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MARCH 12, 1951 25 CENTS

FREEMAN

WHY STALIN HAS SPARED EUROPE
Lawrence R. Brown

THE CRY OF FREE ENTERPRISE
Garet Garrett

MacARTHUR WAS RIGHT
Lieut. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr.

ARIZONA RECLAMATION MUDDLE
Oliver Carlson

CONGRESS IN ECLIPSE
An Editorial

Editors: **John Chamberlain · Henry Hazlitt · Suzanne La Follette**

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with which is combined the magazine, PLAIN TALK

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MARCH 12, 1951

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A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR., and Douglas MacArthur were cadets together at West Point, served together in the Philippines in 1922 and 1923 — and in 1945 they were together on the battleship "Missouri" in Tokyo Bay when the Japanese surrendered. From 1943 to 1946 Lieutenant General Richardson commanded all Army and Air Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas, and was the Military Governor of Hawaii. He organized the Bureau of Public Relations of the War Department in 1941, and was its first chief. After his retirement in 1946, he was president of the Pacific War Memorial. . . . BRIGADIER GENERAL BONNER FELLERS (Ret.) contributed "The Lessons of Korea" to the first issue of the *Freeman*. . . . News from the Far West has been reported by OLIVER CARLSON in two previous issues. He is now at work on a follow-up of his article in this issue in which the Bureau of Reclamation will come in for severe criticism. . . . HENRY C. WOLFE, reviewer, lecturer and veteran foreign correspondent, has known Czechoslovakia for thirty years. In 1937 he was decorated by President Benes with the Order of the White Lion. Since the Communists took over Czechoslovakia, Mr. Wolfe has been able to return there twice. . . . MORROE BERGER teaches sociology in the Division of General Education at New York University, and has written on political and social subjects for scholarly journals, general periodicals and the newspapers. MAX EASTMAN is well known for his poetry, as well as for his literary and political criticism.

Forthcoming

The promised article on the B-36 bomber by Major Hamilton Long is scheduled for our issue of March 26. Eugene Tillinger, who wrote "The Moral Eclipse of Thomas Mann" for *Plain Talk* (December 1949), will report on Dr. Mann's latest pro-Soviet activities. Another article which will appear in an early issue is "Baseball Accepts the Negro" by Al Hirshberg.

the FREEMAN

NEW YORK, MONDAY, MARCH 12, 1951

THE FORTNIGHT

The so-called "anti-inflation fight" in Washington has violated every known economic principle. The basic and dominant cause of inflation is the increase in the volume of money and bank credit. This increase goes steadily on. Its principal cause is the policy of maintaining artificially low interest rates and forcing the Federal Reserve banks to buy government bonds at par or better and to issue money or credit against them. So far from being opposed, this policy is being insisted upon by the Secretary of the Treasury with the public support of the President.

With its other hand the Administration pretends to protect the public against this inflation by price and wage controls. Price-fixing is a false remedy for inflation even at its best; but it may be doubted whether it has ever before been allowed to deteriorate into quite so shameless a scramble for political favoritism. The labor unions who yelled loudest for price controls refuse to take the same medicine for wages. The farm pressure groups want a ceiling on industrial prices and freedom or even artificial floors for farm prices. And up to the moment of our going to press, there was nowhere enough political courage in Washington to say no to either group. In name of "total mobilization" Washington has been playing a sordid politics which can only increase inflation while it distorts and disrupts production.

Harrison E. Salisbury, the Moscow correspondent of the *New York Times*, has been visiting in Leningrad and filing some stories that make life in the former Russian capital seem just dandy. To hear Mr. Salisbury tell it, the town is brimming over with ballet, opera, the theater and general culture. He estimates that 150,000 persons in Leningrad are engaged in what might be classified as intellectual pursuits. The blithe news from Leningrad would gladden our hearts if it were not for the long memory we have of other Moscow correspondents who have gone forth to write of Leningrad. We recall in particular some of Louis Fischer's Leningrad articles of the middle thirties. Everything was jake then, too — but it was only a matter of weeks before Kirov was murdered and the Russians plunged idiotically into the years of the purges and the great "darkness at noon" trials and the business of inept double-dealing that parlayed the Popular Front into the Nazi-Soviet Pact. If past history repeats, we may confidently expect all hell to bust loose in Russia tomorrow, with sad repercussions elsewhere.

Come to think of it, why does the *Times* bother to keep Mr. Salisbury in Moscow? All that it gets from him is whatever daily publicity guff the Kremlin chooses to hand out. You'd hardly know there was a cold war on from Mr. Salisbury's stories. We don't know where Mr. Salisbury's personal sympathies lie, but we do know that he is perfectly amenable to manipulation by the Russian propaganda bureau. He has even repeated the hoary untruth that United States soldiers fought on the side of the White Russians against the Bolsheviks in 1918–19. The truth about 1918–19 is that American troops in Siberia did their level best to practice a strict neutrality between Reds, Whites and foreign interventionists. The only time they fought at all was when they were fired upon by guerillas and compelled to defend themselves. . . . During Hitler's heyday the *Times* was careful to warn its readers that certain news from Germany was to be taken with a large tablespoonful of salt. The least it could do today would be to put a warning above Mr. Salisbury's dispatches that they are only technically to be considered as part of the news that is fit to print.

The same warning — if the *Times must* publish what General Walter Krivitsky, late head of Soviet Military Intelligence for Western Europe, called Soviet "disinformation" — should have been placed over the recent NANA series of articles on Communist China which it presented to its readers for no reason that could have had anything to do with news value. The author of these dispatches, one Arthur Moore, was introduced by the *Times* as "a well-known British journalist in India." Mr. Moore, with the show of objectivity characteristic of such "disinformation," managed to get in some very neat anti-American propaganda by ascribing it to the Chinese Communist leaders, whom he described as men of "proved quality who have the people at their call." And against this picture of American "corruption" and "villainy" he placed that of a Chinese Communist government "incomparably better than the old Kuomintang government or any government from which a living tradition descends"; a government which, he says, has stabilized

prices, is rapidly deflating the swollen currency, and has brought about a wonderful moral regeneration.

Happy, happy Chinese! What about the news reported in the *Times* itself on October 15 that China was suffering from a famine that was one of the worst, if not the worst, in modern Chinese history? Don't give it a second thought. "For the first time in more than a generation prices are stable." Yet right alongside Mr. Moore's second piece (appropriately datelined "At Sea") was a report from the *Times's* own Hong Kong correspondent telling how Mao's "incomparably better" government had extended the death penalty to a long list of "those who work with imperialism against the fatherland," including "disseminators of counter-revolutionary propaganda and rumors," people "disturbing financial markets," and people resisting "grain tax collection" — in other words, seizures.

We pass over Mr. Moore's self-contradictory statement that Mao is a "Marx-Leninist" and at the same time "wants to encourage private enterprise" and "reckons the bourgeosie as a permanent element in society." In representing Mao and his government as wholly independent of Soviet Russia, Mr. Moore simply ignores Mao's long membership on the Central Committee of the Comintern. The Russians, he says, "may perhaps ask themselves what they have done to deserve" Mao's friendship. General MacArthur may be said to have answered that question in his reports to the United Nations on the use of the latest Soviet weapons by our enemies in Korea. The Arthur Moore dispatches, in sum, though they contained nothing that can seriously be described as news, were full of statements untrue on their face. Why, then, did the *Times* run them?

We would be a little more appalled than we are by the mounting evidence of the big New York City basketball "fix" if we did not live in a world that believes in "something for nothing" for practically everybody. We agree that it is a lamentable thing when three young men of the championship team of the City College of New York admit to trafficking for bribes with the Evil-Eye Fleagles of the gambling fraternity. But after all, think of the world in which these young men have grown to maturity! It is a world in which farmers expect to be bribed annually by government funds to plant, or not to plant, their crops. It is a world in which businessmen (some of them, at any rate) have connived to put the "fix" in with the RFC to get loan money that is taken by force from the taxpayer. It is a world in which whole nations refuse to help reduce the "point spread" between Russian and Western armaments unless they are bribed to do it with Marshall Plan or Point Four cash. It is a world in which countries trade their votes in the UN for promises of ships, loans for highway construction, and what-not. Practically everyone has become used to the idea of easy dough, of living off the other fellow. So when young Al Roth of City College says he took the gambler's money because he was "sick and tired of asking my father for money all the time," it is an understandable thing. We know Al Roth was wrong. We know also that he was just getting in on the act with a lot of people who have no right to be sanctimonious about their own superior virtue in his presence. Have we a right to expect good private morals when public morals are so low?

When its editors started the *Freeman* they expected it to be attacked in proportion as it became effective. So we have hitherto ignored attacks, particularly those that took the form of a smear. A smear is not an attempt to refute an argument, but an attempt to discredit the person or publication that makes it. It has been known by logicians from time immemorial as the fallacy of the *argumentum ad hominem*. Its classic illustration is the legal story: "No case. Abuse the plaintiff's attorney." It is the resort of those who have no answer — and no scruples.

We dislike to think that the *Washington Post*, even in its excess of zeal for the Administration's policies, would knowingly be guilty of such tactics, and therefore we can only assume that it was imposed upon. In an article on January 16 it dragged in the name of the *Freeman* in connection with the Anna M. Rosenberg case. It had to forge a couple of links to do this. It first mentioned the *Freeman* in connection with Ralph De Sola. Now the facts in this case could easily have been obtained by the *Post* by letter, telegram or telephone, none of which sources of information it troubled to use. Ralph De Sola was taken on as circulation manager of the *Freeman* on August 3, 1950. Our first issue appeared on October 2. De Sola's connection was severed on October 16. He did not testify regarding Mrs. Rosenberg until December 8. Mrs. Rosenberg's nomination as Assistant Secretary of Defense was not even announced until November 9.

If the Post had merely been satisfied with gratuitously dragging the name of the *Freeman* into its story, we would have let the whole matter pass. But it resorted, in addition, to a very remarkable device. It accompanied its article with a photograph which showed Ralph De Sola and one Benjamin H. Freedman looking at each other while this Mr. Freedman carefully held up, so that its front cover squarely faced the camera, a closed copy of the *Freeman*.

None of the editors of the *Freeman* knows or has ever met this Mr. Freedman. As we do not need to point out, there is no way of keeping the *Freeman*, any more than any other periodical on public sale, out of the hands of anybody who wants to buy it. So we can only ask: What was the purpose of this photograph? Was it to mislead hasty readers into assuming that the *Freeman* was in some sense a mouthpiece of Mr. Freedman? Was it hoped that the similarity of names would lead to such an assumption? Was it, in short, an attempt at a smear by manufactured association? As we wish to give the *Post* the benefit of every doubt, we refrain from conclusions. But we could suggest other directions for the *Post's* photographic enterprise. For example, it has been advising our government to buy off Mao Tse-tung with Formosa. Why doesn't it take and publish pictures of Mao, or of Chinese Communist soldiers, reading the *Post's* articles along this line with the avid pleasure they must undoubtedly feel? Or, if it wouldn't like to do that, why not abandon its tactics of innuendo by contrived juxtaposition and discuss issues on their merits?

CONGRESS IN ECLIPSE

There has never been a time in the history of this country when the power of the President was higher and the power of Congress lower than it is today.

This situation has been underlined in recent weeks by the open and contemptuous defiance of Congress by Mr. Truman even on matters indisputably within the constitutional domain of Congress. Mr. Truman has defied Congress to put any limits on his alleged right to order as many American troops as he sees fit to any place in the world that he sees fit to send them. He has defied Congress to cut a dollar out of the most recklessly extravagant budget ever presented to it by any President. He has presumed, in the absence of any legal authority whatever, and in clear defiance of the intent of Congress, to lecture the Federal Reserve Board on its monetary and credit policies. And after a senatorial subcommittee of six, including four members of his own party, unanimously agreed to a report naming three of the directors of the RFC as having been unduly influenced in the grant of loans by individuals close to the President, Mr. Truman dismissed the report as asinine and defiantly renominated all five directors of the RFC, including the three named. (Only on this last act of defiance did he have a second thought.)

The situation is indeed paradoxical. Commentators have often attributed Presidential domination in the past to the presence of a "strong man" in the White House, upsetting the constitutional balance. But no man has ever brought fewer gifts to the Presidency, as Forrest Davis has pointed out in the *Freeman*, than the present occupant of the office. Again, though the present Congress is nominally Democratic in both Houses, it is also anti-Fair Deal in both Houses. And the President has lost popular support to such an extent that if he were running for election today against a strong Republican candidate it is probable that Mr. Truman would be soundly defeated. How, then, does Mr. Truman come to feel that he can afford to be more openly defiant and contemptuous of Congress than any of his predecessors?

The reasons are complex. They must be divided into at least two parts — ideological and institutional.

Mr. Truman can today defy Congress, even on the matters most clearly within its jurisdiction, in the calm confidence that he will be automatically supported by most of the Democrats in Congress, by a dependable turnout of self-styled "liberal" and "internationally-minded" Republicans, by a remarkable assortment of talented journalists and "intellectuals," and by the labor bosses, especially PAC. In recent issues of the *Freeman*, both Forrest Davis and Edna Lonigan have cited outstanding examples of such support.

But to treat these Fair Dealers merely as individuals who happen somehow to hold the same opinions would be hopelessly superficial. There is a statist ideology in the contemporary atmosphere. The Fair Dealers breathe it in from each other as they breathe it out to each other. Rather than explain in detail why this statist ideology must necessarily undermine the power of the legislature to check and balance the executive, we prefer to quote the prophetic warning by the Swedish economist, the late Gustav Cassel, uttered in 1934:

> The leadership of the State in economic affairs which advocates of Planned Economy want to establish, is, as we have seen, necessarily connected with a bewildering mass of governmental interferences of a steadily cumulative nature. The arbitrariness, the mistakes and the inevitable contradictions of such policy will, as daily experience shows, only strengthen the demand for a more rational coordination of the different measures and, therefore, for unified leadership. For this reason Planned Economy will always tend to develop into Dictatorship. . . .
>
> The existence of some sort of parliament is no guarantee against planned economy being developed into dictatorship. On the contrary, experience has shown that representative bodies are unable to fulfill all the multitudinous functions connected with economic leadership without becoming more and more involved in the struggle between competing interests, with the consequence of a moral decay ending in party — if not individual — corruption. Examples of such a degrading development are indeed in many countries accumulating at such a speed as must fill every honorable citizen with the gravest apprehensions as to the future of the representative system. But apart from that, this system can not possibly be preserved, if parliaments are overworked by having to consider an infinite mass of the most intricate questions relating to private economy. *The parliamentary system can be saved only by wise and deliberate restriction of the functions of parliaments.* [Our italics.]
>
> Economic dictatorship is much more dangerous than people believe. Once authoritative control has been established it will not always be possible to limit it to the economic domain. If we allow economic freedom and self-reliance to be destroyed, the powers standing for Liberty will have lost so much in strength that they will not be able to offer any effective resistance against a progressive extension of such destruction to constitutional and public life generally. And if this resistance is gradually given up — perhaps without people ever realizing what is actually going on — such fundamental values as personal liberty, freedom of thought and speech and independence of science are exposed to imminent danger. What stands to be lost is nothing less than the whole of that civilization that we have inherited from generations which once fought hard to lay its foundations and even gave their life for it.

So much for how the power of a representative assembly, and liberty itself, can be destroyed by a statist ideology and by the growth of government controls. This is part of what is now happening to Congress.

But Congressional power is also being destroyed by institutional weaknesses, by defects of political organization. It is true that democratic political organization is but an instrument for effecting the popular will. Where that will is itself infected by an unhealthy ideology, the instrument will be used merely to carry out the ideology. But defects in the instrument must add to defects in the result. There can be no political health or stability when the people's will is persistently perverted or thwarted.

Any legislature which does not have the power to remove an incompetent or unfit executive will be impotent in a crisis. As we have pointed out in previous issues, if the executive refuses to compromise or cooperate with it, and demands merely that it "cooperate" with him by

doing precisely what he asks, then such a legislature has only the choice of being either a rubber-stamp for executive policies or obstructing executive policies. And in a crisis it does not dare to obstruct; for everyone feels that even gross mismanagement is less of an evil than government paralysis. Therefore, as long as Congress either does not have the power to remove the executive, or dare not exercise it, it is reduced to the level of a rubber-stamp — consulted, if at all, only as an empty formality or out of "politeness." This situation is sufficiently illustrated by the outcome of the so-called great debate on foreign policy and troops to Europe.

Unless a legislature, to repeat, has the power to remove an unfit executive, it can exercise no dependable check on the executive, and therefore it must tend toward political impotence. Of course such a power will not be responsibly exercised unless it is reciprocal — that is, unless the executive also, in a crisis, has the power of dissolving the legislature — unless, in other words, both the executive and the legislature have the power of carrying an issue directly to the people for an election and a resolution. Because the members of the French Parliament have the one-sided power of expressing lack of confidence in the executive, without risking their own seats, they exercise that power capriciously and irresponsibly. This does not happen where the real power of parliamentary dissolution also exists, as in Britain and Canada.

By what at first seems like a paradox, however, Congress could exercise more real power by self-denying limitations on some of its present nominal powers. The *Freeman* has already pointed out, in "How to Curb One-Man Rule" (February 12) that Congress, and the Senate itself, would exercise far more real power over treaties, agreements and foreign policy generally, if the Senate constitutionally shared its power of treaty ratification with the House, by a majority vote in each chamber, and if a treaty or agreement were allowed to become valid after a certain period, *unless at least one House had rejected it before the end of that period.*

This necessary self-denial on the part of Congress would be most important of all in the fiscal field. Today the President, the House and the Senate all compete with each other in appropriations to appease this or that pressure group. It is small wonder that under such a system the forces of economy can get nowhere, that any real fiscal responsibility is lost, that government expenditures run wild, that inflation grows and gets out of control. We will never have real fiscal responsibility until Congress is willing to accept the wholesome rule that prevails in Britain, for example, in which the legislature can make no expenditure not proposed by the executive. Perhaps the ideal system from the taxpayer's standpoint would be one under which the House could make no appropriation not proposed by the President, and the Senate could make no appropriation not proposed by the House. If both House and Senate had *only* the power to *reduce* proposed expenditures, they would exercise it.

As Henry Jones Ford wrote in 1924: "There is no propensity of human nature more marked than jealousy of opportunities that one does not share. . . . The fact that members are disabled from introducing measures proposing any . . . appropriations . . . of itself shuts out most of the bills congesting legislative calendars. . . . There is no way of preventing the watchmen from pilfering and of keeping them to their duty as watchmen, except to deny them any access to the public treasury."

