the offices but have little share in the inner councils. For the benefit of the real Democrats most of the emphasis was on national security, with a ringing insistence that we cut non-defense spending, and balance new expenditures by taxes. In his ten recommendations for action, however, the President included every important plank in the Fair Deal-PAC line-up — socialized medicine, subsidized medical education, public housing, a new farm program, federal aid for education, ECA, Point Four and civil rights. They were all in battle dress, of course, but otherwise unchanged. The Administration's bold new program for winning the most intellectually complex of all wars is to ask for everything in the PAC program, about as it stood in 1944, plus Mr. Roosevelt's arsenal of democracy.

Even before the President delivered his message, the Fair Deal Members had introduced in the new session bills for health "insurance," federal control of lynching, "civil rights," federalization of unemployment insurance, and aid for state and local governments. Their members have been moved to most of the important new vacancies on congressional committees. They obviously plan to make even more skillful use of the committee system for

propaganda than they did last year in the Tydings "investigation." They plan a spate of new "Buchanan committees" to harass their opponents, and to prevent the opposition from investigating their war powers. They have new and more subtle means for managing public opinion than those they worked out last year to win public acceptance of Point Four.

Standing against the Fair Dealers' new strategies, so far, are only scattered individuals, who do not study the carefully charted designs of their opponents, and do not have any of their own. They have only native good judgment, and true devotion to representative government. But that is all the colonists had to set up representative government in the first place.

ENGLAND'S SOCIALIST ORDEAL

By GEORGE WINDER

London

THE Home Secretary of the Socialist British Government, Mr. Chuter Ede, declared a short while ago that "We have now reached a stage, through the policy of the government — and, I admit, a bit of luck — in which Marshall Aid is no longer a requisite of our economy."

Marshall Aid for Europe has long been accepted by the great majority of the British people as, to use Mr. Churchill's words: "one of the most unsordid and generous acts in history." Nevertheless, there is a growing number who believe that, as far as Great Britain is concerned, it has long been unnecessary to her economy, if not positively inimical to it. For this reason the suspension of Marshall Aid at the end of 1950 was not wholly regretted here.

After the war, Great Britain was like an injured man who requires assistance, and the American people supplied a very useful crutch. But, if a crutch is retained too long, the limping gait becomes a habit. Recovery is postponed, and may even be made impossible.

When the war ended, Great Britain found herself a relatively poor country. She still had, however, most of the old channels of trade open to her. She still had the skill and experience which had enabled her to fulfil a great measure of the world demand for her goods, and she still had her coal and her great capital equipment, only slightly diminished, placed in the center of the world's trade. After five years of war, her old customers were crying for her goods, and the competition of Japan and Germany had disappeared.

All that was required to restore her wealth and power was a period of provident living and hard work, together with moderation in government expenditure. Hard work and provident living have pulled many a man out of financial difficulties. Such virtues have the same power to retrieve the fortunes of nations.

Financial assistance has, of course, its place in the world's economy. But it is one thing to help a nation that is trying to make a recovery; it is quite another to give, almost unconditionally, millions of dollars to a government that is one of the most extravagant in history. And there can be no doubt that the present British Government is extravagant. It has nationalized coal, gas, electricity, transport, civil aviation, cables and wireless, the Liverpool Cotton Exchange, and the Bank of England — and is in the process of nationalizing steel. In every instance, where the government has not actually lost money on these transactions, the cost of the services

supplied has been increased. It has enormously increased social services, notably school buildings and medical care. Free teeth, spectacles and wigs may be desirable in themselves but hardly evidence of that honest poverty that justifies outside assistance.

It has lost heavily in such wildcat schemes as the East African ground-nut venture, where some £32,000,000 has disappeared into the arid waste. It spends some £16,000,000 a year in information and publicity — a government expense that was almost non-existent before the war. (Much of this publicity begs the public to live austerely, and some of it is propaganda in favor of the ideology in power.)

Some of its capital expenditure has been so extravagantly planned and wrongly calculated that it has had to be suspended before completion. The number of people it has taken from productive work to place in government administrative jobs of doubtful value amounts to over 700,000. Quite apart from its huge, and frequently non-productive, capital expenditure, its annual revenue and expenditure is over four times that of the prewar government. Altogether, some 40 per cent of the country's total income passes through its hands. There can be little doubt that, in the days of their new-found poverty, the British people have had placed around their necks the most extravagant government in their history.

But the greatest evil of government extravagance is that it encourages a similar recklessness on the part of the people, with very detrimental consequences to the country's economy. An example of this is afforded by the British food subsidy of over £400,000,000.

The British people are definitely underfed. Bacon and eggs were once the staple British breakfast. Now there are six eggless and six baconless days a week. Unless one has the good fortune to eat at restaurants or canteens, there are also six meatless days a week. The new ration provides only ten pence worth of meat per week per person — about one lamb chop, say. At first glance, then, a food subsidy of over £400,000,000 sounds very helpful. Unfortunately, it does not increase the supply of food by one egg or one rasher of bacon. It only means that the cost to the people of their controlled food supply is reduced by £400,000,000, and they have that amount in their pockets to spend on something other than food.

When £400,000,000 is added to the very definite inflationary pressure which the government has allowed to

develop, it means that the British people have more money to spend than there are useful goods to buy. Nor is it so very worthwhile to save money to build a house, for the supply of new houses is strictly controlled by the government, and is dependent more on the number of children one has than on the amount of money one has saved. In the circumstances, the temptation to spend money on non-essentials is greatly increased. The sale of beer and tobacco is phenomenal, and gambling is perhaps the most flourishing industry in the country.

Now capital, labor and enterprise are naturally attracted to those industries in which most money is spent, and, in consequence, there is a great shortage of labor and the other factors of production in Great Britain's essential industries. Non-essential industries are encouraged at the expense of the essential ones.

Here are some examples: In the years 1946-49 inclusive, Great Britain produced and consumed a yearly average of 4,860,000 more barrels of beer than in the four prewar years, 1935-38. Comparing the same periods, however, she reduced her production of coal, after the war, by an average of 37,000,000 tons a year. In 1937 she produced 240,390,000 tons of deep-mined coal. In 1950, her best year since the war, she produced 216,000,000 tons altogether. Yet coal is of supreme importance to Great Britain. Its shortage affects every one of her industries. If she could restore her prewar coal tonnage, most of her economic problems would be solved.

Similarly, in those same postwar years, she used in the production and consumption of cigarettes and pipe tobacco a yearly average of 46,440,000 pounds of tobacco more than the average for the four years that preceded the war, while her average yearly production of bricks has been reduced by more than 30 per cent.

A very large number of buildings were destroyed in Great Britain during the war, but there is less building construction in the country now than before the war. The construction of houses is down by more than one-third, yet housing is the nation's greatest shortage.

Ever since the war ended, gambling has experienced boom conditions. Horse-racing and dog-racing draw record crowds, and millions of Britons fill in football pool forms every week. A committee set up to study the problem estimated that £700,000,000 a year went through the hands of bookmakers and pool promoters. Altogether, some £2,200,000,000 a year is spent on alcohol, tobacco and gambling, which is twice the amount spent on clothing, and a little more than the amount spent on food!

Of course, a large proportion of this money goes in taxation to the government, which has its own way of spending money — not all of it wise, as we have seen. So important is this money to the British Government that, if the people gave up drinking, smoking and gambling, the welfare state would collapse.

Over the last two years, however, there has been an improvement in this situation. Although some of the most essential industries, as a result of these inflationary conditions, are unable to play their full part in Britain's recovery, there has been a definite improvement in her industrial production, and especially in her export industries. In 1948 the volume of exports was 23 per cent greater, and in 1949, 35 per cent greater, than in 1937. In 1950 it was nearly 70 per cent greater.

This is encouraging, although, when compared with

the expansion of exports of some other countries — notably the United States — it should not lead to complacency. It is noticeable that this improvement has been accompanied by a gradual reduction in the consumption of beer and tobacco. Steadily increasing prices for necessities are leaving the people less money for non-essentials, and as a result labor is steadily returning to employment in essential industries. As the production of non-essential commodities decreases, the production of those commodities on which the people of Great Britain depend for their living steadily expands.

This change from non-essential to essential production emphasizes that Great Britain's difficulties do not all arise from the war, but are derived more from her complete failure to adapt herself to the requirements of peace. In spite of improvement within the last two years, her labor and capital are still wrongly distributed, so that she is unable to pay for the great Socialist experiment in which she is indulging. Socialism, as a system of economic production, has failed, but because of the support given to the economy by Marshall Aid, the British people have only slowly awakened to the fact.

Before the war, the majority of the people of Europe believed it morally wrong to depend on anyone but themselves for a living. It is the departure from this belief which caused the moral collapse of eastern Europe, and which now constitutes the greatest danger to the West. It is marked by the exaltation of governments, and the growing unimportance and impotence of the individual.

Marshall Aid, in spite of its great idealism, has definitely encouraged this lack of individual independence in Great Britain. There can be little doubt that the present Socialist government would not have won the last General Election if Marshall Aid, by providing so many essential requirements, had not made socialism tolerable. If the British economy were not distorted by inflation and government control, the British people would have been quite capable of themselves providing, by production and trade, all these essential requirements without the assistance of Marshall Aid.

This is not to say that, with the withdrawal of Marshall Aid, America should leave Great Britain to her fate and retire into isolation, but that these two great democratic countries should work together not as patron and mendicant, but as partners, each performing those services which it is most fitted to perform, for the rehabilitation and security of all that is left of the free world.

LINES AND POINTS

When it comes to trading with the enemy, Britannia waives the rules.

The only way the taxpayer's burden promises to be lightened is in the matter of take-home pay.

By Communist standards, aggression is nine points of the law.

In Russia, everyone is entitled to Stalin's own opinion.

You can't help wishing that some of those sources "close to the White House" would dry up.

EDMUND J. KIEFER

SOVIET UNDERGROUND, U.S.A.

By PAUL CROUCH

COMMUNIST leaders in the United States, for more than fifteen years, have prepared for the day when the party will go underground. An elaborate apparatus with blueprints for any emergency has been created under the personal direction of Moscow representatives. Practical experiences of underground Communist movements in other countries were studied in drafting secret plans for illegal existence, even during a war between this country and the Soviet Union.

A dozen or more national leaders and scores of local party officials have broken with the Communist movement since 1930. They have lifted the curtain of secrecy from many inside operations of the party, yet little has been told about the special underground apparatus. This is true because Communist officials are given only such information as may be necessary to carry out work assigned to them.

The underground apparatus is a field reserved for a small and carefully selected group at the national headquarters (including, incidentally, few Central Committee members), the district organizers, and a small number of trusted members assigned to special tasks. Few deserters from the Communist Party in the last twenty years were district organizers — the most carefully chosen of all officials in the movement. In fact, Manning Johnson and I are the only former district organizers who have broken publicly with the party and who have revealed important information about its workings to both government and public. Details I am able to give on the Communist underground have never before been published.

