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FREEMAN

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WHAT AIMS IN KOREA?
An Editorial

Editors: John Chamberlain · Henry Hazlitt · Suzanne La Follette

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Editors, JOHN CHAMBERLAIN HENRY HAZLITT

Managing Editor, SUZANNE LA FOLLETTE

Business Manager, KURT LASSEN

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A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

LOUIS BROMFIELD, noted novelist of Malabar Farm and contributor to agricultural science, summarized the fallacies of the Brannan Plan in the *Freeman* of October 16. In this issue he traces the triple alliance of forces that helped produce the Plan. His account of the Communist infiltration of the Department of Agriculture in the thirties supplements Robert Cruise McManus's "The Red Mole" (the *Freeman*, October 16).

WILHELM RÖPKE is a member of the Faculty of the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales at Geneva. He is the author of "The Social Crisis of Our Time" and one of the world's outstanding economists.

As a senior official of the British Broadcasting Company, FELIX GREENE carried out missions abroad, including a study of Nazi and Italian Fascist propaganda organizations in South America. Since 1940 he has lived in the United States. He writes: "On my trips to England these last two years I have been increasingly disturbed at the subversion of Britain's traditional constitution of government, and still more disturbed at the almost total lack of interest in such matters on the part of the public."

RALPH DE TOLEDANO has contributed several articles and reviews to the *Freeman*. As an associate editor of *Newsweek*, he reports on national affairs. He is co-author of "Seeds of Treason" and edited "Frontiers of Jazz," a critical anthology. It is his keen interest in jazz that comes to the fore in this issue.

WINTHROP SARGEANT, once a violinist with the New York Philharmonic, has been writing about music since 1930 rather than producing it. He has been music critic of the *Brooklyn Eagle*, the *New York American* and the *New Yorker*. Now a staff writer for *Life*, he writes on politics and personalities more often than on music.

Forthcoming

"The Phantom American Negro" by George S. Schuyler will present facts about the progress of Negroes in the United States that should amaze the readers of fellow-traveler propaganda. Also scheduled for an early issue is an article on the unhappy history of UNRRA in Yugoslavia by Leigh White.

the FREEMAN

NEW YORK, MONDAY, APRIL 9, 1951

THE FORTNIGHT

The reports from Washington of dismay in the State Department over General MacArthur's declaration of March 24 indicate the answers Mr. Acheson would probably give to some of the questions asked in our editorial on another page of this issue, "What Aims In Korea?" For what apparently irked the State Department was the General's reference to Formosa and Chinese representation in the UN as "extraneous matters." According to Mr. James Reston in the *New York Times* of March 25, "official quarters" in Washington can envision no solution of the Korean conflict on any other basis than the terms of the disgraceful UN "cease-fire" proposal of mid-January; and those terms included the promise of a conference, with representation for the Soviet Union and Communist China, but none for Free China, to discuss Far Eastern problems, among them the future of Formosa and Chinese representation in the UN.

If it could be assumed that the UN were sincerely carrying out the purpose of its charter, to punish aggression, then General MacArthur's statement must certainly have appeared unexceptionable to UN members — including the United States. He declared that Communist China could not, out of its own production, supply its armies in Korea with sufficient modern weapons to withstand the UN superiority in ground firepower, air power, and naval power. He warned Communist China that "a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse." He also declared that the Korean people must not be sacrificed. And having delivered these warnings, he stated his willingness to meet the commander-in-chief of the Red Chinese forces to discuss a cease-fire agreement.

The trouble with this clear and statesmanlike declaration on behalf of the UN is that it assumes a clarity and firmness of purpose of which neither the UN nor our Department of State has so far given any sign. Indeed, a story from the UN in the *Times* of March 25 quoted a spokesman from the United States delegation as stating that this country had "no plans for pressing the United Nations to extend the area of the war" — in other words, to fight the enemy where it would hurt. Does our State Department intend that there shall be a sell-out in Korea? If so, that would explain its failure to declare its objectives. Which makes one wonder whether the proposal which the Israeli delegation was reported on March 23 to be circulating in the UN — the old "cease-fire" proposal dressed in new words — was inspired by the State Department. It would not be the first time that a government seeking a loan from this country had been persuaded to serve as Mr. Acheson's unacknowledged spokesman in the UN.

As we hovered in a state between waking and sleeping the other night we thought we caught the echo of a profound cosmic belly-laugh. It seemed to float down to our pillow from the direction of Mount Olympus. In the strange clarity that comes only with dreams we could see it all in a trice: it was Jupiter laughing at the discomfiture of the British Labor Cabinet officials as they sweated out the problem of finding a way to oppose the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry without giving Churchill some devastating arguments against the nationalization of British steel.

Seriously speaking, recent events in Iran fill us with profound alarm. The one thing that Russia needs in order to fight even a good-sized limited war is high-octane gas. Most Soviet oil today comes from the Baku and the Rumanian fields — and the oil of Baku and Rumania simply isn't enough to keep those monster Soviet tanks and those fleets of planes running for very long. Before the Russians can hope to take on the United States with any chance of success they must do two things. The first is to gain access to Iranian and Arabian oil. The second is to push the Western nations back to a position on the map where they can not easily plaster either Baku or Rumania with a high concentration of bombs. In the light of these two needs, the alienation of Iran's affections for the West must be the Kremlin's No. 1 foreign policy project. We are certain, therefore, that Russian hands were behind the assassination of the Iranian prime minister and the subsequent decision of the Iranian Parliament to nationalize the British oil industry in Iran. Moscow's *Pravda* has, of course, accused the United States of complicity in the assassination of Premier

Razmara. But it is one of the oldest tricks of Soviet propaganda to accuse the enemy of whatever dastardly deed the Kremlin has just finished doing itself.

We are glad to see that the Roman Holiday which the Kefauver Committee permitted to be made of its hearings in New York City is being severely criticized. We thought the batteries of microphones and newsreel and television cameras at these hearings decidedly out of place, and wondered why the "liberals" who objected to the distracting paraphernalia of modern publicity at the Un-American Activities Committee's questioning of the Hollywood ten were so strangely silent about the similar ordeal of Mr. O'Dwyer and Mr. Costello. The witnesses were under oath, and some of them were answering questions which might lead to criminal prosecution. A great many people get "mike fright," or lose their heads before a camera, and many are disconcerted by the glaring light and heat which go along with newsreel and television photography. We think that even gangsters and politicians who consort with them have a right to testify under less disconcerting and unfair conditions.

Another reason why we deplored the circus aspect of these hearings was that it blanketed the trial of alleged "atomic spies." We wonder how many of the people who hung on Costello's and O'Dwyer's words read the testimony of David Greenglass that he found it easy during the war to get access to the most secret information at the Los Alamos plant? Or Harry Gold's testimony that he turned over to the Russian spy Jakovlev detailed and vital information on the atomic bomb which he had received from Greenglass and the physicist Dr. Klaus Fuchs. The Kefauver investigation concerns the powerful criminal underworld and the public officials who deal with it; that is serious. But the spy trial concerns a threat to our national existence and the survival of our civilization; that is not only serious, but may even prove fatal.

Last year Democratic Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, who was generally thought to be a tax-borrow-and-spend New Dealer, surprised pretty nearly everybody by conducting a rousing campaign against the huge Congressional pork-barrel bill for doubtful flood control and river and harbor projects. The Douglas filibuster in favor of economy was pretty much a one-man affair, the sad part of it being that the very Republicans who had been talking so much about the need for economy simply averted their eyes and did nothing to help Douglas along. This year, as we hear it from Washington, Douglas plans a repeat performance of his courageous stand. We hope that Senators Taft, Millikan, Wherry, Jenner and the rest of the supposedly economizing Republicans will give Senator Douglas some support this time. The economizing faith isn't any good without works.

According to Senator Jenner of Indiana, the so-called Universal Military Training bill, which will probably be the law of the land before these words appear in print, contains a hidden "kicker" in it that will enable the President, come peacetime, to draft all eighteen-year-olds, even including girls, for any type of work (even digging canals?) that is deemed necessary to "national security." It may be that the Senator is unduly suspicious of the intent of some of his Congressional colleagues. However, the words of the bill as we last saw it are certainly vague enough to permit a cleverly nefarious semanticist in the White House to get almost anything he wants out of them. The *Freeman* is not opposed to a military draft in the present war emergency, but it sees no sense in the attempt now being made in an hysterical Congressional atmosphere to foist "national service" compulsion (a Nazi device) on generations that are now in grammar school, or even in the cradle. In the first place, no advances in freedom can grow out of permanent peacetime compulsion; in the second place, the next generation, even the next Congress, should be free to do its own legislating for itself. The members of the 82nd Congress have no business trying to commit the 86th or the 88th when they can't even envision what will happen next month.

Observe how the historical myth may creep into the brain cells and lie dormant there like a virus until one day, suddenly, it performs its act of betrayal. No vocal organization in the country has been more anti-New Deal than the Committee for Constitutional Government. In a campaign against inflation it recently sent a long telegram to the President; then it printed the telegram in a series of full-page newspaper advertisements addressed to the public. In this telegram to the President it said: "In 1933 when President Roosevelt lifted the United States out of the depression, New York State agricultural leaders gave major guidance on monetary action to the organized agriculture of the entire nation."

Now, President Roosevelt did not lift the United States out of a depression. It took a war to do that. Second, President Roosevelt's weapon against depression — the weapon that failed — was inflation. Third, there is nowhere any record that the country's organized agriculture was in the least unwilling to embrace such measures as debasement of the currency, deficit spending, enormous subsidies out of the public treasury and the wholesale destruction of food, in order to enjoy its share of the benefits that were expected to flow from the process euphemistically called reflation — a process that was guaranteed to restore prosperity by limiting production and printing dollars. Please, will the Committee for Constitutional Government say what it means?

In a recent issue of the *American Jewish Weekly* there appeared a photograph of American GIs in Korea reading W. L. White's "Report On the Russians." It reminded us that within two weeks after the book was published the Friends of the Soviet Union attacked it in a pamphlet whose only visible means of support was a full-page advertisement by the United States Treasury, urging its readers to buy war bonds. Isn't it just possible that if the government had listened to the W. L. Whites of this world instead of supporting their enemies, there would be no GIs in Korea today and no vast rearmament program to make further buying of war bonds necessary?

A report from the Philippines tells of the assassination by Hukbalahaps of two American farm owners and their farm manager near Manila. Pay it no mind; murder is just an old agrarian reformer custom.

WHAT AIMS IN KOREA?

In our last issue we commented on a long letter which Dean Acheson had written for publication in answer to a young marine's suggestion that our foreign policy was a bit fouled up. Since what the young man chiefly objected to was our involvement in Korea, his letter provided the Secretary of State with an excellent opportunity to define the specific objectives — if any — which Mr. Acheson and the President hope to attain through the fighting in that area. It was high time, indeed; for neither the President nor Mr. Acheson had as yet taken the country into his confidence on that question.

Mr. Acheson ignored this opportunity, and contented himself merely with repeating a few high-sounding generalities. The major questions in the minds of the American people, of our men in Korea, and of their families, remain unanswered. Because both Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson act as if they were completely unaware of what these questions are, we list some of them here. The people who are doing the fighting, and those who are paying for it by their sacrifices, are entitled to prompt, precise and forthright answers.

1. *Are we fighting to push the Chinese Communist forces in Korea back to the 38th parallel, and to stop there regardless of whether or not that is an advantageous strategic line?*

If so, why did we sacrifice thousands of our troops in driving the North Koreans to the Manchurian border? And why should we seek to hold an arbitrary geographical line which from a military standpoint may or may not be defensible?

2. *Are we fighting to establish whatever line in Korea, short of the Manchurian border, is in the opinion of the competent military authorities strategically most defensible?*

3. *Are we fighting to drive the Chinese Communist forces out of Korea and across the Manchurian border, in order that the whole of Korea may be placed under United Nations authority?*

If that is the objective, how can it be attained so long as our forces, on instructions from the Department of State, may not pursue the enemy into Manchuria, but must wait inactive at the border while he regroups, reequips and reinforces his armies, without fear of attack or observation, until he is strong enough for another offensive?

That is precisely what happened when our troops chased the fleeing North Koreans to the Manchurian border. The enemy was permitted to regroup, rearm and obtain reenforcements from Communist China; preparations which our army was not even allowed to find out about because, under State Department instructions, it was not permitted to send reconnaissance planes over the border to observe enemy troop concentrations. Nor were our fighter planes flying along the Manchurian border, under fire from Chinese Communist anti-aircraft batteries on the other side of the river, even permitted to attack those batteries.

Thus rendered immune by State Department orders from molestation or observation by our forces, the enemy built up a formidable army which erupted into Korea and nearly drove our troops into the sea, with heavy casualties.

4. *Are we fighting merely to maintain a military stalemate in Korea?*

The maintenance of a military stalemate would mean that we should attain no military objective. We should merely maintain a tenuous and dangerous hold in Korea, which would continue to cost several thousand lives each month. The only conceivable advantage of maintaining a military stalemate in Korea would be to preserve the remaining shreds of our diplomatic and military prestige in the Far East and to provide time for negotiations with the declared aggressor, Red China, with a view to some compromise — probably involving admittance of Red China to the UN, and in any case probably involving a betrayal of our troops who have fought and died in Korea.

5. *Are we fighting to destroy the enemy forces?*

Communist China has openly admitted intervention on a large scale — estimated at 300,000 to 500,000 troops — in support of North Korean Communist forces. The bulk of the Communist armies which nearly drove our troops into the sea consisted of Chinese Communist soldiers equipped by Soviet Russia.

Red China's armies have been estimated at 4,000,000 men. Their equipment is limited only by Soviet Russia's ability and willingness to supply them. When Chinese Communist troops are hard-pressed, all they have to do is to withdraw into the "privileged sanctuary" of Manchuria, there to regroup and rearm in the safety ensured them by our State Department and the UN. Under these circumstances, how could the limited number of troops we can make available for the Korean operation wage a successful war of manpower attrition against Red China backed by Soviet Russia?

Furthermore, while some 300,000 to 500,000 Chinese troops are engaged in killing our boys in Korea, our government is using the Seventh Fleet to protect the Chinese mainland against diversionary attacks from Formosa by the Free Chinese, which would relieve the pressure on our troops. In other words, the Seventh Fleet is being used to protect the Chinese Communist flank, and to enable the Chinese Red generals to concentrate on killing American boys in Korea.

Why should we not use our fleet to blockade our Chinese Communist enemy, and our air power to destroy military and industrial objectives and transportation facilities in Red China and Manchuria? Why should we not allow Free Chinese forces to make diversionary attacks on the mainland, thus reducing the capacity of Red China to kill our troops in Korea? This would have the added advantage of preventing the Communists from consolidating their hold over all of China so that when the Korean action is finished they can throw all of their weight against Southeast Asia, which Dean Acheson and Dr. Jessup insist we must hold at all costs.

6. *What are the intentions of the United Nations?*

The United Nations in June 1950 declared the North Koreans guilty of aggression and authorized General MacArthur to organize and lead a United Nations force against them. It also called upon all member nations to aid the United Nations forces in every way possible and to refrain from aiding the aggressor. As a result of this action, an international force was organized to defend South Korea. So far the United States has furnished about 90 per cent of the UN troops and suffered about 90 per cent of the casualties.

Although the UN, 106 days after the Chinese Communists openly entered the Korean war, at last declared that they had "engaged in aggression," it has still not authorized effective action against Red China. Also, despite the fact that all member nations were called upon to refrain from aiding the aggressor, Soviet Russia (still a member in good standing) has supported the North Koreans and Red China with supplies and equipment, particularly jet planes, tanks and other items which they could not conceivably have procured from any other source.

No war against aggression can be carried on successfully so long as the UN, on whose authority it is being conducted, spends months in discussing what, if anything, should be done about the aggressor, while refusing to allow UN troops to fight him on equal terms.

7. *Who is to pay for reconstruction?*

Both North and South Korea, particularly South Korea, have suffered vast destruction in consequence of Communist aggression. This destruction, and the surging tides of battle, have rendered millions of Koreans homeless and destitute. Does the UN intend merely to push the aggressors back to the 38th parallel, then condone the aggression and leave the nations of the free world — primarily the United States — to shoulder the burden of reconstruction while the aggressors escape any penalty for the devastation they have wrought? If this is so, if non-agressor nations are to be expected to pay for the damage caused by aggressors, then the basic purpose of the UN is made a mockery and a premium is placed on aggression.

President Truman and Secretary Acheson can not escape responsibility for our losses in Korea. Having allowed the UN ample opportunity to declare a workable policy with respect to the open aggression of Communist China, and having failed to elicit any clear-cut authorization to meet the military issue, they were under a solemn obligation to serve notice on the UN that if it did not, by a fixed date, allow its forces to attack Communist China as a declared aggressor, the United States would reserve the right either to take such action as it might deem necessary in order to protect its own troops, or to withdraw them from the UN forces in Korea.

It is the failure of Truman and Acheson to define our own objectives in Korea, and their instructions hamstringing our troops there, which have caused our unnecessarily heavy casualties. Truman and Acheson will continue to be responsible for the cruel and senseless waste of American lives and treasure until they either permit our land forces there to defend themselves effectively, or admit the ghastly failure of their Asiatic policy by withdrawing our land forces from that theater of war.

THE CRISIS IN CONTROLS

The situation in which the economic mobilization program now finds itself is ironic and almost incredible. No one yelled louder and more persistently for the imposition of direct over-all economic controls than the leaders of organized labor. Yet these same leaders are now the most determined and vociferous opponents of the program. What they are asking for is a program so flagrantly one-sided and discriminatory that it could not possibly be made to work. What they are asking for, in effect, is price ceilings without wage ceilings.

They have never been frank enough, of course, to state this bluntly, but every time they discuss the question of wages and prices they quite openly and shamelessly apply a double standard. They not only ask for the tightest possible ceiling on prices; they demand drastic rollbacks. They even use a double vocabulary. When they talk of prices they always demand a "freeze" or a "ceiling," but when they talk of wages the strongest word they can bring themselves to use is "stabilization." And they always interpret this, in practice, to mean a further boost.