There are other self-reforms that Congress must make if it hopes to restore its prestige and its power, which it can do only to the extent that it can attract able men and earn public confidence. It should abolish the constitutional residence requirement in order to allow local constituencies more freedom of choice and to make able men more independent of local bosses. It should reorganize in order to centralize responsibility. It should abolish the petrifying seniority rules in order to bring about coherence of policy and to provide a Congressional *carrière ouverte aux talents.*

There may be disagreement about the necessity for all these steps. But *some* of them must be taken. "Without people ever realizing what is actually going on" Congress has been losing prestige and power at an alarming rate. The totalitarians in our midst not only approve of the recent huge growth of executive power; they ridicule or denounce Congress for the slightest questioning of that power. It is later than Congress and public opinion think. Representative government and liberty are both in danger. And neither is likely to survive the other.

HAYMAKERS AT STRAW MEN

Speaking at a Conference on the National Emergency held at Freedom House in New York City, former Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson gave an unconscious illustration of the absurdly unreal estate to which the Great Debate on United States military policy has fallen. Complete withdrawal of United States troops from Europe, said Mr. Patterson, would mean repudiation of the North Atlantic Treaty and abandonment of 200 million skilled and energetic people with a workshop far in advance of anything possessed by Russia.

Mr. Patterson's argument consists of a series of wild haymakers at straw men. To begin with, virtually no personality of any consequence has advocated "complete withdrawal" of United States troops from Europe. We already have a couple of divisions in Germany, and they are there to stay for the duration of the cold war. These divisions are our earnest that we are in the war for keeps if Russia chooses to attack; they make war between the United States and Russia automatic the moment that Russian divisions march into western Germany. So Europe has its reassurance that America will fight. True, our divisions in Europe are mere "token" troops. But, *unless Europe itself rearms to the point of creating sixty to a hundred divisions on its own*, even ten or fifteen pre-committed U. S. divisions in Europe would still be a token affair. Looked at in the light of realism, the only way Europe can be abandoned is by way of self-abandonment. The whole argument about a U. S. force in Europe can have no realistic relevance until Europe itself has succeeded in getting at least two million men under arms.

The real absurdity of Mr. Patterson's logic, however, is highlighted by his statistics. For if it is true that western Europe contains 200 million skilled and energetic people as against Soviet Russia's 200 million bumbling, fear-ridden serfs, the failure of Europe to stand up to Stalin can only indicate a will to succumb to the death-wish. Moreover, a "workshop" that is "far in advance of

anything possessed by Russia" ought to be able to sustain a rearmament capable of dealing with the Russians.

Mr. Patterson is quite correct, of course, in assuming that the Europeans haven't bothered to keep pace with the Russians in making ready for war. Neither, for that matter, has the United States. But if both Europe and the United States are virtually starting from scratch in 1951, it means that the Atlantic Pact countries are vulnerable *now*, not in 1953. A rational approach to the business of saving Europe *now* would not stress the duty of the United States to put X number of divisions into France and Germany at a date that must wait upon the creation of an oceanic transport fleet, plus the large-scale re-tooling of United States industry, plus the training of officers to train a still non-existent mass army. Realism and rationality would begin by stressing the duty of the United States to rig up something pronto in 1951 to keep a cover over Europe while those 200 million skilled and energetic Europeans (who don't need ocean transport) get busy on their own account. The only cover for Europe that the United States can rig up in a hurry is an air cover based on North African and British air fields. Such an air cover would almost certainly force Russia to keep the peace under penalty of delivery of the atom bomb on Soviet factories, oil fields and transportation bottlenecks. If United States air and sea-power can not keep the peace by some such threat for the next few years, the peace is not going to be kept. Ike Eisenhower is a man of parts, but if United States air and seapower and United States diplomacy aren't good enough to save the world in 1951 it won't be here for the saving in 1953. Incidentally, no "cover" for Europe can properly be considered apart from the question of keeping Stalin off balance in Asia (see Lawrence Brown's "Why Stalin Has Spared Europe" on page 361).

Mr. Patterson is right in assuming that a promise to put X number of United States divisions into Europe by 1953 may have its psychological uses in prodding European statesmen to create their own armies as fast as possible. But the promise, to be effective, must necessarily be a *conditional* one. The prime condition should be the creation of at least four European divisions to one United States division marked for overseas service on the Rhine or Elbe frontier. What Mr. Patterson fails to see is that if Republicans had not raised the issue of a *quid pro quo* in the matter of ground troops for Europe, the Administration would have gone merrily on with its inane policy of promising everything to western Europe and getting nothing by way of return. In other words, Hoover, Taft, Knowland and Lodge have acted in the interests of awakening Europe to the need for the very "going forward together" policy which Eisenhower insists must be the basis of any realistic defense of European soil. The Republicans should be honored, not condemned, for their patriotic pains.

The North Atlantic Treaty calls for mutual aid as between the various treaty adherents. Mutual aid means just what it says. All that the Taft-Knowland Republicans have insisted upon is that the Europeans live up to treaty obligations along with the United States. If and when western Europe ever does go about the business of ending its devotion to the death-wish, it will be because the fiction of Republican-Democratic bi-partisanship in foreign and military policy died with the 81st Congress.

The *Freeman* would not insist on a mandatory troop "matching" policy (say, one United States division for every five or six European divisions) if it had any trust (a) in the Truman Administration's brain power and (b) in the west European will to emerge from the world of dreams. If Europe is ready and willing to rearm and fight, it will certainly not cavil at having to produce its own armies as a condition of gaining the support on European soil of an American army. On the other hand, if west Europe is not ready and willing to raise the larger part of an Atlantic Pact army, the number of United States troops that can be trained and transported to Europe between now and 1953 must be a matter of complete irrelevance. They would wind up as hostages to Stalin.

Because the realities of the situation are what they are, it ill becomes the Deweyites and the Stassenites among the Republicans to "rat" on their colleagues who follow Taft and Knowland in the matter of troop ratios. The main psychological task at the moment is to get Europeans out of the habit of trusting in an American miracle to be delivered f.o.b. Detroit. The sad fact is that the United States Army is not even up to winning a decisive victory on a limited field in little Korea. This army can produce no miracles of training and transport between now and 1953. If they are to save themselves a rude awakening, the west Europeans must listen to the facts of life and get busy raising their own troops as fast as they can. There will be no "abandonment" of Europe unless European self-abandonment makes it necessary.

GIVING GRAIN TO INDIA

Though even the Nehru government did not ask for more than a long-term loan to enable it to buy 75,000,000 bushels of grain, the Truman Administration insisted on making it a gift. The Nehru government, however, will *sell* this grain to its own citizens, and use the proceeds for its own socialistic schemes.

If our government had sold the grain to the Nehru government we could have used the proceeds to buy strategic materials. We could have accepted in payment part of the Indian sterling balances, estimated at some $1,500,000,000 and used these sterling balances to buy, say, Malayan tin and rubber.

"This grain for India," Mr. Truman declared in his message to Congress, "will have to come in large measure, if not entirely, from this country." Why? The proposition is not self-evident. The United States produces only one-eighth of the world's total food supply.

The Administration has argued that our "political differences" with India, as reflected by that government's championing of the cause of Communist China, "must not deflect us" from alleviating "human suffering." By the same argument, carried only a step further, we should send free grain to Communist China itself, where starvation is probably greater than in India.

Mr. Truman's grain gift proposal completely ignores the fact that India's food shortage has been intensified if not principally caused by the Nehru government's own economic policies, including diversion of food acreage into cotton and jute, uneconomic price ceilings, and exchange controls. Until these are changed, food shortages in India may be expected to continue.

STALIN INTERVIEWS STALIN

The biggest gun in the Soviet arsenal of propaganda is Stalin. But all Soviet propaganda, whether it comes from a fellow-traveling correspondent in Moscow, a Communist Party leader somewhere in the world, or a Soviet spokesman in the UN, is Stalin's propaganda. When the Infallible Leader issues a blast in his own name, therefore, there are two likely reasons: either it has become tactically desirable to change the line — with a face-saving excoriation of convenient scapegoats — or to give it powerful reinforcement.

Stalin's interview with himself in *Pravda* on February 16 did not mark the slightest revision of Soviet strategy. All the familiar demands were there, along with the familiar lies about and accusations against the United States and the other non-Communist powers in the UN. What Stalin demanded was the withdrawal, on his own terms, of UN forces from Korea; the surrender of Formosa; the admission of his Chinese puppet to the UN and the unseating of Free China. Unless the "Chinese" terms were accepted, he warned, the Korean war could "only end in a defeat of the interventionists" — meaning, of course, the UN forces (a threat which Mao has already utilized for purposes of internal Chinese propaganda). If the peoples of the West would only back the Soviet Union and its satellites against their own governments, he said in effect, peace could be preserved. Otherwise war was inevitable. In short, the Stalin interview was a reinforcement of the global Soviet propaganda and military strategy. It was a provisional declaration of war.

The international situation being what it is, the State Department's interpretation of this "interview" as an attempt "to regain lost ground" is over-optimistic to the point of childishness if really meant; dangerously misleading if not. When Stalin issued his statement that situation was as follows:

1. The United States had achieved a belated and Pyrrhic victory in the UN, in the declaration that Stalin's Chinese puppet had "engaged in aggression" in Korea; a "victory" attained only through a virtual renunciation of punitive action and after Mao (Stalin) had scornfully rejected an appeasing "cease-fire" proposal — approved by Acheson — which implied acceptance in large degree of Soviet demands.

2. The whole United States Army, by General Bradley's own admission, was engaged in Korea, fighting a war with its hands tied by the vicious UN prohibition against bombing the aggressor where it would hurt most — at his Manchurian bases — and prevented by the U. S. Navy from getting relief through Free Chinese attacks from Formosa on the Chinese mainland, supported by guerrilla forces within the country: In other words, all available American ground troops were engaged in a strategically senseless and therefore politically insane adventure.

3. The much advertised plan for U. S. and western European rearmament was still in the blueprint stage. Moreover, General Marshall had informed the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that only 100,000 American troops would be sent to Europe (a tipping of his hand which even Mr. James Reston found it hard to take). In the face of what might be called this reassurance to Stalin, whose armies by general admission could overrun Europe tomorrow, and of the notorious reluctance of our European "allies" to prepare for their own defense, Mr. Acheson's insistence that Europe was the decisive area in the global disturbances, and the appointment of Eisenhower to a European command which promises to be for all practical purposes non-existent for some time to come, had all the appearance of a method of diverting popular attention and Congressional debate from the State Department's bewildering strategy in Asia.

4. The question of Formosa was still on the agenda of the UN, where it had been placed on State Department initiative. While it remained there, Stalin might rest assured that he could safely leave the Chinese mainland undefended while deploying his satellite forces in Korea and South China.

The timing of Stalin's "interview" was exactly right from his point of view. First, he knows that he may never be stronger, relatively, than now. Secondly, there was danger that American opinion would force a change of policy on Formosa. (Immediately after the "interview" appeared, it was announced that William D. Pawley, who is said to be in favor of backing Chiang, had been made a special Assistant Secretary of State to advise Acheson on foreign policy — a move of which Stalin's friends in the State Department may conceivably have given him advance notice.) Stalin knows he can take Europe now; but he knows also that it would be more of a liability than an asset so long as the United States remained undefeated. He can not afford to have his Asiatic plans upset, for he must have Asia before he can defeat the United States. That accounts for his repeated stress on what he called the American appropriation of Formosa.

The myth that "Stalin doesn't want war" has been industriously fostered by Soviet propaganda, and has contributed to a great deal of fuzzy thinking in high places. It ignores the fact that last year an unarmed American reconnaissance plane was shot down into the Baltic by a Russian pursuit plane; an outrage which served notice on the United States that Stalin even then was ready to fight. His "interview" should finally dispose of the myth. He has given the world a choice between total appeasement and war wherever it may suit his convenience to unleash it. "Give me what I demand," he says in effect, "or I will take it by force before you can summon the spirit or the strength to resist."

"Who's afraid of the big bad wolf?" is no effective answer; it is no answer at all. Nor would appeasement remove the threat, but only increase it by giving Stalin control of Asia, including the Philippines and Japan (which would become untenable), and laying the northwest corner of this continent open to attack from Asia.

There is an answer — or answers. In our last issue we suggested that the U. S. serve notice on Russia that our atomic weapons would be placed at the disposal of any nation attacked by Soviet or satellite armies. In the editorial on page 358 we discuss further possible deterrents to Soviet aggression. Above all, Formosa should be removed from the UN agenda. That, for once, would leave Stalin uncertain whether or not he would have to contend with the huge manpower of free China, backed by the one thing he fears above everything else — the tremendous productive capacity of the United States.

WHY STALIN HAS SPARED EUROPE

By LAWRENCE R. BROWN

FOR nearly five years western Europe has lain defenseless before the Russians yet no attempt has been made to occupy it. Clearly it was not the presence of Western arms in Europe itself that accomplished this defense. Equally, this was not because the Russians did not desire eventually to conquer Europe.

It is probably true that in 1946 the only people in the government who knew that the Russians intended to occupy Europe eventually were those who intended to help them do so; whereas today it may be assumed that even the President is aware of this ultimate purpose. But this belated knowledge makes no change in the strategic situation. It was not our ignorance of Soviet designs in 1946 that protected Europe, nor is it our admission of them in 1951 that endangers that continent. And probably no one would be so fatuous — except possibly in public — as to argue that Soviet ambitions have changed in the meantime.

A curious question thus arises. For almost five years disarmed Europe has lain exposed to the Soviet power. Yet *now*, while engaged in actual war in Asia, the American Government proposes to divide its scanty troops and its inadequate military supplies in order, it says, to arm Europe. In a time of strange coincidences, this is simply one more.

The Acheson-Marshall proposal to send troops and military supplies to Europe is called a program to defend Europe. It is debated by partisan and opponent as though it were in fact such a proposal. But it is not. That is its publicly declared intention, but can not be its purpose. No proposal to build up a trifling army of perhaps sixty divisions can have as its purpose the defense of Europe against a readily available Russian strength of several hundred divisions of the most heavily armed troops in the world. No intelligent man — and Acheson is intelligent — can so misjudge the relation of means to ends. The proposal might be *part* of a plan to defend Europe, but it is not itself such a plan.

In a sense even the Administration admits the subordinate status of the Acheson-Marshall plan in that the defense of Europe is itself part of a grander enterprise which might be described as rallying the "free world" in defense nominally of itself, but in fact of "peace." The real program is the defense of "peace," not of states or of peoples, and for this lofty enterprise the operations of the UN are as essential as the token military defense of Europe. The two can be separated for intellectual analysis but not for the understanding of their common objective which is not victory or even survival, but "peace."

If we assume then that the Acheson-Marshall plan is only a part of a method of defending Europe and the defense of Europe part of the pursuit of peace, debate over the plan need not turn on the question whether the defense of Europe is desirable or the goal of peace attainable. The necessity of preventing a permanent Russian occupation of Europe can be accepted without thereby accepting the Acheson-Marshall proposals. It will then be possible to estimate what role in the defense this plan occupies and whether it would contribute as much to the defense of Europe as the same arms used elsewhere, or whether indeed it would contribute anything to the defense of Europe.

It is obvious enough where the defense of Europe has lain in these past five years. Europe has been safe from 1946 until today because the Russians were not yet ready for war with the United States. They know they can not afford that war until they can be fairly sure of winning it in a brief time — otherwise our immense industrial plant and our technological skills would produce a military engine that would eventually destroy them. The possession of Europe would only begin the war, not end it, and would not furnish the Russians any means of annihilating the United States before we could annihilate them. In brief, the strategic key to the situation has been the industrial plant of the United States and nothing else. If the Russians dared not occupy Europe in 1946 because of fear of our industrial plant, they will not do so in 1951 — unless they are no longer afraid of it. If they are no longer afraid of it, no amount of American arms and troops in Europe will be sufficient to defend that continent.

Where then is the military power of the West? Turn where we may, there is only one place: The United States itself. Even our power is largely potential, but the power of the states of western Europe is not only potential but also conditioned. Their potential can be converted into actual military power only on the condition that the Soviet Empire does not attack them before this transformation has been completed. Would the Russians be quite so foolish?

Declarations of laudable intentions do not remove these facts. The primary defense of Europe is not troops on that continent, but the ability to create overwhelming military force on this one. The sole occasion for the defense of Europe on European soil can arise only if our ability to create an overwhelming power in America is seriously endangered.

If Europe is now suddenly in real need of defense against the Soviet Empire, this is not a danger originating in Europe. If the danger is real — and I think it is — it can mean only that the Russians no longer fear the potential military power of the industrial plant of the United States. This is broader than merely providing themselves with defense in Russia against atomic attack. In addition, the ability to eliminate our industrial plant would be required. It is thus foolish to consider the defense of Europe as the Acheson-Marshall publicity does, as a European strategic problem. It is not. The problem can never arise until there exists a much more serious American strategic problem. If there is danger to Europe, there must be even more immediate danger to us.

We can be certain of one thing. If the Russians no longer fear the potential military power of our industrial plant, it is because they have figured out some way to eliminate that plant or its importance from the world strategic picture. Since under no circumstances will we sit by and let them occupy and mobilize Europe against us, there are obviously only two ways to do this: either invade the United States and occupy its industrial areas or destroy that plant by air raids and long-range rockets.

Can the Russians do either? If they can not, our troops and arms in Europe are a waste of the taxpayers' money. If they can, whether from bases in Asia, Alaska or Europe, any arms and troops we may have placed in Europe will be an instant and total loss to us. Even if the Russians wished to stage their primary attack against us from Europe — which is not probable, but an assumption for argument's sake — these arms and troops would be worthless. An army strong enough to hold Europe against the present known Russian strength would take us years to build even with the active cooperation of everybody in Europe. And if we had time to build it, we would not need it. The possession of Europe is not in itself enough to assure the success of the Russian objective of rapidly annihilating the United States, or they would have seized it long ago. Something else must be required — and that something is the key to our own life or death. The Russians have shown that without it they believe they can not destroy us. We should be able to draw the obvious contrary conclusion — that with it they estimate that they can.

That something, the lack of which has kept the Russians out of western Europe for five years, is access to the northwestern corner of the American continent and secure possession of the complex sea and air bases and lines of communication that stretch from it back into eastern Asia. From that corner of America and from there alone can air attacks and perhaps invasion be launched with good prospect of destroying us before we can arm sufficiently to turn the tide of ruin. The Russians could seize it tomorrow, but that corner is useless unless its communications are securely in Soviet hands. We are now observing the attempt to establish these secure communications on the battlefields of Korea and in the councils of the UN.