For seventeen years, until I left the party in 1942, I was a high-ranking Communist official. The positions I held included state or district organizer in Virginia, Utah, North and South Carolina and Tennessee; editor of *New South*, Communist organ for the Southern states; member of the *Daily Worker* editorial staff, where I worked with Whittaker Chambers; representative to meetings of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and Young Communist International in Moscow, and to other congresses and top-level policy-making meetings in the Soviet Union; honorary commander of the Red Army; national secretary of the Anti-Imperialist League and national director of Communist work in the armed forces of this country. My work in these posts brought me into close contact with the Communist underground apparatus in the United States and on an international level. Plans worked out fifteen years ago were for an eventuality likely to materialize in the near future — a decisive military conflict between the Soviet Union and the non-Communist world.

The use of the term *underground* requires clarification in reference to the Communist movement. The Communist Party in this country was formed as an illegal and "underground" organization, and it was not until 1923 that it even tried to become legal, under the name

of the Workers Party. Soon its name was changed to Workers (Communist) Party and in March 1929, it became the Communist Party of the USA. In spite of legality, 90 per cent of its activities have been secret and conspiratorial. The party has been like an iceberg, mostly below the surface, with only a small part visible.

Inside the conspiratorial Communist Party there exists a very secret and well-guarded apparatus, long ready for use in an eventual armed struggle between the Soviet and democratic worlds — a struggle regarded as inevitable by Leninist-Stalinist officials. The underground apparatus was set up under the personal direction of J. Peters, a special representative of the Communist International and the Soviet secret police (OGPU, now MVD). I attended many meetings of the district organizers in New York where Peters outlined its structure and gave us detailed directions. I also had many personal meetings and conversations with Peters. Under his guidance I set up the structure in several districts, and with his approval selected party members for key posts in the apparatus.

Even during the "Democratic Front" period, when party members posed as New Dealers while they infiltrated government agencies, the Communist underground remained intact and was even strengthened. Immediately after the Hitler-Stalin pact and the outbreak of war in Europe, the party took steps to improve its preparations for going underground at any moment. During May and June 1941, I was an instructor in a special school held in Alameda County, California, for the study of methods of underground work. Rudy Lambert, chairman of the control and security commission of the California district, was in charge of that school. Steve Nelson was another instructor.

The German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and the about-face of the party line on the war removed all immediate possibility of legislation against Communist activities. But the underground structure again remained intact. In California it is still under the direction of Rudy Lambert.

Every important decision and action by the Communist Party is determined by strategic considerations based on the theory of inevitable military conflict between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Soviet and American Communist leaders have long expected the United States to take the lead in Western resistance against Red conquest of the globe. Most party officials believe the United States will be the last "capitalist country," and they expect their victory here will not be an easy one. Their underground is designed primarily to function during war between the United States and the Soviet Union, and to continue operation in spite of the FBI and all government intelligence agencies.

How efficient is the Communist underground? How dangerous to our national security would it be during a war planned for decades by the Kremlin? Does it have an

Achilles heel? These are life-and-death questions for our country at this time, since Stalin has demonstrated his readiness for World War III at any moment.

In order to answer those questions it is necessary to examine some basic facts about the structure of the Communist underground.

The underground has at least one reserve Central Committee, and probably a second or even a third line of top leadership. As a district organizer, attending all Central Committee meetings and receiving Politburo minutes, I did not know the identity of any member of the reserve Central Committee, or even its size. I only knew of the existence of this committee, obviously appointed by Moscow's representatives, who probably consulted Foster and Stachel in making the selections.

District organizers personally select the reserve organizers and the personnel of a small District Committee to take charge of party work under underground conditions. The reserve District Committee must be small — three to five members — and composed of reliable undercover members. There is no "inner-party democracy" in their selection. Important party functionaries are neither consulted nor informed unless they are designated to some post in the underground.

Some examples from my own experience will illustrate the type of individual likely to be found as a reserve district organizer. (The country is divided into some 26 districts of one or more states.) During the period of 1935-37, the reserve organizer for the North and South Carolina district was a well-known professor at the University of North Carolina. His party name, issued on his membership book and all records, was "Spartacus." During 1940-41, the reserve district organizer for Tennessee was a white professor at Fisk, the Negro university in Nashville. In 1939, the reserve district organizer of the Alabama-Mississippi-Georgia district was the editor of a rural weekly newspaper. Another member assigned to the reserve committee was a Methodist minister. Incidentally, this minister was an official of the Farmers' Union. Such underground leaders are ready to take control at any time that the present officials are placed in custody as agents of an enemy country.

The lowest and the basic unit in the underground plan is the *group* of three to five members. Years ago, this "group system" was introduced under directions handed down by Peters. Branches of 20 members, for example, were divided into four groups of five members each, with a *captain* in each group. In some parts of the country, actual division into groups took place and the captains were appointed. Elsewhere the plan remained in blueprint form, ready for application in case of necessity. Confidential reports I have from Los Angeles and other cities indicate that the Communist Party has already broken up its previously large clubs or branches of 15 to 25 or more members and is now operating through units of three to five.

The general plan is not rigid, and the organizational set-up in specific localities is often shaped to meet special conditions. A good example was the "special section" in Alameda County, California, in 1941-42. It contained one branch of government officials and employees — federal, state, county and municipal. A second branch was composed of attorneys, doctors, and other professionals. A third was made up of employees of the Shell

development project, then doing important research connected with the atomic bomb. A fourth consisted of professors at the University of California. The fifth and most important part of this super-secret section was a unit of employees at the radiation laboratory, who were working on the atomic bomb.

Each member of the "special section" of about 60 belonged to the party under an assumed name. Even the county organizer did not know the true names of these members, who never attended membership meetings or took part in any open Communist activities. Such sections will require little organizational change when the party goes underground.

Already the party has discontinued membership books and is taking other steps for transition to illegal existence. There are to be no dues stamps or records with real names.

Remembering the Palmer raids, Communist leaders anticipate the possibility of government action to round up party officials. They expect the majority of prominent Communists to be picked up, but they would like to protect key leaders, especially district organizers. Since 1935 district organizers, and in some cases county organizers, have been under orders to have a reserve hide-out, preferably the farm of a reliable undercover member. In Tennessee, in 1940, a farm five or six miles from Nashville was selected for this purpose.

I have reason to believe that the Communist Party plans to operate from headquarters in Mexico if the FBI and other agencies make this country too dangerous for operation. During 1940, the party expected to be "outlawed" at any time because of its efforts to block all aid to Great Britain and other countries fighting Hitler. I was one of the district organizers authorized and directed to reach Mexico, if possible, in case the government took steps to suppress the party. Incidentally, Communist leaders have always thought the government gave them far more attention than it did; they have a persecution complex and are inclined to be jittery.

Confidential mail channels and codes for communications have existed in the party from its earliest period. District organizers provide the national office with confidential addresses, often those of business houses and sometimes of sympathizers rather than actual dues-paying members. One address I used at Charlotte, N. C. was that of a Negro undertaker. The national office also supplies district organizers with confidential addresses in New York. These addresses are changed at frequent intervals. The party now discourages correspondence by mail, even through such channels. Couriers are being used to an increasing extent.

Party codes have been employed extensively, usually based on a book-code system. Codes are used for communications between Moscow and the party leaders in this country, and also between American Communist officials and parties in other countries. A mechanical code based on movable disks around a long cylinder is sometimes used by Soviet agencies and was recommended to me by Red Army general-staff officials when I was national director of Communist work in the armed forces of the United States.

In considering the strength of the Communist underground and its ability to defy federal legislation and op-

erate even during war, we must remember that it is a part of the greatest international conspiracy in world history. It is backed by the resources of the Soviet Government and is supervised by the foreign division of the MVD. It is the nerve center of Stalin's fifth column within our borders.

The Soviet secret police operate both within and outside the ranks of the Communist Party. Sometimes an important party official ceases all public Communist activities. He may attend Central Committee meetings and conventions, but quietly takes a back seat and does not speak or take part in discussions. Two examples were Nicholas Dozenberg and Juliet Stuart Poyntz. Dozenberg, once national organizational secretary of the party, became a part of the OGPU machine about 1928 and for many years played a vital role in it, traveling throughout the world as a trusted agent of Stalin's secret service. On one occasion Dozenberg introduced me to a Russian who was then the head of the OGPU in the United States. Juliet Stuart Poyntz, a member of the Central Committee and formerly national secretary of the International Labor Defense, dropped out of all public activities to become an agent of the OGPU. She disappeared in the summer of 1937, presumably kidnapped and murdered because she had decided to break with the movement.

Not all party leaders who become part of the Soviet secret police drop out of leading positions. It was general knowledge in CP inner circles that Charles Krumbein, New York district chairman, Charles Dirba of the Central Control Commission, Jacob Golos, and J. Peters were part of the "apparatus," as the Soviet secret police is generally known among national Communist officials. Through them Moscow is able to maintain a constant check on the loyalty of all American party leaders and guarantee their absolute subservience to Stalin.

The Communist movement has a relatively large reserve force of important Moscow-trained leaders. Some are in the United States, carefully avoiding public identification as Communists. Others presumably are in the Soviet Union, ready to return to the United States when their presence here shall be important to Stalin.

Probably the most important American Communist leader in the eyes of the Kremlin is Rudy Baker. Most party members, as well as the public, have never heard of him. Baker, formerly Michigan district organizer, was sent to the Lenin School in Moscow about 1930. There he came under the personal attention of Stalin and other members of the Politburo. Since his graduation from the Lenin School, Baker has worked quietly on important assignments. A few years ago he was in the United States as the representative of the Communist International, but he is now believed to be back in Moscow.

The most notorious American agent of the Soviet secret police is George Mink, once a Philadelphia taxi driver. Mink is a relative of a high Soviet official, Solomon Losovsky, who was responsible for his early spectacular rise to power both in the OGPU and the Communist International's maritime section. He traveled with me to the Soviet Union in 1927, and in Moscow I saw his OGPU credentials. For many years Mink has been well known as a specialist in murders of former Communists who have broken with the movement. His presence on the West Coast in March 1950 was reported by *Counterattack*.

Although personnel is the chief consideration in the Communist underground, those in charge of this field have given considerable attention to printing presses, mimeograph machines, and supplies for turning out propaganda literature. Peters instructed all district organizers to investigate the possibility of buying small print shops and weekly newspapers in rural communities — in the names of reliable party members not publicly identified as Communists. In North Carolina the party financed the purchase of a printing plant, in the names of two undercover members, and located it at Chapel Hill, where it was operated as a commercial shop. Most of the funds for its purchase were supplied by the Central Committee, on the recommendations of Peters and V. J. Jerome.

Many mimeograph machines have been stored in private homes, with large reserves of paper, ink, and stencils. During a period of only six weeks in May and June, 1941, the Communist Party in Alameda County, California, spent several hundred dollars for purchase of such reserve supplies. In addition, the party leaders designed a small hand mimeograph that can be carried in a brief case. These were manufactured at a cost of less than \$5 each, and hundreds were distributed throughout the party. Organizers have been instructed in methods of making gelatine duplicators when other means for leaflet production are not available.