They want, for example, "to correct hardships, inequities, and substandard wage rates." But it never occurs to them that there can be any hardship or inequities as among prices, or that a price might be fixed below costs of production. Today weekly wages in industry average about 180 per cent higher than in the period 1935–1939, while rents average only about 33 per cent higher. But the labor leaders demand "tight rent controls," and would consider it outrageous if anyone used the word "tight" in connection with wage controls.

The demands of the union leaders, in fact, are so flagrantly one-sided that they are comic, or they would be if the situation that these demands have brought about were not so grave.

It would, of course, be quite impossible to grant the union leaders' demands. It is obvious that most of them are not sincerely seeking even wage "stabilization." They are trying to exploit the nation's present crisis to force up wages still higher. Every formula they bring forward is a formula for raising wages. They are trying to get extended and perhaps even universalized for union labor the dangerously inflationary cost-of-living "escalator" clauses that they have already succeeded in forcing into a few individual contracts. There is more than one reason for suspecting that in spite of their protests they actually like to see inflationary price rises, so that these can be an excuse for further wage demands. The chief way, in fact, that the union leader has for making his own job seem necessary to the rank-and-file union members is to point to the continuous increases that he has been able to wring out of employers.

The present revolt of the union leaders is a thinly disguised effort to exploit the present national crisis in order to increase their own power. They were successful during the last war in getting the War Labor Board to force the so-called "maintenance of membership" provision into the overwhelming majority of union contracts. They are now looking for still other ways to make unionism compulsory. They are using the present crisis in a drive for still further "fringe" increases — which means every kind of extra compensation that is not counted in the straight wage-rate calculation but must always be counted for what it adds to the cost of producing goods.

And finally, the union leaders are trying to use the present crisis in order to take over at least part of the functions of management. Their demand for a "participation" in management is really a demand for a veto power over managerial decisions. Under the pretense of fighting "big business" they are fighting for super-unionism, for political powers that will complete their stranglehold on the American economy. Through the device of the industry-wide strike, they have already asserted the principle that they are entitled to bring the industry of the country to a halt unless and until their terms and conditions are met. What they are trying to do now is simply to extend the application of that principle.

It is the labor union leaders of the country, as we have pointed out, who have been most insistent on the imposition of over-all price controls. Now the theory of over-all controls, on the part of those who hold it sincerely, is that the entire price-wage-cost level should be legally frozen just where it stands, or just where it stood on a given day or period in the past. Mr. Bernard Baruch, for example, proposed an over-all ceiling over the entire economy, including prices, wages, rents and fees, as of June 24, 1950 — the day before the outbreak of hostilities in Korea.

Now this concept of an over-all freeze implies among other things that the *relationships* of prices, wages and costs to each other should be frozen just where they were. It is clear that unless such functional relationships were retained in a broad way, the economy could not continue to work at all. It would be impossible, for example, to freeze prices just where they are and to allow wages (which are in themselves prices, and constitute the greater part of all costs) to keep on rising. Profit margins would be wiped out, and then turned into losses. Production would become impossible.

Union leaders have tried to rationalize their proposals by contending that profits are "too high," and should be reduced to a "reasonable" level. One of the unstated assumptions of this contention is that there is such a thing as a uniform rate of profit. Of course there is no such thing and never has been. The margin of profit is different for every individual firm. In practically all industries there are firms that are just managing to make ends meet; they show either negligible profits or actual losses. In a given industry or competitive area most firms must pay a uniform or prevailing rate of wages and can charge no more than a rather uniform or prevailing price for the product. If the price of the product stays where it is, or is forced down, while wages are forced up, this means that the "marginal" firms in that industry can no longer stay in business. Their production must halt and their workers must be laid off.

Failure to recognize these determining facts among others is one of the things that are wrong with the whole concept of over-all price control. At any given moment the relationship of the supply of and demand for any given product determines the price of that product, while the price of that product in turn determines supply and demand. The immensely complex inter-relationships of supply and demand, of the prices of thousands of different products to each other, of the wage-rates of millions of different workers to each other, and the complicated cross-relationships of prices, wages, costs, profits and losses, are constantly determining what goods are to be made, by what methods, and in what relative quantities. To bring about this marvelous dynamic balance and synchronization of production is the major function of a free price system. When prices are legally frozen this function is no longer exercised. Prices can no longer serve as a guide to producers or consumers. Distortions, strains and disequilibriums occur throughout the whole productive system.

Some of the advocates of over-all price control think that all this can be cured by straightening out what they call "inequities." But how do you measure an economic inequity? What is the test? Is it inequality of income? In June of 1950, workers who made men's work clothing got an average wage of less than $36 a week. Workers in automobile factories were then averaging $76 a week and printers more than $80 a week. Neither the union leaders of the printers nor of the automobile workers have ever suggested straightening out this sort of discrepancy. And such discrepancies are much wider than the above figures would indicate, if we compare individual workers rather than the over-all average of whole industries.

Of course union leaders contend that wages in the past have *always* been inequitable as compared with prices. They always argue — they are arguing now — that before wages are "stabilized" they should be allowed to "catch up" with prices. But there is no tenable basis for the contention that wages are now "behind" prices in the upward spiral. Compared with the period from 1935 to 1939, for example, weekly industrial wages have gone up an average of 180 per cent while the cost of living has gone up only about 82 per cent. We are not contending that any relationship of wages to prices or of one wage to another or one price to another was "fair" at any given time in the past, and therefore ought to be preserved, restored or frozen. One worker in June of 1950, say, was earning only $40 a week, while the worker next to him, because of longer experience, was earning $80 a week. We can not expect the younger worker to regard it as fair that his wage should be permanently frozen at one-half of that of his fellow worker. Yet this is typical of the kind of inequity we impose when we try to freeze the whole price and wage level as of a given date and regard the status quo of that date as a measure of justice.

These are some of the reasons why selective price fixing would at least be more enforceable and less dangerous to the structure and balance of production than over-all price fixing. Selective price fixing is of course discriminatory. It disrupts the delicate balance of price relationships, and it usually results in holding down the prices and profit margins, and therefore the production, of the very commodities most needed in war, and therefore the

very commodities whose production we are most eager to increase.

The case against price fixing can be summarized in this way: if the volume of money and credit is prevented from increasing, the general price level will not soar, and price fixing will be unnecessary, but if the volume of money and credit is permitted or encouraged to increase, then any attempt at price fixing will be futile. It will be in fact much worse than futile, for it will disrupt production, and it will be increasingly harmful to production the greater the increase in the volume of money and credit we are trying to offset by the price fixing.

The union leaders would be on firm ground if while demanding freedom from wage control they were also willing to concede freedom from price control. They would be on the strongest possible ground if, while ceasing to ask special privileges for their own group, they insisted on an end to farm price supports, "parity" formulas, and similar special privileges for others.

What, then, are the causes of inflation, and what would be a proper program for combatting it? Here are five measures for combatting inflation, set down in the approximate order of their importance:

1. The basic and direct cause of inflation is an increase in the volume of money and credit in relation to the volume of production. At the end of 1939 demand deposits and currency outside of banks together totalled $36,000,000,000. Wholesale prices in 1939 stood at an index number of 77. In December 1950 the volume of money and credit had reached a total of $118,000,000,000, and wholesale prices had soared to an average of 175.

It is obvious that this general rise in prices was caused by the increase in the volume of money and not by any decrease or shortage in the volume of goods. On the contrary, the index of industrial production, which stood at 109 in 1939, had risen by December 1950 to 216. This rise in production was the chief reason why wholesale prices between 1939 and the end of 1950 did not rise more than 127 per cent, though the volume of money and bank credit increased by 228 per cent.

The chief cause for the increase in the volume of money and credit all through this period was the government's own cheap money policy, carried out chiefly through the device of pegging outstanding government bonds above par. The Federal Reserve banks were forced to buy the bonds, which were then made the basis for the creation of more money and credit. At the end of 1939 Federal Reserve and commercial banks combined held a total of about $19,000,000,000 worth of U. S. Government obligations. At the end of 1950 the Federal Reserve and commercial banks held a total of $83,000,000,000 worth of Government obligations. In other words, about $64,000,000,000 out of the whole increase of $82,000,000,000 in money and bank credit since the end of 1939 in effect represents the "monetization" of government securities acquired by the nation's banking system.

It follows from this that the chief single way to stop inflation is to stop forcing the Federal Reserve banks to support outstanding government bonds above par. This is merely a way in which the left hand of the government buys the bonds that it "sells" with its right. If the government stops pegging its own bonds, and increasing the volume of money and credit in order to do so, then interest rates will go up. The rise of interest rates will discourage private as well as governmental borrowing. Raising discount rates has been the traditional way of halting an inflation.

Even this measure may not be enough. Sterner measures for halting inflation through preventing the further expansion of money and bank credit may prove to be necessary. But there is no point in discussing these until this first major step has been taken and its results observed. There is no substitute for this measure. Any attempt to halt inflation by some other means, while continuing to monetize the public debt, must be set down in advance as an evasion of the issue.

2. The government must balance the budget. This is another way of saying that it must not increase monetary purchasing power. The government must take away in taxes as much new purchasing power as it creates by its expenditures. Civilian buying must be cut by as much as government buying is increased. A balanced budget is necessary in order to prevent any further increase in the total volume of money and credit.

3. The budget must be balanced primarily by cutting unnecessary and wasteful government spending rather than by a still more burdensome increase in taxes. Excessive expenditures, even when balanced by tax revenues, reduce the total volume of useful production not only because they directly pay for wasteful activities but because excessive taxes discourage and disrupt production and must ultimately make it impossible to maintain a free enterprise system.

4. To the extent that taxes are raised further, they should be placed primarily on consumptive expenditures rather than on incomes; and they should be placed both on luxuries and on articles of mass consumption. This is the most direct way of combatting inflation through taxes, and practically the only way left of taxing the bulk of the national income. Wholly apart from the harm that would be done by further increases in upper-bracket personal income taxes and in corporation taxes, we have already squeezed most of the juice out of those oranges. It has been calculated, for example, that if we took *every dollar* of taxable personal income above $10,000 we would get additional revenues of less than $4,000,000,000; that if we took every dollar of taxable personal income above $26,000 we would get additional revenues of less than $1,000,000,000, and that if we took every dollar of taxable personal income above $50,000 we would get additional revenues of only about $215,000,000.

In the long run, of course, further increases in upper-bracket personal income tax rates would produce *less* revenue, not more. And they would make impossible the continuance of a private enterprise system.

5. In addition to these over-all monetary and fiscal measures, a few direct selective controls, in the nature of priorities and allocations, may prove necessary. But these direct controls will be far less in amount than those being currently discussed. They will not be needed for the general purpose of "combatting inflation," but only in the interest of accelerating conversion to a war economy.

HENRY HAZLITT

BACK OF THE BRANNAN PLAN

By LOUIS BROMFIELD

THE BRANNAN PLAN, along with much of Mr. Truman's Fair Deal Program, appears to be dead. Its revival or the appearance on the horizon of something like it might well occur if inflation continues to a point where the national economy breaks down and a depression follows. This, of course, is exactly what Stalin is waiting for, along with the Communists in this country and their fellow-travelers in the Department of Agriculture and elsewhere in our bureaucratic structure. Not only would we be in for more intricate and comprehensive agricultural supports and regimentation, but we should find at once that the Communists were up to their old tricks. There would probably be a whole new set of "borers from within" like those who in the thirties infested our Department of Agriculture and made their way into other divisions of the government.

Therefore, it might be worth while to look into the past in order better to understand the future. The bag of tricks would probably be the same.

The story of the infiltration of government agencies is not half told as yet. And beyond it, there were other elements which confused the situation during the thirties. One of them was the fact that John L. Lewis and the CIO were welcoming the Communists into the fold of organized labor and condoning, if not cooperating with, their operations within government. John L. eventually found that you can not play with Commies, but it took the CIO much longer to repudiate them and clean house.

For a long time certain leaders of labor have cherished two dreams. The first is to turn the whole government into a socialist operation; the second, to bring about an alliance between organized labor and the farmers — which alone could make it possible to attain the first ambition. The attempt on the part of labor leaders to organize everybody is not merely sociological and benevolent; it is also political, particularly in the minds of leaders like Walter Reuther and apparently, of late, even like Philip Murray. This ambition suited the Communists. It was the same trick by which they had duped the organized labor forces of other nations and then taken over. So we got a curious pattern of the Communists attempting to use organized labor, and organized labor thinking it was using the Communists, while both were bent upon using the farmer together with his great political influence.

As a rule the farmer isn't easy to use. He is an independent cuss who doesn't like government intervention and hates anything connected with socialism. In every country where the Communists have taken power, the landowners and even the prosperous peasants and tenants represent the stiffest opposition to the regime. But to the Communist, control of the landowner and farmer is first on the schedule for the revolution — if the farmer does not raise enough food the rest of the nation does not eat, and a counter-revolution can occur.

John L. Lewis with his catch-all District Fifty tried again and again to organize the farmers into a force cooperating with labor in the role of stooge, and failed. Here enter the Farmers' Union, Lee Pressman and a very smart gentleman called James Patton. Together with certain labor leaders they decided to set up their own farmers' organization not upon a union basis but ostensibly upon the basis of the already sturdily established Grange and the Farm Bureau, both of which had steadfastly refused to be taken in either by the blandishments or the threats of organized labor and of the Communists lurking in the background.

In their corner, the labor leaders, spurred by the clever Mr. Pressman (who recently confessed that he had been a member of the Communist Party) and abetted by Mr. Patton, set out to split up the farmers and capture them by surprise. This again was a sound Communist pattern. The only thing lacking was the tools. It was quite impossible to penetrate and capture the two great farmers' organizations, so they virtually invented a stooge called the Farmers' Union. Until that time the organization had had a kind of lingering existence; it still has today save for the brazen voice of Mr. Patton, which makes it sound far more important than it is, and the sympathies of Secretary of Agriculture Brannan, who was declared the special darling of the Farmers' Union during its 1950 convention in Denver.

The capture of the Farmers' Union was a comparatively easy operation. Early in its career the headquarters were moved into the offices of Communists Lem Harris and Harold Ware, the latter an acknowledged, violent leader trained in Moscow. But that was not the only headquarters it used. When you wanted to contact some official of the Farmers' Union, it was often necessary to go to the headquarters of the CIO to find him, generally in Jim Carey's office. At that time Carey was not the ardent enemy of the Communists that he became when they took over his own United Electrical Workers and threw him out of office. The whole business in those days was a triple play from the Communists to the CIO to the Farmers' Union and back again.

It is probable that the move-in on the Farmers' Union was made on Communist advice, since the organization represented on the whole the farmers of the lowest economic status. Its membership is still made up largely of sharecroppers and tenant farmers, and it prospers not at all in the more solid agricultural areas or among the more successful farmers who feed the nation. In such an organization it was possible to apply the old Communist technique of appealing to class hatred to divide the farmers, a technique still used by Mr. Patton and his friends.

During this period a double picture was presented. On the one hand there was a CIO-Communist-guided Farmers' Union; on the other, Communists and fellow-travelers working simultaneously inside the government and no-

tably in the Department of Agriculture. These inside operators were all in divisions set up to impose regimentation in one form or another upon the farmer, or to court him with bribes and free payments and political favoritism. There were the "wise guys" like Lee Pressman and Alger Hiss who eventually outsmarted themselves, the soft-headed sentimentalists of the Henry Wallace type who looked upon Moscow as the New Jerusalem, and the bright young men who came to town, often from freshwater colleges, and overnight were given positions of great authority — not upon any grounds of ability or experience but simply because they were devoted to New Deal precepts.

In all of this the Henry Wallaces and the bright young incompetents were a great help. And when Chester C. Davis cleaned house in the Department (a scared Wallace lacked the courage and hid away in Virginia), a great troop of this element resigned and followed the guilty ones into the street. Most of them, like their leaders, simply moved over into other government departments to continue their sabotage. But the purge was a great setback to the whole plan of taking over the farmers either by guile or by force, either through the Department or through the stalking horse of the Farmers' Union.

It is noteworthy that with Henry Wallace began the whole policy of taking into the Department all sorts of people who knew little or nothing about either agriculture or agricultural economics. Until this time it had always been assumed that men and women in the Department should have some knowledge which equipped them to aid the farmer; but with the establishment of countless New Deal agencies and bureaus, outsiders streamed in until 90 per cent or more in the New Deal bureaus, even down to those who filled minor positions, were Communists, fellow-travelers or at least "pinks." Mr. Pressman, the confessed leader, Mr. Chambers and Miss Bentley, have testified to this. At that time or even today it would have been difficult indeed for the Communists to recruit agricultural authorities or politicians who had any sympathy for communism — except from the Farmers' Union.

In referring to the whole group that infested the Department of Agriculture, including Pressman and a half dozen other leaders who were fired, Chester Davis said with notable moderation that "their object was to remake our economic system and they would subordinate every other consideration to that end." Obviously the interests of the farmer and even of agriculture itself were of little or no importance to them.

In several cases the leaders actually attempted to carry off or destroy the records in their offices, which were of course government property. A lot of their underlings resigned with them. However, a great number of those involved in one way or another in the infiltration remained with the Department and are still there, using pressures and influences toward the socialization of agriculture and the capture of the farmer. This is well known and accepted in Washington. All of these bureaucrats are in the Administration bureaus set up under the New Deal and the Fair Deal. You will find none of them in the research bureaus, the extension service or in any of the "legitimate" agricultural bureaus.

It is this group, an offshoot of the old infiltration, who together with James Patton of the Farmers' Union and a couple of other outsiders, concocted the Brannan Plan of noisome and ill-fated history. When you take the Brannan Plan apart all the past influences become evident, even to the influence of the CIO through its perpetual ambition to take the farmers into camp.