In view of this situation, is there really any partial defense of Europe by which the Acheson-Marshall plan could be justified? If there were a clear surplus of available American military power, undoubtedly the use of some of it for local European defense would be wise for psychological if not military reasons. But can we consider that we have such a surplus in the face of Soviet power in eastern Asia? And even on the basis of the improbable answer that we have such a surplus, is its use on the lowland plains of Europe an intelligent disposition of it? Is there any non-committed, non-political soldier who believes that any European army in the next few years will be strong enough to hold western Germany, the Low Countries, and France against the immense superiority of the Soviet armies?

In contrast, the types of military power in which we have an advantage or the possibility of an equality are those of the air and the sea, and this brings to strategic importance not the plains of northern Europe but the line of the Mediterranean — a means for striking at the vitals of the Soviet Empire. These we can hardly reach any other way. England, too, belongs in this class if we can assume that she will display the same courage against the intelligent evil of Stalin's Empire that she did against the maniacal evil of Hitler's.

But this is not the basic arrangement of the Acheson-Marshall plan. Even if we were sure of the will and ability of a broken and divided continent, doubt would remain concerning the wisdom of investing any military power in such indefensible positions. But we have also every reason to doubt the willingness to fight. Despite the necessarily favorable statements of officials, Europeans do not see why they should fight for us, and there are many to whom the issue arises in precisely this form. Of course, we Americans know that our two wars in Europe were solely for the sake of virtue, and hence that virtuous Europeans should be dutifully thankful to us. Naturally this emotion would be rather weak in Germany, but even in France the last war is not surrounded with the same moral aura that it wears for us. There are many Frenchmen who doubt that the triumph of unconditional surrender was worth the destruction of so much of France. (It is interesting to recall that this destruction was the result of Marshall's own strategy of invading France rather than Yugoslavia — a strategy always insisted upon by the Russians, an example perhaps of the compound interest of folly.)

There is another curious thing about our present policy of sending arms to Europe — not only the timing and the strategic substance, but the source. It is proposed by Mr. Acheson and General Marshall. Perhaps we should rejoice that these two tried and true friends of Soviet expansion have at last decided that enough is enough. But their objections to Soviet expansion have these curious geographical and strategical limits; so much so that their contribution to the defense of Europe amounts to no more than a publicity campaign on their stated intentions.

One would suppose, after Marshall's eminent success in assisting Stalin in destroying the Chinese Nationalists and in having been Stalin's choice for command of the Western armies against Germany, that he might be a little self-conscious about advocating any policy at all toward Russia. One might further suppose that in view of such a dismal record in once defending the interests of the United States against his former sponsor, others would ponder with considerable skepticism his newest anti-Stalin proposal. But no. He is a military hero, a friend of all "forward-looking forces," and hence immune to such considerations.

Worse, he is a military expert, and any criticism of his policy is shouted down as military judgment by amateurs. Obviously, a professional soldier, if he is informed and honest, is the best source of tactical advice. But it does not take a military expert to know that sixty divisions of a weak coalition can not stand against three hundred of an efficient, centralized Empire. It does not take a professional soldier to understand the desirability of secure lines of communication, or the consequences of air raids and invasions, or the result of losing the pick of one's army on a distant and indefensible continent. The very advocates who demand that we send troops to Europe cite this is a reason to keep them away from Asia.

One would suppose that the record of all the disasters at which Mr. Acheson has assisted would be more than enough to disqualify any proposal of his that in any way involved the Soviet Empire. Even if the proposal to waste arms in Europe — for that is all it really is — did not fall apart on mere analysis, did not even take on the color of something to help the Russians by diverting our strength away from the strategic key, the fact that Acheson proposed it should be enough. But it does not seem so. On Acheson, public opinion is perhaps more dubious than on any other single aspect of this horror, but even on Acheson our moral confusion prevents our seeing with ominous clarity.

Marshall is protected by the myth that he is a military hero, but Acheson's immunity is of a more spiritual source, as becomes him. This man has always announced his devotion to the laudable moral objectives of international policy; how can we believe that he has brought his country to the edge of ruin and still utterly undismayed, still as debonair and assured as ever, presses on into the vast disasters for which his earlier work has been only the preparation? Surely no intelligent man could make such fearful errors — and Acheson is an intelligent man. Surely no moral man could knowingly contrive such ruin — and Acheson is a moral man.

Is not the difficulty the fact that we have profound doubts about Mr. Acheson's actions yet accept the moral source from which they stem? For everyone really knows that the only thing intriguing with the UN can accomplish is some device to surrender the western Pacific to Russia and therewith the vital communications to future Russian bases in Alaska. Yet Acheson is permitted to play his strange games with this absurd assembly. We can readily realize that it would not be a Soviet seizure of Europe, but a permanent Soviet occupation of the continent, that would threaten the existence of the United States. Yet since the first can not now be prevented once the Russians are ready for war, it is neither a token defense of Europe nor a pursuit of "peace" that can protect us. It is either the ability by power, and power alone, to deter the Russians from launching war, or in the end, power enough to drive the Russians out. To neither alternative does the Acheson-Marshall plan contribute.

Why then does the pursuit of this perilous nonsense still seem to the American public an adequate substitute for foreign and military policy? Because we have been told that the defense of the free world and of international peace is a moral goal and the UN its proper instrument, while the realistic defense of the United States is something that no lofty soul would be concerned about. This may be the trouble with Mr. Acheson and with all his friends, and for the moment we can accept it as their only trouble. But we can not accept their principles and then cavil at their performance. They are the men who are consistent, not their opponents.

We can not successfully fight these policies until we realize that Acheson *is not a moral man.* His whole purpose of "international peace" is a profoundly immoral purpose. It does not require the continuing strength of the United States; rather, the contrary. His concept of a free world is a concept only, bearing no relation to the realities of political and military power in the world. It has not even the existence of a weak coalition. It is only a phrase. Until we can realize this, every surrender to the Soviet Empire has moral justification as something required to appease the free world or prevent the dissolution of the UN, which to so many is the hope of the world.

Yet no one, not even the most naive, supposes that the UN will help defend us when Russian troops and planes start moving against us. No one supposes that the "free world" will rise as a man. Perhaps some individual nation in its own defense will take up arms along with us. Perhaps none will. But whatever happens, the UN can do nothing to help us even in the improbable contingency that this fantastic assembly were to vote something or other in our favor. What difference would it really make whether it voted for us or against us? If we get aid, it will come not from a "free world" but from *states,* and it will come because to give it will be the self-interested policy of some *state.* But it will not come from anyone if the United States is first blasted to rubble and threatened with invasion from Asia.

PARTY LOYALTY *vs.* PATRIOTISM

By JONATHAN MITCHELL

THERE IS talk that Chief Justice Vinson may succeed Secretary Gor'blimey in the State Department. Maybe you remember the Vinson mission to Moscow in October 1948 — the one that didn't come off. Mr. Truman and most of the Democratic party leaders were also involved in it, and it forms a case history in both a low-grade approach to treason, and what is wrong with Washington. In ordinary times, the loyalty of party leaders to their party and their loyalty to the country run along easily and side-by-side; in the present state of the world, these loyalties come repeatedly into conflict.

The notion of sending Vinson to Moscow was conceived at a time when General Marshall — then the Secretary of State — was at a UN meeting in Paris. The Berlin air-lift was on, and, after many anxious weeks, showed that the Russians would eventually be beaten. Marshall had the British, French and other Western delegates behind him, and Vishinsky was reduced sullenly to reading newspapers in the UN debates, or walking out. Word of the proposed Vinson mission was like a negative electric charge. With this seeming proof that something queer was in progress behind their backs, the Western delegates moved away from Marshall, and the pressure on Vishinsky dropped to zero. The Paris meeting was an American diplomatic fiasco, and the air-lift had to be kept going through the subsequent cold, dark and miserable winter.

What makes the Vinson mission a good case history is its plain evidence that the Democratic leaders were aware of acting against America's interest. Getting wind of their intention, Mr. Lovett — then Marshall's deputy in State — drove to the White House, and, according to report, talked to Truman with unsparing bluntness, upon which Truman caved in. Marshall came flying back from Paris; Truman met him on the runway before the news photographers, grinning apprehensively from ear to ear.

By customary standards, the Democratic leaders are good men, and true. The trouble was they were also

party men, and, besides being the year of the air-lift, 1948 was an election year. In particular, the Progressive Party had been set up, and was running Mr. Wallace for President. The party and Wallace were the American manifestations of the so-called Duclos program — that is, the dismantling of the formal and informal wartime popular fronts in the Allied countries, and the forming of independent pro-"peace" groups. In all countries, the real aim of these groups was to confuse, to delay and to paralyze.

Toward the beginning of the 1948 campaign, and while the air-lift was still in its critical phase — in the last few days of August and the first few of September — there occurred a pair of events that may have had a bearing on the later Vinson mission. The person standing against the Russians in Berlin was General Clay, but behind him in Washington was Secretary Forrestal. Forrestal was opposing the Russians all across Europe and the Near East, and plugging for American rearmament, and was perhaps the only major Administration figure whose acts were not confused, delayed or paralyzed. The first of the two events was a story by a correspondent close to the White House that Forrestal would shortly be fired from the Cabinet. When other correspondents sought a denial from Truman's press staff, none was forthcoming — which was taken as confirmation. About ten days later, the Progressive Party's headquarters in New York announced that, wherever its candidates for Congress were entered against New-Deal Democrats, they would be withdrawn — or, in cases in which this was legally impossible, would make no campaign.

The decision to send Vinson to Moscow — and thereby undermine Marshall at Paris — was taken about a month later, in the second week of October. During the same week, the Progressives let it be known Wallace would thereafter campaign only in New York and nearby Connecticut. In the vast apathy surrounding Mr. Dewey's expected victory, this announcement went unnoticed; on its face, however, it was incredible. Besides "peace," Wallace had been campaigning on the Jim-Crow issue. Earlier he had dipped into the South and been rotten-egged and ripe-tomatoed; the publicity, especially in the Negro press, had been enormous, and some northern Negroes — in a sense, as a matter of honor — had moved perceptibly to his side. The Progressives' best chance — indeed, their only chance — of a big vote was to repeat this tactic, and observers had anticipated the campaign would end in a whirling crisis of race relations. Wallace not only did not reinvade the South in the all-important last three weeks of the campaign — he hardly campaigned at all.

There is fragmentary evidence that — outside New York, where the American Labor Party had to be protected — Wallace votes were directly thrown to Truman. In Ohio, for instance, Wallace's name had been kept off the ballot and, to vote for him, it was necessary to mark a long list of Progressive electors. Many thousands of persons were found on election day to have voted for both the Progressive electors and Truman. The likeliest explanation is that they had been drilled long and hard in voting for Wallace, and overnight told to switch. Truman's plurality over Dewey was slightly more than 2,000,000 votes; my own guess is that Wallace votes account for perhaps half of it. It can not be proved, in a copper-riveted fashion, that the story about the firing of Forrestal, the Progressives' withdrawal of their Congressional candidates, the Vinson mission and Wallace's dropping of his campaign, were deals, but to think them unconnected is childish.

There have been other episodes in which the Democratic leaders have sacrificed America's interest for pro-Communist votes; the Administration's Far Eastern policy has been a long series of such episodes. It is untrue to suppose they have not known what they, and the Administration, were doing; many of them, for example, knew about Mr. Hiss months before Mr. Chambers's testimony. And yet the Democratic leaders as a group — those in the Senate and House and on the National Committee — are good men, and as good as we have a right to expect. The difficulty lies in the duty they owe their party — and all of us — to seek the votes of small dissident groups of citizens. The American political system and the systems of all Western countries have two parties, or blocs of parties; the reason for having them is to make the party or bloc in power responsive to dissident groups. The responsiveness of governments to such groups is what makes possible modern Western society, and Western liberty.

It does not untie the tangle, in my opinion, to say the American pro-Communists are not a proper dissident group, but the pawns of Russian agents. We have always had groups among us wishing to further foreign interests. For a long time the Irish-Americans were famous for this; pro-British, pro-French and other groups, often centering around the great New York banks, have at times had immense influence. We have tolerated such groups not entirely from good nature, but because there was no good way to deprive pro-foreign citizens of their votes without mangling our political system.

In the particular case of the Vinson mission, the Democratic leaders can make out a kind of defense. The mere announcement of the mission, it is true, cost America important diplomatic advantages, but, if Vinson had actually gone to Moscow, it may be taken for granted he would have stood up for America as stoutly as Marshall in Paris, and perhaps more effectively. On the other side of the ledger, the Democratic Party here at home was in real peril. The Dixiecrats had split off from one side, the Progressives from the other. If those splits had been permitted to become sharp and permanent, the party might have broken up. At best, the country would have been in for a long period of political turmoil. For the worst, think back to the breakup of the Whigs in 1856 and 1858, which left the politicians helpless to deal with the approaching Civil War.

To you and me as citizens, this defense is not convincing. Vishinsky was our enemy, and to have helped him out at Paris was next door to treason. But here again is the puzzle of the Democratic leaders' being virtual traitors. The world over, no man is more justly known as a patriot than Mr. Churchill. In last year's British election, he proposed to fly to Moscow for a meeting with Stalin — a maneuver not quite so raw and crude as the Vinson mission, but one which, if carried out, would have put Great Britain at a severe diplomatic disadvantage — and he did it to get pro-"peace" votes

from the Laborites. Like the Democratic leaders, Churchill's purpose was not to impede his country's interest, but to hold the Tory Party together, and keep the British political system running.

What was wrong with the Vinson mission, and is generally wrong with Washington, is that the world has fallen on bad times. The pro-foreign groups we were accustomed to have among us had like standards of political morals, and the foreign countries, or regions, for which they acted wished us no harm. Imitating what Hitler did in France, the Russians have found means to seduce and frighten Americans into strange behavior, and to turn our political system against us. Being marvelously interdependent in its parts, the system is not easily altered, and our political leaders, caught in the ways of their predecessors for five and six generations back, have no will to alter it.

No one can say whether we have seen the worst. By their own actions within Russia and outside, the Russians are driving Americans away from the American pro-Communist groups, and individual politicians are using these groups' hostility to get votes from the rest of us. The evil thing about the strain the pro-Communists are putting on the party leaders and political system is the temptation it gives for war. With war, a democracy becomes totalitarian by democratic process, and the pro-Communists can be democratically herded off to a democratic Tule Lake, where they would have no votes. War is a quick remedy, but it would be a long time being paid for.

MACARTHUR WAS RIGHT

By ROBERT C. RICHARDSON, JR.
(Lieutenant General U. S. Army, Ret.)

SO GENERAL MACARTHUR is a reckless tactician, and a gambler with the lives of his men, all because he launched an offensive to end the war in Korea! That was the press and radio refrain when his troops unexpectedly bumped into the masses of the Chinese Red Army that had been able to sneak across the Yalu River undetected, turning our near-victory into a defeat. Let us see whether these criticisms are justified and whether MacArthur took any chances with the lives of your sons.

When the offensive launched on November 24 failed, a storm of criticism burst forth all over the world. General MacArthur was accused of overconfidence, of arrogance, of being a law unto himself, of failing to make a proper estimate of the situation, and of a complete breakdown of his military intelligence. The British press was especially critical. The *New Statesman and Nation* continued its campaign of animosity, discrediting his achievements and his competence, and practically calling for his dismissal.

Much of this criticism was highly emotional. The disappointment over the reverse was so intense that it resulted in an attempt to place the blame almost exclusively upon General MacArthur. The chorus was loud and hysterical. Some writers appeared even gleeful that MacArthur had at last met with a defeat; that someone, even the Chinese Reds, had been able to put a few dents in his shining armor.

To read these criticisms one would think that our troops were being led by an amateur general, determined to take a desperate gamble against obvious odds. It seemed to be forgotten that General MacArthur is the most experienced, the most successful and the most brilliant soldier in our Army. All of his past career, especially his extraordinary achievements in the Pacific campaign, was for the moment discounted.

As one of his associates in the war against Japan, I knew that MacArthur gives deep thought to every problem, and that he is not a man to make half-baked decisions. I was convinced that the great decision to launch this final offensive was made only after the most careful estimate of the situation.

But a good estimate can be made only when a commander has complete information about the enemy — his location, his strength, his armament and his probable intentions. This information, when evaluated, is called either military or political intelligence, depending upon the source from which it comes. In the field, the commander is responsible for his combat intelligence, but he must look to higher headquarters for his political intelligence, which in this instance was the responsibility of the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

To pass judgment on this vital decision that led to the great retreat, one must know what intelligence was made available to MacArthur and what was the military situation at the moment.

In the realm of his own responsibility, MacArthur had his field forces to gather the information, but from the outset he was tremendously handicapped by the restrictive directives of the United Nations. He could operate only in Korea. His patrols and reconnaissance parties were enjoined against penetrating the area in which the Chinese Red Army was concentrating across the Yalu. His aviation was even more restricted, due to the proximity of the battlefront to the Yalu, and to the prohibition of air reconnaissance beyond the international border. Again, the nature of the terrain and the enemy's shrewdness in moving only at night complicated whatever air reconnaissance might have been carried out in Korea.

Reliance therefore had to be placed on the action of the ground troops. Patrols, minor attacks to capture prisoners for interrogatory purposes, radio interception, reports of local inhabitants were all used and exploited fully, but none of this intelligence disclosed the intention of the Red Chinese Army to attack as such. It did determine that there were elements of that army in North Korea. But that only confirmed the fact that Chinese were in the sector. The fiction that these Chinese were "volunteers"

was being promoted in the meetings of the United Nations. There were no disclosures of the presence in Korea of organized units of Mao's army, nor of its intention to launch a full-scale attack. Under these circumstances, MacArthur could depend only on political intelligence from Washington to inform him of what was happening across the Yalu in Manchuria. But the question is, did he receive such a warning?

From a source well qualified to know, it is reported that he did not. Political intelligence was practically nil, and it had failed to penetrate the Manchurian Iron Curtain. Had the General been warned by the State Department or the Central Intelligence Agency of the new danger confronting him, it is obvious that he would have made other plans. Having driven the North Koreans to within 35 miles of the international border, his decision to launch his final attack was based on the local intelligence which correctly reported slight opposition on his immediate front. The whole atmosphere in the United Nations and in the United States seemed to be a conviction that the Red Chinese Army would not come to the support of the North Koreans.

Now let us glance at the military situation. The first time that MacArthur ran into Chinese elements, his forces were in columns of pursuit and, as such, vulnerable to surprise mass counter-attack. He withdrew from that trap most skilfully, following which there was a general withdrawal of all enemy forces. When he reported that there were Chinese troops in Korea, indignant denials immediately arose. He was skeptical. The time had come to verify the truth or falsity of this propaganda. He had to know definitely what was in front of him, and the only way to find out was to attack and force the enemy to disclose himself. He dared not remain passive.