Last but not least, the Communists have been building financial reserves for more than fifteen years for use when they go underground. The underground reserve of the party in Alameda County in 1941 was about \$2000. Such funds are held by trusted party members in their personal bank accounts or safe-deposit boxes. The reserve funds are decentralized as far as possible to prevent large sums from falling into the hands of the government.

In spite of the carefully prepared, elaborate underground structure, with a reserve Central Committee and possibly a second and even third line of top leadership, and with plans for use of couriers, the party anticipates periods during which communication between local groups and higher committees will be broken. Under such conditions the groups will act on their own initiative. In the California school on underground work the importance of individual initiative and independent action by the groups, based on political analysis of any given situation, was emphasized. Peters also instructed district organizers to place great emphasis on this point in their directives to functionaries assigned to this secret work. The significance of this should be as obvious as it is ominous.

In the event of armed conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, the party's main task will be to cripple and weaken the American war potential. Communists will turn out propaganda leaflets and stickers, of course. But far more important and dangerous will be specific acts of military and economic sabotage. Communist leaders have always known that definite means and objectives in this field can be determined only when the time arrives. Using but one yardstick — the interest of the Soviet Union and Soviet victory over this country — the group will determine what its members shall do.

If the present party membership of 50,000 is divided into groups of an average of five, this means 10,000 units in the country, each a center for espionage and every conceivable form of sabotage. We may reasonably as-

sume that nine-tenths of them will be put out of operation by the vigilance of our intelligence agencies. But if even a thousand avoid detection and operate during war, they will be a real danger to the nation.

What is the Achilles heel of the apparatus?

The apparently strong underground structure has one basic weakness: the growing disillusionment of many Communists and the ever-increasing number of former party members. There are approximately 50,000 party members in the United States at present. At a conservative estimate, there are more than 200,000 people in the United States who *once* belonged to the Communist Party. A few left for personal reasons, but the majority became bitterly disillusioned and quit the party because of their opposition to its methods and objectives. Most of

them today are loyal citizens who, because of their personal knowledge and experience, are among the strongest opponents of the Soviet dictatorship and its American stooges.

Collectively these ex-Communists could identify practically all party units in the country and most of the reserve officials and personnel in the underground apparatus. Not all of those still in the party are completely loyal to Stalin. Some now hesitate at the final step of becoming traitors to their country in time of war.

The Communist underground *has an Achilles heel*. It is to be found in the tens of thousands of *ex-Communists* who, if called upon to do so, can render invaluable service to our country and to the cause of freedom at this critical moment in history.

MANPOWER OF FREE CHINA

By GERALDINE FITCH

WHATEVER the past blunders of China, and whatever the past sins of America against China, the naked truth today is that our one hope of curbing the Chinese Communists is to avail ourselves of all the help Free China can give us. For today Free China is our only potential source of ample manpower.

The help available there divides itself into two parts: the troops on Formosa, and the Nationalist guerrillas on the mainland. Had we supplied those guerrillas, the Chinese Communist armies could never have been thrown in such numbers into Korea.

When on June 27 the United Nations called on all member states "to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary . . .," Chiang Kai-shek offered 33,000 troops on behalf of National China, charter member of the UN. Apart from our own troops, that is more than the combined forces supplied by other UN members. The offer was rejected for the ostensible reason that acceptance might incite Red China to intervene on the side of the North Koreans. And so far as I know, Generalissimo Chiang was not even thanked.

After the fiction of Communist "volunteers" had been dispelled, and Communist General Lin Piao's armies had been identified, the Generalissimo repeated his offer. To date it has not been accepted. Those 33,000 men would be a big help to our battle-weary GIs and to the forces of the Korean Republic. Moreover, Chiang's aid could be expanded, probably up to a quarter of a million men or more.

Last May I was one of a group of 25 news correspondents, radio commentators and photographers who visited Formosa. Our party saw a new Nationalist Army; the oft-defeated and formerly dejected forces had been reorganized, retrained and revitalized. This near-miracle is largely the work of General Sun Li-jen of Virginia Military Institute, who put the infantry through a complete course of indoctrination along with their military training, and has given the army new blood by recruiting soldiers from among the sturdy Formosans.

Though for security reasons we were not told the exact

size of the new National Army, we had data on which to base our estimate of about 500,000 on Formosa itself. While we were there the troops were evacuated from Hainan. At Kao-hsiung, where the ships were coming in, we saw trainloads of soldiers, worn and thin but in high spirits, leaving for dispersal points. We visited emergency hospitals for the wounded and the sick (many with malaria); we talked with the soldiers, both on the pier and in hospitals.

Young officers were still sure that in time they could have won. Reports had been circulated abroad that Hainan was given up without a struggle. It was not true, they said. The decision on top levels two months earlier had been to evacuate troops and equipment if the Communists ever succeeded in landing large numbers. Eleven assaults had been repulsed. Then, under cover of darkness, many of Mao's soldiers were put ashore, and soon reinforced by Communist guerrillas infesting the hills. Great piles of equipment neatly stacked on the pier were evidence of an orderly withdrawal. No officer and no unit had defected. Only the dead were left behind, and a unit of Nationalist guerrillas whose business it would be to harass the Communists sufficiently to keep Hainan's iron ore from moving.

On Hainan the troops had acquitted themselves well. On Tan Po and Quemoy islands they tasted victory. Today there are seasoned troops as a hard core for the army on Formosa.

Soon after our press party returned to the States, Nationalist troops and supplies were evacuated from the Chu-san Islands. This strategic move with no leak to the enemy was rightly regarded as a victory by the Generalissimo. Concentrating all available troops and equipment on Formosa was necessary because a midsummer invasion was expected, and without military aid from the U. S. the Nationalists could not possibly defend all the outlying islands.

While on Formosa we visited the air force training center. The Chinese Air Force (CAF) had moved from Chengtu, West China, a year and a half before, to a former Japanese base on Formosa — bombed into a

rubble heap and without roads, light or water. Now it was occupied by the Signal Corps School, Communications and Mechanics Training Institutes, and the Flying School; and new offices, classrooms, laboratories, library, barracks, mess halls, athletic fields and a swimming-pool had been built — a miracle of achievement. We talked with fine officers who had flown fifty or a hundred missions against the Japanese. Many of them wore the wings of the Chinese-American Composite Wing as well as those of the CAF. Some had been with General Chennault in the Fourteenth Air Force. Others had taken their advanced training in Texas or Oklahoma. One, who had flown 160 combat missions and wore the American DFC, was said by his colleagues to have 21 service bars which he was too modest to wear all at one time.

Prevented by fog from flying to the tank corps base, we were briefed on the mechanized troops. We learned that a long-deferred shipment of tanks, purchased under the \$125,000,000 military appropriation of Congress (1948) had recently arrived. Surplus tanks, "demilitarized for combat use" at the end of the war, had been imported from Hawaii and "cannibalized" or welded together again. We inspected an arsenal where captured Japanese rifles were being re-bored to use standard Chinese ammunition, and where excellent sub-machine guns were coming off the assembly line.

The Chinese Navy, greatly handicapped by want of spare parts and three-inch shells, had given a good account of itself in the effective blockade of the mainland. It was training technicians, midshipmen and officers, and repairing its few war vessels. Before the fall of Nanking, the navy was credited with destroying or seriously damaging 3,531 Communist motor-powered and sailing junks, and capturing 325 others. Following the Nationalist withdrawal from Shanghai, the navy held the advanced bases on Tan Po, Quemoy (Kinmen) and the Chusan Islands, and patrolled the coast. Acknowledged by some to be 97 per cent effective, the blockade brought forth loud protests from British shipping companies and the American Isbrandtsen Line, which were blockade-running for trade with Red China. Last year the Chinese Navy stopped 32 foreign ships and persuaded them to turn back, forcibly turned back eight others, and captured 53 Communist craft.

On Formosa is the largest trained anti-Communist force in Asia. From what we saw with our own eyes plus reliable reports of the Chusan withdrawal soon thereafter, some 700,000 effective Nationalist ground troops are there, in addition to the air force, navy and tank corps. Equipment is needed — more ammunition, spare parts, radar, new planes and ships. But a UN military mission would find that the aid needed would not include a single American GI.

What is the potential strength of Nationalist guerrillas on the mainland? There are anti-Communist* underground forces in every corner of continental China, some operating in small groups which hit and run, while others number tens of thousands. They probably total at least a million and a half — a rough average between what the Communists concede and the exaggerated reports of the over-optimistic. At least a million can be located. Moreover, since large numbers of Nationalist soldiers

joined the Communist armies when Chiang was pressured by the Marshall Mission into demobilizing more than a million of his troops, most of them could be won back. The division of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army which was reported to have rebelled and joined the guerrillas may have been part of those demobilized units.

Among the guerrillas are large numbers operating under the Ministry of Defense, i.e., maintaining direct contact with Formosa. There are other groups, actively anti-Communist, but not necessarily pro-Nationalist. An able American who has made a voluntary, non-military, non-official, survey of guerrilla potential says there are 200 "splinter" groups having their representatives in Hongkong and hoping to get aid somewhere, somehow. Vice President Li Tsung-jen has lost his guerrilla following because of his failure to return from the United States. General Chang Fa-kwei, known as "Old Ironsides," has a considerable following, but no Third Force can command anything like the strength of the forces still loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Reliable reports indicate that the Nationalists in general, and Chiang in particular, are daily growing in favor on the mainland and their return is fervently desired.

The greatest concentrated guerrilla strength and the area most favorable for the initiation of an organized counter-revolution is in South China, Fukien, Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces. This is partly because the Communist advance in China began to snowball after the disintegration of the Nationalist front on the Yangtze. Political commissars had less time to indoctrinate the people and, as they advanced to the southern provinces, they found a more militant resistance. The Canton area is traditionally the seat of Chinese revolution; its merchants, at home and overseas, are among the world's best. Canton was one place the Chinese Communists had to garrison, not just "organize." When Lin Piao's armies moved north from South China and eventually into the Korean War, this area was left poorly defended.

Translated from the Chinese, the names of anti-Communist guerrilla forces are cumbersome — the People's Anti-Communist Self-Protection Army, the Southwest People's National Salvation Army, the Southern Fukien Mobile Column. To give an example of guerrilla organization, that of Fukien province is divided into four areas. Ten counties in the southern section alone have an aggregate of 60,000 men. In northern Fukien the first guerrilla leader to raise an anti-Communist flag rallied 1000 picked men. Another has his headquarters in the hills 15 miles from Foochow, the provincial capital, and from time to time raids the city. An old guerrilla leader operates from Matsu Island in the mouth of the Min River (still in Nationalist hands), sending his men on frequent raids inland.

Many of the units of South China are composed of peasants; others are led by college graduates and rally more of the educated youth. A former Nationalist garrison commander of Canton, now called "the General with the Black Flag," has 50,000 guerrillas in the western hills of Kwangtung, and is well known among Chinese overseas, who would gladly support him with arms and ammunition if U. S. permission to purchase and export were granted.