The intent of the very first principle of the Plan is childishly apparent. It would lower the cost of food to the consumer while guaranteeing a profitable price to the farmer, with the taxpayer — a faceless, nameless fellow whom everybody kicks around — paying the difference. This was calculated to bring together organized labor and the organized farmer, while making everybody else happy. By tying two such powerful groups into one force it would guarantee complete political power to the organized labor group, which could then set up a labor government along Socialist lines, perhaps with some Communist trimmings. The plan deliberately left out the big farmer and the highly prosperous farmer, which meant in most cases the better kind of farmer. In other words, the rich farmer became a sort of *kulak*; the next stage might well be confiscation and division of his land. The regimentation of the farmer proposed in the Brannan Plan was a bureaucratic nightmare and, once enforced, it would leave the farmer bound and tied, a captive and a victim.

How much Mr. Brannan actually had to do with the plan has never become clear. His is the prime example of the bureaucratic career. Originally a not-too-successful lawyer in Denver, he was one of those bright young men who came to Washington with the New Deal. Finally he found a berth as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, and when Clinton Anderson resigned was made Secretary to keep the seat warm for a political appointment after the Presidential election. Here he exercised a talent for edging upward and making his position secure. When most big Democrats were lukewarm about Mr. Truman's chances, Mr. Brannan campaigned day and night and made himself generally indispensable. His reward was the Secretariat. How much Mr. Brannan knows of agriculture and what sympathies he has toward the farmer are questions which remain wide open, to put it mildly. What he did produce out of the hat, whether on his own or as a stooge, was a first-class socialist proposal designed to take the farmer into camp and deliver him over to organized labor. And all of this was the natural outcome of that triple play back in the thirties.

The triple play is still in operation, although the CIO has cleared its skirts of the Communists and would prefer to forget the days when it played ball with them. Mr. Pressman went on to become secretary and legal advisor to the CIO and was the guiding spirit in the organization of its Political Action Committee, whose campaign turned out so disastrously in the last elections. Mr. Patton continues to be perpetual president of the Farmers' Union, and brought Secretary Brannan to its 1950 convention to be canonized as a patron saint of the radical minority farmers' organization.

The program adopted at that convention, a document written with dialectic skill and shrewdness, places great emphasis on the "family" farm. It neglects to say that many a large and prosperous farm is a family farm. It neglects to say, with a curious ignorance of American agriculture, that the size of a farm has little to do with whether or not it is a family farm. In the Southwest,

50,000 acres may be a family farm. In other areas I have known "family" operations on a few acres to produce incomes in excess of $100,000 a year.

The Brannan Plan and the purpose of the Farmers' Union is avowedly directed at the redistribution of large farms and their division into small farms. The program implies that everybody should have a small farm, whether the unit is efficient or not. This, of course, is the first step to be taken when Soviet Russia invades a country. The land is divided arbitrarily into small holdings; then, after it has been proved that this can not work, the next step is to establish collective farms, dispossessing the small owners and putting them all under the direction of the state.

The published program puts great emphasis on "youth" camps and "recreation" camps where special study can be given to specified problems. This, again, is a page directly out of the Communist book. It is now well known, even by the labor unions through sad experience, that such camps become centers of intensified Communist indoctrination.

Strongly urged is the formation of farmers' committees so designed as to "build a direct channel of administrative and policy communication between farmers' committees at the grass roots and the Secretary of Agriculture in Washington." What is this but the local soviet? A little further on we read:

> The function of the local committees should be broadened so as to include responsibility in its area for *all* action programs of the Department. In some instances there are statutory difficulties to this arrangement as in the case of the Soil Conservation District Boards of Supervisors. For purposes of coordination, farmers' committees should include members representative of the programs for which it has no statutory responsibility. *The object is to give farmers one committee to deal with instead of many.*

The italics are mine, but the meaning is clear enough. Plausible, but out of what book did it come? This is followed by:

> We recognize, however, that our legislative efforts must be fortified with political action. Family farming must be defended at the ballot box. Candidates must be judged, elected and defeated on a basis of their records in light of the Farmers' Union program or our legislative efforts will be hampered.

Innocent? Read some of the propaganda addressed to the peasants when the division of land occurred in Poland. The wording is almost identical. Still further we read:

> We deplore the continuation in peacetime of so gigantic a military establishment as the United States now maintains. We take this position not only on economic grounds but because the existence of so large a military class is always a threat to civil government. On the same grounds, we restate our opposition to universal military training and to further extension of the Selective Service System.

Why should what is assumed to be a purely agricultural organization make such a careful point of cutting down our military forces? The next follows naturally:

> We believe that disarmament in this respect (the hydrogen and atomic bombs) and *in all others* must begin at once, and that the key to atomic disarmament lies in action through the UN for the destruction of all bombs, an end to further work of any kind in the development of these weapons, and the simultaneous imposition of a rigid control and inspection system.

Very plausible again and something which any citizen would advocate, but why is such emphasis put upon it by what is ostensibly a farmers' organization? And what nation is the only one in the UN which objects to any system of "rigid control and inspection"?

A dozen other passages could be quoted which appear equally odd in the program of a farmers' organization. (Incidentally, the Nebraska branch of the Farmers' Union refused to endorse the program and withdrew.) Naturally support is given not only to the Brannan Plan but to every bureau or proposed bureau which tends to socialize the nation and to concentrate power in Washington and especially in the Department of Agriculture. It is not difficult to see why Secretary Brannan and the Farmers' Union love each other.

Recently Secretary Brannan advised the appointment of James Patton to the advisory committee on agricultural controls appointed by Secretary of Defense Symington, although Allan Kline, president of the largest and most representative of the farmers' organizations, the National Farm Bureau, was passed over entirely. The appointment of Murray Lincoln of the Ohio Farm Bureau Insurance Company to a post on the committee was merely slippery deception. Mr. Lincoln, once secretary of the Ohio Farm Bureau, has no connection whatever with the National Farm Bureau, and only vaguely with the Ohio Farm Bureau through its subsidiary insurance company. He has always been looked upon with disfavor by the national organization because of his radicalism. In the vicious campaign of labor to defeat Senator Taft in Ohio, Mr. Lincoln, alone among those having any connection, even remote, with the Farm Bureau, came out publicly for Taft's opponent and gained the name of "would-be Judas goat" of the farmers. Although he represents no group of farmers save perhaps some of the minority in the Farmers' Union, Secretary Symington selected him to regulate the farmers, along with Patton, who represents the smallest and weakest of the farm organizations.

The third appointee was Albert Goss, head of the National Grange, a fine man but not a fighter like Kline of the Farm Bureau, or Patton. Mr. Goss died recently, and at this writing no appointment has been made to fill his place. So the farmers of America are left to the doubtfully tender mercies of Jim Patton, Murray Lincoln and Secretary Brannan. This may mean that for the moment Patton and Brannan have got what they want, but it is mighty poor politics and may account to a large extent for the overwhelming defeat of the candidates who advocated the Brannan Plan. The people do eventually smell things out, and the farmer is not so dumb as the "liberal" bureaucrats in Washington would like to believe. In short, Mr. Brannan has become a serious liability to Truman and the National Democratic organization, both of whom ostensibly believed not so long ago that the Brannan Plan was going to take in everybody and pave the way for a Labor-Socialist government. It may just be that this is another instance of the "wise guys" outsmarting themselves.

Senator McCarthy has been loud and perhaps rash in his wholesale denunciations of the Communist and Socialist influences within the government, but there is a considerable quantity of truth in his accusations. The whole truth is difficult to unearth because of the devious ways

in which the Communists operate, because of the cooperation given them by now disappointed and bitter bureaucrats, and because much of the story goes back into the thirties. From the *Amerasia* case and the State Department's China policy through to the Brannan Plan, the old influences are still operating, and as the nation faces crisis after crisis, the whole weblike structure of influences may well prove even more tenuous than it has been up to now.

POLICY-MAKER ANONYMOUS

By ALFRED KOHLBERG

EARLY in October 1945 a long report from the Supreme Commander to the Secretary of War described the situation in China as of V-J Day. It made far-reaching recommendations for United States policy in that war-torn country. It reported the numbers, disposition, armament and condition of the troops of the Republic of China, then under command of the American Theater Commander, Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer. It reported on the air force under his command, the reserves of ammunition at the China end of the Hump, and the greater reserves still lying in India.

It reported fully on the Chinese Communist armed forces, not under General Wedemeyer's command. Colonel Barrett, General Wedemeyer's liaison officer in Yenan, reported that the Communists numbered somewhere between 125,000 and 250,000 men, mostly very poorly armed, and had no air force. In contrast, General Wedemeyer commanded 4,000,000 troops of the Nationalist Government.

The report then recommended that with the approval of the Nationalist Government, already given, the United States guarantee the personal safety of the Communist leaders, their right to organize freely as a political party and to campaign and vote in a free election to choose a new government of China; the election to be held in the fall of 1946, after pacification of the country. To qualify for these guarantees the Communist troops were to lay down their arms to American task forces.

The report further recommended that if the Communists refused to accept the proposals they be surrounded by the troops under General Wedemeyer and forcibly disarmed, after which the Communist Political Committee members (Politburo) were to be exiled, and the guarantees of personal safety and political rights were to be extended to the balance of the Chinese Communist Party.

This report, with its recommendations which would have ended the civil war in China before it started, was received at the War Department a few days later. Copies were made for consideration by the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

More than a month later, in November, when Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley returned to Washington, this report was still under discussion in the military services and had not yet been forwarded to the State Department with recommendations. Ambassador Hurley resigned. President Truman appointed General Marshall to replace him.

When General Marshall and Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson sat down to prepare the instructions that President Truman was to sign, neither of them had seen or knew of this report. Nor had either General Marshall or Under-Secretary Acheson any first-hand information on the situation in China. Relying on State Department advice, they proposed a truce between the National Government and the Communists, with the Communists receiving positions in partial control of the National Government, while retaining their separate army.

Still without knowing of the Supreme Commander's proposal, they ordered (or requested) the Secretary of War to instruct General Wedemeyer so to dispose the National armies as to leave all North China to the Communists (China White Paper, Appendix 61: enclosure). To enforce this decision on the Nationalist Government, General Marshall was authorized by the President in his public statement of December 15, 1945, to withhold all aid from China until the coalition government had been set up. This decision was enforced against both Nationalists and Communists, but worked out unevenly, because the Nationalists had nowhere else to look for aid, while the Communists were armed, trained and directed by the Soviet Union.

Now, more than five years later, it has become clear that an unnecessary civil war in China, which was in reality a war between China and the Soviet Union using Chinese stooges, has developed into an American-Chinese Communist war, which is in reality a war between the United States and the Soviet Union using the very same Chinese stooges.

Who was the Mr. X or General X who kept this report and its recommendations from reaching the State Department, where it could have been used as a guide by General Marshall and Under-Secretary Acheson? And can not our 54,649 casualties in Korea (at last reports) be laid directly at his door?

Is this still too "top secret" for our boys in Korea, their parents, the Congress and the public? And where is Mr. X (General X) today?

Perchance directing our Far Eastern policy?

LINES AND POINTS

In official Washington, there apparently is less nervousness about atomic attacks than about blasts of criticism.

Few Congressmen do as well by foreign relations as by their own.

The Administration's idea of playing ball is to call on all Americans to make sacrifices, while it concentrates on making a hit.

Congress takes the view that the President should eliminate non-defensible spending.

EDMUND J. KIEFER

INFLATION: THREAT TO FREEDOM

By WILHELM RÖPKE

Geneva

IT IS a good thing to be reminded from time to time that most of the present controversies about the issues of economic policy are based on profound differences concerning the very principles involved. Such a reminder may come quite by accident, as it did to me the other day. Within a few hours I came across two statements from different parts of the world, both dealing with the same subject, but arriving at diametrically opposed conclusions because they started from entirely different social philosophies. The subject was money.

One of these statements was contained in an impressive paper, "Inflation or Freedom?", written by Philip Cortney, the well-known American businessman and author. One of his main conclusions was that, in the end, a people can preserve its freedom only if it avoids inflation. To achieve this, however, has become a formidable problem under modern mass democracy. A sound monetary system can not be expected if it is dependent entirely on the government, on the parties and on the groups powerful in modern mass democracy. To Mr. Cortney, the gold standard seems to be the only solution of this problem.

The other statement came to me from Germany. Its author was a Socialist university professor who violently criticized what he called the "disastrous deflationary policy" of the Central Bank of western Germany (*Bank Deutscher Länder*). His conclusion was that "the most democratic instrument of economic control, i.e. money and credit," must be taken away from such an irresponsible "rival government" and "handed over to democracy."

It is difficult to imagine two statements more irreconcilable than these. They reflect principles between which no compromise seems possible. For either it is desirable that the money and credit of a nation should be entirely under the control of the government executing the will of the majority, or it is, on the contrary, desirable that such a concentration of control should be counteracted. Either it is wise to put all one's eggs into one basket, or it is not.

In order to answer this question we must first understand the kind of task which, in this case of money, has to be solved. It consists in constantly regulating its volume in such a way that no harm is done either by its becoming redundant (inflation) or by its becoming too scarce (deflation). It is hardly necessary to add that this definition of the task of monetary policy covers very knotty problems which arise mainly from the difficulty of finding an objective way to determine exactly the right volume of money for any given time.

But even supposing that this difficulty had been overcome, we could hardly feel safe in leaving the job to the government, unless we can be confident that it will not succumb to the temptation to use money, as the German author puts it so beguilingly, "as an instrument of economic control." In this we can be the less confident the more a government — as necessarily under democracy — is dependent on alternating majorities or powerful groups, whether of organized labor, organized agriculture, or organized industry.

The probability that such a government, equipped with absolute power over money, will use it to bring about deflation has always been very small. Today, with paper standards adopted everywhere, it is almost nil. All the greater, therefore, is the danger that weakness, confusion and lack of resistance to power groups and ideologies will lead the government to a course of inflation.

The memory of the disastrous deflation of the early thirties still makes many people incapable of seeing things in their right proportions. The shock of that distant experience was so great that most people still fail to realize that, on the average and throughout history, the danger of inflation has always been infinitely greater than that of deflation.

Inflation is an ever-present temptation. Under all circumstances it is the line of least resistance. There is no organized lobby opposed to it. Its beginnings produce agreeable effects, and it takes a long time before everyone finally recognizes it as a social catastrophe. Deflation, on the other hand, is a bitter experience from beginning to end. A government resourceful and unscrupulous enough to promulgate appropriate theories to make inflation fairly acceptable, and to dispel possible fears, will rarely be unpopular. As far as I know, no statesman responsible for inflation has ever been the victim of bloody revenge. On the other hand, there was at least one in our time (Rasin in Czechoslovakia after the first World War) who was murdered because he was held responsible for a policy of deflation.

Even when, finally, the evil consequences of inflation — the drug which is so stimulating in the beginning — become apparent, the government will always be able to postpone the day of reckoning by finding pretexts and scapegoats, such as "profiteers," "speculators" or people unpatriotic enough to withdraw their capital from the country. And it will be quick to learn from totalitarian governments the trick of "repressed inflation."

The secular trend is toward inflation and not toward deflation. During the last centuries, there never was a safer bet than this — that within a generation a gold piece would have preserved its purchasing power while a note would have lost a considerable part of it. Never has a government enjoyed unlimited power over money without misusing it for the purpose of inflation. To deprive governments of this power, and to make money independent of their arbitrary decisions or lack of insight, has been one of the main functions of the gold standard. Its other function has been to make possible — by the same "depoliticalization" of money — a truly international monetary system. Never was this "depoliticalization" of money more essential than in our age of democ-

racy. This statement is no criticism of democracy. It is, rather, a serious warning not to overlook the only conditions under which democracy can work.

After the general downfall of the gold standard, there was left in many countries a last counterweight against the unlimited power of governments over money. It is that (more or less relative) independence of central banks which our German critic means when he speaks so ungraciously of a "rival government." Even this last obstacle against the unlimited power of governments over money, however, seems to be doomed in our time. It is regarded as an intolerable infringement of democracy. Independent central banks appear to our modern Jacobins as so many Bastilles which must be razed to the ground.

What does that mean exactly? The late Professor Joseph A. Schumpeter, in the last paper of his life ("March into Socialism," *American Economic Review*, May 1950), warned us against the danger of "perpetual inflationary pressure," which seemed to him the almost inevitable result of the political and ideological forces of our time. To destroy the independence of central banks would mean that the last dam against this sea of "perpetual inflationary pressure" would be blown up. There is no need for me to point out from Switzerland that the present struggle between the United States Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board proves that in your country also the same tendency is at work.

Everywhere the campaign against the independence of central banks as one of the last brakes on "perpetual inflationary pressure" has been launched in order to remove a most inconvenient obstacle to a course of economic policy which is thought to be "progressive." This course is that of "full employment at whatever cost," as it is understood today. In other words: If we still have doubts whether or not, after the destruction of the hated "rival government," money would be used for a policy of "perpetual inflationary pressure," it is precisely the aims of those who are asking for the destruction of the independent central bank that turn such doubts into certainty.

In order to characterize those aims and their ultimate consequences, I can not avoid saying a few plain words. For more than twenty years now, we have been discussing everywhere the general issues of the free economy and of collectivism in all its shades and combinations. The discussion will go on as fiercely as ever. The moment seems to be ripe, however, to stop and ask whether there is not one point at least which seems to have been settled by experience. It is now obvious that the final result of all these policies of "full employment," of "planning," of "cheap money," of the "welfare state," of "functional finance," of the maximum pressure of taxation and so on, has been a *steadily progressing inflation*, interrupted only by occasional recessions, partial adjustments and unjustified warnings against deflation. That is the bitter truth, and after more than ten years of steadily mounting inflation in most countries nobody can deny it any longer.

It is indeed time for us to face the hard fact that the whole world is saddled with a *chronic* problem of inflation. Since the Korean crisis it has taken on an acute and particularly dangerous form, seemingly rebellious to milder treatments. Onto the previous and chronic "democratic and social" inflation there has now been grafted a growth of old-fashioned "military" inflation. The combination of the two has made the hitherto concealed danger evident to all eyes.