After his initial encounter with the Chinese Reds, there were three courses of action open to General MacArthur: to withdraw, to remain in position, or to advance. At that stage of the operations, there was no justifiable military or political reason to withdraw. To remain passively in position was to court danger, particularly as he was not permitted to use aviation for reconnaissance. No commander of experience could accept the risks involved. His position was of wide extent. It afforded freedom of maneuver, but his forces were too few to enable him to perfect an effective defensive organization in depth. As subsequent events disclosed, had he decided to remain in position, the Chinese Red Army (still thought to be in Manchuria) would have attacked at a time and place of its own choosing. It would have waited until it had built up such strength that it was assured of sustaining an operation capable of destroying the Eighth Army. The late General Walker stated that only the order to advance had saved his army from annihilation.

Failure to achieve the result does not bring into question the soundness of the decision for the reason that it revealed the presence of the Communist Chinese Armies in force, south of the Yalu, and their operations and intentions. It was indeed lucky that the General did attack. When he ran unexpectedly into the Chinese Reds, his own forces were maneuverable, and his situation was fluid. These circumstances permitted him to make an orderly withdrawal to lines of greater security without being too severely hurt, and simultaneously to inflict great losses upon the enemy.

Comment in irresponsible circles characterizes this action as a debacle. This is pure nonsense and utterly unfair to the brave men of MacArthur's command. Their organizations were always well in hand. There was never any sign of panic. The report was widely circulated, for example, that the Marine Division had been "completely decimated." Yet on December 13, in Washington, the Marine Corps headquarters announced total casualties of 3000–3300, of which about half were battle casualties, in an over-strength division. The same exaggeration prevailed regarding the other forces. But news of the orderliness and efficiency that had characterized the evacuation of the Tenth Corps from Hungnam brought a noticeable revival of public confidence.

The crux of the problem now is that we are in a new war, which no one in authority wishes to recognize. Opposed to General MacArthur's forces are the armies of Communist China, Soviet trained and Soviet equipped. In view of the restrictive directives under which MacArthur is compelled to operate, his troops face disadvantages without precedent in military history. Imagine a commander being forbidden to attack the enemy's sources of supply! It is incredible! What hope of victory can there be when our forces are so limited and there is no chance of reinforcement? General Bradley has stated publicly that nearly all of our army has been sent to Korea. Without hope of additional strength, our troops face the possibility of great disaster. Certainly there is no longer a military objective in Korea that can possibly be attained. The retention of our forces there can be only for some political reasons undisclosed to the public. Whatever they may be, they are not worth the sacrifice of our young men. Korea never was the place to stop communism, as has been proved amply by the campaign now in progress.

That we should withdraw from Korea immediately is the universal judgment of the many Americans whom I have heard discuss this matter. There is no disgrace in a withdrawal. We can afford to lose a battle or a campaign in order to win the war under more favorable circumstances. Remember that General MacArthur won the war against the North Koreans and successfully carried out the mission given him by the United Nations. There has never been the slightest sign of a debacle in Korea.

THERE ARE *at the present time two great nations in the world. . . . The Russians and the Americans. . . . The American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the people. The Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.*

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1835

THE CRY OF FREE ENTERPRISE

By GARET GARRETT

A STRANGE sight in the political firmament is American private enterprise selling itself and its works to the American people. But it is not a sign. It is an activity of the late afternoon. The sign is buyers' resistance.

How shall this sign be understood? If private enterprise can not read it, and read it grimly, not omitting a few tears in the graveyard of its own principles, then one may be permitted to wonder if it knows why it is losing its world to the Welfare State.

The question at the core of its anxiety is perfectly phrased by Professor Robert W. King, as follows:

> Why should political doctrines consistently repudiated by liberty-loving peoples throughout the centuries now be a widespread intuitional answer to the world's unfinished business? Why should there now arise a well-nigh universal faith in the guiding and ameliorative powers of the State?

This is simply to ask: What has become of that deep American intuition that unlimited government is the enemy of freedom and will in the end devour it?

The importance of getting the question reduced to that form is that all the ideological words are put aside. You look straight at the thing itself; and the thing itself is government. The staggering political fact of our time is the sudden rise in the power and authority of government — *with the consent of the people.* Continuously year after year, morning and afternoon, occasion by occasion, the sphere of government expands, the usages of compulsion become more and more familiar, and the world of private enterprise contracts.

If this continues the sequel may be foretold. You do not have to find the ideological name for it. By any name it will be the planned life, in which the individual will have exchanged liberty for status, plus a delusion of security; and the first virtue of a citizen will be obedience.

Events are impatient and swift, and the fatal fact is that many of them are irreversible, at least for a long, long time. To realize this you have only to remember what the world of private enterprise was like less than one generation ago.

The first principle in it was limited government. Taxation was for revenue only. The cost of being governed was so little that people hardly felt it. Everything else was unlimited. In the relations between government and the law-keeping citizen the word compulsion, as now used in *compulsory* thrift or *compulsory* insurance, was unknown. For the government to compete with the private citizen was thought immoral, unfair and un-American. It was a world of free markets, free prices and free contracts. Every individual was expected to take care of himself. The people supported the government and therefore controlled it.

How much of that world would you say survives?

The unlimited principle now is government. One of government's astonishing achievements has been to make itself free of the ancient restraints of money. It is no longer bound by what radical economists call the fetish of solvency. It does not have to balance its budget. When it spends more than its income, it turns the deficit into money. Taxation, which formerly was for revenue only, now is employed as a social and political instrument — that is to say, it is used to redistribute the wealth of the nation in a leveling manner. The people who pay for government no longer control it. This is not only because it is too vast to be comprehended; there is also the sinister reason that too many people now are its beneficiaries and dependents. A giant bureaucracy is necessary because government now assumes responsibility for the welfare and happiness of the individual, for his full employment and for the stability of the economy, on the ground that private enterprise is no longer up to the job. It intervenes in the labor contract and acts upon wages and the hours of labor. It minds what the farmer plants and reaps, and in return for his submission to the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture it guarantees him profitable prices. It minds what people buy and sell in Wall Street. It controls the price of capital. It is the largest lender of money, competing with private bankers; the greatest enterpriser, competing with private enterprise; the greatest trader, competing with the private trader.

"State capitalism," says Earl Browder, formerly head of the Communist Party in the United States,

> in substance if not in formal aspects has progressed further in America than in Great Britain under the Labor Government, despite its nationalization of certain industries, which is a formal stage not yet reached in America. . . . State capital in its most advanced form is taking over the field of foreign trade. No escape from this tendency is possible.

This revolutionary change in the use and meaning of government has taken place in twenty years; and although the people have accepted it, they did not vote for it in the first place. Neither in the Democratic Party's platform in 1932 nor in any of Mr. Roosevelt's campaign speeches was there the slightest glimpse of the New Deal. On the contrary, the theme of that campaign was less government, heroic economy and sound money. The process has been that defined by Aristotle as revolution within the form — "so that the ancient laws will remain while the power will be in the hands of those who have brought about a revolution in the state."

Moreover, it is an unfinished process, still going on. The further program for the Welfare State proposed by President Truman would add $25 billion a year to the civil and social expenditures of government.

The answer private enterprise gives to the question as it is phrased by Professor King is incomplete. It says something has happened to people — and by people it means not the radicals, not the new liberals, not New Dealers and Fair Dealers, nor Socialists either, but the

great mass of Americans to whom these have successfully sold the idea of the Welfare State. The people, it says, are all right, still sound and full of common sense, only they have been misled. By a plausible dialectic of fallacy, by a kind of demagogy appealing to fear and weakness, by bribery and durocracy (government by gift-giving), the people have been beguiled away from the truth upon which the American way of life was founded. They must be taught the truth again. It must be laid upon them in simple words — by slogans, by comic strips, in movies, by radio and television, by every means of mass communication.

Briefly, what the people need is Economic Education. To impart it is a job of salesmanship.

So the voice of private enterprise selling itself to the people, or, for the punch line, "selling America to Americans," now is in the air of the time. Economic Education is patriotic merchandise. If you are a corporation you can buy it by the package from competitive suppliers and distribute it to your employees. If you do not like any of the authentic packages you may hire experts who will do you one special; or you may choose which to support among the forums, councils and foundations that carry on the evangel of private enterprise, and thereby risk being haled before a committee of Congress to say why you do it — and why it is not a kind of lobbying to influence legislation.

The results so far have been mainly chargeable to experience. Whether or not economic illiteracy has been reduced in the nation may be debatable. But certain it is that the people who respond enthusiastically are generally those who do not need the education, and that those who are supposed to need it most are the least susceptible. In any case, the fortunes of the Welfare State do not wither, and the perimeter of private enterprise continues to shrink toward the sea. Its defenders begin to think they are not getting their money's worth, and to ask: What is wrong with this Economic Education?

But that is not the right question. There might be nothing wrong, and still it might fail for other reasons.

It is true that something has happened to people. There is a ponderous literature about it, and concerning the cause. In the world of economic thought it was the Keynesian corruption; in the academic world it was the infiltration of anti-capitalist doctrine; in the political world it was the voice of Roosevelt and the New Deal revolution, and since Roosevelt it has been the ceaseless, highly organized and very artful propaganda conducted by government for a Welfare State adapted from European models. The effects of this propaganda have been mainly three:

1. To make dependence upon government respectable;
2. To degrade by dialectic the simple American idea of freedom, and,
3. To break down the distinctions, hitherto very clear, between the traditional American form of government and the Socialist form — as when the State Department in a popular booklet entitled "Our Foreign Policy," with a foreword signed Harry Truman, says:

> The deepening division between the Soviet-dominated bloc and the free world is not, as some people wrongly think, a conflict between capitalism and communism. Among the nations of the free world, in fact, you will find some that are not capitalist at all, but have freely chosen a Socialist system.

There is your government telling you that freedom and socialism may dwell amicably together in the same house.

All of that has happened to people. But has nothing happened to the mind of private enterprise? It says about people that they have yielded freedom in exchange for benefits conferred upon them by a paternal government.

How much of its own world did private enterprise surrender to government in the great depression to keep itself — in the words of Harold Ickes — from going through the wringer?

In the year 1932 I sat with Ambassador Dawes in London discussing the economic debacle. I said to him: "Don't you see, General, what the trouble is? Perhaps one-third of the capital values of the world is lost and people will not believe it?"

He said: "How can anybody not believe it? There it is written before their eyes. What else could these prices mean?"

I said: "People are still hoping the old prices will come back. They will not accept the loss, write it off, and turn their backs on it."

To this he replied: "I agree. And the sooner we do that, the better."

Not long after that he came home, found his bank in great trouble, and borrowed $80,000,000 from the government to save his stockholders. When I next saw him in Chicago the New Deal was in high gear. As I walked into his office he pushed some buttons and three men came in. He said to them: "Just sit down there. I need ballast. I know what this man will say is true, but I'm afraid he's going to make me believe it." Then to me: "Now shoot."

I said: "Well, General, nothing could have persuaded me that you could ever believe in the New Deal."

"I'm not saying I do. I'm like grandpop who was telling the boy on his knees about the hound chasing the rabbit. The hound was overtaking the rabbit. He was right on top of the rabbit and his jaws were wide open to grab it, when the rabbit ran up a tree. The boy said, 'Why, grandpop, a rabbit can't run up a tree.' Grandpop said, 'I know that, too; but this one had to.' And now," the General continued, glaring at me, "if you had been under water as long as I have and had just got your nose up for one breath of air, and all that water trying to pull you down again, you'd be surprised at what you could believe in."

Whether or not private enterprise ever did believe in the New Deal, even at first, the fact is that it did most willingly embrace the New Deal's recovery program. It solemnly bound itself to live happily thereafter by government sanction and to submit American business to the police power of the Blue Eagle.

What was the program? As defined by President Roosevelt, it was "a partnership between government and farming and industry and transportation . . . a partnership in planning and a partnership to see that the plans are carried out."

In this partnership, private enterprise bound itself by written codes —

1. to limit production;
2. to repress competition, and,
3. to raise and maintain prices.

The government on its part undertook —

1. to suspend the anti-trust laws so that industry-wide agreements to limit production, restrain competition and fix prices would be beyond the reach of the Department of Justice, and,

2. to bring about a general restoration of prices by debasing the currency, that is to say, by inflation, romantically called reflation.

"The overwhelming majority of business men," said President Roosevelt, "were entirely willing to go along."

That was true. They were willing also that the few who might refuse to go along and sign the Blue Eagle pledge — these to be called chisellers — should be put in jail or punished by a public boycott engineered by government propaganda.

When it entered into this bargain with government, private enterprise betrayed every principle on which it was founded. Its world could never be the same again. Never again would it be able to make a perfectly whole case for free markets, free prices, free contracts, free competition, free production or sound money, having bargained them all away in exchange for immediate relief from the pains of deflation and loss. Moreover, by this act it conceded the basic New Deal premise, which was that private enterprise alone, without the aid of government, was unable to right the ship.

The great justification of free capitalism had always been that for all its ruthlessness it did one thing magnificently. That was to multiply the satisfactions of everyday life and to cheapen the cost of them progressively, thereby increasing the wealth of society as it had never been increased before. Here now, in willing collaboration with the planners at Washington, it was undertaking to limit the production of wealth — to produce fewer of the goods that satisfy human wants and to charge more for them.

All of this history is remembered by those who now seem impervious to Economic Education. They hear what private enterprise is saying to them about the merits of a free economy. Their difficulty is not that they do not understand it; they can not reconcile it with the fact that in 1933 private enterprise, along with the farmers and for the same reason, embraced a planned economy.

After a while the Supreme Court wrung the neck of the Blue Eagle; but by that time the government had got control of money, banking and credit. The banking world, too, had surrendered to government, and thereafter American banking was hardly more than an agency of government, with its solvency guaranteed in terms of a debased currency.

The irony of this was, as it turned out in the sequel, that the banks were not really busted. They were in a jam; they could not pay their creditors on demand. But that had happened to them before, and after having written off their losses, they had come out all right, and so it might have been again, if they had but had the courage to write a red line under their bookkeeping losses and stand fast. But when the government offered to underwrite their losses they surrendered. They were willing to condone inflation and debasement of the currency. They saved themselves and lost their world, with the result that today the moral bankruptcy of free private enterprise is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that on the question of honest money it is hopelessly divided.

Those who now write the literature of Economic Education, and those who subsidize and promote it, are deeply concerned about the fate of the American middle class. Its wealth is being destroyed.

Who is this middle class? It is every man who buys an insurance policy or a government bond or who makes a savings deposit in the bank; it is every man who trusts a dollar enough to save it by investing it or putting it under the rug.

How is its wealth being destroyed? By inflation. By what the government does to money.

If the income from your bonds, from your savings bank account or your insurance policy, buys only one-half as much as it did, then one-half of your invested wealth has vanished. According to the way of thinking that now controls the mind of government, it has vanished forever. You will never get it back. The government's thesis, as expressed by the President's Council of Economic Advisers, is that prices shall never fall again. The government will see to it. There shall be continuous expansion of the economy, supported by planned inflation, which means only that the buying power of the middle-class dollar can not rise again. Deflation is taboo.

Well, that is government; that is government theory. You may think of it what you will. But what will you think of a banking world, still clinging to the words and axioms of private enterprise, that has watched the progressive destruction of the American middle class with misgivings that dissolve into complacency as it contemplates the prodigious rise of its own profits?

Banking now is a sheltered business — sheltered by government. Its profits are practically guaranteed by government. Its deposits are insured by government. Whatever else happens, it knows that it can always get dollars from the government to pay off its depositors when and if they ask for their money back. What will the dollars be worth? Bankers now take the position that they are not responsible.

For nearly twenty years they have watched people coming up the steps with dollars in their hands; they have received these dollars through their little windows and have written the number of them down in books, knowing for sure that the dollar-bringers would be poorer when they get their money back. You might suppose that as custodians of the people's money they would have been up in crusade for honest money. You might suppose that even if they felt helpless, they would at least tell people the truth — that they might say:

"We want to tell you what happens to your money. The government comes and takes it out of our till and puts in place of it an IOU. We are helpless. We can not refuse to let the government take your money. We can not refuse to take its IOU. But what we want to tell you is that when you want your money back we shall have to pay you back in the paper dollars we get from the government, and we have no idea what those dollars will be worth."

On the subject of inflation Economic Education has been most eloquent. Inflation, it tells you, is a fatal contagion; it may destroy your form of government and

was being promoted in the meetings of the United Nations. There were no disclosures of the presence in Korea of organized units of Mao's army, nor of its intention to launch a full-scale attack. Under these circumstances, MacArthur could depend only on political intelligence from Washington to inform him of what was happening across the Yalu in Manchuria. But the question is, did he receive such a warning?

From a source well qualified to know, it is reported that he did not. Political intelligence was practically nil, and it had failed to penetrate the Manchurian Iron Curtain. Had the General been warned by the State Department or the Central Intelligence Agency of the new danger confronting him, it is obvious that he would have made other plans. Having driven the North Koreans to within 35 miles of the international border, his decision to launch his final attack was based on the local intelligence which correctly reported slight opposition on his immediate front. The whole atmosphere in the United Nations and in the United States seemed to be a conviction that the Red Chinese Army would not come to the support of the North Koreans.

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After his initial encounter with the Chinese Reds, there were three courses of action open to General MacArthur: to withdraw, to remain in position, or to advance. At that stage of the operations, there was no justifiable military or political reason to withdraw. To remain passively in position was to court danger, particularly as he was not permitted to use aviation for reconnaissance. No commander of experience could accept the risks involved. His position was of wide extent. It afforded freedom of maneuver, but his forces were too few to enable him to perfect an effective defensive organization in depth. As subsequent events disclosed, had he decided to remain in position, the Chinese Red Army (still thought to be in Manchuria) would have attacked at a time and place of its own choosing. It would have waited until it had built up such strength that it was assured of sustaining an operation capable of destroying the Eighth Army. The late General Walker stated that only the order to advance had saved his army from annihilation.

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The results so far have been mainly chargeable to experience. Whether or not economic illiteracy has been reduced in the nation may be debatable. But certain it is that the people who respond enthusiastically are generally those who do not need the education, and that those who are supposed to need it most are the least susceptible. In any case, the fortunes of the Welfare State do not wither, and the perimeter of private enterprise continues to shrink toward the sea. Its defenders begin to think they are not getting their money's worth, and to ask: What is wrong with this Economic Education?

But that is not the right question. There might be nothing wrong, and still it might fail for other reasons.