Out in Yunnan province three brothers direct 100,000 guerrillas. In Anhwei province, from whose mountain

fastnesses the Communists back in the early thirties harassed Chiang Kai-shek with armed rebellion before their defeat and long march to Yenan, the tables are now turned. Nationalist units today work throughout the hundreds of miles of mountainous country, assailing the occupying Reds. In Szechuan province — known to Americans as West China — the People's Liberation Army, the Anti-Communist Salvation Army, the People's Revolutionary Army and similar groups, number 400,000 guerrillas. Manchuria has a smaller force known as the Anti-Communist Iron-footed Army (cavalry) actively operating against the entrenched Reds. In the desert area of Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan provinces with their grassy plains, two Mongolian princes are in revolt. Chinghai province is almost wholly Mohammedan, and the Mohammedans are revolting against Red domination. In every province resistance groups and their leaders can be named, and their availability for an organized resistance movement is assured.

The Communist generals and the Peiping radio admit (by understating their troubles or overstating the number of guerrillas they have liquidated) that resistance is growing. General Peng Teh-huai recently conceded that "thousands of guerrillas are operating in the area of Sining (capital of Chinghai) and the mountain areas of Kansu and Ninghsia." In recent dispatches to the *New York Times* Henry Lieberman quotes official Communist papers as declaring that "the Korean war has stimulated resistance activity in East China" and calling upon all security bodies "to rid themselves of complacency and crack down harder on 'bandits,' 'saboteurs' and 'special agents,'" which in our vocabulary means "guerrillas."

Does this mean that all the Chinese mainland is about to rise and throw off the incubus of Communist control? Not at all. From all available information, that is not yet possible. But there are islands of resistance in every part of China, some large, some small; some armed, some serving as unarmed operators skilled in sabotage. This is the potential, awaiting direction from Formosa, or supplies by airlift, or commando raids along the coast, now prevented by our Seventh Fleet. But to encourage a simultaneous uprising of all guerrilla units without giving it aid and direction would mean only temporary resistance, after which — with the best leaders liquidated, and terrible reprisals on guerrilla families — the resistance movement would be broken, Communist control would be consolidated, and hope would die in millions of disillusioned people.

On the other hand, once the UN or the United States alone decided to use the Free Chinese to fight Red China, a Chinese-American composite group similar to our wartime OSS could unify, organize and supply this resistance and through it could make Communist China blow up in Stalin's face. It would not be necessary to send American ground troops either to Formosa or to the Chinese mainland. In Red China is the manpower that our mistaken foreign policy allowed to be organized against us. On Formosa, and in the mainland resistance movement, is the manpower still available to the free world. We can save that world by recognizing our past mistakes, and by combining our military and industrial might with the manpower of anti-Communist China.

"HE WAS A MAN—"

By CHARLES YALE HARRISON

WE ARE adjured, and quite properly, to say nothing but good of the dead. This is an injunction, however, with which compliance is sometimes difficult. But in speaking of Benjamin Stolberg it is, I think, particularly easy, since there was so much that was not only good but distinctive and superb in his life.

There was, for instance, his wholehearted and unalterable devotion to the cause of human freedom in the face of the threat of totalitarian slavery. There was, too, his brilliant intuition, his keen insight, his sensitive awareness, his incisive and sometimes deadly wit, his engaging humor, and his unmistakable, distinguished prose style.

William Hazlitt once remarked that the love of liberty was the love of others and that the love of power was the love of ourselves. If this is true, as indeed it is, then Ben Stolberg's love of others was boundless.

He was among the first of us to recognize, with amazing clarity, the threat to our free institutions inherent in communism. And for this foresight he paid a heavy price. For years he was relentlessly maligned, traduced, and vilified by the agents of Stalin's fifth column both here and abroad. He was boycotted, blacklisted, and frequently denied the opportunity freely to express himself while, at the same time, Communists and fellow-travelers were appointed to high public office and were courted and touted by too many publishing houses, broadcasting companies, and influential magazines. There was no honor in his country, except among a relatively small group, for this prophet who had foretold with clairvoyant accuracy the enormous dangers with which we are now confronted. As a result, for several years he lived in a kind of courageous, genteel poverty, borne with fortitude and a graceful indifference which was sometimes heart-breaking to behold. But always, even to the end, the very end, there was his saving grace of humor. Somehow he managed to be gay and witty; to laugh in circumstances that would have reduced lesser men to despair.

Who of us will ever forget that laugh of his? It started, as many of us now ruefully remember, as a low chuckle coming deep from within, from his heart, as all true laughter should, and finally broke into open, delighted, infectious, boyish hilarity.

And, of course, there was Ben's extraordinary capacity for living. He loved people, ideas and the clash of honest opinion. But above all he loved conversation, and he was a virtuoso at it. He had been almost everywhere and had known almost everyone worth knowing. He chose his friends and his enemies with a fine discrimination, and he had an enviable collection of both. In short, he lived fully, richly, and with completeness.

Perhaps you may recall a character known as Father Latour in Willa Cather's "Death Comes for the Archbishop." In conversation with a younger man the good father smiled slowly and said: "I shall not die of a cold, my son, I shall die of having lived." And of Ben Stolberg it may be truly said that he died of having lived.

Now he is lost to us. And the tears we shed for him are not the tears of altruism. We weep for ourselves. We weep because we have all been irreparably impoverished by his tragic death.

FROM OUR READERS

Mr. Wallace Replies

The article entitled "The Red Mole" by Robert Cruise McManus, in the *Freeman* of October 16, 1950, has been used by different people to smear my record as Secretary of Agriculture. I therefore ask that in simple justice you publish the following facts:

1. Hal Ware, the man who built up the Communist cell in the USDA, was employed by the Coolidge-Hoover Secretaries of Agriculture, not by me. I never heard of him or knew him while I was Secretary of Agriculture.

2. Wadleigh was brought into the USDA by Hoover's Secretary of Agriculture. I never heard of him or knew him while I was Secretary of Agriculture.

3. Morton Kent was employed for four months in the Rural Resettlement Administration at the time of the transfer to the USDA in 1937. He left in the spring of 1937 apparently because of economies which I insisted upon when Rural Resettlement was brought into the USDA. I never heard of him or knew him while I was Secretary of Agriculture.

4. William Ullman was employed by the Rural Resettlement Administration when it was outside of the USDA in 1935. I never heard of or knew him while I was Secretary of Agriculture.

5. Nathan Gregory Silvermaster was employed by the Rural Resettlement Administration when it was outside of the USDA in 1935. I never heard of or knew him while I was Secretary of Agriculture.

6. John Abt was brought into the USDA by Jerome Frank in 1933. He had been a member of the same legal firm as Frank from 1927 to 1930. He left in 1935 in the manner described by McManus. I never heard of or knew him while I was Secretary of Agriculture.

7. Nathan Witt was brought into the USDA by Charles J. Brand at the recommendation of Jerome Frank in August of 1933. He left in July of 1934. I never knew of him or heard of him while I was Secretary of Agriculture.

8. Charles Kramer was brought into the USDA by Fred Howe, the Consumers' Counsel of the AAA in December of 1933. He left in the manner described by McManus in 1935. I never heard of or knew him while I was Secretary of Agriculture.

9. Alger Hiss was employed by Jerome Frank in May of 1933 with high recommendation from Prof. Felix Frankfurter. He left not directly but indirectly as a result of the purge in 1935 in the manner described by McManus. As of January 12, 1951, Chester Davis writes to me:

Alger Hiss didn't act or sound like a Communist around me in 1935 . . .

11. I never employed Lauchlin Currie. He was brought into Economic Warfare by Leo Crowley after I left.

12. Lee Pressman was hired by Jerome Frank in 1933 and left in 1935 as a result of the "purge."

At the time of the "purge" described by McManus I wrote in my notes of February 4, 1935:

While I am no lawyer, I am convinced that from a legal point of view, they had nothing to stand on and that they allowed their social preconceptions to lead them into something which was not only indefensible from a

practical agricultural point of view but also bad law. In talking with Chester by himself I discovered that the whole situation had reached the breaking point in his mind and that he would have to have a definite showdown with Alger Hiss and Jerome Frank.

The word "they" in the above paragraph refers specifically to Jerome Frank, Alger Hiss and Lee Pressman. . . .

Most of the men whose names are listed I never met or heard of while I was in Washington. The two exceptions are Hiss and Pressman. Jerome Frank brought them in to see me several times on purely legal matters. Frank, I knew socially but not Hiss or Pressman or any of the others.

Whatever the *Freeman* may think of my efforts to serve peace after leaving Government, it must admit that the record does not admit the outrageous charge that as Secretary of Agriculture, Vice President and head of the Board of Economic Warfare I was surrounded by Communists and espionage agents. So to say is a reflection on the Administration of which I was proud to be a part.

In any Department with 80,000 employees there are many kinds of people. To say that a certain group of these people of whom the Secretary never even heard "surrounded" him is sheerest nonsense.

The information I have here presented has been compiled since reading the *Freeman* of October 16. It would have been submitted earlier but it took some time to get the information together. In the name of justice to your readers, myself and the Government which I served I ask you to print this reply.

South Salem, New York

HENRY A. WALLACE

We have published Mr. Wallace's letter as written, with two exceptions: 1) Mr. Wallace criticized an article which, he said, was prepared for the *Freeman* and submitted to him. Criticism of an article "prepared for" but not published by the *Freeman* is obviously irrelevant. 2) Mr. Wallace's point 10 discussed the political affiliations of two men of whom one was not named at all in Mr. McManus's article, and the other only in passing, as having promoted "Marxist policies."

THE EDITORS.

Sword of Damocles

Three Oklahoma war-whoops for "Why Stalin Needs Asia" (January 22). It is certainly the best thing you have ever printed. However, I must give you hell for publishing William A. Orton's piece (the *Freeman*, December 25).

Professor Orton buttresses his argument largely with an absolute falsehood — the dogmatic assertion that "problems of world adjustment have become social, and not ecological." This is doubly false, because authorities agree that our ecological crisis is a double-bladed sword of Damocles, which has been growing sharper and heavier for at least 100 years. One blade is the Malthusian crisis — a net world increase of 55,000 births a day, which will soon be 60,000. The other is the fact that humanity is quite literally destroying the earth at a constantly accelerating rate.

This two-ply ecological crisis which Mr. Orton denies is actually the chief — and almost the sole — cause of the socio-political crisis. Hence, he first denies the very ex-

istence of the true cause, then mislabels the effect as the cause and builds a false argument upon a totally false premise. Deprived of these false premises and false arguments, his piece loses all validity.
New York City

T. Q. MITCHELL

Garden Variety

Herewith a few reflections on Mr. John Chamberlain's attitude toward his garden which first of all I regard, with him, as an assistance to survival, rather than a show-piece, even though his self-conscious neighbors might object.

It is appropriate that the *Freeman's* garden editor should read and enjoy the various Adair books, and it is good that he is the proprietor of a small home garden. But it is dangerous for him to indicate to greenhorn gardeners that success and good eating are likely to come from the sloppy, lazy, no-weeding approach to the soil. Growing a garden with a minimum of effort is surely more satisfying than enduring the suspicion that each turnip has cost a dollar's worth of callouses and charley-horses. But your readers should be asked to ponder the idea that in gardening, laziness is an art.