To see this is very important in the general debate for and against the free economy. For we recognize now that to fight for a free economy not only means to fight for the freedom of markets; it also means to fight against chronic inflation and the erosion of the purchasing power of money which it involves. Until quite recently, I fear, there has been little understanding of the strong but subtle reasons why the collectivist destruction of the free economy in our time is necessarily connected with a process of constant inflationary pressure. Today at least the fact itself should be obvious to everyone. The advocates of free economy can not be fully understood if the fact is overlooked that their determined resistance to collectivism comprises an equally determined resistance to inflationism. The one resistance is as determined as the other, because the one danger is as great as the other. That is so, however, because the source of the danger is the same in both cases.

Inflation is as old as the power of governments over money. And as old as inflation are also the patched-up theories whose aim is to conceal or to justify it. But there is something new in our age. Formerly inflation was at least something which was done with a bad conscience. The theories with which it was clothed were after all, like hypocrisy, the proverbial tribute which vice pays to virtue. All that has now been changed. The governments and social groups which now cooperate to bring about the "perpetual inflationary pressure" of Professor Schumpeter are able to work with theories of academic respectability which not only give them back their good conscience, but turn sin into positive virtue. As a last line of resistance, and as a sort of reassurance against the final consequences of monetary and fiscal recklessness, governments bent upon inflation can always fall back on the newly discovered device of repressed inflation with its collectivist controls. As long as possible, inflation will be denied as an optical illusion, and the very term will be indignantly rejected as inappropriate. But when this line can no longer be taken, because the inflationary pressure has become too obvious, there is always time to apply the screws of "repressed inflation" and to have even the naiveté or effrontery to call this "combating the inflation."

In other words: In the field of theory inflation will be argued away, and in practice it will be forbidden — as is now happening once more in the United States. All the greater, of course, is the resentment against those killjoys who are tactless enough to expose the inflationary consequences of the popular theories (of "full employment," the "welfare state," etc.) and to denounce the practice of "repression" as collectivism with all its consequences.

Now we come back to the question from which we started. We have seen the danger of "democratic" inflation, and now there can no longer be any doubt regarding who is right: the American liberal who does not trust governments having undisputed power over money, or the German Socialist who hates the very idea of not entrusting democratic government with this power. If we do not believe it to be a good thing to break up the

last dam against the "perpetual inflationary pressure," we are bound to agree that the German Socialist is very wrong indeed.

His statement, however, is more than the expression of an error in economics. It is also rooted in a definite social and political philosophy which is profoundly mistaken. It is the sort of statement which a man is always likely to make whose ideal is the centralization of power and the monolithic state. Decentralized government, Montesquieu's "separation of powers," federalism and self-government, diversity, "checks and balances," intermediate groups between the mass of individuals and the one central government — the *"république une et indivisible"* of the French Jacobins; all these things are hateful to him. He has no use for the idea that it is the very condition of a well-functioning democracy to limit the power of the central government by decentralized administration and a judicious system of counterweights against the state.

This eternal Jacobin looks as suspiciously at a central bank which has not yet been reduced to the level of an obedient office of the central administration as he will look at every other residue of independent activities: at the free town, the private school, the private doctor, and finally even at the family itself. Totalitarianism is nothing else than the ultimate consequence of this increasing centralism which feeds on itself. It leads as surely to the final dissolution of society as its extreme opposite, anarchy.

In the treasure of the legends of mankind there is a story which symbolizes the mania of insatiable centralism. It is the story of the Roman emperor Caligula, who is said to have expressed the wish that the Roman people had only one head, so that it could be conveniently chopped off with one stroke. Caligula's hearty wish will forever remain the symbol of unlimited and tyrannical centralism. And it is this that makes sound money an impossibility.

THE NEW ANTI-SEMITISM

By GEORGE E. SOKOLSKY

A WEEKLY paper, *Common Sense*, published in Union, New Jersey, devoted to anti-Semitism, is being spread over the country. It comes in the mails and is distributed by hand at gatherings and meetings. It makes no effort to deceive its readers but blatantly pursues its role by employing the gimmick of using the word "Zionist" instead of Jew and making Zionism and communism identical.

This association of Zionism with Marxism is obviously without foundation; yet so potent is constant repetition that I have heard even those who should know better repeat the canard.

Most of the assertions in this paper are completely false and can be so established. There is not even an attempt to give the impression of knowledge of history or of current news, but the device of identification is used indiscriminately. I shall analyze one article from the issue of January 15, 1951, entitled "Zionists and Stooges Control Defense Systems," as an example of the method employed. The paper says:

> *Common Sense* will gladly prove that the only difference between communism and Zionism is in the spelling of the words.

Zionism, in the tradition of the Jews, is 4000 years old. The Psalms, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ibn Gabirol, Jehudah Halevi refer to Zion as the hope of Israel. The Passover service repeats the story of the Exodus of Jews from Egypt to the land of Israel. It was this attachment to the land of Israel which kept the Jews together for 2000 years, during the Diaspora. Were it not for this hope and the love of the Torah, the Jews would have disappeared like their neighbors, the Hittites.

Communism came into practical existence in 1848 with the publication of the "Communist Manifesto," by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. It was not seeded down in any country until 1917 when Lenin seized power in Russia. Political Zionism, which was introduced into Jewish life by Theodor Herzl, was his intellectual response to the Dreyfus case in France. Herzl was a distinguished Viennese journalist who covered the case for his newspaper. The labors of his successors, principally Dr. Chaim Weizmann, resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel.

Common Sense says:

> Marshall allowed the "Marshall Plan" to be camouflaged with his name. The "Marshall Plan" was written by L. Levitsky (Levine) changed again to Louis Lorwin, a Russian-born Yiddish Zionist.

No evidence is offered that Louis Lorwin had anything to do with the preparation of the Marshall Plan. There is ample evidence that Dean Acheson had much to do with the eventual development of the Marshall Plan. So did Averell Harriman and Paul Hoffman. Also, the first name of Lorwin is spelled Lewis, not Louis. His name was originally, I believe, Levine. Lewis L. Lorwin is an economist, long associated with the Brookings Institution, the International Labor Office at Geneva, etc.

Common Sense says:

> Marshall, now Secretary of Defense (in name only) is pictured above as honored guest at a $500 a plate dinner held in the Waldorf Astoria, New York, to celebrate the birthday of Chaim Weizmann, Yiddish President of Israel . . .

What is a Yiddish President? Yiddish is a language. It is derived from the German "*Jüdisch.*" Dr. Weizmann is not a Yiddish President any more than Harry Truman is an English President. The use of the adjective is either a display of ignorance or perverted humor.

Chaim Weizmann, a chemist of distinction, whose researches in acetones made possible our present high ex-

plosives, gave his discovery gratis to the British Government during World War I. He is President of Israel.

Common Sense says:

> Another top man in the Marshall circle is R. A. Lovett, Marxist student of Felix Frankfurter at Harvard.

Robert Abercrombie Lovett is neither a Marxist nor a Zionist nor a Jew. He is a banker born in Texas of old American stock. He studied law at Harvard in 1919–20 and became a banker, associated with the Harrimans. He served in the U. S. Naval Air Service in World War I.

Common Sense says:

> Anna M. Rosenberg, the new Assistant Secretary of Defense, was pushed into the U. S. Defense Department by pressure from every Zionist group in America. Such Zionist financial powers as Lazard Freres & Co., Lehman Brothers, Kuhn, Loeb and Co.; Albert Lasker (a close associate of Bernard Baruch) and Gimbels Co., all used their influence to ascertain that Anna M. Rosenberg be placed in charge of the Nation's manpower.

There is no evidence that this is true. Mrs. Rosenberg was investigated by a Senate Committee under very severe charges. Yet these charges were not proved, and those who made them have been discredited.

There are no Zionists and few Jews in Kuhn Loeb and Co. or Lazard Frères, the best-known partner of which is an Irish-American, George Murnane. Albert Lasker and Bernard Baruch are not "close associates." They are not even friends. I do not know what Gimbels are referred to; there are so many of them. But if the editor of *Common Sense* means Bernard Gimbel, this newspaper is hitting at a man who has earned the fine reputation he enjoys as a sportsman as well as merchant.

Common Sense says:

> . . . Anna M. Rosenberg's Red Record would fill 30 pages of *Common Sense* — the red record of her associates would fill 5,000 pages. If it is not so, sue us . . .

The challenge to sue is silly. Precisely what is the financial status of *Common Sense* to make a suit for damages worth while? Besides a jury might ask: "How could such a paper damage anyone?"

I opposed Mrs. Rosenberg's appointment; read the record; withdrew my opposition because the record — prepared by her opponents — did not warrant opposition or unfavorable comment. I wrote nothing on the subject for my column.

Common Sense says:

> . . . Marx Leva, also an Assistant Secretary of Defense, is another Zionist who is in an important position to dictate the policies to patriotic men and women of America.

I do not know whether Marx Leva is a Zionist; he is a Jew. He is also a brilliant lawyer who was brought into our national defense by James Forrestal. He served under Louis Johnson and now under George Marshall. He was born in Selma, Alabama; studied law at Harvard. He entered government service as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black. He has seen duty in the Navy. He is regarded as a man of extraordinary ability.

I could go through article after article in this newspaper, which is edited by Conde McGinley, and prove historical inaccuracies and deceitful twists of current news.

I do not know Conde McGinley. In my anti-Communist associations, which go back to 1917, I have never come across his name until I saw it in this weekly newspaper. What his record is and where he originates, I do not know, and have not troubled to inquire, but his is not the way to combat communism in the United States or anywhere else. By his emphasis on racial and religious hatred, he paves the way for precisely the evils which he claims to oppose.

Marxism is a philosophy of life, derived from a foul brew of Hegelianism confounded with Darwinism; prepared by an apostate Jew who became an atheist. No Jew who accepts the traditions of his fathers, who believes in Natural Law as it is written in Leviticus and Deuteronomy, who has been inspired by the Psalms and the Prophets, can accept the secularism of Marxism. The State of Israel has a Communist Party, as the United States has one. But in Israel, it does not count.

Some Jews are Communists. So are some Protestants, Catholics, Hindus and Buddhists. All groups have traitors, renegades and just plain damn fools. In the fight against Marxism there are an astounding number of Jews. In the United States, those who have fought communism most devastatingly and at the greatest sacrifice, have found Jews among them in a disproportionate number.

I appeal personally to real fighters against communism to denounce this paper, *Common Sense*.

Mr. McGinley may be well-intentioned in his opposition to communism but he is singularly ill-informed, particularly when he associates Zionism with communism. For the United States, this foul confusion is dangerous, particularly at a time when we seek anti-Communist allies throughout the world. Who is to say that the little state of Israel may not be of extraordinary value to this country in the frightful days ahead?

Such a paper as *Common Sense*, by constant repetition of a lie, follows the Great Lie technique which both Hitler and Stalin have used to such advantage. I take this opportunity to nail the lie that communism and Zionism are identical, akin, associated.

To cite one more piece of evidence, I quote from the Jewish Labor Committee:

> We are demanding a thorough UN probe in an effort to force the USSR and its satellites to make known all the facts about the destruction of the cultural, spiritual and physical life in Jewish communities. Spiritual annihilation can be as disastrous as physical destruction.
>
> Anti-Semitism has not died in Romania, nor has the Communist government considered it necessary to fight against it. More than 68,000 Romanian Jews have been deprived of political privileges because they won't bow to the one dominant political party — the Communist Party. They cannot get farm or factory work and face starvation.

THE JEWS *are among the aristocracy of every land; if a literature is called rich in the possession of a few classic tragedies, what shall we say to a national tragedy lasting for fifteen hundred years, in which the poets and the actors were also the heroes?* GEORGE ELIOT

BRITAIN'S MYSTERIOUS CABINET

By FELIX GREENE

IN THE afternoon of May 17, 1950, the elderly and much respected Viscount Cecil of Chelwood rose to his feet in the House of Lords. In grave words he moved a resolution: "That the growing power of the Cabinet is a danger to the democratic constitution of the country." It is quite probable that the historians of the future will look upon this resolution as the first shot fired in a constitutional crisis that has, like a thunder cloud, long been gathering and which may soon burst upon the British people. Like Dunning's famous resolution of 1780, "That the power of the Crown has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished," Lord Cecil's resolution seeks to draw attention to a *misbalance* that has developed in the British system of government which, if unchecked, will endanger the structure of the state. In 1780 it was the Executive in the person of the King that required restraint; today it is the Executive in the shape of the Cabinet that has, in the opinion of Lord Cecil and a large number of thoughtful people, extended its power to the point of despotism.

In 1780 it was comparatively easy to recognize the usurpation of power by the Crown; and consequently it was simple to correct. By that time, as a result of the prolonged and bloody constitutional struggles of the previous century, the power of the king had been closely defined in law and clarified by a large number of constitutional enactments. But today who knows what the legal power of the Cabinet is? Who can tell when and in what way it has overstepped its legitimate bounds? No one can tell; for one of the strangest facts about the modern political system in England is that the Cabinet — the supreme directing authority of the land — is itself unrecognized by law. It does not form any part of the legal Constitution; its power is wholly undefined. The rules relating to the formation of the Cabinet, the relationship of its members to the Prime Minister, and the power it wields are not in legislation, nor in the Common Law, nor in the law and custom of Parliament. The Cabinet is a most mysterious body.

Historically, the Cabinet is a committee of Ministers appointed by the Crown to exercise the executive functions of government, similar to the functions exercised by the President and his various Secretaries of State. In practice, it is a committee of the leading members of a political party — that is, it is a *party* committee — appointed to office by the Prime Minister. Beyond that, all is shrouded in mystery. Britain is ruled by a secret committee of which almost nothing whatever is known.

As Walter Bagehot, the constitutional historian, commented:

> The most curious point about the Cabinet is that so very little is known about it. The meetings are not only secret in theory, but secret in reality. . . . The most powerful body in the State is a committee working wholly in secret. . . . No other select committee has any comparable power; and considering how carefully we have fettered and limited the powers of all subordinate authorities, our allowing so much discretionary power on matters peculiarly dangerous and peculiarly delicate to rest in the sole charge of one secret committee is most strange.

And Lord Rosebery, who was himself Prime Minister, wrote in the same vein:

> Nothing . . . [is] more strange and extraordinary, in a country with so much democracy about it, than the spectacle of a secret council, on the Venetian model, and sworn to absolute silence, enacting the business of a nation which insists on publicity for everything less important.

Professor Lowe, in his book "Governance of England," brings out even more strongly this quality of secrecy:

> The fact that the English Cabinet is a secret committee is in reality a most astonishing phenomenon . . . [and] that the gravest concerns of a people should be decided under the cloak of an impenetrable darkness.

At the head of this secret committee, whose members are sworn to silence, is the Prime Minister. He is by far the most powerful man in the country. He has a plenitude of power that no other constitutional ruler in the world possesses — far more than that of the President of the United States. Though in law the king is the chief magistrate of England, in practice the powers of his office have been transferred to the Prime Minister. He is the Cabinet's leading member; he forms it; he can change it; he can dismiss any or all of his colleagues; he can alter the government or destroy it.

Now the Prime Minister comes to this office, with its enormous power, by *no process of public election*. In law and in theory he is appointed by the king. But by custom the king is not free to choose his chief minister; he has no choice but to appoint the leader of the party that has the largest following in the House of Commons. But who appoints him as leader of his party? That again is shrouded in mystery. The members of his party do not elect their leader by open vote. He is chosen as leader — and therefore as Prime Minister — by methods quite unknown, by a small charmed circle of the higher ranks of the party organization. The nation has as its most powerful figure a man who was never chosen by the people, or even by the open vote of his own party followers. This is, for a democracy, a most strange anomaly.

But why should this arrangement, which has apparently stood the test of time, now be questioned? Why, after many years of quiet and efficient operation, should it at this particular time give rise to a powerful and ever-growing discontent? It is because new practices have been introduced in the last few years which have thrown out of balance altogether the careful division of authority which worked so well for many generations. Formerly, upon this enormously powerful secret committee known as the Cabinet, the House of Commons exerted a continuous and vigilant restraint. The House acted as a cor-

rective influence upon the governing forces of the Executive; it maintained an ever-watchful eye over the rights and liberties of the subject. A member of the Cabinet could hold office only so long as he retained the confidence of the people's representatives and each member of the Cabinet was answerable to the House of Commons, individually and personally, for all his actions. The House was always jealous to guard its right (and did not hesitate to use it) to demand the dismissal of any member of the Cabinet if ever it saw fit to do so. With such a watchful control by an independent House of Commons the system of Cabinet government worked amazingly well.

It was under this system that the power and productivity of England expanded and the influence of this small island people was felt in the farthest corners of the world. While it gave the people freedom it also gave efficient government. By a long process of trial and error the English had found an almost perfect balance between the need, on the one hand, for a flexible and strong Executive, ready to act promptly and with authority; and, on the other hand, a legislature composed of the people's representatives who at every stage kept the final control and ultimate decisions in their hands. Just as the President knows that he "must carry Congress with him," so the English Cabinet in every decision would have present in their minds the question: "Will this meet with the approval of Parliament?"

In the course of a few years, all this was changed. Lord Cecil's motion, and the growing apprehension it expresses, arise from the fact that the Cabinet has by slow degrees removed itself from the restraining influences which made its power, though so great, tolerable, until today the House of Commons exerts no control over the Executive. The steps by which this astonishing change in the English Constitution was achieved were each in itself insignificant; each small change in procedure seemed logical and plausible when it was proposed; and it is only now, as their accumulative effect is at last being felt, that the people of England are beginning to realize the revolution in their form of government that has silently taken place.