It is true that something has happened to people. There is a ponderous literature about it, and concerning the cause. In the world of economic thought it was the Keynesian corruption; in the academic world it was the infiltration of anti-capitalist doctrine; in the political world it was the voice of Roosevelt and the New Deal revolution, and since Roosevelt it has been the ceaseless, highly organized and very artful propaganda conducted by government for a Welfare State adapted from European models. The effects of this propaganda have been mainly three:

1. To make dependence upon government respectable;
2. To degrade by dialectic the simple American idea of freedom, and,
3. To break down the distinctions, hitherto very clear, between the traditional American form of government and the Socialist form — as when the State Department in a popular booklet entitled "Our Foreign Policy," with a foreword signed Harry Truman, says:

> The deepening division between the Soviet-dominated bloc and the free world is not, as some people wrongly think, a conflict between capitalism and communism. Among the nations of the free world, in fact, you will find some that are not capitalist at all, but have freely chosen a Socialist system.

There is your government telling you that freedom and socialism may dwell amicably together in the same house.

All of that has happened to people. But has nothing happened to the mind of private enterprise? It says about people that they have yielded freedom in exchange for benefits conferred upon them by a paternal government.

How much of its own world did private enterprise surrender to government in the great depression to keep itself — in the words of Harold Ickes — from going through the wringer?

In the year 1932 I sat with Ambassador Dawes in London discussing the economic debacle. I said to him: "Don't you see, General, what the trouble is? Perhaps one-third of the capital values of the world is lost and people will not believe it?"

He said: "How can anybody not believe it? There it is written before their eyes. What else could these prices mean?"

I said: "People are still hoping the old prices will come back. They will not accept the loss, write it off, and turn their backs on it."

To this he replied: "I agree. And the sooner we do that, the better."

Not long after that he came home, found his bank in great trouble, and borrowed $80,000,000 from the government to save his stockholders. When I next saw him in Chicago the New Deal was in high gear. As I walked into his office he pushed some buttons and three men came in. He said to them: "Just sit down there. I need ballast. I know what this man will say is true, but I'm afraid he's going to make me believe it." Then to me: "Now shoot."

I said: "Well, General, nothing could have persuaded me that you could ever believe in the New Deal."

"I'm not saying I do. I'm like grandpop who was telling the boy on his knees about the hound chasing the rabbit. The hound was overtaking the rabbit. He was right on top of the rabbit and his jaws were wide open to grab it, when the rabbit ran up a tree. The boy said, 'Why, grandpop, a rabbit can't run up a tree.' Grandpop said, 'I know that, too; but this one had to.' And now," the General continued, glaring at me, "if you had been under water as long as I have and had just got your nose up for one breath of air, and all that water trying to pull you down again, you'd be surprised at what you could believe in."

Whether or not private enterprise ever did believe in the New Deal, even at first, the fact is that it did most willingly embrace the New Deal's recovery program. It solemnly bound itself to live happily thereafter by government sanction and to submit American business to the police power of the Blue Eagle.

What was the program? As defined by President Roosevelt, it was "a partnership between government and farming and industry and transportation . . . a partnership in planning and a partnership to see that the plans are carried out."

In this partnership, private enterprise bound itself by written codes —

1. to limit production;
2. to repress competition, and,
3. to raise and maintain prices.

The government on its part undertook —

1. to suspend the anti-trust laws so that industry-wide agreements to limit production, restrain competition and fix prices would be beyond the reach of the Department of Justice, and,

2. to bring about a general restoration of prices by debasing the currency, that is to say, by inflation, romantically called reflation.

"The overwhelming majority of business men," said President Roosevelt, "were entirely willing to go along."

That was true. They were willing also that the few who might refuse to go along and sign the Blue Eagle pledge — these to be called chisellers — should be put in jail or punished by a public boycott engineered by government propaganda.

When it entered into this bargain with government, private enterprise betrayed every principle on which it was founded. Its world could never be the same again. Never again would it be able to make a perfectly whole case for free markets, free prices, free contracts, free competition, free production or sound money, having bargained them all away in exchange for immediate relief from the pains of deflation and loss. Moreover, by this act it conceded the basic New Deal premise, which was that private enterprise alone, without the aid of government, was unable to right the ship.

The great justification of free capitalism had always been that for all its ruthlessness it did one thing magnificently. That was to multiply the satisfactions of everyday life and to cheapen the cost of them progressively, thereby increasing the wealth of society as it had never been increased before. Here now, in willing collaboration with the planners at Washington, it was undertaking to limit the production of wealth — to produce fewer of the goods that satisfy human wants and to charge more for them.

All of this history is remembered by those who now seem impervious to Economic Education. They hear what private enterprise is saying to them about the merits of a free economy. Their difficulty is not that they do not understand it; they can not reconcile it with the fact that in 1933 private enterprise, along with the farmers and for the same reason, embraced a planned economy.

After a while the Supreme Court wrung the neck of the Blue Eagle; but by that time the government had got control of money, banking and credit. The banking world, too, had surrendered to government, and thereafter American banking was hardly more than an agency of government, with its solvency guaranteed in terms of a debased currency.

The irony of this was, as it turned out in the sequel, that the banks were not really busted. They were in a jam; they could not pay their creditors on demand. But that had happened to them before, and after having written off their losses, they had come out all right, and so it might have been again, if they had but had the courage to write a red line under their bookkeeping losses and stand fast. But when the government offered to underwrite their losses they surrendered. They were willing to condone inflation and debasement of the currency. They saved themselves and lost their world, with the result that today the moral bankruptcy of free private enterprise is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that on the question of honest money it is hopelessly divided.

Those who now write the literature of Economic Education, and those who subsidize and promote it, are deeply concerned about the fate of the American middle class. Its wealth is being destroyed.

Who is this middle class? It is every man who buys an insurance policy or a government bond or who makes a savings deposit in the bank; it is every man who trusts a dollar enough to save it by investing it or putting it under the rug.

How is its wealth being destroyed? By inflation. By what the government does to money.

If the income from your bonds, from your savings bank account or your insurance policy, buys only one-half as much as it did, then one-half of your invested wealth has vanished. According to the way of thinking that now controls the mind of government, it has vanished forever. You will never get it back. The government's thesis, as expressed by the President's Council of Economic Advisers, is that prices shall never fall again. The government will see to it. There shall be continuous expansion of the economy, supported by planned inflation, which means only that the buying power of the middle-class dollar can not rise again. Deflation is taboo.

Well, that is government; that is government theory. You may think of it what you will. But what will you think of a banking world, still clinging to the words and axioms of private enterprise, that has watched the progressive destruction of the American middle class with misgivings that dissolve into complacency as it contemplates the prodigious rise of its own profits?

Banking now is a sheltered business — sheltered by government. Its profits are practically guaranteed by government. Its deposits are insured by government. Whatever else happens, it knows that it can always get dollars from the government to pay off its depositors when and if they ask for their money back. What will the dollars be worth? Bankers now take the position that they are not responsible.

For nearly twenty years they have watched people coming up the steps with dollars in their hands; they have received these dollars through their little windows and have written the number of them down in books, knowing for sure that the dollar-bringers would be poorer when they get their money back. You might suppose that as custodians of the people's money they would have been up in crusade for honest money. You might suppose that even if they felt helpless, they would at least tell people the truth — that they might say:

"We want to tell you what happens to your money. The government comes and takes it out of our till and puts in place of it an IOU. We are helpless. We can not refuse to let the government take your money. We can not refuse to take its IOU. But what we want to tell you is that when you want your money back we shall have to pay you back in the paper dollars we get from the government, and we have no idea what those dollars will be worth."

On the subject of inflation Economic Education has been most eloquent. Inflation, it tells you, is a fatal contagion; it may destroy your form of government and

consume your liberties. Why are people not terrified? Why do they seem to doubt it?

The answer is that they see private enterprise violating its own precepts. In its day-by-day behavior private enterprise makes a working compromise with evil. Generally its position is that the government is entirely responsible for inflation and that, until people do something about government, business is obliged to sup with satan under the sign of the cross. The habit of its moral accommodation is progressive: witness the history of wages in the last five years.

More and more the principle of relating wages to production gives way to the idea of tying them to the cost of living. This of course begets only more inflation. The higher wages are added to prices, with the effect that the cost of living rises again, wherefore wages must be raised again.

Yielding the case for a fifth round of wage increase in five years, yielding it even before negotiations opened, on the ground that it was in the pattern, the president of the United States Steel Corporation said it would be only a little inflationary, and asked: Could we not better afford a little more inflation than a struggle with labor that would interrupt the production of steel?

At a recent gathering of bankers, industrialists and merchants the president of a great railroad, reporting on the state of business, said: "Business was never so good and never so unsound."

The laughter that greeted this statement was cathartic. It purged away unbidden thoughts. Inflation was the cause of this frenzy of business, "with people buying everything whether they need it or not"; inflation was the source of the great profits rising on the books of business from meeting an insatiable demand in a seller's market with cost-plus pricing; inflation at the same time was the hagfish that enters the body of prosperity and devours it from within. Every man there knew that. Every man there knew that his profits were unreal. And every man there knew secretly what nobody would say, namely, that business would sooner have illusory profits, knowing them to be illusory, than to have no profit at all.

The only medicine that will cure inflation is a return to government solvency and sound money; but it is a bitter dose and the patient for a while may be pretty sick. There would be deflation of prices, of credit, of profits, and possibly a deflation of wages. Who wants deflation?

Certainly private enterprise does not want it. On the contrary, dread of loss inclines it to hope that the planners at Washington with their new economics may be right when they say the powers of government can be employed so to administer the nepenthe of inflation as to stabilize the delirium of perpetual boom. Suppose it worked. All human experience says it can not work, or not for long. But suppose it did. There would be a price to pay. And the price would be a further shrinkage in the world of private enterprise and a corresponding increase in the sphere of government authority, perhaps to the point of finality.

To avoid the awful pains of deflation and to save its profits, is private enterprise willing to pay that price? If so, there is nothing more to be said; and it is only whimsical to ask: Who will sell American private enterprise to itself?

THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID

I am not at all sure that Great Britain would care to have a gift from the taxpayers of the United States. I doubt it very much.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, December 17, 1940

These simple, earthy men did not look like any terrible threat to Chungking and world stability [Describing Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh and other Chinese Communist leaders at Yenan].

THEODORE H. WHITE and ANNALEE JACOBY in "Thunder Out of China," 1946

. . . coincident with the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two Governments it will be the fixed policy of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: To refrain and to restrain all persons in government service and all organizations of the Government or under its direct or indirect control, including organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from it, from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatsoever to injure the tranquility, prosperity, order, or security of the whole or any part of the United States . . .

MAXIM LITVINOV in a communication to President Roosevelt, November 16, 1933

Russia needs to secure her borders and can not possibly allow the small Baltic states, for example, ever again to be made use of by reactionary powers for aggressive purposes. Soviet Russia wants not only a free, strong and independent Poland, but an independent and prosperous Turkey, Persia and China; and will undoubtedly work toward these ends.

ARTHUR UPHAM POPE, *New Masses*, June 22, 1943

On the economic front my views are left. I can support for that reason the Soviet dictatorship, which tolerates no civil liberties. I do so because, though I oppose dictatorship in principle, the Soviet Union has already achieved economic liberties far greater than exist elsewhere in the world. In the long run the only ground on which liberty can be securely based is economic. The "workers' democracy," despite the limitations of dictatorship, is the nearest approach to freedom that workers have ever achieved — and they constitute all but a small minority.

ROGER BALDWIN, letter to the *Nation*, January 23, 1935

TRUMAN'S LEADERSHIP HAS UNITED THE NATION

His Prompt and Decisive Action Ended Differences and Started All Departments Running Smoothly

Headline in the *New York Times*, July 2, 1950

The Freeman *invites contributions to this column, and will pay $2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged.* THE EDITORS

THE STRATEGIC MIDDLE EAST

By BONNER FELLERS

LENIN once said that the road to communism is through preaching nationalism to subject peoples. Today Communist agents in the Middle East are busy preaching this Lenin doctrine. Unfortunately for the free world, their audience is receptive.

A million Arab refugees, homeless, undernourished, living in caves; thirty million non-independent North Africans smarting under French domination; peoples of Iraq, Jordan and Egypt irate under occupation by British troops, are all making the going easy for the Communist agitators.

The negative policy of the United States toward these critical areas serves to aggravate the situation. The fault lies largely in the fact that we deal with the Middle East through the eyes, interests and prejudices of our European allies. Britain is accorded primary interest; it is British policy which we follow there. The United States is represented not by traditional American love of freedom but rather by those European powers, especially Britain, which tell us where to stand so as best to further their own aims.

The unfortunate part of our policy is that the Allies who influence us are colonial powers, interested in the exploitation of the Middle East and North Africa. Consequently, their position there is most unenviable.

Since 1882 the British have dominated the Egyptians by force. British troops on the Suez are unwelcome. The Egyptians want to guard their *own* territory. The dispute over the Egyptian Sudan remains unresolved. The failure of the UN to act on these issues drives Egypt from closer association with the Western powers.

In North Africa the situation is worse than in Egypt. There the French maintain a colonial administration which amounts to serfdom. Morocco had been independent of European domination for more than a thousand years. It was not until the nineteenth century that the French, British and Spanish made heavy inroads of Empire. In 1912 Morocco became a French protectorate with loss of liberty and individual freedom. Tunisia under French domination is stricken with poverty, and the people have been crushed by force.

While passing through the Mediterranean in 1943, President Roosevelt — possibly with tongue in cheek — promised the Sultan of Morocco: "I will never allow this state of things to exist after the war. This exploitation by foreigners is not in the interest of the people." And the Sultan of Morocco is still loyal to America, hoping constantly that this pledge will still be honored by the freedom-loving American people. Yet when the oppressed Arabs and Jews of North Africa protest their troubles, they find that the United States is strangely silent and, behind the scenes, supports the European powers.

Communists from France and Russia, protesting their objective to be liberty for all, are pressing for an Arab Alliance. And thus, in spite of the solemn commitment of the United States to contain communism, our policy in the Middle East and North Africa actually furthers its extension!

The incomprehensible part of this policy is that it is contrary to our own best interests, for the Middle East is critical, key terrain, vital to our success against Communist expansion. The Middle East is a fabulous land which has been fought over for centuries. It is the bridgehead to three continents. In it lie vast oil fields, the Suez Canal and potential strategic bases.

If war comes, the collapse of our 50-division European defense would appear certain. Against it Stalin can hurl a formidable Red Army which can be stepped up readily from its present strength of 200 divisions to 500 or even a thousand, should he need them. Only an extreme optimist would count on our being able to hold air bases in western Europe. Spain, however, may be enabled to resist by her Pyrenees barrier. We hope that Britain would offer an unsinkable aircraft base, but again the fortunes of war might deny us its use. We must have flexibility to our plans.

There are excellent potential air base sites in Libya. Possibly these are the closest to Russia which we would be able to hold with small ground forces. Here the water and desert barriers of the Mediterranean and Middle East would prevent Russia from throwing the full weight of the Red Army against us. From these bases, which offer unlimited dispersal areas, medium bombers and long-range fighters can strike deep into Russia; from them they can deny Russia the oil of Rumania and Saudia Arabia. When one realizes that 40 per cent of the known oil reserves of the world lie in the Middle East, the necessity of being able to deny this oil to Russia becomes imperative.

Today the Middle East has been caught physically and ideologically between the surging, irreconcilable forces of the East and West. Communists tell these non-independent peoples that European colonial imperialists — backed by America — seek only exploitation. Western propaganda warns them against the Communists who seek to enslave the world. Each of these forces is so overpowering that the people must yield eventually to one or the other.

In view of the strategic importance of the Middle East we can not afford to lose the ideological struggle there.

Africa, also, is part of Stalin's program for world communization. Once in possession of the Middle East, the extension of Red domination over all Africa would be greatly facilitated. Loss of Africa would be a tragedy to the Western powers, for this undeveloped continent, rich in natural resources, offers to Europe and America a vast potential market.

The African people number fewer than 200 million; they are wretchedly poor. But provide them with better food and medical care, and the population would doubtless double in two generations. The natives, being inclined

essentially to agriculture, could help feed Europe in exchange for manufactured goods. Thus abundance could be created readily both in Europe and Africa. The fly in the ointment lies in the fact that free Europe, still stunned from World War II, is unable to devote its energies to Africa, where the Communist threat is real and immediate.

The key to the solution of our problem in the Middle East and Africa lies in Egypt. Egypt exercises a strange mystic control over the Arab and Moslem worlds. If the United States policy toward Egypt were direct from Americans to Egyptians; if our attitude contained warmth — and I do not mean money; if Egypt could count on a close relationship, culturally, economically and militarily, the Arab and Moslem worlds could be aligned closely with the free peoples of the world. A series of fortunate events in history makes this Egyptian leadership possible.

For centuries, either the Ottoman Empire or Germany — and sometimes both — served to keep the great Russian bear from wandering over Europe and the Middle East. The Ottoman Empire had held together because its people possessed a common culture and a defiant, compelling religious faith. Like Austria-Hungary, it was a bi-national Empire in which the Turk and Arab were united by an indigenous political-religious ideology.

But gradually, as the Ottoman Empire met the impact of Western influence, its components became weak. Then World War I collapsed the Empire. The Turks and Arabs separated. The Turks became independent and looked to the materialism of the West. The Arabs broke up into tribes which fell under the domination of France, Spain, Great Britain and Italy.

In 1923 Turkey threw away the Caliph cloak and declared for Westernized methods without reservation. She held that Islam and modern civilization were incompatible, and she elected to be modern. To the Moslem this act amounted to a renouncement of his faith. It offended his sensitive feelings; it troubled his conscience. He pondered: Is it true that I can not be modern and progressive and yet keep the faith of my fathers?

On the other hand, when Egypt firmly accepted Western materialism and at the same time firmly retained her old faith, it caught the Moslem's imagination. The stand gladdened his conscience. Egypt became his Mecca — a progressive state by Eastern standards, with a flavor of Western methods, and still a Moslem state to which the same 400 million Moslems of the world could turn with pride. Here was a country tolerant toward religion; free of inquisition, staunch for personal liberty — democratic — *yet Moslem.* To anyone who dreams of a close union of all Arabic and Moslem peoples, Egypt, especially Cairo, represents his ideal. Here he finds everything he likes from religion to political intrigue, from art to prostitution. Egypt's victory of tolerance was a victory for Moslems everywhere.

Leadership in Egypt may not always be good, but it is accepted by the Arabs and Moslems who follow blindly and who like to commit the same mistakes. Egypt enjoys such an enviable position that the most convincing proof to a Moslem that a thing is correct is — if it is done that way in Egypt.

But Egypt is more than a Moslem state where East meets West. Since the nineteenth century Egypt has been a Mediterranean power. Her population exceeds 20 millions; her annual imports amount to half a billion dollars. No longer bound by the sterling bloc — Britain repudiated her Egyptian war debt of half a billion pounds — Egypt is free to turn to the United States. Egypt seeks no money from us — only trade, cultural relations, and mutually beneficial defensive measures. She can not turn to Russia, which has nothing to offer in trade, culture, security, or freedom. Although Egypt realizes the strength of her leadership in the Arab and Moslem worlds, she does not know how best to exercise it.