About his weed-shaded tomatoes, his neighbors probably were growing varieties like Victory and Earliana, whose vines are shockingly nude of protecting leaves. Had they grown Marglobe, Bonny Best or John Baer, they wouldn't have needed weeds to shade the fruit — in fact, some *aficionados* in this section rip out leaves of these bushes to give the fruit a chance. If you want a good argument some time, open your columns to partisans of staking-and-pruning tomatoes *vs* those of us who plant them further apart and let them run.

Plainfield, Vermont

JOHN PIERCE

Eighteen — and Under?

The table below (*New York Herald Tribune*, January 21, 1951) compares the Administration's proposed military demands on American boys with our Atlantic Pact allies' present demands on their youth.

Country	Age	Length of Service	Place of Service
United States	18 yrs.	27 mos.	Anywhere in the world.
Belgium	20 yrs.	14 mos.	Belgian territory.
Denmark	21 yrs.	11 mos.	At home.
France	20 yrs.	12 mos.	French territory.
Holland (x)	20 yrs.	12 mos.	Dutch territory.
Iceland	No military service required.		
Italy (x)	21 yrs.	18 mos.	At home.
Luxemburg	18 yrs.	6 mos.	At home.
Norway	20 yrs.	9 to 12 mos.	At home.
Portugal	20 yrs.	18 mos.	At home.
United Kingdom	18½ yrs.	24 mos. (z)	British territory.

x — not at present operative
z — only under certain conditions

Should the UMT bill be enacted, the long-time adherents of peacetime conscription who make up the membership of "The Committee on the Present Danger" can shift their sights with confidence to the grammar school-preschool sector. When that is brought under control the problem of organizing the diaper brigades can be undertaken.

Brooklyn, New York

DANIEL M. KELLY

THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID

I welcome the support of Browder or anyone else who will help keep President Roosevelt in office and win the war and win the peace.

HARRY S. TRUMAN, as quoted by INS, October 17, 1944

I know you will not mind my being brutally frank when I tell you that I think I can personally handle Stalin better than either your Foreign Office or my State Department.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, letter to Churchill, March 1942

What has happened is that the British have accepted certain facts and gone along with them when they knew certain things were going to happen. Whereas we have known that our people were not mature enough, either in the Congress or throughout the country, to understand if we took similar action as the British. Nor do we have special interests involved, which at all times makes the British position different from ours.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, on British recognition of Red China, January 27, 1951

I do not know whether Mr. Churchill invoked the President's aid. Everyone in this Chamber knows that Mr. Roosevelt could not send a soldier, he could not send a dollar of military supplies to Mr. Churchill or his government or any other government until the Congress of the United States authorized such action.

SENATOR TOM CONNALLY, June 19, 1944

To betray a weak and backward people who trusted us is to affront the good name of this country, and to encourage violence and allow an aggressor a profit by wrongdoing destroys the whole foundation of the collective security of the League of Nations itself. It puts a premium on lawlessness.

CLEMENT ATTLEE, December 19, 1935, during the House of Commons debate on Ethiopia

I intended to say to Francis Biddle [Chairman of Americans for Democratic Action] that he, and others like him, . . . should make it plain that what they are against is not communism so much as Russian expansionism.

O. JOHN ROGGE, the *New Leader*, January 29, 1951

The Russians do not want to fight us. They want to build up their own country and help themselves. If we had the sense of a jackass, we'd do the same.

HELEN GAHAGAN DOUGLAS, December 12, 1945

The *Freeman* invites contributions to this column, and will pay \$2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged.

THE EDITORS



DARKNESS AT NOON

By RICHARD MCLAUGHLIN



THE REVIEWS of Sidney Kingsley's dramatization of Arthur Koestler's famous novel, "Darkness at Noon" (Alvin Theater), were mostly favorable. But I was astonished to find some of them praising Kingsley for having written a stinging piece of propaganda. This kind of snap judgment suggests that the reviewers could use a few lessons in semantics. For that matter, maybe we all could, seeing that we get ensnared so easily in tired similes and loose generalizations that confuse us and therefore must doubly confound our readers.

The word propaganda has taken on a special connotation in these days of high-pressure politics. Any school child, if called on to define the term, would answer that it has something to do with presenting lies in the guise of truth. Thus Mr. Kingsley is being wrongly complimented when his critics praise him for propagandizing. They would have been more nearly accurate had they pointed out what a superbly thrilling drama he has made from the ideological conflict implicit in the novel. What most people, even Kingsley's most enthusiastic fans, seem to overlook is that he, like Koestler, is dramatizing historical facts. The Kremlin's mock trials in the thirties *did* occur, as we all know. But foolhardy optimists in this country did not commence to rearrange their rosy views of the USSR until much later — not until the Soviets had begun to menace our postwar reconstruction plans in Europe and Asia and were practically on our own doorstep.

When Macmillan published "Darkness at Noon" in 1941 — a novel which appealed more to the mind than to the emotions — our intelligentsia still had a lot to learn before they could treat its revelations as anything more than brilliant propaganda. Fortunately, today there are increasing numbers who regret their infantile political reasoning of the past. They have learned to recognize in plays like "Darkness at Noon" shades of their own careless interpretation of recent history. Nevertheless, as the result of our congenital optimism (or maybe it is a human but dangerous quirk in the Western mind), there continues to be a group in the United States who think we are merely suffering from a bad case of dialectic jitters, and that our growing antipathy toward Stalin's geopolitical aggression is a sign of hysteria. Such people, and all those who passed over Koestler's novel, certainly need to see the totalitarian mind at work as it is exposed by Mr. Kingsley's keen scalpel.

Kingsley has performed a remarkably skillful surgical operation on the brain of communism. In the broad terms of the theater he lays bare the intricate torture chamber of the mind of a man who all his life has fanatically pursued the Communist party line. In the end, of course, the man, Rubashov, discovers that the party is an idiotic myth. He spends his last hours tormented by his own heinous record of inhumanities against his fellow human beings. Perhaps the only light thrown on the

darkness may be found in Rubashov's realization that communism has no martyrs, and that there is a kind of last-minute reprieve granted those who die knowing that they are only deluded idealists or opportunists guilty of illogical practices. "The means have become the ends," bleakly observes Rubashov as he goes to his execution.

If Koestler's powerful novel was a nightmarish confirmation of our worst fears of communism, then Kingsley's adaptation is considerably more so for arriving a decade later. In exploring the psychology of a loyal Communist the play gives us cause to wish — that is, if a choice were at all possible — that we were dealing with the Old Bolsheviks instead of their present-day robot successors. Mr. Kingsley's robots are so terrifyingly real that, thanks to Claude Rains's masterfully persuasive acting in the star role, an Old Bolshevik like Rubashov appears to be no more than a sympathetic dupe in a political fraud.

The drama opens with the arrest of the former People's Commissar, Rubashov, who now finds himself a victim of his own unreasoning tactics. The novel employed endless flashbacks, and Mr. Kingsley has followed suit by wisely commissioning Frederick Fox to build a set that permits easy functional access to the past. By making use of Fox's device the prisoner can sit in his cell or walk across the stage into something that happened a long time back. The main attention is focused on Rubashov's struggle with his two inquisitors, who are trying to prove that he has plotted against the state.

Alexander Scourby is forceful and intelligent as Ivanov, the cynical prison commandant who is of Rubashov's own generation of revolutionaries and wishes him to confess and go free. Walter J. Palance as Gletkin, the sadistic fanatic who represents the terrorist dictatorship of the future, looks as menacing as he sounds. The others, Luba (Kim Hunter), the secretary whom Rubashov loved but not enough to save her from torture and death; Luigi (Will Kuluva), a tough but poignantly rebellious Italian worker; and Philip Coolidge as the Tsarist inmate 402, stand out in a large, well-chosen supporting cast.


The sun is still high in our skies, but no one who sees "Darkness at Noon" can possibly avoid holding his breath when he tries to picture what the political follies of 1951 might bring us in, say, 1953. This gripping melodrama of twentieth-century power politics serves as a fierce reminder to us all what to expect from a despot whose tyrannical rule is haunted by those grimly prophetic whisperings from Machiavelli's "Discorsi":

He who establishes a dictatorship and does not kill Brutus, or he who founds a republic and does not kill the sons of Brutus, will reign only a short time.

DEATH VALLEY, 1951

What if we know the desert's of our making?
Does that slake thirst or wash the arid eyes,
Or turn the cactus-spines to nests of flowers?
What though the barren soil be flesh of ours?
Bare rocks our bones? This sand but blood that dries
And blows? The brazen sun our own heart breaking?
There's no less agony, and more of sin,
For those who know the drought is all within.

BEN RAY REDMAN



A REVIEWER'S NOTEBOOK

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

A nation begins to decline when it neglects its own classics. But no trend is necessarily permanent, and classics can come back. Take the case of William Graham Sumner's "What Social Classes Owe to Each Other," for example. Published originally in 1883, this little classic of individualism was long unavailable to the general reader. Some three years ago it was reprinted by Pamphleteers, Inc., of 1151 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California. According to my West Coast spies, it has been selling very well.

"What Social Classes Owe to Each Other" has had the strangest of histories. It was written at a time when the fallacies of Welfare State thinking were just beginning to take hold in America. A professor of economics at Yale in the early eighties, Sumner sensed the oncoming socialistic deluge when it was the merest trickle. He could hardly know in 1883 that Edward Bellamy was already meditating in Boston on the notions of the Utopian Socialists, and getting ready to write his "Looking Backward: 2000-1887," a book which does its best to suffuse the idea of the regimented slave state with a romantic glow. He could hardly have been aware that out in Chicago young Henry Demarest Lloyd was predicting (in the *Chicago Tribune*, of all places) that "the unnatural principles of the competitive economy of John Stuart Mill will be as obsolete as the rules of war by which Caesar slaughtered the fair-haired men, women and children of Germania." Nor could he have known that in Indiana Socialist Eugene V. Debs was taking his first flier in politics, as city clerk of Terre Haute. Yet Sumner felt in his bones that the world of his youth was about to shift on its axis. Faith in individualism was weakening; Sumner knew it from reading the accounts of speeches in the papers. The willingness of the Gilded Age plutocracy to accept government favors in the form of tariffs also impressed him as a sign of decadence; no free society, as he well knew, could be built on hypocrisy.