It is in accordance with human nature that any one placed in authority will always attempt to free himself from any restraining influence. So it was with the English Cabinet. One of the first steps was to protect the members of the Cabinet from being personally answerable to the House of Commons. In the course of recent years there was evolved the theory of "collective responsibility" sometimes known as "Cabinet unity." Under this doctrine, the Cabinet in effect say to the House of Commons: "As a Cabinet we stick together. If you wish to challenge one of us, you must challenge all of us. If you wish to dismiss one Minister for malpractice or inefficiency, then you must dismiss us all. Whatever one of us does, all of us will stand behind him."

Whatever advantages to good government this system may have brought — and it did bring some — it soon became clear that where all are responsible, no one is responsible. The introduction of the doctrine of "collective responsibility" has given members of the supreme governing committee an unchallengeable personal immunity. Since its inception there has never been a single instance in which the House of Commons has been able to secure the dismissal of a Minister *whatever he may have done.*

Another factor, of far greater importance, helped the Executive to overcome the restraining influence of the House of Commons. That was the development, both in Parliament and in the country constituencies, of highly organized and centrally controlled party machines. In the old days there were parties, it is true; but they were loose associations of like-minded men; and always the individual Member of Parliament was allowed to exercise his freedom of judgment in voting. In recent years party organization and party discipline have been developed to such an extent that it is now only on very rare occasions (and then most often on quite trivial issues) that a Member of Parliament will ever dare to vote against his party's instructions. The party machines are now so powerful that they can, by withdrawing their support from a Member who shows too much independence, make it virtually certain that he will lose his seat at the next election. To disobey party orders means the end of his political career. Party discipline has been developed in the House of Commons to a degree quite unknown in Congress and to an extent which would be resisted by politicians of all parties (except, of course, the Communist) and the general public everywhere in the United States. The coercion of Members to vote according to direction is, of course, an infringement of the English Bill of Rights which secures to Members their right to vote freely according to the dictates of their consciences.

With the development of the disciplined party ranks a complete change took place in the relationship of the Cabinet to the House of Commons. The Cabinet, as the highest committee of party representatives, can now count on the automatic obedience of its supporters in the House of Commons. While it controls a majority in the House — and it would not be in power unless it did — the Cabinet knows with absolute certainty that any and all of its decisions will be automatically translated into law. There has never been a case since 1895 (when the present system of party discipline was first being established) that any Cabinet controlling a majority in the House has ever been turned out of office.

Automatically marshalled majorities in the House of Commons mean (as Lord Simon pointed out in support of the Cecil resolution, and as a member of a number of Cabinets he should know) that the Executive today, once it is in power, *can do what it likes* without any sense of restraint. The position would be a parallel one if, by the development of an iron centralized party control, the President would know that *any* proposal he wishes to bring forward would automatically be endorsed and enacted into law by Congress. Add to that the fact that no law passed by Parliament can be declared unconstitutional (as in the United States), and some idea may be conveyed of the enormous and virtually unfettered power that now resides in the Cabinet in England. It represents a concentration of power never previously tolerated in the whole history of England.

The myth still survives that the Cabinet is under the ultimate control of the House of Commons. It is a myth that dies hard. It is true in law in theory; but in reality it has ceased to be true. So crucial is this point that it is worth inquiring to see what some of the eminent constitutional authorities have to say about it. Professor Law,

a number of years ago, declared: "The House of Commons no longer controls the Executive; on the contrary the Executive controls the House of Commons." Professor Ivor Jennings says: "If the Government has a majority, and as long as that majority holds together, the House does not control the Government, but the Government controls the House." Professor Ramsay Muir says: "To say that Parliament controls the Cabinet is an absurdity"; also, "Parliament is no longer in any real sense the sovereign power in the State." And Mr. Lloyd George, who for so many years had actual experience of the present system, declared before a Select Committee of the House of Commons: "Well it [the House] has not got control. I am speaking now after forty years of experience. Parliament has really no control over the Executive; it is pure fiction."

When the real seat of power moves away from Parliament to the Executive, the major decisions of state inevitably begin to be made elsewhere. They are made in the party meeting, at trade union headquarters, in the Cabinet room, in the Government offices — anywhere but in Parliament.

The House of Commons is now merely the official means whereby decisions made elsewhere receive the technical endorsement required to make them into law. The really puzzling thing (and perhaps this is the gravest question of all) is how a nation that by tradition has always been politically alert, could have drifted, almost absent-mindedly as it were, into a position in which its democratic structure is endangered, and a position so difficult to remedy without conflict. Warnings have been given by those who should have commanded general attention, but have been strangely left unheeded. As long ago as 1929 the then Lord Chief Justice of England, speaking with all the weight and authority of his office, wrote these words:

> It is manifestly easy to point a superficial contrast between what was done or attempted in the days of our least wise kings, and what is being done or attempted today. In those days the method was to defy Parliament — and it failed. In these days the method is to cajole, to coerce and to use Parliament — and it is strangely successful. The old despotism, which was defeated, offered Parliament a challenge. The new despotism, which is not yet defeated, gives Parliament an anaesthetic. The strategy is different, but the goal is the same. It is to subordinate Parliament, to evade the Courts, and to render the will or the caprice of the Executive unfettered and supreme.

The dangerous position into which they have drifted is at last being recognized by an increasing number of British people. There is no question that in the next few years we shall see in England the most strenuous efforts being made to re-establish the supremacy of Parliament. There is also no question that these efforts will be as strenuously resisted. Sooner or later, however, the necessity of defining and limiting the powers of the Cabinet, which at present operates in so secret and mysterious a way, will be recognized. Struggle undoubtedly there will be. Already, beneath the surface, the lines are being laid. And when finally the issues become simplified and they are grasped by the people of England, we shall see one of the fiercest constitutional conflicts since the days of Charles. On its outcome will depend the future of democracy in England.

THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID

Yet I disapprove very much of the way in which these legislative committees work. Smearing good people like Lauchlin Currie, Alger Hiss, and others is, I think, unforgivable. Though we are told they have every opportunity to clear themselves the fact that they have been smeared can not be erased. Anyone knowing either Mr. Currie or Mr. Hiss, who are the two people I happen to know fairly well, would not need any denial on their part to know they are not Communists. Their records prove it.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, August 16, 1948

As regards such criteria as faithfulness to international commitments and agreements, no historian of diplomatic relations can possibly demonstrate that Russia has violated her obligations more frequently than other nations, or as frequently as some. Even the Soviet Government, since the passing of the destructive phase of the Revolution, has proved in this respect fully as reliable as any of the contemporary governments.

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN, "Russia and the United States," 1944

The Attorney General [Vishinsky] is a man of about 60 and is much like Homer Cummings: calm, dispassionate, intellectual and able and wise. He conducted the treason trial in a manner that won my respect and admiration as a lawyer.

JOSEPH E. DAVIES, "Mission to Moscow," 1941

Harry Hopkins is my witness for the statement that the unity of Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt was a firmer and more tangible thing at Yalta than at Teheran. And it was evident that Father's role, even more than at earlier conferences, was that of leader. . . . He dominated Winston Churchill more completely than before; Joseph Stalin was likewise prepared to heed Father's counsel, to accept Father's solutions.

ELLIOTT ROOSEVELT, "As He Saw It," 1946

. . . when I read even my own reports from Moscow at that time [1942–1945] I find a slight sense of shame at the extent to which I felt obliged to moderate those reports in the Soviet favor if they were to get any audience in Washington and not appear to be extreme and anti-Soviet and to condemn themselves. I wish today I had been blunter . . .

GEORGE KENNAN, May 29, 1950

If there was a Tory majority at the next election Great Britain would have said to the world: "All the roads are closed except the roads to civil war."

ANEURIN BEVAN, June 6, 1949

The Freeman *invites contributions to this column, and will pay $2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged.* THE EDITORS

racy. This statement is no criticism of democracy. It is, rather, a serious warning not to overlook the only conditions under which democracy can work.

After the general downfall of the gold standard, there was left in many countries a last counterweight against the unlimited power of governments over money. It is that (more or less relative) independence of central banks which our German critic means when he speaks so ungraciously of a "rival government." Even this last obstacle against the unlimited power of governments over money, however, seems to be doomed in our time. It is regarded as an intolerable infringement of democracy. Independent central banks appear to our modern Jacobins as so many Bastilles which must be razed to the ground.

What does that mean exactly? The late Professor Joseph A. Schumpeter, in the last paper of his life ("March into Socialism," *American Economic Review*, May 1950), warned us against the danger of "perpetual inflationary pressure," which seemed to him the almost inevitable result of the political and ideological forces of our time. To destroy the independence of central banks would mean that the last dam against this sea of "perpetual inflationary pressure" would be blown up. There is no need for me to point out from Switzerland that the present struggle between the United States Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board proves that in your country also the same tendency is at work.

Everywhere the campaign against the independence of central banks as one of the last brakes on "perpetual inflationary pressure" has been launched in order to remove a most inconvenient obstacle to a course of economic policy which is thought to be "progressive." This course is that of "full employment at whatever cost," as it is understood today. In other words: If we still have doubts whether or not, after the destruction of the hated "rival government," money would be used for a policy of "perpetual inflationary pressure," it is precisely the aims of those who are asking for the destruction of the independent central bank that turn such doubts into certainty.

In order to characterize those aims and their ultimate consequences, I can not avoid saying a few plain words. For more than twenty years now, we have been discussing everywhere the general issues of the free economy and of collectivism in all its shades and combinations. The discussion will go on as fiercely as ever. The moment seems to be ripe, however, to stop and ask whether there is not one point at least which seems to have been settled by experience. It is now obvious that the final result of all these policies of "full employment," of "planning," of "cheap money," of the "welfare state," of "functional finance," of the maximum pressure of taxation and so on, has been a *steadily progressing inflation*, interrupted only by occasional recessions, partial adjustments and unjustified warnings against deflation. That is the bitter truth, and after more than ten years of steadily mounting inflation in most countries nobody can deny it any longer.

It is indeed time for us to face the hard fact that the whole world is saddled with a *chronic* problem of inflation. Since the Korean crisis it has taken on an acute and particularly dangerous form, seemingly rebellious to milder treatments. Onto the previous and chronic "democratic and social" inflation there has now been grafted a growth of old-fashioned "military" inflation. The combination of the two has made the hitherto concealed danger evident to all eyes.

To see this is very important in the general debate for and against the free economy. For we recognize now that to fight for a free economy not only means to fight for the freedom of markets; it also means to fight against chronic inflation and the erosion of the purchasing power of money which it involves. Until quite recently, I fear, there has been little understanding of the strong but subtle reasons why the collectivist destruction of the free economy in our time is necessarily connected with a process of constant inflationary pressure. Today at least the fact itself should be obvious to everyone. The advocates of free economy can not be fully understood if the fact is overlooked that their determined resistance to collectivism comprises an equally determined resistance to inflationism. The one resistance is as determined as the other, because the one danger is as great as the other. That is so, however, because the source of the danger is the same in both cases.

Inflation is as old as the power of governments over money. And as old as inflation are also the patched-up theories whose aim is to conceal or to justify it. But there is something new in our age. Formerly inflation was at least something which was done with a bad conscience. The theories with which it was clothed were after all, like hypocrisy, the proverbial tribute which vice pays to virtue. All that has now been changed. The governments and social groups which now cooperate to bring about the "perpetual inflationary pressure" of Professor Schumpeter are able to work with theories of academic respectability which not only give them back their good conscience, but turn sin into positive virtue. As a last line of resistance, and as a sort of reassurance against the final consequences of monetary and fiscal recklessness, governments bent upon inflation can always fall back on the newly discovered device of repressed inflation with its collectivist controls. As long as possible, inflation will be denied as an optical illusion, and the very term will be indignantly rejected as inappropriate. But when this line can no longer be taken, because the inflationary pressure has become too obvious, there is always time to apply the screws of "repressed inflation" and to have even the naiveté or effrontery to call this "combating the inflation."

In other words: In the field of theory inflation will be argued away, and in practice it will be forbidden — as is now happening once more in the United States. All the greater, of course, is the resentment against those killjoys who are tactless enough to expose the inflationary consequences of the popular theories (of "full employment," the "welfare state," etc.) and to denounce the practice of "repression" as collectivism with all its consequences.

Now we come back to the question from which we started. We have seen the danger of "democratic" inflation, and now there can no longer be any doubt regarding who is right: the American liberal who does not trust governments having undisputed power over money, or the German Socialist who hates the very idea of not entrusting democratic government with this power. If we do not believe it to be a good thing to break up the

last dam against the "perpetual inflationary pressure," we are bound to agree that the German Socialist is very wrong indeed.

His statement, however, is more than the expression of an error in economics. It is also rooted in a definite social and political philosophy which is profoundly mistaken. It is the sort of statement which a man is always likely to make whose ideal is the centralization of power and the monolithic state. Decentralized government, Montesquieu's "separation of powers," federalism and self-government, diversity, "checks and balances," intermediate groups between the mass of individuals and the one central government — the *"république une et indivisible"* of the French Jacobins; all these things are hateful to him. He has no use for the idea that it is the very condition of a well-functioning democracy to limit the power of the central government by decentralized administration and a judicious system of counterweights against the state.

This eternal Jacobin looks as suspiciously at a central bank which has not yet been reduced to the level of an obedient office of the central administration as he will look at every other residue of independent activities: at the free town, the private school, the private doctor, and finally even at the family itself. Totalitarianism is nothing else than the ultimate consequence of this increasing centralism which feeds on itself. It leads as surely to the final dissolution of society as its extreme opposite, anarchy.

In the treasure of the legends of mankind there is a story which symbolizes the mania of insatiable centralism. It is the story of the Roman emperor Caligula, who is said to have expressed the wish that the Roman people had only one head, so that it could be conveniently chopped off with one stroke. Caligula's hearty wish will forever remain the symbol of unlimited and tyrannical centralism. And it is this that makes sound money an impossibility.

THE NEW ANTI-SEMITISM

By GEORGE E. SOKOLSKY

A WEEKLY paper, *Common Sense*, published in Union, New Jersey, devoted to anti-Semitism, is being spread over the country. It comes in the mails and is distributed by hand at gatherings and meetings. It makes no effort to deceive its readers but blatantly pursues its role by employing the gimmick of using the word "Zionist" instead of Jew and making Zionism and communism identical.

This association of Zionism with Marxism is obviously without foundation; yet so potent is constant repetition that I have heard even those who should know better repeat the canard.

Most of the assertions in this paper are completely false and can be so established. There is not even an attempt to give the impression of knowledge of history or of current news, but the device of identification is used indiscriminately. I shall analyze one article from the issue of January 15, 1951, entitled "Zionists and Stooges Control Defense Systems," as an example of the method employed. The paper says:

> *Common Sense* will gladly prove that the only difference between communism and Zionism is in the spelling of the words.

Zionism, in the tradition of the Jews, is 4000 years old. The Psalms, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ibn Gabirol, Jehudah Halevi refer to Zion as the hope of Israel. The Passover service repeats the story of the Exodus of Jews from Egypt to the land of Israel. It was this attachment to the land of Israel which kept the Jews together for 2000 years, during the Diaspora. Were it not for this hope and the love of the Torah, the Jews would have disappeared like their neighbors, the Hittites.

Communism came into practical existence in 1848 with the publication of the "Communist Manifesto," by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. It was not seeded down in any country until 1917 when Lenin seized power in Russia. Political Zionism, which was introduced into Jewish life by Theodor Herzl, was his intellectual response to the Dreyfus case in France. Herzl was a distinguished Viennese journalist who covered the case for his newspaper. The labors of his successors, principally Dr. Chaim Weizmann, resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel.

Common Sense says:

> Marshall allowed the "Marshall Plan" to be camouflaged with his name. The "Marshall Plan" was written by L. Levitsky (Levine) changed again to Louis Lorwin, a Russian-born Yiddish Zionist.

No evidence is offered that Louis Lorwin had anything to do with the preparation of the Marshall Plan. There is ample evidence that Dean Acheson had much to do with the eventual development of the Marshall Plan. So did Averell Harriman and Paul Hoffman. Also, the first name of Lorwin is spelled Lewis, not Louis. His name was originally, I believe, Levine. Lewis L. Lorwin is an economist, long associated with the Brookings Institution, the International Labor Office at Geneva, etc.

Common Sense says:

> Marshall, now Secretary of Defense (in name only) is pictured above as honored guest at a $500 a plate dinner held in the Waldorf Astoria, New York, to celebrate the birthday of Chaim Weizmann, Yiddish President of Israel . . .

What is a Yiddish President? Yiddish is a language. It is derived from the German *"Jüdisch."* Dr. Weizmann is not a Yiddish President any more than Harry Truman is an English President. The use of the adjective is either a display of ignorance or perverted humor.

Chaim Weizmann, a chemist of distinction, whose researches in acetones made possible our present high ex-

plosives, gave his discovery gratis to the British Government during World War I. He is President of Israel.

Common Sense says:

> Another top man in the Marshall circle is R. A. Lovett, Marxist student of Felix Frankfurter at Harvard.

Robert Abercrombie Lovett is neither a Marxist nor a Zionist nor a Jew. He is a banker born in Texas of old American stock. He studied law at Harvard in 1919–20 and became a banker, associated with the Harrimans. He served in the U. S. Naval Air Service in World War I.

Common Sense says:

> Anna M. Rosenberg, the new Assistant Secretary of Defense, was pushed into the U. S. Defense Department by pressure from every Zionist group in America. Such Zionist financial powers as Lazard Freres & Co., Lehman Brothers, Kuhn, Loeb and Co.; Albert Lasker (a close associate of Bernard Baruch) and Gimbels Co., all used their influence to ascertain that Anna M. Rosenberg be placed in charge of the Nation's manpower.

There is no evidence that this is true. Mrs. Rosenberg was investigated by a Senate Committee under very severe charges. Yet these charges were not proved, and those who made them have been discredited.

There are no Zionists and few Jews in Kuhn Loeb and Co. or Lazard Frères, the best-known partner of which is an Irish-American, George Murnane. Albert Lasker and Bernard Baruch are not "close associates." They are not even friends. I do not know what Gimbels are referred to; there are so many of them. But if the editor of *Common Sense* means Bernard Gimbel, this newspaper is hitting at a man who has earned the fine reputation he enjoys as a sportsman as well as merchant.