The hand we extend to her is guided by European colonial powers. Consequently, Egypt is not free to throw her weight with us. Yet the United States sorely needs the support and friendship of the Arab and Moslem worlds to which Egypt is the key. This is essential to the success of our policy of containment. The next move must be ours.

To effect the support we need to contain communism, deter war and win if war comes, the United States should:

1. Stop underwriting European colonialism. (Communism can not be defeated by support of colonialism.)
2. Adopt a policy of dealing directly with the Middle East rather than blindly following the British.
3. Endorse the principle of self-government — *everywhere.*
4. Encourage the formation of a defensive Mediterranean Alliance, to include Spain.
5. Help equip, if requested, local forces for the defense of air bases.
6. Extend the Monroe Doctrine over those members of the Alliance which are vital to our security.

Such a new and better relationship with the Middle East could be achieved merely by a change in our attitude. This would not destroy our firmly established relationships with France and Britain because in the long run, our stand would benefit them in the furtherance of world peace.

In the final analysis communism, which is an ideology, can not be destroyed by force and bayonets. It can be destroyed only by another, and *better* ideology. We possess this better ideology, but in the Middle East we have permitted it to become submerged. It is still not too late to correct our mistakes if we decide to fight communism by furthering the cause of freedom.

THINGS WE'D LIKE TO FORGET

That Russia is enjoying a great Trojan-horse laugh on us.

That it isn't so much the interest on a 1941 E-Bond that bothers us, it's the principal of the thing.

That we have done more to wreck national security in five years than Russia could do to build up her own with any number of five-year plans.

That trading with the enemy is a bold British custom.

That the government's inflation bellows is melting the freeze.

EDMUND J. KIEFER

ARIZONA RECLAMATION MUDDLE

By OLIVER CARLSON

RECLAMATION is a sacred word to the people of the water-hungry states of the Far West. Ever since the days of Brigham Young in Utah a hundred years ago, Westerners have been reclaiming arid lands and turning them into fertile farms and orchards. Slowly and painfully they have learned how to impound the water from melting snows, from the occasional rains, and from mighty rivers such as the Colorado and the Columbia. The great urban and industrial centers of southern California would be non-existent but for the genius of reclamation engineers. The careful husbanding and scientific distribution of the impounded water have increased the well-being of farmers and city folk alike throughout the entire West.

Every Westerner knows this. That is why reclamation is a sacred word to him. That is why reclamation has become a potent factor in western politics. In recent years almost every ambitious politician, no matter what his party label, has promised his constituents more water through greater and ever greater reclamation projects.

For the past three years Congress has been considering the most fantastic reclamation project — as to scope, cost, and amount of land to be reclaimed — ever to be conceived by the United States Bureau of Reclamation. Known as the Central Arizona Project, this amazing irrigation plan was approved by the Senate of the United States last year and may very well have been passed by the Senate again by the time this article is in print.

The overwhelming mass of Americans have never heard or read about the Central Arizona Project. Most of those who have heard about it think of it primarily as a battle between the states of California and Arizona for the use of Colorado River water — with big, prosperous California seeking to deny little, underpopulated Arizona its just share of this water. Public sympathy, therefore, quite naturally goes to the underdog — to Arizona. The propagandists and lobbyists for this project have succeeded in keeping public attention focused on the have-*vs*-have-not aspect of the controversy rather than on whether it is economically justifiable or financially sound.

What does the Central Arizona Project propose to do? Its primary purpose is to "rescue" approximately 150,000 acres of Arizona desert land which were put under cultivation during the war boom days of the early 1940s, and to supply water for a possible additional 100,000 acres.

To achieve this "rescue" it is proposed (1) to build a mighty dam on the Colorado River above Hoover Dam; (2) to build, below Parker Dam, four pump lifts which would raise 1,200,000 acre feet of irrigation water to a height of almost a thousand feet; and (3) a network of aqueducts and canals for transporting this water over 315 miles across Arizona where it finally would be used to grow ordinary field crops.

Here indeed is an engineer's dream! Here is to be erected a mighty Niagara in reverse, with ten billion pounds of water being lifted to a height of 985 feet every 24 hours. The amount of electric power needed just to lift this water from Lake Havasu to the top of the ridge would be more than ample to power a thousand large factories or to meet the domestic needs of a city of half a million population.

The cost of this amazing project was estimated by the Bureau of Reclamation at $738 million in 1948. In view of the Bureau's long record of underestimating costs, plus the increased costs for both labor and materials since 1948, it is a safe assumption that original costs on the Central Arizona Project would exceed a billion dollars today. This is five times the cost of the Hoover Dam, many times the cost of the Panama Canal, much more than the cost of developing the TVA — and far greater than the cost of the proposed St. Lawrence Seaway.

The area to be benefited is all within the state of Arizona, and the project would directly benefit only about 25,000 farmers. Secretary of Interior Oscar Chapman and his Reclamation Bureau's report admitted that there are only about 6000 farms within the project area and that, of these, 420 farms contain 55 per cent of the land to be irrigated. In other words, the project would give benefits of more than $550,000 to each of these 420 large landholders, and of tens of thousands of dollars to each of the other 5600 farm owners.

If the people of Arizona wish to make such magnificent gifts to a few of their farmers, we in the other 47 states have nothing to say about it. But when the entire billion-dollar cost of this project is to be borne by the taxpayers of the nation, for the benefit of a handful of land speculators in Arizona, then the matter is very much our concern. And that is precisely what the Central Arizona Project proposes.

Furthermore, the Bureau of Reclamation insists that the Arizona farmers who are to receive the water can afford to pay only $4.50 per acre foot for it. But, on the basis of the 50-year repayment period proposed, the cost of delivering this water would amount to $18 per acre foot annually — or *approximately four times the charge estimated by the Bureau.* Here again the burden of cost would fall upon the taxpayers from Maine to Washington, and from Minnesota to Mississippi.

Former Senator Downey of California testified last year:

> Central Arizona land is worth *at most* $300 per acre . . . but at $300 per acre, the whole irrigated area of Central Arizona, less than 600 thousand acres, could be bought for $180,000,000, and the 150 thousand acres at stake could be bought for $45,000,000.

I find that the United States Agricultural Census for 1945 lists *the total value of all farm lands and buildings in the State of Arizona at $287,000,000.* The original expenditures for the Central Arizona Project would be almost three times that figure!

There are times and conditions under which we can not count the dollars-and-cents expenditures for a project. Could it be that the products to be grown on the "rescued" land are so vital to our national existence that we must not count the cost? They are potatoes, wheat, corn, cotton, barley, oats and sorghum. Are these scarce products? Quite the contrary — they are precisely the ones which have been in over-supply year after year. They are the ones for which the American taxpayer has paid out hundreds of millions of dollars for price support programs *precisely because they were a drug on the market.* To spend an additional billion dollars in Arizona to keep these surplus crops on the market appears to be the height of economic stupidity.

At this point readers may well ask themselves how such a fantastic project can receive serious consideration by Congress or be seriously proposed by the Department of the Interior and its Reclamation Bureau.

First and foremost, this billion-dollar project has vast political implications. The project, it has been estimated, would take from eight to twelve years to complete. A working force of from ten to twenty thousand people would be constantly employed within the state. The number of federal patronage jobs would be very great, and the spending of a billion dollars in a state with a population of approximately 750,000 would give the party in power a complete stranglehold over the people of the state. To land speculators, contractors, jobbers, liquor dealers, gamblers and union bosses, it should prove a bonanza of fabulous dimensions. And a grab-bag pattern would have been set, which politicians and land speculators in other western states would rapidly seek to follow. For there are still millions of potential irrigable acres in the West. The Bureau of Reclamation has already worked out plans for projects which would cost nearly $19 billion, and it has on its drawing boards an additional set of projects with an estimated cost of $29 billion.

Here indeed are projects to gladden the heart of every believer in the continued expansion of big government. But it is a frightening prospect to all others.

Bernard DeVoto, who was born in the West and knows it well, called this development "A state of mind . . . that could produce a national disaster."

> The engineering projects in the West [he wrote] amount to an American Five Year Plan, Fifty Year Plan, and Hundred Year Plan rolled up together. They are going to be carried through as far as the credit of the United States will permit. The western bloc in Congress will see to it that they are, and Senator Douglas's superb and wholly futile attack on the last pork bill shows what the technique is. What President Truman said about these projects on his western tour amounted to just this: I bought the West two years ago and I'm here to assure you that there is enough money so that you'll be happy to stay bought. There is no party line in these matters, the only answer a Republican candidate would bother to make out West would be a promise to pay still more.
>
> Meanwhile the Five-Fifty-Hundred Year Plan calls for by far the largest expenditure the United States has ever made for internal improvements, by far the largest it has ever made for anything except war and defense. Ninety per cent of its objectives, at this stage, are entirely hypothetical. An undetermined part of them are also fantasy, guess, mirage, dream, vision, hope: some part of them will fail; some part of them may turn out to be fairly large-scale disasters.

It is high time that the people of the western states look more closely at the reclamation projects offered to them by the Bureau of Reclamation and power-hungry politicians. No land should be reclaimed and irrigated at excessive cost, or to produce crops of which we already have a surplus or which can be produced cheaper elsewhere. There are tens of millions of acres of cultivable land in the Midwest, the Deep South, and the East which can be reclaimed at a fraction of the cost of western lands. In these areas the problem is simple — that of draining swamp lands and of building dykes and levees.

A group of experts at Stanford University who have been working on a water resources policy for the United States declared in their group report that "Agricultural production in excess of its present output must increasingly rely on the area of the nation which has a net surplus of precipitation, i.e., the eastern half." And they warned: "If irrigation to expand farm production in the West should be given priority, the transfer of population westward would have to stop far short of what it otherwise might be . . . therefore, the use of water for agricultural irrigation should by no means have priority when it would curtail the desirable expansion of homes or industry."

These experts further insisted: "In our view there is no longer (if there ever was) any economic or social justification for subsidizing federal irrigation projects, whether by charging no interest on allocated costs, leniency in levying interest-free charges on users of irrigation water, or by transfer of either surplus power revenues or interest collected on the power investment. These practices have been the source of waste of federal funds, which will presumably be multiplied many times if the practices are continued."

Arizona has in Senator Ernest W. McFarland (majority leader of the Senate) and Senator Carl Hayden two astute and powerful champions of the fantastic Central Arizona Project. By political logrolling, trading, and through their key positions on the Rules and Appropriations committees, these Senators were able to get their measure passed by a vote of 55 to 28.

The present national emergency may give pause to many Senators and Congressmen before they vote for this measure again in 1951. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that politicians will attempt to tie it in with national emergency measures.

PENTHESELEA

Noble and gentle Amazon, be true
To your stern vow. Give not with your curved lips
And kissing laughter, as the languid do,
With your warm-clasping arms and cool slim hips,
And muscles hard as gold, and breasts in hue
And mold like snowy morning, and the thrill
Of your deep supple thought — give not the will.
Give never with your gifts the giver too.
Walk in the earth when to this depth enraptured;
Walk far and fast. Let space and time renew
The inner clear flame-arrow and reset
The string. Walk with the sky's wind, the uncaptured.
Stand with the pines till solitary. Let
The firm earth, first as last, companion you.

MAX EASTMAN

THE MOVIES AND PROPAGANDA

By HARRY FELDMAN

IN A speech before the New York County Lawyers' Association on December 14, 1950, Governor Thomas E. Dewey revealed himself as the first responsible American political leader to recognize the strategic importance of the motion picture in the current struggle against the Soviet Union. "Let's make our propaganda offensive mean something," he declared; "where Russia sends one movie showing they are saving the world, let us send ten good ones."

Unfortunately, it is my duty to report that there is little likelihood of these brave words ever being implemented by action. We do not have ten good films to send abroad this year. I doubt that we have even one. When I glance at the movie advertisements in the daily papers, I find such exhibits being offered as: "Pagan Love Song" ("Musical filmed in a tropical paradise"), "Mr. Music" ("Hear 'Life Is So Peculiar' and eight other hit tunes"), "For Heaven's Sake" ("That Belvedere man again"), "Vendetta" (with Faith Domergue, "latest star discovery of Howard Hughes who brought you Jean Harlow and Jane Russell"), "Harvey" ("More laughs than I've had in months"), and others just as silly.

Alas, poor humanity! When the Visigoths invaded northern Africa in the Fifth Century A.D. and attacked the ancient city of Carthage, they found the populace engaged not in defending the walls but in watching a circus. If, God forbid, war should break out tomorrow and enemy planes come to bomb our cities, would we, to our everlasting shame, be found sitting in movie palaces and watching Clark Gable sedulously striving to please Barbara Stanwyck?

The boot, alas, in Mr. Churchill's famous phrase, is on the other foot. It is not the Americans but the Russians who are effectively using the film to advance their political and ideological aims. This is attested by no less a figure than Cecil B. DeMille, the dean of Hollywood directors, who, in a book called "Soviet Cinema," edited by A. Arossev (Moscow: Voks, 1935), wrote:

> In the fifteen years since the Soviet Cinema was instituted as a national medium of expression it has grown to a point where it can now teach its teacher. Using our American technique as a basis, it has since built for itself a mode of expression which is entirely individual, and which now contributes ideas to workers in this art in other countries. . . .
>
> Hollywood sat up and took notice when such pictures as "Potemkin," "Ten Days That Shook the World," "The Old and the New," "China Express," "Storm Over Asia," "The Pass to Life" and other Soviet films were shown here. We saw a new force and a new outlook. We saw a technique which would translate abstract ideas into a vivid visual form. The spirit of experimentation, the life's blood of any art, which was evident in the Soviet cinema, stimulated us into more daring experiment with our own ideas.

I reprint this somewhat astonishing statement not in order to provide Senator McCarthy with material with which to embarrass Mr. De Mille, but as an indication of the power with which the Soviets have wielded the cinema as a political weapon. Opinions may vary as to the artistic merit of Soviet films. The critic may decry the didactic approach, the excessive speech making, and the dialectical stultification of the more recent productions; but the effectiveness as propaganda of such works as "Lenin in 1918," "The Vow," "Alexander Nevsky," "The Turning Point," "The Battle of Stalingrad," "The Young Guard," and "Distant Journey" can not be denied.

On the film front the Soviets are scoring an overwhelming victory against American movies. The Soviet films aggressively seek to promote the interests of the Soviet Union as conceived by its leaders. They aim to glorify the Soviet leaders, the victories of the Red Army, the collective system of agriculture, the achievements of Soviet industry, and the discoveries of Soviet science. Their purpose is to instill Soviet patriotism and a fanatical devotion to the Soviet cause, and to this end they evoke the greatness of Russia's past — the almost legendary achievements of Alexander Nevsky, Peter the Great, Marshal Suvorov, General Kutuzov, Admiral Nakhimov and Alexander Pushkin. American films, however, are not even engaged in battle. Their purpose is not to promote America. They do not aim to glorify the priceless American heritage of freedom and democracy, the traditions of our armed forces, and the achievements of American industry and agriculture. Neither do they seek to inculcate American patriotism, nor do they endeavor to evoke the greatness of our past — the almost legendary achievements of Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton and Lincoln, the struggle of generations to settle the wilderness, and the tradition that made of America a home and a haven for the oppressed and exploited and disinherited of all lands. If the fate of our country rested upon our films, I am afraid that we would be conquered overnight.

In Hollywood movies are produced for the purpose of providing what is euphemistically described as "entertainment." Actually, of course, it is simply to make money. To this end Hollywood lets loose at the world a barrage of propaganda almost equal in volume to that of the Soviet Union. But the object of this propaganda is to promote the interests not of America but of Hollywood itself. It is to convince millions of people that life in Hollywood is a glamorous round of parties and swimming pools, that even the most unstable neurotics among the stars are really wonderful people, and that an industry which in 1950 did not create a single film even remotely comparable to Eisenstein's "Potemkin" (1925) is today at the height of its technical and artistic accomplishment.

The propaganda issued by Hollywood probably surpasses in mendacity even that of the Soviet Union. For it is quite possible that the leaders of the USSR themselves believe that their system would benefit mankind, just as Torquemada was apparently convinced that the Spanish Inquisition was a salutary method of extirpating sin and saving souls. But the people in Hollywood notoriously do not believe in their own publicity. I would rather see the most wooden and uninspired propaganda in behalf of America than this ceaseless trumpeting of Hollywood's virtues and glamour. Actually, however, the most powerful, because indirect, propaganda would be the free and untrammelled expression of American artistic genius. Hollywood ought to forget its clutching desire for glorifying itself, and go to work to produce some good pictures.

If Governor Dewey, when he advocated that we "make our propaganda offensive mean something," really meant what he said, then he should take positive steps to stimulate the enterprisers of his own state. There is much that New York can do. Because Hollywood is more bent upon making propaganda for itself than on producing pictures that would do credit to the nation, it does not follow that America must remain impotent on the film front. It is entirely possible for New York to sponsor a new type of film far more representative of America than the Hollywood product. Such was the dream of the late Mayor La Guardia. The state has the intellectual talent, the studio facilities, and the necessary capital and labor. It is the Governor's duty to goad New York citizens to action.

FROM OUR READERS

Answering Mr. Wallace

I was deeply interested in Mr. Henry Wallace's revelation that he did not know who worked for him when he was Secretary of Agriculture in the thirties.

Did he know who worked for him when he ran for President of the United States on the "Progressive," or Kremlin, ticket in 1948? Did he know that it was the same old Department of Agriculture crowd?

Did he know that his campaign manager was C. B. Baldwin? Did he know that his counsel were Lee Pressman, Nathan Witt and John Abt, all of whom were named by Whittaker Chambers and *Pressman himself* as members of the general staff which established the original Red underground in the American government? Did he know that the "Progressive" Party's research department was in the hands of Charles Kramer and Victor Perlo, one of whom was an ex-Agriculture man and both of whom are accused of membership in the same general staff?

As Moran used to say to Mack (or maybe Mack used to say to Moran) "Brother, yoh ignorance is *refreshing!*"

Hopewell, New Jersey — ROBERT CRUISE MCMANUS

How Fake Is Feikema?

In the *Freeman*, issue of January 22, Edith H. Walton writes a review about a book by Feike Feikema, "The Brother." Miss Walton begins by telling us that " 'The Brother' is the second volume of a trilogy — which, somewhat grandiloquently, is to be called 'World's Wanderer.' " Now, what to hell is so grandiloquent about that title? Is it any more grandiloquent than "The Wandering Jew," "Paradise Lost," "The World's Illusion," "Sanctuary," "Intruder in the Dust," "Crime and Punishment" and "The Naked and the Dead"?