A profound student of veering social currents, Sumner set his face uncompromisingly against the rising Welfare State principles of the New Day. The record of history told him that the Welfare State inevitably becomes the Illfare State. In "What Social Classes Owe to Each Other" Sumner tried to underscore the lesson of history by bringing simple arithmetic to bear on the Welfarists' proposition. The state, as Sumner said, is All-of-Us organized to protect the rights of Each-of-Us. But when Some-of-Us try by political manipulation to live off Others-of-Us, rights necessarily go out the window. In Sumner's estimation the type and formula of most Welfare — or Illfare — State schemes come down to this: A and B put their heads together to decide what C shall be

made to do for D. The vice of such scheming is that C is never consulted in the matter; he is simply clubbed by the police power of the state into diverting a part of his earnings to someone he has never seen. C is very likely a most responsible citizen; he is generally the type of person who supports himself uncomplainingly, sees to it that his children are educated, and contributes to the voluntary charities of his neighborhood. If C has any surplus over what it takes to live and provide for his children and his locality, he generally saves it and invests it, thereby adding to the capital equipment by which the nation's standard of living is maintained and raised.

Sumner called C the Forgotten Man. The phrase was doubly prophetic, for by a most ironical sequel Franklin D. Roosevelt picked it up in the nineteen-thirties and applied it, not to Sumner's C, but to Sumner's D. This simple act of misappropriation, which made C more forgotten than ever, did much to get the Welfare State notions of the New Deal accepted by a troubled nation. Misapplied or not, there's nothing like a good phrase backed by a golden voice to win votes.

If the attempted rehabilitation of D at the expense of C really served to help D, there might be a case for taking a portion of the product of C's energy by state fiat. But it is written in the arithmetic books of the seventh grade that D is hurt, not helped, when A and B scheme to mulct C of the fruits of his toil. Now it can not be that Americans have actually forgotten their seventh-grade arithmetic; they have merely ceased to apply it to their thinking on social matters. Any child ought to be able to see that if C has, let us say, \$3000, it will buy just \$3000 worth of goods and no more. Let us say that A and B take \$1000 of C's money to spend on D. Some of the \$1000 must be used to support the sterile machinery of state collection, bookkeeping and redistribution. But after the politicians and their office-holding dependents have taken their cut of the \$1000, D gets some of the money. In the natural course of events he uses it — to consume. What is left to C of the original \$3000 also goes largely into consumption; there simply isn't enough left of the total to enable C to save anything out for investment. So under Welfare politics there is no addition out of the \$3000 to the capital stock of the nation. Thus, because of the schemings of A and B allegedly in behalf of D, the industrial system does not expand. The upshot of this is that D is prevented from getting a job. He remains at the mercy of A and B, who continue to take it out on C.

Since A and B are of the predatory type of do-gooder who insists on being unselfish with other people's money,

they are not likely to get around to taking a refresher course in seventh-grade arithmetic. But if D has any pride at all, he must some day begin to apply what he learned in the seventh grade to his own social plight. Does he want forever to remain a ward of A and B, getting a continually decreasing portion of consumer goods as the population grows and presses against the limits of a static industrial system? Wouldn't it be far better for him to throw in his lot with C in an effort to expand the capital plant and so create a productive niche for himself in society?

The reason why D has not been able to see that his welfare depends on making a common front with C is that A and B have learned to delude him with inflationary tricks. A and B are always pointing out that the "gross national product" is up by so many billions of dollars over the product of ten years ago. What they do not bother to tell D is that the value of the dollar has been debauched, and that it is no longer a good measuring stick for anything. It is true enough that the gross national product of the United States has continued to increase. Despite the scheming of A and B, the Forgotten Man has been able to squeeze out some money for investment even after he has paid most of his savings out to support D. But by all the logic of arithmetic the United States would be far richer today in capital equipment if Franklin Roosevelt had made the correct identification of William Graham Sumner's Forgotten Man. If C had been left unmolested there would be more butter for everybody — and more guns for our allies.

Sumner is usually thought of as a heartless logician, a basically uncharitable man. "What Social Classes Owe to Each Other" is, however, almost Biblical in its understanding of the "law of sympathy." At the very best, says Sumner, one of us fails in one way and another in another, "if we do not fail altogether." It will not do to condone failure abstractly, but if a man happens to be pinned to earth by a falling tree, it is scarcely appropriate to his immediate predicament to deliver him a lecture on carelessness. True, the man may have been careless; but a lecture won't get the tree off his leg. Amid the chances and perils of life, says Sumner, men owe to other men their aid and sympathy. But aid and sympathy must operate in the field of private and personal relationships under the regulation of reason and conscience. If men trust to the state to supply "reason and conscience," they so deaden themselves that the "law of sympathy" ceases to operate anywhere. Men who shrug off their personal obligations become hard and unfeeling, and it is small wonder then that they are entirely willing to go along with hard and unfeeling politics. It is when he decides to "let the state do it" that the humanitarian ends up by condoning the use of the guillotine for the "betterment" of man.

So far as I am aware, "What Social Classes Owe to Each Other" is not used as a text in any college in the country. If it is reprinted often enough, however, the time will come when it will make its way back to the campus. Students are curious even when they are deluded and misled, and when books are available, students will find their way to them.

THE THEATER OF YEATS

The Story of the Abbey Theatre, by Peter Kavanagh.
New York: Devin-Adair. \$4.50

It is a pity that Mr. Kavanagh has "kept his own opinions out of the story so that the evidence might speak for itself." Interesting and valuable as his work is for scholars of the theater, it lacks the magic of personality that makes a book exciting reading for everybody. Ireland is a mysterious, passionate country; one of the founders of the Abbey Theater, W. B. Yeats, was a great poet, a fine man of impetus, fire and constant youth; and a book about him and his theater should read like an entrancing novel. This book doesn't read that way.

Besides Yeats, two other outstanding characters were connected with the establishment of the renowned theater: the playwright Lady Gregory, and Mrs. A. E. Horniman, a pioneer in the British idealistic theater. The latter bought the Mechanics Institute Hall in Dublin, remodeled it and turned it over to Yeats in 1904 as the Abbey Theater rent free for six years. Since 1899 Yeats had been directing the Irish Literary Theater in the Irish capital. He had opened it as the home of "ancient idealism," of free experiment "without which no new movement in art can succeed." Yeats dreamed of making his theater the source of Celtic and Irish dramatic literature. Though, in his youth, a member of an anti-English patriotic secret society, Yeats was not a narrow-minded nationalist. His own works were shaped "under the casual impulses of dreams and daily thoughts"; at times a nationalistic moral was present in him but without being arbitrarily stressed. For Yeats, the theater was a form of pure artistic expression — not a forum of propaganda, as it was, let us say, for Ibsen or Shaw.

Like any other experimental theater in Europe, the Abbey had no money. Until its very end — which came with the death of the great poet in 1939 — the Abbey Theater was a pauper for thirty-five years. Empty auditoriums did not discourage Yeats. He firmly believed in his righteousness and in the eventual triumph of a poetic theater. Looking at the stalls, empty of the public that would not understand him, Yeats was even pleased. His dream was an intimate theater with "an audience like a secret society . . . an audience of 50," and with a company "of half a dozen young men and women who can dance and speak verse or play drum and flute and zither." Isn't it wonderfully invigorating to hear words like these from a man of 70 in our vulgar era, when even young people of the theater think of nothing beyond kudos and money?

In his book, Mr. Kavanagh describes the battles and misunderstandings between the founders; he talks about the critics who ridiculed the new policy and the plays and even abused Yeats himself by calling him arrogant and stupid; he gives us a picture of Mrs. Horniman's leaving the Abbey after dissensions with Lady Gregory and an idea of the public's attitude, of the theatergoers either staying away, or hissing the productions and even indulging in riots.

But the Abbey was not the only pioneering and experimental theater in Europe at the time. The critics were ridiculing and abusing every advanced theatrical enterprise whenever and wherever in the world such an

enterprise was functioning. The history of the stage is full of discouraging reactions of the press and of the public. Every man of the theater who has had the privilege of participating in some pioneering movement has actually felt the sting of these reactions on his own back.

The last years of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth represent the period when the theater was flourishing all over Europe. Strangely enough, two antagonistic tendencies — the realistic and the symbolic or formalistic — were manifesting themselves at the same time. Both were reactions against "ham acting," "ham productions," against the self-exhibitionism of selfish, ignorant actors, against the degenerate forms of the "romantic" and the so-called "domestic" drama of the preceding period.

The Abbey Theater was not an exception in the general artistic development of the European theater. W. B. Yeats was representing the symbolic, poetic movement, while Lady Gregory's plays and methods of production were realistic.

In his experiments, Yeats was influenced by the French and Belgian poet-symbolists — Verlaine, Maeterlinck, Van Lerberghe, Rachilde, Remy de Gourmont, Verhaeren and others; his methods of production were very similar to those of Paul Fort and Lugné Poe at their Parisian symbolic Arts Theater, which opened its doors to the public on November 18, 1890. Lady Gregory's inspiration came from the realistic experiments of the celebrated André Antoine, from Otto Brahm in Berlin, from the famous Burg Theater of Vienna, the Meininger Company, and the Moscow Art Theater. Like Paul Fort and his colleagues, Yeats thought that the theater was a place as sacred as the church, a place for the public to listen reverently to poets explaining their visions, while the spirit and the imagination reigned supreme. Considering the background of a production as an atmospheric accompaniment to the play, and no more, Yeats, like Paul Fort, made use at the Abbey of real artists (Gordon Craig, for instance) instead of hack decorators. Like the French Symbolists and, since 1906, the Russian modernists in the Vera Komisarjevsky Theater at St. Petersburg, Yeats subordinated the action to the words and lines of the play; he wanted poetry to be read musically; he advocated economy of movement: all gestures and movements of the actors had to be "nobler than those the eye sees"; they had to be rhythmical too; they had "to seem flowing up into imagination from some deeper life than that of the individual soul." In Yeats's productions no one was allowed to move on the stage while an actor spoke. Yeats even advocated the use of masks. As director, Yeats was a fiery, enthusiastic leader; he was ruthless and used what would nowadays be called "dictatorial" methods. In a letter to Lady Gregory he wrote, "I desire a mysterious art, doing its work by suggestion, not by direct statement, a complexity of rhythm, color, gesture, not space pervading like the intellect, but a memory and a prophecy."

Mr. Kavanagh ends his book by saying that the Abbey Theater died with Yeats. I think that the Abbey of Yeats began dying much sooner. Ireland's civil war produced a new generation of playwrights — O'Flaherty, O'Casey, O'Faolain, who were realists and had to be staged realistically, to the great distaste of Yeats. From

1931 to 1935 the Abbey company spent most of its time in America. Yeats did not go with it; and everybody knows that touring conditions hardly improve the quality of actors' work. In 1932 Lady Gregory died, and from 1935 onward Yeats, a sick man, had to spend whole winters on the Riviera until the day when the clock of eternity struck for him.

Cast a cold eye
On life, on death,
Horseman, pass by

says the epitaph that Yeats wrote for himself in the churchyard of Drumcliffe under Benbulbin. Beneath that stone lies the great Irish poet, and his poetic theater lies there with him.

THEODORE KOMISARJEVSKY

CHRISTOPHERS' CRUSADE

Careers That Change Your World.

One Moment Please! by James Keller, M.M. *New York: Doubleday. \$2.00 each*

The movements on the right are increasingly religious in character and expression. The Christophers, Moral Rearmament, Spiritual Mobilization, Alcoholics Anonymous, and many smaller groups, speak to millions of receptive men and women who seek a spiritual response to the personal challenges they encounter.