Common Sense says:

> . . . Anna M. Rosenberg's Red Record would fill 30 pages of *Common Sense* — the red record of her associates would fill 5,000 pages. If it is not so, sue us . . .

The challenge to sue is silly. Precisely what is the financial status of *Common Sense* to make a suit for damages worth while? Besides a jury might ask: "How could such a paper damage anyone?"

I opposed Mrs. Rosenberg's appointment; read the record; withdrew my opposition because the record — prepared by her opponents — did not warrant opposition or unfavorable comment. I wrote nothing on the subject for my column.

Common Sense says:

> . . . Marx Leva, also an Assistant Secretary of Defense, is another Zionist who is in an important position to dictate the policies to patriotic men and women of America.

I do not know whether Marx Leva is a Zionist; he is a Jew. He is also a brilliant lawyer who was brought into our national defense by James Forrestal. He served under Louis Johnson and now under George Marshall. He was born in Selma, Alabama; studied law at Harvard. He entered government service as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black. He has seen duty in the Navy. He is regarded as a man of extraordinary ability.

I could go through article after article in this newspaper, which is edited by Conde McGinley, and prove historical inaccuracies and deceitful twists of current news.

I do not know Conde McGinley. In my anti-Communist associations, which go back to 1917, I have never come across his name until I saw it in this weekly newspaper. What his record is and where he originates, I do not know, and have not troubled to inquire, but his is not the way to combat communism in the United States or anywhere else. By his emphasis on racial and religious hatred, he paves the way for precisely the evils which he claims to oppose.

Marxism is a philosophy of life, derived from a foul brew of Hegelianism confounded with Darwinism; prepared by an apostate Jew who became an atheist. No Jew who accepts the traditions of his fathers, who believes in Natural Law as it is written in Leviticus and Deuteronomy, who has been inspired by the Psalms and the Prophets, can accept the secularism of Marxism. The State of Israel has a Communist Party, as the United States has one. But in Israel, it does not count.

Some Jews are Communists. So are some Protestants, Catholics, Hindus and Buddhists. All groups have traitors, renegades and just plain damn fools. In the fight against Marxism there are an astounding number of Jews. In the United States, those who have fought communism most devastatingly and at the greatest sacrifice, have found Jews among them in a disproportionate number.

I appeal personally to real fighters against communism to denounce this paper, *Common Sense*.

Mr. McGinley may be well-intentioned in his opposition to communism but he is singularly ill-informed, particularly when he associates Zionism with communism. For the United States, this foul confusion is dangerous, particularly at a time when we seek anti-Communist allies throughout the world. Who is to say that the little state of Israel may not be of extraordinary value to this country in the frightful days ahead?

Such a paper as *Common Sense*, by constant repetition of a lie, follows the Great Lie technique which both Hitler and Stalin have used to such advantage. I take this opportunity to nail the lie that communism and Zionism are identical, akin, associated.

To cite one more piece of evidence, I quote from the Jewish Labor Committee:

> We are demanding a thorough UN probe in an effort to force the USSR and its satellites to make known all the facts about the destruction of the cultural, spiritual and physical life in Jewish communities. Spiritual annihilation can be as disastrous as physical destruction.
>
> Anti-Semitism has not died in Romania, nor has the Communist government considered it necessary to fight against it. More than 68,000 Romanian Jews have been deprived of political privileges because they won't bow to the one dominant political party — the Communist Party. They cannot get farm or factory work and face starvation.

THE JEWS *are among the aristocracy of every land; if a literature is called rich in the possession of a few classic tragedies, what shall we say to a national tragedy lasting for fifteen hundred years, in which the poets and the actors were also the heroes?* GEORGE ELIOT

BRITAIN'S MYSTERIOUS CABINET

By FELIX GREENE

IN THE afternoon of May 17, 1950, the elderly and much respected Viscount Cecil of Chelwood rose to his feet in the House of Lords. In grave words he moved a resolution: "That the growing power of the Cabinet is a danger to the democratic constitution of the country." It is quite probable that the historians of the future will look upon this resolution as the first shot fired in a constitutional crisis that has, like a thunder cloud, long been gathering and which may soon burst upon the British people. Like Dunning's famous resolution of 1780, "That the power of the Crown has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished," Lord Cecil's resolution seeks to draw attention to a *misbalance* that has developed in the British system of government which, if unchecked, will endanger the structure of the state. In 1780 it was the Executive in the person of the King that required restraint; today it is the Executive in the shape of the Cabinet that has, in the opinion of Lord Cecil and a large number of thoughtful people, extended its power to the point of despotism.

In 1780 it was comparatively easy to recognize the usurpation of power by the Crown; and consequently it was simple to correct. By that time, as a result of the prolonged and bloody constitutional struggles of the previous century, the power of the king had been closely defined in law and clarified by a large number of constitutional enactments. But today who knows what the legal power of the Cabinet is? Who can tell when and in what way it has overstepped its legitimate bounds? No one can tell; for one of the strangest facts about the modern political system in England is that the Cabinet — the supreme directing authority of the land — is itself unrecognized by law. It does not form any part of the legal Constitution; its power is wholly undefined. The rules relating to the formation of the Cabinet, the relationship of its members to the Prime Minister, and the power it wields are not in legislation, nor in the Common Law, nor in the law and custom of Parliament. The Cabinet is a most mysterious body.

Historically, the Cabinet is a committee of Ministers appointed by the Crown to exercise the executive functions of government, similar to the functions exercised by the President and his various Secretaries of State. In practice, it is a committee of the leading members of a political party — that is, it is a *party* committee — appointed to office by the Prime Minister. Beyond that, all is shrouded in mystery. Britain is ruled by a secret committee of which almost nothing whatever is known.

As Walter Bagehot, the constitutional historian, commented:

> The most curious point about the Cabinet is that so very little is known about it. The meetings are not only secret in theory, but secret in reality. . . . The most powerful body in the State is a committee working wholly in secret. . . . No other select committee has any comparable power; and considering how carefully we have fettered and limited the powers of all subordinate authorities, our allowing so much discretionary power on matters peculiarly dangerous and peculiarly delicate to rest in the sole charge of one secret committee is most strange.

And Lord Rosebery, who was himself Prime Minister, wrote in the same vein:

> Nothing . . . [is] more strange and extraordinary, in a country with so much democracy about it, than the spectacle of a secret council, on the Venetian model, and sworn to absolute silence, enacting the business of a nation which insists on publicity for everything less important.

Professor Lowe, in his book "Governance of England," brings out even more strongly this quality of secrecy:

> The fact that the English Cabinet is a secret committee is in reality a most astonishing phenomenon . . . [and] that the gravest concerns of a people should be decided under the cloak of an impenetrable darkness.

At the head of this secret committee, whose members are sworn to silence, is the Prime Minister. He is by far the most powerful man in the country. He has a plenitude of power that no other constitutional ruler in the world possesses — far more than that of the President of the United States. Though in law the king is the chief magistrate of England, in practice the powers of his office have been transferred to the Prime Minister. He is the Cabinet's leading member; he forms it; he can change it; he can dismiss any or all of his colleagues; he can alter the government or destroy it.

Now the Prime Minister comes to this office, with its enormous power, by *no process of public election*. In law and in theory he is appointed by the king. But by custom the king is not free to choose his chief minister; he has no choice but to appoint the leader of the party that has the largest following in the House of Commons. But who appoints him as leader of his party? That again is shrouded in mystery. The members of his party do not elect their leader by open vote. He is chosen as leader — and therefore as Prime Minister — by methods quite unknown, by a small charmed circle of the higher ranks of the party organization. The nation has as its most powerful figure a man who was never chosen by the people, or even by the open vote of his own party followers. This is, for a democracy, a most strange anomaly.

But why should this arrangement, which has apparently stood the test of time, now be questioned? Why, after many years of quiet and efficient operation, should it at this particular time give rise to a powerful and ever-growing discontent? It is because new practices have been introduced in the last few years which have thrown out of balance altogether the careful division of authority which worked so well for many generations. Formerly, upon this enormously powerful secret committee known as the Cabinet, the House of Commons exerted a continuous and vigilant restraint. The House acted as a cor-

rective influence upon the governing forces of the Executive; it maintained an ever-watchful eye over the rights and liberties of the subject. A member of the Cabinet could hold office only so long as he retained the confidence of the people's representatives and each member of the Cabinet was answerable to the House of Commons, individually and personally, for all his actions. The House was always jealous to guard its right (and did not hesitate to use it) to demand the dismissal of any member of the Cabinet if ever it saw fit to do so. With such a watchful control by an independent House of Commons the system of Cabinet government worked amazingly well.

It was under this system that the power and productivity of England expanded and the influence of this small island people was felt in the farthest corners of the world. While it gave the people freedom it also gave efficient government. By a long process of trial and error the English had found an almost perfect balance between the need, on the one hand, for a flexible and strong Executive, ready to act promptly and with authority; and, on the other hand, a legislature composed of the people's representatives who at every stage kept the final control and ultimate decisions in their hands. Just as the President knows that he "must carry Congress with him," so the English Cabinet in every decision would have present in their minds the question: "Will this meet with the approval of Parliament?"

In the course of a few years, all this was changed. Lord Cecil's motion, and the growing apprehension it expresses, arise from the fact that the Cabinet has by slow degrees removed itself from the restraining influences which made its power, though so great, tolerable, until today the House of Commons exerts no control over the Executive. The steps by which this astonishing change in the English Constitution was achieved were each in itself insignificant; each small change in procedure seemed logical and plausible when it was proposed; and it is only now, as their accumulative effect is at last being felt, that the people of England are beginning to realize the revolution in their form of government that has silently taken place.

It is in accordance with human nature that any one placed in authority will always attempt to free himself from any restraining influence. So it was with the English Cabinet. One of the first steps was to protect the members of the Cabinet from being personally answerable to the House of Commons. In the course of recent years there was evolved the theory of "collective responsibility" sometimes known as "Cabinet unity." Under this doctrine, the Cabinet in effect say to the House of Commons: "As a Cabinet we stick together. If you wish to challenge one of us, you must challenge all of us. If you wish to dismiss one Minister for malpractice or inefficiency, then you must dismiss us all. Whatever one of us does, all of us will stand behind him."

Whatever advantages to good government this system may have brought — and it did bring some — it soon became clear that where all are responsible, no one is responsible. The introduction of the doctrine of "collective responsibility" has given members of the supreme governing committee an unchallengeable personal immunity. Since its inception there has never been a single instance in which the House of Commons has been able to secure the dismissal of a Minister *whatever he may have done.*

Another factor, of far greater importance, helped the Executive to overcome the restraining influence of the House of Commons. That was the development, both in Parliament and in the country constituencies, of highly organized and centrally controlled party machines. In the old days there were parties, it is true; but they were loose associations of like-minded men; and always the individual Member of Parliament was allowed to exercise his freedom of judgment in voting. In recent years party organization and party discipline have been developed to such an extent that it is now only on very rare occasions (and then most often on quite trivial issues) that a Member of Parliament will ever dare to vote against his party's instructions. The party machines are now so powerful that they can, by withdrawing their support from a Member who shows too much independence, make it virtually certain that he will lose his seat at the next election. To disobey party orders means the end of his political career. Party discipline has been developed in the House of Commons to a degree quite unknown in Congress and to an extent which would be resisted by politicians of all parties (except, of course, the Communist) and the general public everywhere in the United States. The coercion of Members to vote according to direction is, of course, an infringement of the English Bill of Rights which secures to Members their right to vote freely according to the dictates of their consciences.

With the development of the disciplined party ranks a complete change took place in the relationship of the Cabinet to the House of Commons. The Cabinet, as the highest committee of party representatives, can now count on the automatic obedience of its supporters in the House of Commons. While it controls a majority in the House — and it would not be in power unless it did — the Cabinet knows with absolute certainty that any and all of its decisions will be automatically translated into law. There has never been a case since 1895 (when the present system of party discipline was first being established) that any Cabinet controlling a majority in the House has ever been turned out of office.

Automatically marshalled majorities in the House of Commons mean (as Lord Simon pointed out in support of the Cecil resolution, and as a member of a number of Cabinets he should know) that the Executive today, once it is in power, *can do what it likes* without any sense of restraint. The position would be a parallel one if, by the development of an iron centralized party control, the President would know that *any* proposal he wishes to bring forward would automatically be endorsed and enacted into law by Congress. Add to that the fact that no law passed by Parliament can be declared unconstitutional (as in the United States), and some idea may be conveyed of the enormous and virtually unfettered power that now resides in the Cabinet in England. It represents a concentration of power never previously tolerated in the whole history of England.

The myth still survives that the Cabinet is under the ultimate control of the House of Commons. It is a myth that dies hard. It is true in law in theory; but in reality it has ceased to be true. So crucial is this point that it is worth inquiring to see what some of the eminent constitutional authorities have to say about it. Professor Law,

a number of years ago, declared: "The House of Commons no longer controls the Executive; on the contrary the Executive controls the House of Commons." Professor Ivor Jennings says: "If the Government has a majority, and as long as that majority holds together, the House does not control the Government, but the Government controls the House." Professor Ramsay Muir says: "To say that Parliament controls the Cabinet is an absurdity"; also, "Parliament is no longer in any real sense the sovereign power in the State." And Mr. Lloyd George, who for so many years had actual experience of the present system, declared before a Select Committee of the House of Commons: "Well it [the House] has not got control. I am speaking now after forty years of experience. Parliament has really no control over the Executive; it is pure fiction."

When the real seat of power moves away from Parliament to the Executive, the major decisions of state inevitably begin to be made elsewhere. They are made in the party meeting, at trade union headquarters, in the Cabinet room, in the Government offices — anywhere but in Parliament.

The House of Commons is now merely the official means whereby decisions made elsewhere receive the technical endorsement required to make them into law. The really puzzling thing (and perhaps this is the gravest question of all) is how a nation that by tradition has always been politically alert, could have drifted, almost absent-mindedly as it were, into a position in which its democratic structure is endangered, and a position so difficult to remedy without conflict. Warnings have been given by those who should have commanded general attention, but have been strangely left unheeded. As long ago as 1929 the then Lord Chief Justice of England, speaking with all the weight and authority of his office, wrote these words:

> It is manifestly easy to point a superficial contrast between what was done or attempted in the days of our least wise kings, and what is being done or attempted today. In those days the method was to defy Parliament — and it failed. In these days the method is to cajole, to coerce and to use Parliament — and it is strangely successful. The old despotism, which was defeated, offered Parliament a challenge. The new despotism, which is not yet defeated, gives Parliament an anaesthetic. The strategy is different, but the goal is the same. It is to subordinate Parliament, to evade the Courts, and to render the will or the caprice of the Executive unfettered and supreme.

The dangerous position into which they have drifted is at last being recognized by an increasing number of British people. There is no question that in the next few years we shall see in England the most strenuous efforts being made to re-establish the supremacy of Parliament. There is also no question that these efforts will be as strenuously resisted. Sooner or later, however, the necessity of defining and limiting the powers of the Cabinet, which at present operates in so secret and mysterious a way, will be recognized. Struggle undoubtedly there will be. Already, beneath the surface, the lines are being laid. And when finally the issues become simplified and they are grasped by the people of England, we shall see one of the fiercest constitutional conflicts since the days of Charles. On its outcome will depend the future of democracy in England.

THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID

Yet I disapprove very much of the way in which these legislative committees work. Smearing good people like Lauchlin Currie, Alger Hiss, and others is, I think, unforgivable. Though we are told they have every opportunity to clear themselves the fact that they have been smeared can not be erased. Anyone knowing either Mr. Currie or Mr. Hiss, who are the two people I happen to know fairly well, would not need any denial on their part to know they are not Communists. Their records prove it.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, August 16, 1948

As regards such criteria as faithfulness to international commitments and agreements, no historian of diplomatic relations can possibly demonstrate that Russia has violated her obligations more frequently than other nations, or as frequently as some. Even the Soviet Government, since the passing of the destructive phase of the Revolution, has proved in this respect fully as reliable as any of the contemporary governments.

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN, "Russia and the United States," 1944

The Attorney General [Vishinsky] is a man of about 60 and is much like Homer Cummings: calm, dispassionate, intellectual and able and wise. He conducted the treason trial in a manner that won my respect and admiration as a lawyer.

JOSEPH E. DAVIES, "Mission to Moscow," 1941

Harry Hopkins is my witness for the statement that the unity of Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt was a firmer and more tangible thing at Yalta than at Teheran. And it was evident that Father's role, even more than at earlier conferences, was that of leader. . . . He dominated Winston Churchill more completely than before; Joseph Stalin was likewise prepared to heed Father's counsel, to accept Father's solutions.

ELLIOTT ROOSEVELT, "As He Saw It," 1946

. . . when I read even my own reports from Moscow at that time [1942–1945] I find a slight sense of shame at the extent to which I felt obliged to moderate those reports in the Soviet favor if they were to get any audience in Washington and not appear to be extreme and anti-Soviet and to condemn themselves. I wish today I had been blunter . . .

GEORGE KENNAN, May 29, 1950

If there was a Tory majority at the next election Great Britain would have said to the world: "All the roads are closed except the roads to civil war."

ANEURIN BEVAN, June 6, 1949

The Freeman *invites contributions to this column, and will pay $2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged.* THE EDITORS

BORCHARD OF YALE

By WILLIAM A. ORTON

AROUND New Haven there are thousands of people who have both seen and heard Edwin Borchard unawares. They have seen and heard him, not as the Hotchkiss Professor of International Law, not as counsel or star witness in any of his big cases, but as the occupant of a modest desk among the violins of the New Haven Symphony Orchestra. He was one of its founders, for many years its president, and is still a most generous patron. He would toil away at his part like any tyro, drive himself down to rehearsals and concerts (how he and his family survived his driving is a mystery known only to God) and struggle along because he loved it, as he loved certain other things that he has never quite succeeded in defining. But does one ever quite succeed in that?