Miss Walton harps on Feikema's grossness. Is that bad? Grossness was bad under Cromwell but it was okay during the Restoration. Rabelais, without his grossness, would have been lost to the world. Grossness is like a comet, appearing every so often in the mores. It is often like a badly needed dose of epsom salts.

In her concluding sentence Miss Walton says: "Maybe this trilogy is just something he had to get out of his system." Well, isn't it highly possible that all art — whether great or small — has to be got out of the system? Bach's B-Minor Mass had to be got out of the system — even if it was ordered by the Church. That goes for Handel's Water Music which nobody ordered in advance . . . and for Beethoven's Choral Ninth . . . and for the cave art of the primitives (or do you think the Duveen brothers were around at the time?) . . .

New York City — HARRY SERWER

Long Overdue

I have read each issue of the *Freeman* from cover to cover and am happy that a long overdue vehicle has finally arrived on the American scene. Amazing America — Cadillacs and deep freezers, television and jet planes, atom bombs and billions of gold buried at Fort Knox, and only one small journal devoted to that one thing essential to the proper use of all the rest!

San Diego, California — WILLIAM C. BLACK, M.D.

A Tonic for Americans

I notice that our "liberal" dailies, the *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune*, seldom — if ever — mention "Herbert Hoover, American Quaker," by David Hinshaw. It should be read by every American, and should be included in all high school and college history courses. It rewrites the history of this last quarter century, so that we can see and understand the distortion and deliberate defamation of this saddest era. This fine volume is a tonic for true Americans, a breath of fresh air in these days of Socialist smog.

Your magazine is sweeping the country and arrived in the nick of time.

West Orange, N. J. — ISABELLE LANDON

On the ACLU

I read with great interest a letter to the *Freeman* from the Director of Public Relations of the American Civil Liberties Union.

In its 1943 Report to the Legislature, the Legislative Committee investigating un-American activities in California reported the following finding:

> The American Civil Liberties Union may be definitely classed as a Communist front or "transmission belt" organization. At least 90 per cent of its efforts are expended on behalf of Communists who come into conflict with the law. While it professes to stand for free speech and free assembly, it is quite obvious that its main function is to protect Communists in their activities of force and violence in their program to overthrow the government.

The 1948 report of the Un-American Activities Committee devotes pages 107–112 to proving this point.

Palo Alto, California — JOHN M. HANLEY

Their Own Petard

In his review of her book, "Red Masquerade," Victor Lasky praises Miss Angela Calomiris for joining the Communist Party at the behest of the FBI, working for seven years as a spy, and finally appearing as a witness at the trial of the Communist leaders. . . .

Hoist by their own petard, the Communists have no reason to complain. They may even feel a certain satisfaction that their adversaries can no longer boast of a higher conception of right and wrong than themselves, if willing to join in the attempt to destroy the integrity of social relations. Can we with consistency denounce some persons for abandoning moral standards and exonerate others who descend to the same level?

Santa Barbara, California — FRANK W. GARRISON



A REVIEWER'S NOTEBOOK

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

Arthur Koestler is a representative symbol of a tortured age. An ex-revolutionary, he now knows that the Russian "experiment" has become a ghastly error. But he can't quite bring himself to see that the cause of the error is to be found, not in Stalin's personality or the peculiar circumstances of Russian history, but in the basic idea of socialism itself.

Driven by an understandable urge to justify his own revolutionary past, Koestler tends to glorify the ex-Communist. In Koestler's eyes only those who have been through hell with an about-to-backslide Intourist guide are properly equipped to understand the manifold wiles of the devil. But the ex-Communists whom Koestler trusts invariably turn out to be those who hang in a contemporary philosophical void. They are the ones who seem to cherish the myth of the New Beginning, not the ones who have found their way back to the principles of Jefferson, or of John Locke, or of the early John Stuart Mill, or of the expounders of Christian gospel. The idea that an old credo might very possibly be a true one is a Chestertonian notion which Koestler can not consciously admit. He is still a believer in the Great Change, still a Socialist millennialist — and the only faith he could wholeheartedly accept is the one that will be born the day after tomorrow and tricked out in a whole new set of words.

The myth of the New Beginning hangs over Koestler's latest novel, "The Age of Longing" (Macmillan, $3.50), robbing it of whatever cutting edge it might have had. Like Orwell, Koestler has chosen to write of the future. But the future of "The Age of Longing" is the near mid-fifties and the scene is a Paris that is all too forlornly contemporary in its flavor. Koestler has no love for the gruesome emissaries of the Commonwealth of Freedom-loving People (i.e., the Soviet Government) who are busy softening up his beloved Paris for the kill. But the west Europeans of Mr. Koestler's story are too sunk in defeatism, apathy, sloth and spiritual nullity to rally for a last-ditch fight. As for the Americans, they are portrayed by Koestler as innocent and shallow creatures who scarcely understand the magnitude of the crisis that confronts them. Symbolically, the rather appealing American heroine of Mr. Koestler's story, Hydie Anderson, misses her aim when she sets out to kill Fedya Nikitin, the New Barbarian from the Black Town of Baku. Hydie means well, but she doesn't have what it takes to play in the same league with Joan of Arc, Rosa Luxemburg and Charlotte Corday. Because she is not a true anti-Stalinist hepcat of the ex-Communist breed, Hydie can not even carry through a good symbolic gesture of world-saving. If the world is to be saved at all, so Koestler seems to be saying in effect, it will not be by the Americans, but by some new monastic order of a still unfledged twenty-first century religion. This New Beginning must wait, of course, upon the decaying phase of the Dark Age which Stalin began circa 1927.

What distresses me about Koestler's novel is not its pessimism about the contemporary French effort to survive — after all, the man may be right in his theories about Europe's decadence, which correspond to William S. Schlamm's as set forth in an early issue of the *Freeman*. Koestler may even be right about America's "little and late" psychosis, which is a reflex of its congenital optimism. To justify the case for Koestler's pessimism, it is obvious that western Europe doesn't at the moment seem to have any sense of urgency about rearming. As for the Americans, they seem to misconceive the whole crisis as a problem of advertising the future disposition of their troops, not of creating a compact power to be thrown against Stalin wherever the battle may be joined. (The decisive field may very well be in Iran, where there is oil; not in a western Europe which can supply little fuel for the planes which Stalin must use to overpower his abiding enemy, the U. S. A.)

The root trouble with Koestler's novel is not the author's pessimism about French rearmament and American brains, but his inability to see that the old faiths of the West are plenty good enough to throw back the Mechanical Men from the East. Whatever the verbal symbolisms for its affirmations (and they are as many and as richly diverse as might be expected from an individualistic people), the West has always believed that man is something more than the sum of his conditioned reflexes. Even those Westerners who are superficially enamored of the idea of "social engineering" do not really believe that the human personality is to be placed at the mercy of political shamans who would experiment with it in the interests of that consuming Moloch which goes by the deceptively innocent name of "society." When Koestler's Hydie Anderson refuses to let her Russian lover, Fedya Nikitin, reduce her to the level of one of Pavlov's dogs, she is acting as any self-respecting Western girl would act. Her rejection of Nikitin is far more prophetic of the American ability to survive and win than Koestler himself sees.

Because of his contempt for some of the surface manifestations of American life (our preoccupation with gadgetry, our mania for decrying both harmless eccentricity and original thought in the interests of a streamlined conception of good "public relations") Koestler misses the deeper currents that move the American republic. One of his characters argues flatly that America has produced no Maid of Orleans, no Madame Curie, no Krupskaya, no Bronte sisters, no Florence Nightingale. So? Well, what

about Emily Dickinson, Clara Barton, Mrs. Whittaker Chambers (a *decent* Krupskaya), Mrs. Marcus Whitman and the thousands of unsung American women who followed their men into Pawnee and Blackfoot country with the full knowledge that a single slip in vigilance might mean their scalps and the lives of their children? Even the Hokinson woman, if cornered, is likely to be a tougher cougar than Koestler might anticipate.

If Koestler's novel leaves much to be desired so far as its fundamentals are concerned, it remains a most brilliant virtuoso performance on its coruscating surface. Who else has caught the flavor of the tragi-comedy of contemporary French "intellectual" life in a way that compares with "The Age of Longing"? Koestler's satirical flaying of a milieu is absolutely dazzling. There is his Monsieur Anatole, the last representative of the culture that once skipped so blithely from republic to empire and back again without losing trust in the ultimate resilience of Gallic man. Monsieur Anatole suffers from paralysis, a collapsed prostate and cirrhosis of the liver, but even though his animal appetites have long since been dulled to a mere echo inside the skull his intellectual skepticism is made palatable by a continuing animal faith.

Not so with the people who come to Monsieur Anatole's parties. There is Dupremont, the fashionable pornographer, who tries to lure people to religion by baiting his books with lechery. There is Touraine, the opportunist publisher, and Professor Pontieux, the apostle of "neo-nihilism" (Koestler's parody of existentialism). Others *dans cette galère* include Navarin, the poet; Father Millet, the priest who rather enjoys having naughty things whispered about him; Georges de St. Hilaire, the Malraux-type novelist; and Lord Edwards, the British physicist who obligingly alters his mathematical equations to prove the case for an expanding or a contracting universe depending on whatever Soviet cosmology happens to be in favor with Stalin at the moment. These characters, and others like them, are either attracted or repelled by the Soviet magnet, but, since they are all utterly blah, it doesn't matter which way they point.

The ex-revolutionaries of Koestler's novel are a more respectable breed. The limping Julien Delattre, who lost his faith and his ability to write revolutionary poems when the Popular Front gave way to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, retains a few shreds of human dignity; at least he knows that Soviet communism is evil and wants to do something positive to combat its spread. Boris, the walking cadaver who has survived the forced labor camp and the liquidation of his wife and child, may be mad, but he is nonetheless an heroic figure. As for Professor Vardi, who decides to take a chance on going home to eastern Europe after the death of Number One (Koestler's euphemism for good old Joe), he is pitiful in his delusion that a new life may possibly await him as a teacher at the University of Viennograd. (Of course it doesn't; Vardi ends up by "confessing" participation in a "treason" plot, like any other victim of "darkness at noon.")

With the Stalinist barbarians Koestler is also brilliant. Nikitin is fully explained in terms of his childhood in the black oil town of Baku and his subsequent adolescence as a priggish Komsomol. Nikitin's faith in a sort of cybernetic's view of Marxism is made all too horribly palpable as Koestler really hits his writing stride. Like others of his tribe, Nikitin believes in liquidation as ordained by the selection of, say, the top ten per cent of "socially unreliable elements" by the mechanical decree of an IBM punch-card winnower. In Nikitin's perverse pharmacopoeia there is no psychic illness that a good reconditioning of the reflexes can not cure.

In the last analysis the excellence of Koestler's characterization in "The Age of Longing" varies inversely with the intensity of his hatred. He is first-rate with Nikitin and with the backslid Hero of Culture Leontiev, and he is good with his various French types. But he maligns his American girl, Hydie Anderson, by making her a twentieth century version of Henry James's Daisy Miller. Just because Hydie proved a deficient marksman when she hit Nikitin in the groin, not the heart, is no reflection on the quality of the determination that could very well have been hers in the light of her tangled inheritance and background. Mr. Koestler seems to think it a reflection on her will simply because she hadn't been trained to shoot by Annie Oakley. After all, Koestler might have stopped to reflect that a dedicated Russian intransigent, Dora Kaplan, botched the job when she shot at Lenin.

Thousands will enjoy "The Age of Longing" for its sheer brilliance. Thousands more will be put off by the curious fact that virtually everybody in the book spouts dazzling dialectics with the glib agility of Koestler himself. And thousands more, I predict, will discover that reading the book is comparable to peeling an onion: at the very core of the firm, pearly layers one opens up on — nothing. Koestler has parodied the "neo-nihilists," but in his refusal to bottom himself on the enduring truths of Western faith he is in danger of becoming the neo-nihilist *malgré lui*, and hence a more pitiful creature than his own Professor Pontieux.

THOUGH THE EARTH BE WASTED

Observe the heron and the crane
And plant to quiet your hands.

Nations have their seasons
The rain has its law
And there is time for the fig and pomegranate
And time for Solomon's hymn to his love
    Sleeping on the spiced pillow
        And anointed linen.

There is a day for the idol and the plague
    And for weariness
And a nation writes its chronicles
    With the stylus of Job.

Five hundred years is a generation
And it shall be a thousand
Till they return to the wine-press
    And the marriage bed
But they shall have it
Though the earth be wasted
    As the stones of the moon.

EDWARD DAHLBERG

THE HYBRID STATE

Where We Are At, by Thomas H. Barber. *New York: Scribner's. $3.00*

Much writing has flowed over the presses to describe to puzzled readers "where we are at." Some of the books are excellent for the minds of those who are familiar with the jargon of modern economic and financial writing. But I know of no recent book which describes our present plight more vividly and in simpler terms and without appearing to bend down to the reader's intelligence than Mr. Barber's. Here is easy reading if ever I saw it. It is in the calm and unhurried manner of a man who has lived long, passed through the period of excited wrath, and is now, after a calm, broad look at the whole social landscape, in a quiet mood, without swearing and with a sense of humor, pointing out in this troubled scene the forces which have brought us so swiftly into so much war, debt, confusion and frustration.

Mr. Barber's book has a quality not easy to define. Without superheated adjectives, but merely running along with the calm simplicity of an interesting man chatting with a neighbor, explaining sometimes with gravity, sometimes with an amused chuckle, one striking fact after another, he manages to give the reader not merely a pretty fair understanding of where he has landed but a profound sense of uneasiness about it.

The theme that America grew rapidly to power and wealth through the unmanaged magic of a free society is a well worn one. It is something of a feat, therefore, to have this old story told with a new and eloquent interest and clarity. All this is done as a prelude to an impressive picture of the depth and the width of the alterations which have been wrought in our political and economic society, not to make it better but to bring it finally to a state of disorder and futility resembling ever more that much confused and broken thing called Europe. The old American society was built upon the theory that a nation needed raw materials but that it also needed the talents of that very limited number of fertile and adventurous minds capable of turning these raw materials into the usable resources of a nation. These were the job-makers — the enterprisers, the inventors, the administrators, the acquisitive men. There was always the problem of restraining them from imposing on their fellows. The aim of our society was to release their energies and restrain their appetites. The new school which harnesses us and drives us today proclaims that since all men are not wise enough to manage their own affairs, the job will be turned over to a more prudent government.

Of rare interest are Mr. Barber's three chapters on "Special Privileges for Everybody," "The Bureaucracy," and "The Managed Economy," chapters in which we see the all-wise government at work supplying the "prudence" for everyone. In the process it has in a brief period reversed the work of centuries. It has produced an economy half-free and half-planned which can not work any more than a state half-slave and half-free. Few writers have succeeded better in making clear the point that in attempting to manage the planned part, this hybrid state must inevitably bring the so-called free part under its compulsion, that the spread of the compulsions is progressive and that the end is slavery. And worse than slavery — for in the very act of distributing wealth the hybrid state does not distribute but destroys it.

Mr. Barber has filled his book with a wealth of homely illustrations and solid factual supports.

JOHN T. FLYNN

THE BENEFICENT ENTERPRISE

The New Society, by Peter Drucker. *New York: Harper. $5.00*

Sometimes the importance of a published work does not at first appear. Mendel's study of genetics, which revitalized the science, was ignored for decades. Mr. Drucker's "The New Society" has not had much fanfare to date, but I suspect it will become increasingly influential with the passage of time.

Drucker starts out with a truism. "The enterprise has emerged as the decisive . . . institution of society." Of course. The modern business corporation or enterprise, in which the efforts of numerous individuals are marvelously coordinated, does most of society's work and transforms every phase of life. Yet the import of this revolutionary event is seldom considered, although it raises nearly as many problems as it solves.

Most of Mr. Drucker's concern is with the internal workings of the enterprise. His contribution in this field is outstanding. However, he barely touches upon the enterprises' external life, that is to say, upon the struggle between enterprises for the market. It is this struggle [1] which establishes "economic prices," essential for the efficient utilization of resources, and provides that excess capacity which makes this country so powerful in war as well as that psychic release, "the moral equivalent of war," which attenuates the urge to pursue ends by military means.

Mr. Drucker points out in "The New Society" that it is the *organization* and not the individual worker that produces the goods. As a result the status of the worker has come to depend upon his job instead of upon his work. This makes him more vulnerable to the business cycle. Furthermore, the unit of work is not a product but an operation, sometimes a single operation. Because of this condition some observers have supposed that the craftsman is being turned into a machine. However, the intermediacy of this stage is beginning to be recognized. Whatever is repetitive can be done by a power-driven machine. Thus it is not the craftsman who will be eliminated, but the unskilled worker. Men will continue to design products, to analyze jobs, to cut patterns, to attend the power-driven monsters which perform the repetitive motions, and to coordinate the numerous contributing processes which are being carried on all over the surface of the earth. All of these require skill, a different kind of skill than that needed to fashion a jacket, but skill none the less. As the workers in general recognize, it is not the new procedures which degrade men.

The role of profit is stressed. Profit, Mr. Drucker maintains, must cover "the cost of staying in business." To prevent the impoverishment of the economy, adequate

[1] See "The Theory of Monopolistic Competition," by Edwin Chamberlin.

reserves must be set aside today against the needs and risks of tomorrow. He supposes that profits are usually too low for this purpose except possibly in the Soviet Union, but he does not explain why, if this is so, capital and the standard of living have increased in the United States so much faster than in Russia.

Unless profit is defined as the difference between current costs and gross returns, a somewhat unusual definition, I do not see why future costs must come out of profit. A larger fraction of future costs could be set aside by increasing the allowance for amortization, as is done in war time, and by pension and other special funds. The important thing is to divert a sufficient fraction of the available effort to capital formation, a consummation that can be achieved in a number of different ways.

Yet Mr. Drucker is quite correct in attributing crucial importance to profit and loss, as would be clearer if he treated the subject of monopolistic competition more fully. For profit is not only a source of income but also operates like red and green traffic lights, directing effort to the places it is needed and reducing the flow at other spots. When the profit of an enterprise or an industry is higher than elsewhere, money and the efforts of men are attracted. When profit is negative, men and money are repelled. Since profit in a competitive field reflects relative efficiencies and the preferences of the public between products, profit and loss by their channeling action serve to translate needs into satisfactions without the intervention of bureaucrat or plutocrat.

This function of profit is so badly performed by conscious direction that an attempt is being made both in Soviet Russia and in Socialist England to use profit as a supplementary guide to investment. However, in a planned economy prices are controlled and production is scheduled. Under these conditions, profit does not reflect relative efficiencies or consumers' choices, and ceases to be a useful guide. It therefore is unlikely that the British will maintain the rate of productivity increase of their steel industry after it is nationalized, even if they continue trying to use profit and loss as a basis for investment decisions.