Each of these movements approaches the nature of man from the Christian standpoint of conversion, which has less to do with leaving one church to join another, than it has with changing personality, with rebuilding character, with recognizing faith in the supernatural as the essential mechanism for such change.

In a word, without a belief in God, nothing can be done to improve the nature of man.

Moral Rearmament and Spiritual Mobilization are essentially Protestant movements, although neither is limited in the memberships and associations to any faith. Moral Rearmament has accomplished more in Europe than in the United States, having placed itself on the firing line against Marxism in the very heart of Marxism in Europe. In its technique, public confession plays an enormous role, cleansing the spirit of the barnacles of untruth. Its leader, Dr. Frank N. D. Buchman, started his work among college students, but has spread out to the European proletariat. It is a movement which requires its activists to make sacrifices of their careers and lives in the effort to change themselves and other men and women.

Spiritual Mobilization is a movement within churches led by Dr. James W. Fifield, Jr. of Los Angeles. It is uncompromising in its acceptance and preaching of Christian moral doctrine, making of the church a living thing — not benches and altars and homiletics, but a pulsating response to the challenges of the life which men and women face today. Its followers are limited to the United States.

Alcoholics Anonymous is a movement to aid those whose lives have been corrupted by alcoholism, who not only join in a cooperative self-aid but who recognize that without a humble acknowledgment of God's aid, man can not help himself. It is perhaps the most sur-

prising social effort of our time because the individual who enters upon its course humbles his personality to elevate his spirit; confession, contrition, assistance to others in self-help, and faith in God are the means to the end of a restoration of human dignity.

The Christophers are not a mass movement. Rather each acknowledges the force of God in better living. Its founder is Father James Keller, a priest in the Maryknoll order of Roman Catholic missionaries. Altogether Father Keller has produced four books: "You Can Change the World," "Three Minutes a Day," "One Moment Please!" and "Careers That Change Your World."

Despite the religious affiliation of their leader, Christophers need not be Catholics nor even members of Christian churches. In his first book, "You Can Change the World," Father Keller said:

... an attempt was made to underline the fact that every individual, young or old, rich or poor, highly educated or untutored, in low position or high, can play an important part, however small, under God, in changing world trends for the better.

Moral Rearmament was not a response to the challenge of communism but moved in that direction after it had made a mark in other fields. The Christophers, on the contrary, were definitely organized to meet Marxian evangelism. As the Communists became career propagandists, Father Keller recruited Christophers for a life of career propaganda. He said:

... we stressed that one need not necessarily be brilliant, well-trained, or in a high position. No matter how limited a person's qualifications might be, he or she could still wield far-reaching influence for good as a Christ-bearer. As St. Paul so forcefully put it: "The foolish things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the wise; and the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the strong."

The battle that the Christophers fight is not to win members to a church, but rather to win over individuals to the cause of better living as designed by Christianity. It fights not only communism as a movement, but paganism as a way of life even among those who regard themselves as Christians.

"One Moment Please!" is an inspirational book, a volume that might be read a page a day, perhaps at breakfast, to give a pause for reflection and prayer. In this book, Father Keller does not stir his reader to anger or violence but offers the calm of the sacristy. It is a book of peace.

Religious and inspirational books are numerous, but few, in recent times, really do more than quench the thirst. Father Keller does more: he presents a cause; mobilizes the reader as a soldier in the cause; and provides a task which may be rejected but not without a thought and perhaps a twinge of conscience.

In the battle for the survival of Western civilization, particularly in our country, a religious revival is as essential as any bombs we may manufacture. For those who believe in nothing may become a prey to anything.

In such a revival of faith in God, the Christophers and Father Keller's books will play a telling role, for Father Keller does not merely stimulate an interest; he inspires a crusade.

GEORGE E. SOKOLSKY

THE GREAT HERETIC

Tito and Goliath, by Hamilton Fish Armstrong. New York: Macmillan. \$3.50

Josip Broz Tito, communist dictator of Yugoslavia and since 1948 an open rebel against Moscow, enjoys a rare and precarious distinction. He is the only successful Communist heretic. The list of such heretics is extremely long, probably longer than the list of sects which fell under the ban of the medieval Church. But the doubters of Stalin's infallible inspiration have been snuffed out by a police system that works far more ruthlessly and more efficiently than the crusaders who marched with fire and sword against the Albigensian heretics of southern France in the thirteenth century.

When Lenin died twenty-seven years ago power rested in the hands of a Politburo of seven members: Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky. Call the roll of these men, so mighty in Russia in 1924, and the response is one dictator and six obituary notices. Rykov and Bukharin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, perished in the great darkness at noon, the orgy of self-incrimination trials. Tomsky, who tried to preserve for the Soviet trade unions a faint semblance of independence, preferred suicide to the standard self-abasement of the trial. Trotsky, the greatest of the heretics, the Satan of Stalin's Paradise Lost, was struck down by a professional assassin in his Mexican retreat.

Along with these distinguished victims of Stalin's unholy inquisition there were countless unknown martyrs. Every well-known "old Bolshevik" condemned in the trials carried down to destruction hundreds of personal followers. There were Communist youth leaders who refused to spy on their comrades, party secretaries who were not ruthless enough in carrying out food requisitions.

It was not only in Russia that monolithic communism took a high toll of dissenters. Rajk in Hungary, Kostov in Bulgaria, Gomulka in Poland are examples of foreign Communists in high places who suffered death or political elimination as Soviet purge methods were extended to the satellite states.

Tito alone successfully defied Stalin, withdrew from his vast Eurasian empire (now far larger than Genghis Khan's), a country with a sizeable army and a strategic geographical location, and piled insult on injury by professing to be a better and more orthodox Communist than the master of the Kremlin. The first World War was touched off when a Bosnian student, impelled by South Slav nationalist fanaticism, assassinated the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. A third World War may find a starting point in the circumstance that a Croatian Communist invoked South Slav nationalism in throwing off the yoke of Moscow.

Hamilton Fish Armstrong, veteran editor of *Foreign Affairs* and a former military attaché in Yugoslavia after the first World War, tells the story of Tito's defection and analyzes the present position of the Yugoslav dictator. He includes a good deal of useful incidental material about developments in other Iron Curtain countries, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, Hungary. The author shows considerable familiarity with the bloody course of intrigue in the most backward, obscure and isolated of all the Soviet dependencies, Albania.

In contrast to some quicktripping journalistic writing on the subject, Mr. Armstrong's analysis is sound and thorough and well buttressed by a combination of personal observation and study of relevant books and newspapers. The style is sober and unsensational and perhaps suffers from undue restraint in dealing with the baseness and folly involved in the decisions of Teheran and Yalta, which amounted to a colossal betrayal of the friends of the West in Poland, Yugoslavia and other east European countries.

However, in spite of his restraint, the author is capable of terse, incisive judgments:

No Party member who is physically within the grasp of the MVD can say at a given moment what his life is worth, if anything.

Why has Tito succeeded, at least up to the present time, while so many heretics of communism have been subjected to summary moral and physical liquidation? Mr. Armstrong suggests part of the answer when he points to the decisive influence of geography in making possible for Tito a victory which was impossible for Gomulka, the Polish dissident Communist who sympathized with "Titoism." Poland is caught in a nutcracker vise between Soviet troops in Russia and Soviet troops in Germany, while contingents of the Red Army, officially called communications troops, are stationed on Polish territory.

There is no common frontier between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the Soviet troops which "liberated" Belgrade, Zagreb and other large towns had been withdrawn. Moreover — and this may well explain the rage of the Kremlin at Tito's defection — the Yugoslav Communist dictator had learned very well the technique of totalitarian rule.

He created in Yugoslavia an almost perfect miniature replica of Russia's infallible leader, tightly disciplined party, all-seeing and universally feared secret police, youths marching to appointed construction tasks with songs and fanfare (and no jobs or admittance to universities for youths who didn't march), collective farms and all the rest of it. It was as impossible to organize an anti-Tito movement among the Yugoslav Communists as it would have been to pass a resolution of censure, directed against Stalin, in some branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Armstrong has no illusions about the nature of Tito's dictatorship. He points out that collective farming, in Yugoslavia as in the Soviet Union, has been agony for the peasants and must be considered responsible for much of the food shortage in what is normally an agricultural country. Deportation and expulsion of capable German farmers is another cause of famine; a hasty program of forced industrialization is a third.

However, on strictly practical grounds, like those which could be advanced for support of the Spanish rightwing Tito, General Franco, the author believes that American policy should be directed to the support of Tito in the interest of European defense. Yugoslavia under present conditions is a cover for Italy and Greece, not a spearhead pointed against Italy and Greece, as it would be if Tito were replaced by a Moscow *Gauleiter*.

Tito, according to the author, has almost half a million men under arms, and about three-quarters of a million

trained reserves. The Tito army is deficient in air power and armor; it would probably take to guerrilla fighting in the hills if there were a major Soviet offensive. Still, the anti-Soviet defenses in Europe are so weak that every additional bit helps.

And even the inarticulate anti-Communist Yugoslavs probably prefer Tito to a ruler who would take his orders directly from Moscow. It is not easy to gauge public sentiment under any kind of dictatorship. But it would not be surprising if the joking reply of Charles II to his brother's warning of possible assassination would describe the attitude of many of Tito's subjects. Quipped the Merry Monarch:

"They'll never kill me, James, to make you King."

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

MONEY FOR THE MILLIONS

Credit For the Millions, by Richard Y. Giles

The Poor Man's Prayer, by George Boyle. New York: Harper. \$2.50 each

The credit union is often the precursor and sometimes the financier of other cooperative developments. It is the mother ship from which many a cooperative craft has been launched — to float or to founder.

To mark the 100th anniversary of its founding, the credit union movement has generated two books, both of which in quite different ways attest the vitality and worth of the struggle which they chronicle. Mr. Giles has given us a competent history of the movement, written from an independent stance, and sufficiently documented to serve the reference needs of most libraries. Mr. Boyle has written a novelized biography of Alphonse Desjardins, the obscure, dedicated civil servant who pioneered the now numerous and powerful credit union of Quebec. The book is certainly not a great novel. But it is an effective and moving document, redeemed from sentimentality by the success with which it conveys the assertion of human faith and fellowship that provides the inner dynamic of the credit union movement.

Human life can be organized for a time into totalitarian forms around the motivations of fear and greed for power. But after the life of the individual and the group has been paralyzed and withered by the attrition of these forces, then love and fellowship must be invoked to reanimate it.

Greed does not even have to take a totalitarian form to paralyze the creative forces of man. Seemingly the Shylock motif is a permanent aspect of human behavior. During the depression the loan sharks who terrorized Wall Street clerks, city employees and recipients of WPA checks genially referred to their operations as "the Shylock racket." One loan shark operated an office on Broad Street, making ten-dollar loans from week to week and charging interest rates of from 880 to 1950 per cent. When an unfortunate clerk couldn't pay the six-dollar interest on a ten-dollar loan, he was beaten and left lying in front of the bank building at 50 Broad Street. When Dutch Schultz tried to muscle into the Shylock racket, jealous mobsters liquidated Dutch and four of his lieutenants.