Looking backward, one wonders how he ever found time to learn the fiddle. There were no silver spoons for children of immigrant parents in the middle eighties. In those days, youngsters learned to fight off their own toes — and how much America owes them! Borchard came from one of those curiously gifted families like the Steins and the Berensons. His share of the gifts included a keenly analytical mind that preferred the concrete to the abstract, and an amazing capacity for sustained work. But there was nothing highbrow about it. He enjoyed playing the infield alongside Eddie Collins for the Columbia baseball team. More lastingly, there was tennis; and to watch that agile body on the court, even in later years, irresistibly suggested the agile mind that could always plant a volley in the seat of humbug.

Law school days (and nights) at CCNY gave time for more serious matters, such as the translation of technical French and German. Somewhere along the way young Borchard mastered typing and shorthand; which he sometimes taught, to keep himself going. Characteristically, nothing was wasted. Phoebe Morrison, his research assistant through the fighting years, could work from his shorthand, as could his later secretary Lucile Seibert. Like everything else he did, it was clear, though it was not the popular system.

At Columbia Borchard met the one man who enlisted his complete, almost uncritical, devotion: John Bassett Moore. By a sort of natural succession, Borchard now has the Moore papers. Yale has published several volumes under his editorship, and there may be more to come. Moore was about 24 years older than Borchard, and then at the height of his power and influence. He was frequently called away from his academic duties to serve as Assistant Secretary of State; but he must have spotted a brilliant student and possible successor. Much of Borchard's work has in fact carried on Moore's major interests: the North Atlantic Fisheries case, for example; the development of Pan-American arbitration; the codification of international law at Lima and The Hague. All this was "in the works" many years before Moore's (and Borchard's) campaign against the foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson. By the time that issue developed, Borchard had acquired a lot of practical experience.

Much of it was economic, especially financial: developed by hard study while he was law librarian of Congress; by his experience as legal advisor to the National City Bank and, later, to the United States Treasury. In both the practice and the teaching of law, Borchard's main interest has been in the way law affects the activities and destinies of human beings, corporate or individual. He once described law, including international law, as "founded on practical experience of human affairs." That does not imply a naive pragmatism. It does, however, explain his distrust of "natural law" theorizing or any other sort of *a priori* or moralistic approach. In his view, that sort of approach is a romantic escape from reality "for which one may have all possible sympathy but no great intellectual respect." It is simply bad law, giving rise to bad policy — policy that won't work.

Because of his experience and turn of mind, Borchard has always been in demand by international corporations that have got snarled up in conflicting interpretations of international law — to which our modern world contains no logical limit. For the same reason, much of his work has been devoted to clearing up the legal debris left by war and revolution; a necessary, exacting and thankless task. At one period, for example, there was a lot of litigation about Russo-American claims and counterclaims in American courts. At another period similar issues cropped up on (or under) the soil of Mexico. In both cases public and private international law were all mixed up. Borchard hated that sort of confusion and plowed his way through a jungle of technicalities to straighten things out.

One of his latest cases, heard at Denver a few years ago, illustrates that particular aptitude. The essential issue was whether or not war broke out at Pearl Harbor. To a layman that might seem a silly question; and privately Borchard thought so too. He allowed himself to be a little facetious about his being brought all the way from New Haven to Denver to argue that what happened at Pearl Harbor was war. But a lot of insurance money was at stake; and to decide whether it legally was or was not war required a knowledge of the precedents and technicalities that few men possessed. Borchard sympathized with the claimants; but both common sense and international law decided that Pearl Harbor was warfare; and it pleased him that he was able to convince the bench in less than half an hour.

That aptitude at handling complicated and highly technical issues in a clear and commonsensical way is evident in his forthcoming book, the first of the Yale Law School Studies, on "State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders." But it had been brought out as far back as 1932 by a challenge from a totally different quarter; a challenge that Borchard, busy as he was, simply couldn't resist. A certain district attorney of Worcester County,

Massachusetts, was quoted as saying, "Innocent men are never convicted. Don't worry about it, it never happens." Borchard did worry about it. He was not so sure.

With the assistance of Dr. Russell Lutz and a corps of collaborators all over the country, he analyzed the detailed records of 65 cases out of a much larger number. The results were devastating. "Convicting the Innocent" landed the Yale University Press among the publishers of best-sellers. The book was reprinted by Garden City, with illustrations that included comparative photographs and fingerprints. It became one of the most popular whodunnits — so much so that for years after Borchard was besieged by doubtful characters with plenty of money, who wanted to retain him for the defense. But he had won his case, which was, essentially, that in instances of wrongful conviction there should be legal provision for compensation to the injured party. Other countries had it, but not this one. A Federal statute to that effect was enacted in 1938; and it is good to recall that FDR presented to Borchard the pen with which it was signed.

The episode illustrates what might be called (without his permission) Borchard's interest in the humanization of law; his conviction that technical law is, or should be, the servant of humanity rather than the master. He has never generalized the thesis, but his record seems to suggest it. Take for example his work on "Declaratory Judgment." The job itself was exceedingly technical. It involved the distinction, quite confused in American legislation, between equity and law. But the main issue was clear to any layman. As law then stood, the entrepreneur had to take on his own shoulders the legal risk of a borderline venture, under severe penalty if the courts subsequently condemned it. What Borchard contended was that he should have an opportunity to find out in advance which way the legal cat was likely to jump. Again Borchard won his plea; and the ensuing Federal statute brought him a second pen from FDR.

Another presentation about that time probably gave him still greater satisfaction. One says "probably," because Borchard has never been aware of himself as a VIP. He has never been, has never tried to be, what is called "impressive"; and nature did not so design that slight, tough frame. He always took his job so much more seriously than he took himself that the contrast was deceptive; especially to opposing counsel, who sometimes failed to realize what they were up against until a case got down to business. Personal publicity never entered his scheme of values; so his work on the Constitution of the Irish Free State remains a closed chapter to the people of the nearest trans-Atlantic republic.

One might guess that it had for him more than a legal interest; but on the legal side it was a fascinating problem for an international lawyer to help define the future relations of Eire with Britain, the British monarchy, the Commonwealth and the hoped-for society of free nations. When the Constitution was finally adopted, Eamon de Valera sent Borchard an inscribed copy over his personal signature. That was perhaps Borchard's most treasured trophy of the late 1930s.

By that time, Borchard was on the crest of a distinguished career, much of it spent directly in public and international service. In several countries his work was almost as well known as it was in Washington. He had been honored by Berlin and Budapest universities. He had — and has — the affectionate esteem of a wide circle of colleagues and former students. He was lucky in having not only the devotion, but the admiration, of an exceptionally able wife. Thurman Arnold (no mean judge of such matters) recalls his beautiful entertaining, and how much it added to life in New Haven — but of course that was really Corinne. She would protect and manage her domestic dynamo, so far as he could be managed; even buy him clothes enough to look less like a ragamuffin — for when Borchard was keen on a case, what external impression he made mattered somewhat less than half a damn. He was now embarking on the biggest case of his life. And it was going against him.

It was not merely a case at law, though from his point of view it was that; it was an appeal to history and public opinion, not yet decided. It was a fight for a vision, an American vision that some scions of the Mayflower seemed determined to obliterate. Borchard literally gave his life for it. It evoked a deep congenital strain in him that one is tempted to call Franciscan. He became, with all his energy and resources, the Franciscan on the warpath — or rather, the peacepath, which is traditionally the harder to tread.

There were really two issues, though they could hardly be separated. Both are now belatedly recognized as central to American policy. One concerned the constant aggrandizement of executive power and authority: mainly, but by no means solely, in international affairs. That prompted Borchard's continuing study of Executive Agreements. Historically it seemed to be the rule that international tension increased the irresponsibility of the Executive, and every increase in the irresponsibility of the Executive increased the international tension.

For some queer old-fashioned reason, Borchard really believed in democracy. So, for example, he supported the Ludlow amendment (the referendum on war) which FDR opposed tooth and nail. On just what theory of democracy Borchard rested is not as clear as it might be; but he seems to have supposed that, given time and opportunity to think for themselves, the mass of voters would recognize the validity of his second contention.

He has never had the slightest faith in the notion of universal peace via universal force; nor in any of the idealistic, moralistic, political or institutional apparatus that stems from it. One must admit he has some evidence. He is no absolute pacifist. As in other such matters, he shies away from general prescriptions; but particularly that of "collective security" based on bombs, bases, bacteria, pacts, promises, advance commitments whether public or "executive." Ever since 1915 the role of such commitments in American policy (and for that matter in the League of Nations or the UN) has seemed to Borchard to ensure only the enlargement of limited wars to general ones, advertised as vindications of international morality but actually amounting to no more than a defense of the status quo — or with luck, to an improvement on it from the standpoint of the victors. And in his view, if, as and when America joined one side, the influence of a real "third force" toward lasting peace and justice must inevitably be dissipated, whatever the outcome.

So he defended not only the law, but the moral basis of

neutrality; which Wilson, while this country was non-belligerent, had at least respected, which FDR, while this country was (by Executive fiat) non-belligerent, had strenuously denied. To defend that position in view of what Roosevelt was saying in America and what Hitler was doing in Europe called for more courage than is usually expected either of college professors or international lawyers.

In his fighting opposition to the war policy Borchard was in the company of such men as Hoover, Hutchins, Flynn, Fosdick, Beard, Lewis, Lindbergh, Villard, Wheeler, Kennedy and many another — men whose names and reputations are not to be dismissed lightly. But this somewhat heterogeneous company was dissolved by Pearl Harbor. Whether a more lasting coherence might have been hoped for is a moot question, perhaps a vain one. Even the Society of Friends was split from top to bottom; and the slogan of " a bipartisan foreign policy" was singularly effective, during the critical years, in depriving America of such contributions as Adam Smith, Burke, Gladstone, Morley and others had made to British policy. After President Truman's first (Presidential) plunge into international affairs, Borchard rather felt that he was "teaching a dead subject" with only a lost cause to remember; and in the dregs of the memory were those he knew among the great and powerful who would agree with him in private and oppose him in public for what they called "political" or "democratic" reasons. For the moment, like others of that erstwhile group, he finds himself pretty much alone.

But only for the moment, historically speaking. Events rather than individuals are reopening the whole case at a somewhat deeper level than that of current politics; and Borchard's work on it will be in evidence again, like that of Beard. Are human beings intrinsically such that with time and opportunity they will prefer the way of decency and common sense toward expanding community? Or are they such that they will, or must, choose mutual destruction? The case is open; petitions from friends of the court are in order.

For Borchard personally, one might guess that his happiest hours have been spent in association with men of good will playing their diverse parts in the human symphony; as in the Brahms First, for example (always a favorite of the intellectuals) with its profound innocence of approach to the final movement, soaring steadily into the firm song — *ohne Hast, ohne Rast* — of those who can never be defeated.

JAZZ AND HISTORY

By RALPH DE TOLEDANO

FOR A young art, jazz is full of hoary truisms. One of the hoariest is that jazz is performance. This, of course, is like saying that painting is performance. But how then differentiate between pointillism and cubism? Or in music between the improvisations of Frescobaldi and those of Jelly Roll Morton? Certainly all music is performance. Memory, more than meticulous scoring, keeps a musical tradition alive.

But when you've said this, the hoary truism remains. Jazz *is* performance; and the history of jazz becomes the compilation of those specific performances which were preserved. I remember sitting in a recording studio some fifteen years ago, listening to a group of men from Duke Ellington's band playing lovely, lyric rings around the tune, "I Can't Give You Anything But Love." When they had finished, the recording engineer (who thought the men were rehearsing) walked out of his booth. "I guess we should have cut that one," he said. The performance was lost forever.

It was as lost as the singing of the deep, plangorous *saeta* of Holy Week in Sevilla or the thousand ringing verses of some buried *chanson de geste*. It was as lost as all jazz would have been but for the development of the phonograph. Only because this development ran concurrently with the second, or classic, period of jazz do we know how the titans of the 1920s and 1930s sounded — or at least what they sounded like through the filter of old acoustical and early electrical recording.

The pre-history of jazz, then, is the pre-history of the phonograph. Only the interplay of fact and long memory gives us an idea of what jazz in the late 1890s and early 1900s must have been — and this through the easy tongue and talented lips of a Jelly Roll, recreating the past on discs for Library of Congress archivists. And the history itself, as it can be heard on the few hundred old recordings available, is a history of moments caught by the vibrating needle.

This is, perhaps, what makes the recently issued recordings of the Benny Goodman Jazz Concert of 1938 truly historic — much more historic than Paul Whiteman's Aeolian Hall "Symphonic Jazz" concert which in 1924 went like a shot arrow of sound into the air, to be remembered but never reheard. The group of assorted jazzmen who trooped onto the Carnegie stage that cold, crisp night of January 16, 1938, shared with the overflowing audience a tight little feeling that history was being made.

It was a mistaken sense of the meaning of history, plus lack of knowledge, which gave people on both sides of the proscenium this feeling. Most of them thought that this unveiling of jazz in Euterpe's staidest environs was a new thing. Actually, it was not. There was not only Whiteman's raid on the Aeolian, but numerous others before and after: Will Marion Cook in 1919 had taken a Negro jazz orchestra to Europe's concert halls; Louis Armstrong had aimed his long, brass horn at the chandeliers of the Salle Pleyel, if memory serves me; and Duke Ellington had tapped his foot elegantly on other Continental stages.

Even to a young man such as myself, standing in the back of the hall and jiggling to every beat of the drum, there was a sense almost of the *déja vu*. The public's rapture over the "invasion" grew mostly from the thought

that Gene Krupa — muttering something about "pork chops and lyonnaise potatoes" as he pounded the big and little hides — could drop his chewing gum just about where in the next night or so Leopold Stokowski might catch his shoe on it.

But fate was on the prowl for history that night in Carnegie Hall, and for reasons which none of us could have predicted half an hour before the concert. Get any five, seven, ten, or twenty jazz musicians together on any given night and the result will be anything from cheap domestic sherry to Carlos II brandy. If the musicians are "right" — and this applies to a New Orleans gang or to a group of sidemen hitting a rocking Fletcher Henderson arrangement — then you'll have music. If they're not "right," the result can be anything from mechanical to downright terrible.

Fate decided that they should be "right" that night. They were "right" to the point of real inspiration, and the most inspired was Jess Stacy, a black Irishman with patent-leather hair and the studious manner of a good bartender, who sat hunched over the piano and made more music than any five men at the concert.

The critics, sitting in the best seats, were too busy writing tomorrow's review and adjective-gathering really to know what was going on. Perhaps two out of the whole collection — and Irving Kolodin of the old *Sun* was one of them — had ever journeyed up to Harlem or down to the Village to hear jazz in the raw or to pay it any pertinent mind. They were not serving as critics but as Sunday supplement writers, quick to discourse on the effect of rhythm and brass on the lower nervous system. The true, the honest, and the historical critic was a length of innocent-looking wire leading from the microphones on the stage to a hidden recorder. It took close to eleven years for the recordings of that concert to be issued commercially — two 12-inch Long Playing (33⅓ rpm) records on the Columbia label (SL 160).

And perhaps it is better that there was this time lag. The test of what the heart remembers but the ears forget can often be shattering. In the case of the Goodman concert it is not shattering, though you hear the music now without the two-way empathy of the participating crowd and the responding performers.

As the microgroove needle moves over the vinylite, what you hear is the Goodman band of the late thirties, and the guests who gave color and depth to the concert. You hear them as they really sounded then, not as they sounded on the records of the period; they are free of the tyranny of studio clocks which have always ruled that a jazz record must be three minutes long, add or take away a few seconds. It's the Goodman band as it played at innumerable college dates and dancehalls — spread out, relaxed, letting an extra chorus ride if the soloist was with it, playing for an audience and hence for itself.

(The "killer-diller" arrangement with just a little too much sock; the solidly rocking dance number; Harry James's circus cornet not quite getting off; the precise, singing, inexhaustible Goodman clarinet; and in the "Sing, Sing, Sing" finale, the unfolding of the Stacy piano, jazz right down to the ground, involved and delicate and full, as original as Chopin playing barrelhouse.)

This is it, you say happily. This is jazz, this is performance. And then, because the critical mind is a nuisance, you stop and think back. Those of us who were there before recall that when this music pounded out of Carnegie Hall that winter night, on the heels of Gene Krupa's irrepressible drumming, we tried to restrain the burgeoning excitement. As jazz purists (as the young critics who would replace the "outdated" Wilder Hobsons and Frank Norrises), we were a little superior to Goodman's music. It was related to the genuine article, but watered down for the consumption of jitterbugs.

This snobbery in reverse, this cult of the original, grew out of a false musicology, a belief that pure jazz was exclusively an amalgam of Negro rhythm and Negro melody, touched by the old English four-part hymn. Talk of *bamboulas* and Congo tom-toms went hand in hand with a superior attitude toward jazzmen like the tragic genius, Bix Beiderbecke, because he played in Paul Whiteman's orchestra and in "white" style.

What was forgotten in all the talk of performance was that the pristine jazz we touted had never existed. Even before it got out of the Delta country, it had already been wedded to ragtime, popular song, and the quadrille. It had picked up every scrap of melody that floated up and down the Mississippi and added to it that peculiar Negro syncope which in the past had kept the melodic monotony of the Negro alive by its sheer drive. As jazz spread, it continued to gobble up whatever lyricism it found about the country. In the Tin Pan Alley we so despised, jazz found a real mate, as culturally unabashed as itself, matching its sorrow but flooding it with a wave of pure melody such as jazz had never known before.

When Paul Whiteman rapped sharply with a monster baton at his Aeolian Hall concert in '24, he was trying to recognize the synthesis of these two beautiful and unruly partners — the urbanized Negro and the urban Jew. It was perhaps too much and too little to pour the genius of Jelly Roll Morton and Louis Armstrong and King Oliver and George Gershwin and Irving Berlin into the voluminous kettle of the Whiteman orchestra. The "symphonic" tag was pretension of another sort; and because it ruled out the vital element of spontaneity, it failed.