The free enterprise system has virtues as well as defects, though the virtues are often overlooked. Perhaps it will not be out of place to summarize the main achievement of "The New Society."

The limited liability corporation has immortalized the entrepreneur. By administering prices within a range of competition, these immortal entrepreneurs (i.e., corporation managements) have so strengthened their concerns that these are enabled to conduct research, to improve products and to plan and conduct explorations into the unknown much more effectively than their unstable precursors. By means of these activities a working formula has been evolved which realizes the dream of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, the dream of perpetual progress, at least in the technological field. As a result all of society, not only those who belong to the corporate structure, enjoys a higher living standard from year to year. Liberty, too, is enhanced, the liberty of the individual, since liberty depends in part on the margin of buying power above that needed to sustain life. Thus the promise written into the Constitution is being realized by an ever-widening circle of the American population.

On the other side of the ledger are two appalling defects: (1) Many individuals, cut off from their roots, have lost their sense of belonging to society; (2) The downswings of the business cycle periodically imperil social stability.

The larger part of Mr. Drucker's study pertains to defect No. 1. It is here that he makes his major contribution. Men ask more of society than the opportunity of making a living. The individual also requires a meaningful function and a recognized position to keep self-respect. In Mr. Drucker's opinion, working for a corporation often fails to provide these.

Drawing on his wide experience, Mr. Drucker offers a series of suggestions designed to restore significance to the worker's task by integrating it into a group activity, and by making visible the relationship of the group activity to the over-all process. Drucker also suggests various ways in which the autonomous enterprise community might develop a social and purposive life of its own. I have no doubt that even the partial achievement of these ends would enable more workers to take pride in their occupations and to draw satisfaction from their daily routines.

In respect to the second defect, Mr. Drucker suggests "a predictable income and employment plan" according to which each enterprise would guarantee its own workers a certain minimum income during the year. I believe this proposal to be impractical and unneeded.

Impractical, because only a few of the larger enterprises — and these confined to the consumers' goods industries — would be a position to guarantee even partial employment, as Mr. Drucker admits; not needed, because the problem of unemployment, or so I believe, is not nearly as difficult or as far from solution as Mr. Drucker assumes.

Mr. Drucker writes: "To prevent or to overcome depressions it is necessary to stop booms. But no government dependent on votes has been able so far to convince its constituents that it should shoot Santa Claus." Therefore Mr. Drucker recommends the weak ameliorative measure cited above.

But is it necessary to stop booms in order to overcome depressions? I hardly think so.

Booms are the means by which the economy expands. Periodically optimism prevails, money is created by the banks and loaned to investors; demand, as a result, exceeds supply, and additional effort flows into those channels illuminated by the green light of profit. Eventually the shortages are overcome. Supply catches up. Prices fall. Pessimism prevails. The quantity of money contracts as loans are paid off. Effective demand diminishes. The profit margin narrows. The capital goods industries contract. Men are disemployed.

It is this ebb and flow which gives scope to the entrepreneur and opportunity to the worker. Individuals, corporations, even industries, live in a state of flux, in which the more able tend to rise. Of equal importance, the deadwood (the submarginal producer) is cut, and the misplaced are thrown out of their uncomfortable sockets during the sinking spells. Largely because of this rhythm, the free enterprise system maintains its vitality and efficiency. (The Russian authorities refresh their staffs periodically by drastic purges, a wasteful ersatz for the impersonal swings of the market.)

But if the business cycle is socially useful, the overcoming of depression, which I agree with Mr. Drucker is necessary to preserve our freedoms, is not a matter of stopping the booms, or even of preventing the subsequent declines, but one of holding the swings, in particular the declines, *within safe limits*. I believe this could be accomplished by keeping the initial decline from pyramiding. If the first drop, usually a curtailment in the heavy industries, were prevented from causing an equal drop in effective demand and thereby spilling over into the consumers' goods industries, the delimited decline would merely permit wear and tear to cut down the temporarily unneeded capacity of the capital plant. Thus the decline would amount to a breathing spell in which the constructive forces (inventions, plans, new wants, etc.) gather enough strength to touch off a revival. Many of us believe that society has the power and the knowledge to hold the inchoate declines which follow spurts in capital formation, within narrow boundaries.

Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the specific measures needed. I, for example, believe that built-in counter-cyclical fiscal measures would do the trick, measures which increase the supply of money when production falls, and decrease it when production rises. Unemployment insurance is a small-scale example of this kind of device. Others advocate public works and relief spending with created money, dangerous measures because of the probability of wrong timing. Nevertheless, differences of opinion in this field are not too important. Experience in recent wars has demonstrated that when demand is augmented in a period of unemployment so that buying power becomes greater than the supply of goods at current prices, stagnation is replaced by turbulent productive activity. And surely if demand can be increased before a foreign foe, it can be increased to ward off domestic disaster, and more safely, since there would be no need to push the increase into the danger zone of inflation.

However, these matters lie outside the scope of Mr. Drucker's valuable study. He has concentrated on the much more difficult problem of providing social and functional satisfactions for the middle and lower echelons of the industrial hierarchy. Since the system already provides material well-being, the addition of spiritual values would make the United States and other societies which adopted similar procedures pleasanter places in which to live.

Furthermore, the problem of the cycle has become academic for the time being. The Administration has foolishly decided to crystallize the structure of the economy for the duration of the international emergency by deciding to impose direct controls, despite the fact that the flexibility of industry is probably America's main advantage over the totalitarian societies. No doubt when American enterprise has become sufficiently weakened by red tape and the diversion of energy into black-market activities so that the world protagonists have become roughly equal, the conflict will turn into open war. Nemesis, or is it Fate, seems to prefer an even contest. Thus England and France waited last time until the Nazis had seized enough resources to achieve parity before they accepted the gage of battle. We may repeat the same mistake.

HAROLD LOEB

A STUMBLING SARTRE

Troubled Sleep, by Jean-Paul Sartre. *Translated from the French by Gerard Hopkins. New York: Knopf. $3.50*

Publishers, unlike reviewers, can afford to have frequent lapses of memory. In fact, these mnemonic blank spots contribute largely to their successful book sales. Meanwhile, reviewers must struggle along trying to be fair and invariably making enemies because they have much longer memories.

Take the case of the reviewer of Jean-Paul Sartre, for example. As a reviewer I have followed Sartre's career for the past decade with great interest. Unfortunately, I have recently been forced to change my opinion of his writing. The promise that one discerned in the first two Sartre novels, "The Age of Reason" and "The Reprieve," is now vitiated in this third volume, "Troubled Sleep," by a distasteful pandering to sensationalism.

The fashionable hint around town is that we are now expected to discount the relevance of Sartre's "existential" philosophy and judge his new work solely on its merits as an artistic novel. But *Sartre sans existentialisme* is an absurd idea. Suppose we were to ignore the stoic philosopher in Sartre's projected tetralogy. What then? There would be very little left outside of some starkly graphic war reporting. As for the virtuosity of Sartre's writing technique, it is mainly derivative. Despite his emphasis on the blood and gore of battle and his customary proclivity for pointing up the seamy side of life, there is no scene in this new novel that can compare with the *Walpurgisnacht* in Farrell's "Studs Lonigan" or the amatory passages in Dos Passos's "U.S.A." Perhaps the closest Sartre ever comes to competing with either of these American naturalistic novelists is the bacchanalian episode in which Mathieu unwillingly joins his despondent fellow-soldiers in drinking themselves into sick stupefaction. Judging by the shifting camera's eye and the appalling flatness and sentimentality of his prose, Sartre appears to have been deeply influenced — but in the wrong way — by the novels of Dos Passos, Farrell, Faulkner and Hemingway.

The characters in the earlier novels reappear — Mathieu, the teacher; Boris and Ivich, the Russian émigrés; Daniel, the homosexual; Brunet, the Communist, and so on. These characters should all be moving toward Sartre's carefully planned awakening to "total involvement" in the human situation, and a consequent last-ditch escape from the apathy and inertia of 1940. However, Sartre has apparently come to realize, along with his publishers, that the stark existentialist view of life is no longer fashionable. If its doctrine had some meaning in the France of 1940, when men in all walks of life had to make a stoic choice between fighting or enduring a living death under the Nazi occupation, it is no longer relevant to a day of wider choices.

Let's face it: without their existential connotation, these characters are utterly meaningless. Not only are they wretchedly confused but abysmally dull, even when they are "cutting up" most sensationally in the dreary pages of a Baedeker that goes all out to catalogue the scatological, subhuman phenomena at large in our modern civilization.

RICHARD MCLAUGHLIN

NUMBING CONFUSION

The Scarlet Sword, by H. E. Bates. *Boston: Atlantic Monthly — Little, Brown. $3.00*

"The Scarlet Sword" by H. E. Bates is a bloody brew permeated by a confusion that not only confuses but numbs. It's the story of a group of people trapped in a remote Catholic mission in Kashmir during the 1947 partition riots between the Hindus and Moslems.

This could have been a vivid and arresting book had Mr. Bates pruned and organized his material and warmed it with people who have reality. As it is, "The Scarlet Sword" is nothing but a pallid "South Wind" gone berserk. The beleaguered mission is an island populated with stock characters on whom it is only too easy to hang random bits of philosophy and an occasional wisecrack.

There is an obese, flabby priest whose wobbling faith is symbolized by a pair of slipping braces (he's perpetually on the verge of losing his pants); a hard-boiled war correspondent, bored and on the prowl for a story; a neurotic English colonel, very school-tie, and his pregnant wife; a loquacious, hypochrondriacal Englishwoman and her repressed daughter whose hold on her virginity loosens with incredible speed under the impact of physical danger; a Scottish nurse who finds the perils of India an anti-climax after living in an Edinburgh tenement with a drunken father; a dancer from a Bombay bordello done up in an orange and yellow sari and dripping with turquoises and that enigmatic obviousness which is the hallmark of most prostitutes in fiction; a young Eurasian doctor who loses her husband in the rioting and whose calm under stress is too unhuman to be convincing; a group of nuns of all ages and nationalities; and hordes of faceless, terrified refugees.

The mission, located in a beautiful spot overlooking the snow-topped heights of Nanga Parbat, is suddenly invaded by a band of Afridis and Pathans, and for ten days it resounds with the screams of raped women and frightened children, the bodies of the murdered lying about the compound in bloody windrows. Only the rabbits in their hutches escape scot-free, and they, like the braces of the priest, assume the proportions of a symbol.

In one of his philosophizing fits, Crane, the war correspondent, is reminded of how things were with a squadron of fighter pilots during the war: "All the physical heartiness underlined by fear of death; all the jolly exultation in little things above the ache in the bone." This would be all right if he had stopped there, but he and the colonel try to keep up their morale with the kind of spurious wisecracking with which Hemingway sometimes punctuates his epics on "grace under pressure."

The love affair between Crane and Julie Maxted, the English virgin, is even less convincing than the wisecracks. Crane takes an instinctive and violent dislike to the girl when he glimpses her in the ward of the mission hospital, but it is only too obvious that their defenses will crumble at the first shot. They do. Their rapports might have had a certain dramatic pathos, but they never progress beyond a few kisses snatched in odd corners, and these, too, are punctuated by wisecracks.

"I'll make a bad husband," cracks Crane, "but a good co-respondent."

"You haven't even kissed me," Julie reminds him plaintively, "and you talk about divorce."

The Scottish nurse, who is toying with the idea of becoming a nun, is the only real character in the book. Desire for the fleshpots flares up at the sight of Crane lighting a cigarette, and between a few stolen puffs (much more charged with emotion than the kisses Crane and Julie snatch between raids), she suddenly realizes Crane stands for everything she thought she had renounced, and that she doesn't want to renounce it.

If Mr. Bates does a bad job on his dramatics, he does a good job on the landscape. Some of his descriptions of the view of the valley and mountains as seen from the mission have beauty and reveal the sensitiveness of a poet.

ALIX DU POY

DEATH OF A NATION

East Wind Over Prague, by Jan Stransky. *New York: Random House. $3.00*

Back in the thirties Czechoslovakia was acclaimed as an "island of democracy in a sea of dictatorships." The Czechs were lauded for their level-headed progress, their inherent good sense, their courage, and their determination to be a free people. In the opinion of some Western observers, Masaryk's little republic would be the last country in Europe to succumb to any form of totalitarianism. Today that once dedicated democracy is behind the Iron Curtain. Moreover, it produced a far higher percentage of Communists than less progressive countries like Poland, Hungary and Rumania.

In "East Wind Over Prague" Jan Stransky, a liberal deputy who escaped after the Soviet putsch, gives the best answer yet published to the paradox of Czechoslovakia's tragedy. It is a readable, frank, lucid volume that should be pondered by everyone in the Western world who has any interest in the survival of civilization.

Fortunately, the author does not merely give us an account of what happened; he tells why it happened. His analysis of the Soviet conquest of his homeland is penetrating, incisive and subtle. In the background, of course, was traditional Pan-Slavism and fear of Pan-Germanism. After Munich there was the natural revulsion against the West. There was the cruel, exhausting Nazi occupation. Finally, just at the end of the war, there was the American Army's mysterious halt at Pilsen while Czech patriots in Prague were being slaughtered by German SS troops. Few Americans, undoubtedly, realize the harm done the West by this halt. It gave the Soviet propagandists a made-to-order opportunity to tell the Czechs that the American Third Army stopped at Pilsen in order to allow the SS to kill off the Czechs. In "War As I Saw It," General Patton wrote: "In view of the radio reports that the Czechoslovakian citizens had taken Prague, I was very anxious to go on and assist them, and asked Bradley for authority to do so, but this was denied." Whatever the story behind it, the Third Army's halt had grave political consequences for the West.

The root of the Soviet conquest was fear. "To fight communism," Stransky writes, "means to fight fear." Czech Communists helped the Russian invaders by spreading the propaganda of fear and of the futility of resisting Sovietism. An old Czech proverb, "You can not spit against the wind," was pressed into service. The wind

was from the East, from the steppes. What good was it to win an election? If you were a Communist and the election went against you, nothing unpleasant happened to you. But if you were an opponent of the Communists, you could only lose one election. In other words, the Communists dinned it into the people that there was no future in democracy. Why not be smart and line up with the winners?

Russian savagery, on the other hand, revolted the majority of Czechs. When the Red Army men entered Czechoslovakia, they were received as "liberators." They were the heroes who drove out the hated Nazis. But the Russians did not long live up to the role of saviors. They looted, murdered, raped. Some of the Russian atrocities against their Slavic brothers are almost too horrible to relate. Stransky reports that in some of the liberated villages up to fifty per cent of the women were violated. "In the first few days after the liberation of Brno, more than 2000 women who had been raped asked for admission to hospitals — among them about thirty little girls under twelve years and two women over seventy."

The Russians robbed houses, stopped people on the streets and stole their watches. "In a town in southern Moravia, the headmaster of a small college showed me the school's museum of natural history specimens in which Soviet soldiers had drunk to the last drop all the methylated spirit out of the bottles containing frogs, snakes, lizards and even one human embryo." The men from the East cut old paintings out of their frames for shooting targets. They chopped up pianos or finely carved furniture for firewood. "What beasts they are," an old peasant said to Stransky. "Their whole country must look like my stable when my cows get the colic . . ."

President Benes and his democratic colleagues were helpless. The cards were stacked against them when, in the closing days of the war, they had to return from London to Czechoslovakia via Moscow. There Stalin made no bones about his program. Either the Czechs were to take Communists into their government or the Benes administration could not return to Czechoslovakia. And, of course, the West made few efforts to back up the Czech democrats. Washington and London, apparently, agreed with Moscow that Czechoslovakia was to be in the Soviet Zone. Yet this Central European land, in view of its geographical position, concentration of industry, skilled workers and high standard of living, was of key importance in the struggle for control of Europe. The Kremlin's strategists knew that and acted accordingly.

In regard to the mysterious death of Jan Masaryk, Stransky thinks he was murdered. He knew too much about Soviet plans and methods. The possibility that he would some day give "evidence of this kind was the unknown force which precipitated him from his window."

And what of the future? Stransky has no encouragement for those who hope that the quarrel between East and West is a matter of semantics. He calls a showdown inevitable. The longer war is delayed, he believes, the more terrible it will be. He fears the West will "wait once more till the blow falls at the time and place which will suit the aggressor best. But at least, for Heaven's sake, let us be ready! Ready not only physically but above all morally, never forgetting for a single moment what we are up against and what we will be up against."

HENRY C. WOLFE

CODIFYING IGNORANCE

Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry, by Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan. *New Haven: Yale. $4.00*

Mr. Lasswell is a well-known political scientist who has made some genuine contributions by applying to the study of politics the findings of other "cultural" sciences, especially social psychology. Mr. Kaplan is described as a "student of the philosophy of language and of scientific methodology." They have collaborated in writing this book, which they offer as "an attempt to formulate the basic concepts and hypotheses of political science."

The authors present a series of definitions of terms and some propositions about human behavior in political situations. They define the subject matter of political science as the activity of persons who have varying patterns of relations with others, varying demands and expectations, and who are organized in groups of varying complexity. They then discuss the patterns of influence and power which are revealed in the interactions of persons and groups. Finally they discuss political purposes (or "functions") and political institutions (or "structures").

The result is an impressive codification of our ignorance. As Messrs. Lasswell and Kaplan are the first to proclaim, we are far from having a respectable science of political behavior measured by the achievements of the natural or physical sciences. The authors have tried hard to supply at least the foundation for such a science by starting with very elementary definitions and propositions, but one wonders if they get much beyond that. It seems to be a bit too early to codify the findings of political science into a "system" without revealing more gaps than matter.

Although the opening words of "Power and Society" announce that this is not a study of current political life, it is precisely when it does become such a book that it has most interest. Here the authors draw heavily from the political "realists," Machiavelli, Hobbes, Mosca, Pareto, Michels, and from two contemporary political scientists, R. M. MacIver and Charles Merriam.

It is unfortunate that the authors have barricaded themselves behind a forbidding terminology and ingenious circumlocution. The "principle of configurative analysis" in political inquiry is said to combine the "manipulative" with the "contemplative" standpoint. This means that a full study of political behavior combines the study of political theory (or values) and political science (or practice). The book bristles with the obscurantism of current social science terminology. Thus the authors tell us that the fruitless quest for universal laws only deflects us "from partial inquiries that can illuminate situationally localized problems in empirical ways." There follows a reference to the two most overworked terms of current social science, "conceptual framework" and "theoretical structure."

It is unlikely that "Power and Society" will reach the general or the intellectual but non-academic public, for whom it is clearly not intended. Probably it's just as well to keep this demonstration of scholarly limitations within the academic family.

MORROE BERGER

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