Thomas E. Dewey launched his career by breaking up the raw gangster phase of this racket. But the less lethal loan sharks continued their operations in the heart of the

financial district despite the fact that then and now the credit unions, the Morris Plan banks and many large institutions like the National City Bank were charging from 9 to 18 per cent for small loans. Legal Aid Societies, Chamber of Commerce groups, the Russell Sage Foundation and the foundations established by Edward A. Filene have all crusaded against the loan sharks. But still the racket lives an obstinate underground life, punctuated by recurrent public scandals. Of more than 10,000 personal bankruptcy petitions filed in Atlanta between 1930 and 1940, 85 per cent came from individuals who had been dealing with loan sharks. In 1944 reporter Kenneth C. McCormick and the *Detroit Free Press* won a Pulitzer fellowship and prize for exposing the loan shark lobby that had been bribing Michigan legislators to vote against a bill, sponsored by the legitimate loan companies, that would have lowered the legal interest rate on small loans. During the same year a Federal Grand Jury indicted thirteen southern money-lending chains which were trying to collect from 90 to 180 million dollars on 75 million dollars loaned in 1943. Delaying tactics so successfully obstructed the Department of Justice that by 1949, reports Mr. Giles, it was apparent that under existing law the Department of Justice could not protect the small borrower, and his only hope was to organize.

That is what the credit unions are all about. They pool the small savings of employees of firms and government departments, the members of trade unions and organized farmer groups, the residents of racially homogenous and socially integrated neighborhoods, villages and parishes, as in Quebec. They loan these interest-bearing savings back to their members. They are operated for the most part by volunteer committees. Some of the credit unions are large, possibly too large. The Municipal Credit Union of New York City, with its membership of 34,000 city police, school teachers, firemen and sanitation employees, charges one-half of one per cent a month. The Decatur-Wabash Credit Union of Decatur, Illinois, is supported by the payroll deductions of the employees of the Wabash Railroad. In 1949 it had assets of over four million dollars, of which more than half was invested in loans to members, the rest being in government bonds. Dividends of three-and-a-half per cent were paid on shares. All members were protected by both loan insurance and life savings insurance. Loan insurance protects the union and its members against the loss entailed by the deaths of members with loans outstanding.

Life savings insurance provides in effect a form of life insurance, much cheaper than the expensive "burial insurance" that is ordinarily bought by small wage earners. When a credit union member dies, his estate gets the amount of his savings up to \$1000, plus an equal amount from the insurance fund. (Age restrictions reduce this coverage after age 55.) In 1948 about 70 per cent of the organized credit union movement was providing this kind of unique insurance bargain. Giles writes:

Credit unions have all the strong and weak points of amateurs. At their best they are wonderful. At their worst they are incompetent. They may be too business-like or they may not be businesslike enough. . . . Nevertheless, the amount of human decency and energy that credit unions can count on is wonderfully great.

Mr. Boyle's novel exhibits the social dynamism of

these human assets when they are organized. Almost invariably the job has to be done by somebody possessing some share of the qualities of humble workaday saintliness that distinguished Alphonse Desjardins, the Hansard legislative reporter who never earned more than \$2000 a year. Out of this meager stipend he contributed over \$4000 plus a lifetime of obscure, unremitting toil to establish and develop a movement that now numbers over a thousand *caisses populaires*. He died a poor man but a Commander of the Order of St. Gregory, whose funeral was attended by dignitaries of the Church and the state. While intensely Catholic in faith and feeling, Mr. Boyle's novel is sufficiently distinguished both in craft and in spiritual sensitiveness and insight to transcend all boundaries of creed. It, too, is an admirable contribution to the literature of the cooperative movement.

JAMES RORTY

TRADITION OF OPULENCE

Poets of The English Language, edited by W. H. Auden and Norman Holmes Pearson. New York: Viking. 5 volumes, \$12.50

These are five small volumes of English and American poetry going from Langland's "Piers Plowman" up through Edwin Arlington Robinson. They are not the usual, stale anthologizing which so often contains the worst poems of the best poets. It was Herman Melville who said that it is the least part of genius that attracts the multitude. Mr. Auden, the poet, and Mr. Pearson have edited the books, and, for the most part, have shown a bias for the opulent, the orient pearl in verse, having in mind as their touchstones Marlowe's "Hero and Leander" and Ben Jonson's "The Alchemist." What is usually so very vexsome about poetry anthologies is the inclusion of dead authors who would remain dead were it not for the business academics who are continually getting out fat, humbug textbooks of perfidious verse. As for the poet, Auden, it is hard to understand why he has imitated these academics by putting into an otherwise fine collection the amateur meters of Ann Bradstreet, Fitz-Greene Halleck and Philip Freneau.

The editors have given just attention to Christopher Smart, one of the four mad poets of England. Smart, grubbily neglected by his friend, Samuel Johnson, is not in Johnson's "Lives of the English Poets"; but all of Smart's "The Song of David," that Ophir gold of poetry, and once so hard to obtain, is in this anthology. There are also two fragments from Christopher Smart's "Rejoice in the Lamb," which the unfortunate poet wrote during his seven years in Bedlam. This remarkable piece of genius, which may well have been the model for Blake's visions, was almost unknown up to two or three years ago. However, it is greatly to be feared that it will be the lesser Smart that will attract attention now. The catcult in "Rejoice in the Lamb" will be the main reason for awakened interest in him in certain affected circles.

One ought to mention Jones Very, a sort of small Christopher Smart of Salem, who was given to idiotic trances; Jones Very, as Robert Cantwell informs me, was a Salem contemporary of Hawthorne, and lived next door to the insane asylum; and whenever he had one of his god-head seizures, aggravated by a little drinking, his kind

friends would take him over to the mental institution where he remained until he was lucid or crazy enough to write some more poems. However, there are no more than two examples of his verse in these volumes, and it is difficult to know whether or not he deserves less or more consideration than Bradstreet, Halleck and Freneau.

The editors have included some very good devotional poetry, a lovely, chanting plaint by George Herbert called "The Sacrifice," Donne's "Litanie," and Sidney Lanier's lengthy hymn to the marshes, always interesting for its sounds and syllables. George Chapman, famous for his translation of the "Iliad," and Gavin Douglas, who did a beautiful pre-Elizabethan translation of the "Aeneid," are represented in the books.

There are fifteen Herman Melville poems in these volumes; editors would have had to be quite daring to have put so much Melville into an anthology in the thirties. Ten years ago Richard Aldington had selected seventeen poems from Herman Melville for his Viking anthology, but he was told that so many Melville poems would not be good for library or college business. Maybe the theory that Melville had an amatory fixation on Hawthorne has made him a good anthology subject for a Freudian age.

In each of the five books there are some good and sensible words by the editors about the meaning of different poetry traditions. There is, for example, a short, lucid passage on Elizabethan punctuation. This passage has none of the gimcrack pedantry of the ordinary glibish grammar which is glutted with syntactically correct but quite trite and puerile sentences. Though the American anthology habit has contributed more to stupor than it has to whetting the appetite for great poets, these five books, with their many rare poems, will prove a great stimulation to the avid reader.

EDWARD DAHLBERG

BEN FRANKLIN'S LETTERS

The Letters of Benjamin Franklin & Jane Mecom, edited, with an introduction, by Carl Van Doren. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. \$5.00

Here is an invitation to peer over Benjamin Franklin's shoulder as he peruses his mail and pens his responses. The letters printed and pressed in the volume are ones the Pennsylvania publisher, diplomat and inventor exchanged with a favorite sister over a 63-year span and tell first hand of life in the red, white and blue era of American history.

In the flutter of epistles is the account of Boston under Red Coat occupation that Jane Mecom wrote her brother in the fall of 1774. The troopers were foul-mouthed, she reported ("won can walk but a little way in the street without hearing there Profane language"), and the shop across the street from her had been smashed by a bully in uniform wielding a bayoneted rifle.

Franklin was in London at that time, seeking an eleventh-hour formula to avert war. The conflict, should it flare, would last fifteen years, he predicted to his sister.

Franklin had been in the English capital some seasons earlier at a time when the talk was that the British Government would do away with the Stamp Act if the

Americans would bear the cost of the stamps already printed. To Franklin this was like asking a man who had refused another the permission to jab him with a red-hot poker to pay for the trouble of heating the poker.

When hostilities commenced with the sharp crack of musket fire at Lexington and Concord, Jane Mecom, then a widow, abandoned her Boston home. The refugee in "anxious flight" found haven with friends in Rhode Island. When she was back in Massachusetts in June of 1779, the war swirled perilously close. "My grandson whome I am with," she wrote, "lives where we have frequent alarms they have come & taken of the stock about 3 quarters of a mile distant & burnt houses a few miles from us, but hitherto we are preserved."

Only a small part of the correspondence between brother and sister is concerned with war and events of political portent — and this to Jane's regret.

the few friends I have hear flock about me when I recve a letter & are much disappointed that they contain no Politicks, I tell them you Dare not trust a woman Politicks, & perhaps that is the truth but if there is any thing we could not posable misconstru or do mischief by knowing from you, it will Gratifie us mightly if you add a litle to yr future kind letters.

Most of the letters deal with family matters. Should an older sister as an economy measure be moved from a house Franklin owned to a boarding house? No, ruled Franklin. Old people grow into their houses "as a tortoise into its shell. They die if you tear them out of it. So let our good old sister be no more importuned on that head."

A family formula for soap boiling was passed down to the pair from an earlier generation. Franklin wrote his sister that he was opposed to putting the Franklin arms on the soap, preferring instead the soapboilers' arms. A crown was used, but when the new Republic came into being Jane Mecom was for stamping thirteen stars on the bars of soap.

What did Benjamin Franklin and Jane Mecom have in common? Jane was an unschooled Colonial housewife. Franklin, the private citizen of world repute, may well have been the most educated man of his time. Could the two trade ideas on a par? The mail-bag size of their correspondence testifies that they not only could, but did. Franklin wrote more letters to his sister Jane than to any other person. Of his letters in existence today, the first but one was to Jane, and the last but one.

Jane's spelling, quaint to today's reader, was for her a cause of keen embarrassment. But Franklin, who was pressing for a revision of the alphabet, assured her that her "bad" spelling, as the alphabet then stood, "is generally the best, as conforming to the Sound of the Letters and the Words." He saluted her knack of spelling by ear and told her the story of the man who had received a message only his maid could decipher. The message read, "Not finding Brown at hom, I delivered your Meseg to his yf". The maid "was surpriz'd," Franklin wrote, "that neither Sir nor Madam could tell what y, f was; why, says she, y, f spells Wife, what else can it spell? And indeed it is a much better as well as a shorter method of Spelling Wife, than by Doubleyou, i ef, e, which in reality spells Doubleyifey."

For those who wish to step back a couple of centuries "The Letters of Benjamin Franklin & Jane Mecom" provides a magic portal.

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
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