But the Goodman concert, which we thought unauthentic and a little vulgar, was real and valid. It combined all the elements and all the tongues. The music we heard then, the historic performance we hear today, was jazz as she was spoke in 1938 — rich, brash, uninhibited. The voice was soft and Negro; or it was clipped, tough, accented — New York and Chicago and St. Louis. But it was insistent and adrenalin as jazz has always been.

We tried not to listen then. It's been and gone. But we've got the records, we've got the history, they've both got rhythm. In the words of a Gershwin tune, "Who could ask for anything more?"

EPITAPH

Lie lightly on him, Earth, who lightly lied,
For many of thy daughters, whom thy sons
Called comrade here; whose mocking wit denied
None of thy pleasures, save the harmless ones.
Whose tired heart some good, in secret, did;
Whose faults are buried where his bones are hid.

CAROLINE DUER

FROM OUR READERS

The Reviewers at Work

I should like to call your readers' attention to a book which I have just finished reading and which, I am sure, deserves far more notice than it is now receiving. It is Helen MacInnes's new novel, "Neither Five Nor Three," published on March 3, 1951, by Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York.

I hope that the *Freeman* and its readers may take a special interest in the book because, first, it is the uncompromisingly true, never-before-told story of Communist infiltration in the magazines, book publishing houses, and colleges of this country; and, second, because this gripping, powerfully written novel by a well-known, successful writer (author of "Above Suspicion" and "Assignment In Brittany") is for the most part either being completely ignored or being given brief and slurring mention by the reviewers.

In the course of the book Miss MacInnes describes the process by which anti-Communist books have been buried or ignored in the press of this country over the last two decades. Ironically, her own novel is being accorded precisely the treatment she describes.

New York City — FRANCES KANES

Japanese Pacifism

We question the accuracy of the statement in the article by Forrest Davis, on page 306, the *Freeman*, February 12, which refers to the Japanese people as "martial."

John Foster Dulles, who has been in Japan recently, presents quite a different point of view. The *New York Times* of February 16 states that he found "the present sentiment in Japan was as intensely pacifist as he had encountered anywhere in the world or even more so." Mr. Dulles was quoted as saying: "I formed this impression from thousands of letters I received in Japan which represented a cross section of the Japanese people and I met small parliamentary groups who unanimously urged that there should be no rearmament."

In 1945 the United States dropped atomic bombs on Nagasaki and on Hiroshima, killing in a few moments 100,000 persons, including children and babies. The excuse for doing this was that Japanese militarism was a menace to the world. Now that the Japanese wish to remain unarmed it is proposed to force them to re-arm. Was there ever a more cynical act than this in the dirtiest game known as war?

ELLEN WINSOR

Radnor, Pennsylvania — REBECCA WINSOR EVANS

On the Soviet Underground

Congratulations on Paul Crouch's article, "Soviet Underground, U.S.A.," in your issue of February 26. It is very good, although he doesn't seem to know about the secret Communist short-wave radio setup.

Not having gone through the Comintern "college," he misses out on another point: There are three types of Communist Party underground: 1) semi-legal; 2) illegal (ordinary); 3) illegal (extraordinary). This last applies to wartime illegality in a war against Russia. Mr. Crouch's piece describes the second type, and does it very well.

Detroit, Michigan — JOSEPH ZACK

Mr. Wallace's Duty

I was very much shocked by Henry Wallace's letter in your issue of February 26. The point he makes about Ministerial responsibility appears both dangerous and fantastic. How can the head of a Department plead incompetence as a justification? It was his duty to know what was going on in his Department! I do hope you will take up the principle involved in some future issue, even though Wallace himself may have ceased to matter. After all, some of the official Hiss defenders harbor the same delusion, *i.e.* that not knowing can be used as excuse where knowing was an obligation.

Washington, D. C. — HUBERT MARTIN

Lawmaking by Treaty

May I call your attention to an article in the September 1950 Bar Association *Journal*, entitled: "Treaty Law-Making — A Blank Check for Writing a New Constitution," by Frank E. Holman, of the Washington Bar, Seattle, Washington.

This thoughtful article calls attention to the fact that since Article VI of the Constitution of the United States, declares: ". . . All treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land"; and since Supreme Court cases (particularly Missouri *vs.* Holland, Justice Holmes) declared this article superseded Article 10 of the Constitution, treaties made under the guidance of leftist internationalists are transforming our country into a centralized state. The people are, of course, completely ignorant of what is happening.

After reading Mr. Holman's article, I came to the conclusion that the first thing we must do is work for a repeal of Article VI of the Constitution. This would not eliminate the internationalists, but it would remove a powerful weapon from their grasp and lend a base from which to educate the American people in the terrific danger that confronts them.

Miami, Florida — ETHEL ERNEST MURRELL

Defending Our Ideals

The *Freeman* has become a "must" in our home. For me, it is wonderful to find a magazine so sanely and realistically defending the ideals I believe in. As a young woman, a Junior in college, I find it difficult to avoid confusion concerning the means we must take to solve the problems facing us. A friend of mine has stated the situation thus:

> I've met so many young people recently who just don't care about the country or the perils facing it. I realize that all of these people will give up everything to help when the situation becomes militarily active, but that will be too late this time . . . the next blow that comes will not be a stunning or glancing blow, but a haymaker.
>
> It's a sign of maturity to realize a situation and do something about it, disregarding personal aspirations; and we must be mature in this sense if we and our Christian world are to survive. In other words we must be realistic about defending our ideals. This does not mean being somber, because in making the best of a situation and realizing in our hearts that we are doing the right thing, we can be happy.

The *Freeman* is doing a magnificent job in showing us how to "defend our ideals."

Larchmont, New York — NAN HICKEY



A REVIEWER'S NOTEBOOK

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

Sure, sure, Helen MacInnes's "Neither Five Nor Three" (Harcourt, Brace, $3) is just a thriller. Sure, it has all the stigmata of the breed: the characterization that doesn't allow for hesitancies and contradictions, the tightly contrived plot, the spurts of melodrama, the black-and-white confrontation of good and evil, the presence of a cosmopolitan equivalent of the Lone Ranger, the final satisfying delivery of Right Girl into the arms of Right Boy. Still and all, I got a huge kick out of Miss MacInnes's story. Its plot may be just as preposterous as anything in Conan Doyle or Dorothy Sayers, yet it is a highly intelligent book — and considerably more "real," in its essence, than many a far more naturalistic novel about New York publishing circles.

What makes "Neither Five Nor Three" a supremely relevant job for this particular moment in time is that it recognizes the Communist conspiracy for what it is: a consciously directed attempt to infiltrate every "commanding height" of our civilization, from the government bureaus of Washington to the last little corner of the "opinion industry" that has its center on Manhattan Island. Everyone who has worked in publishing circles in New York during the past two decades must know something of the essential story, yet most people who have run across the spoor of the comrades hesitate to talk about their experiences. For one thing, most Americans don't like to be bothered by the necessity of fighting a conspiracy. (That involves the boredom of creating counter-organizations, it means going to meetings and wasting time on something that can not by any remote possibility be called a part of the happy life.) Secondly, the job of fighting Communists means that your character will be periodically assassinated, your reputation smeared. The comrades work by instilling fear; they achieve their greatest successes by the tacit cooperation of rabbits who are afraid to fight them.

In Miss MacInnes's story the threads are tied up and snipped off with a neatness that hardly corresponds with anything that has ever happened in actual life. Her heroic personages — Paul Haydn, the feature editor of *Trend;* Brownlee, the self-elected cooperator with the FBI; Jon Tyson, the honest college professor — click with the precision of Pinkerton agents. Her villains — Scott Ettley, the journalist who hates his father; Nicholas Orpen, the Communist watchdog assigned to the Manhattan "opinion industry" beat — go through their paces like Stakhanovites in a tractor factory. As for Rona Metford, the bright and pretty girl who gets involved in the social and ideological warfare between Paul Haydn and Ettley, she is just sufficiently opaque to the difference between hawk and handsaw to spin the tale out to required novel length.

It never happened in quite this mathematically balanced way in the places where I worked and encountered Communists in the thirties and the forties. When the *Time, Inc.,* unit of the Newspaper Guild was penetrated and controlled by skilled manipulators of the fellow-traveling mind, it took years of hesitant, half-committed jockeying to clean up the situation. Since nobody can "prove" anything about a Communist who is exempted from taking a party card, the struggle surged back and forth in an indecisive area. The victory was finally won, not by getting any Communists nailed for what they are, but by persuading unit rank and file members to stick around long enough at night to vote down the Communist Party line. No Orpens or Scott Ettleys were ever to my knowledge disclosed at *Time, Inc.* — but it is noteworthy that certain people departed when their activities and ideological preferences became so obvious that even blind men could see what they were doing.

Could I prove that I have ever known a Communist? Since I've never laid eyes on a party card it would be extremely difficult. (For that matter, I never see the moles that ruin my lawn save when my FBI cat brings one up to the light.) But if there haven't been any Commies around, who was it that tried to pressure me in the thirties to write sympathetically about the League of American Writers? Who organized those cocktail parties that hooked us into giving money for Loyalist Spain? (Query: did the money ever reach any anti-Stalinist Spanish Loyalist?) Why did I receive frantic letters urging me to get off the John Dewey Commission to investigate the charges made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow purge trials? How come that Commie sympathizers always seemed to be tipped off in advance when I was busy researching and writing something that went counter to their interests? I have no proof beyond what ex-Communists have told me, but when coincidences pile up year after year into a formation as clearly patterned as a crystal or a snowflake, it is impossible to see "accident" at work. A group of monkeys hitting at typewriters might accidentally write all the books in the British Museum once, but not twice.

Miss MacInnes has caught the signs and universal signature of the central struggle for the control points of Manhattan's opinion industries. She does some things magnificently — as, for example, her description of the heavily oppressive intellectual and emotional atmosphere of a fellow-traveling shindig in a Park Avenue apartment. (What, we may ask parenthetically, would the comrades do without the support of the Park Avenue rich?) The description of the fellow-traveling response to the Party girl who sings "Guadalajara" is good,

straight dramatic writing of a sort that makes one feel Miss MacInnes could manage fiction of the non-thriller type. But since the thriller canons require that all things move swiftly to a violent denouement, "Neither Five Nor Three" must end in absolutely black-and-white certainty. The Communists must be exposed as definitely card-carrying members of the tribe; the conspirators must be driven to suicide by jumping in front of subway trains or off fire escapes; the non-Communists must win as triumphantly and as conclusively as the Lone Ranger wins his nightly struggle against the bandits in the race for the railroad trestle or the place where the blueprint of the old gold mine is hid.

So be it. Miss MacInnes is an "entertainer," and a mighty good one. She is also a propagandist for her side, which is also my side, "our" side. This side needs a few propaganda victories after years of failure and defeat. I wish for the widest sort of popularity for "Neither Five Nor Three." And in so wishing, I nominate Irene Kuhn, who likes to expose the machinations of Communists at strategically placed bookstore counters, to keep an eye on what happens to "Neither Five Nor Three." If it doesn't outsell Rex Stout, then justice will have miscarried for the nth time since Lenin safely alighted from the train at the Finland Station in 1917.

Sinclair Lewis's posthumously published novel, "World So Wide" (Random House, $3), is mildly interesting, but it is a far cry from the big Lewis stories of the twenties. When Lewis lost his taste — or was it his nerve? — for big social themes, he lost the one thing that made him an important writer. The canvases of "Main Street," "Babbitt," "Arrowsmith" and "Dodsworth" were wide and inclusive; the canvas of "World So Wide" is as narrow as an alleyway in the Italian city of Florence where Lewis spent his last days.

The story of "World So Wide" is about an American's rather self-conscious search for the spirit of medieval and Renaissance culture. Hayden Chart, an architect from Newlife, Colorado, is looking for wider horizons after the death of his shrewish wife, but what he discovers is that a nice, sympathetic hometown girl whom he had casually known for years is worth a lot more than a suit of chain mail or an illuminated manuscript, or even a female professor who is good at library research. This is a good sentimental theme, but Sinclair Lewis's attitude toward it fluctuates so aberrantly from page to page that one is at a complete loss to know what is being satirized, and when. In "Main Street," Carol Milford's yearning for culture seemed both poignant and pathetic. But Hayden Chart's attempt to become a latter-day Henry Adams is hardly motivated at all. The writing in "World So Wide" is firm enough, and the description of a wild and wintry drive from Venice to Florence through the Apennines is good. But there just doesn't seem to be much purpose or conviction behind the whole thing.

Write this off as one of Lewis's lesser efforts. But don't forget that, in his day, Lewis cast a mighty shadow. Although he was a stern critic of American manners, he never sold short on American fundamentals.

THE TRIBE OF PLATO

The Open Society and Its Enemies, by Karl R. Popper. *Princeton University Press. $7.50*

This immense work is the most thoroughgoing attack on philosophical authoritarianism that has appeared in our time. It is a polemic on the grand scale. It is also a mine of ideas about politics and economics, logic and scientific method; its theme is the meaning of history, about which the author holds very strong views. The footnotes, mercifully separated from the body of the book and printed behind the text, make up a third of the volume's bulk. The difficulty of reviewing such a mammoth performance may be illustrated by the fragmentary details of the author's own history, which Mr. Popper has supplied here and there, apparently on the principle that a structure such as this deserves a cornerstone in every corner. And it does, too. We may as well glance at them before examining the inside arrangements.

"The Open Society and Its Enemies" was begun in March 1938 on the day Mr. Popper heard the news of the invasion of Austria, and the writing extended into 1943. The first edition was published in 1945, in two volumes; subsequent editions appeared in 1947 and 1949, all under a London imprint. What we have here is a fourth edition revised for American publication, with additions chiefly to the notes. Mr. Popper says that he made no effort to soften the fighting flavor of the original, and indeed the whole book still reads like one man's war against dictatorship. It is written in a hard, humorless, bang-bang style. As an Austrian whose intellectual roots were nourished in what we may call the School of Vienna (the names of Menger, Bohm-Bawerk, Mises, Hayek, Schumpeter and Kelsen are representative, in one field or another, of its hostility to Prussian collectivism) he hammers the German "idealistic" philosophers with particular relish, labeling their type of thought a fraud and calling them swindlers.

Mr. Popper's academic specialty is logic, specifically the logic of scientific inquiry; and since his interpretation of the history of ideas is based on a rigorous application of one of the two possible methods of reasoning about, or rather *knowing* what goes on around us and within ourselves, it is important to grasp the difference between these kinds of logic at the outset. The distinction involved is the gist of the book. This may sound dull but it's much the fastest way of getting to the point. Says Mr. Popper:

> *Methodological essentialism* or the theory that it is the aim of science to reveal essences and to describe them by means of definitions, can be better understood when contrasted with its opposite, *methodological nominalism.* Instead of aiming at finding out what a thing really is, and at defining its true nature, [the latter] aims at describing how a thing behaves in various circumstances, and especially whether there are any regularities in its behavior. . . . It sees in our language and in the rules which distinguish properly constructed sentences and inferences from a mere heap of words, the great instruments of scientific description; words it considers rather as subsidiary tools for this task, and not as names of essences.

A fake scientist, adds Mr. Popper by way of illustration, will ask questions like: *what* is an atom? A true scientist, on the other hand, is interested in *how* rather

than *what*. He asks *how* does an atom behave? *how* does electricity work? *how* do the planets move?

> And to those philosophers [or fake scientists] who tell him that before having answered the "what is" question he can not hope to give exact answers to any of the "how" questions, he will reply, if at all, by pointing out that he much prefers that modest degree of exactness which he can achieve by his methods to the pretentious muddle which they have achieved by theirs.

Such is the criterion with which Popper demolishes all major thinkers of the essentialist type from the fourth century B.C., that is, beginning with Plato, to the twentieth century A.D., which he celebrates by knocking down Whitehead and Toynbee.

However, this clear-sighted view of the relationship between science and the open mind is merely the technical gimmick with which Mr. Popper proceeds to deal with a much bigger issue, that is, the relationship between the open mind and the open, or liberal, society. He develops his comprehensive proposition in his critique of Plato and platonism, where in the course of some 200 pages of text and 150 pages of notes he literally leaves no stone unhurled at the prince of oracular philosophers. Popper supplies his own translations of Plato's Greek and, lexicon in hand, battles with other translators, editors, interpreters and critics. However, that is just the beginning. One does not need any Greek to follow him through the next step.

The procedure he then employs to settle what Plato really meant is an adaptation of the scientific method of constructing a hypothesis. Popper reshuffles and throws out such of Plato's ideas as will not fall into a consistent pattern on the assumption that "a great philosopher is not likely to be always contradicting himself." By the application of this objective test, surely the closest approximation of scientific method that is possible in handling material of this kind, he arrives at the conclusion that "Plato's moral code is strictly utilitarian; it is a code of collectivist or political utilitarianism. *The criterion of morality is the interest of the state.*" And what is the interest of the state? We may answer that question with the observation of another wise man: war is the health of the state. And indeed Plato says flatly that if his political recipes are followed — what they amount to is the permanently total mobilization under military discipline of all men, women, children and domestic animals — the state will always be victorious.

One is not surprised to discover that much of Plato's politics sounds very contempory indeed. Take that wonderful phrase which George Orwell used to describe the Communist theory of justice: all men are equal, but some are more equal than others. It is also an accurate and witty rendering of the platonic doctrine that *equity* demands the unequal treatment of men because although they were all equally born, to be sure, they were born as unequals. Consequently, argues Plato, the proposition which underlies the political concept of equity, that the *equal* application of the law to all men is justice, should be properly understood to mean the opposite. The rule of law which leads to justice in Plato's ideal state is, literally, *iniquity;* and any reader can recognize in that term the verdict mankind passed upon Plato centuries before Mr. Popper took him apart.

Then why did this exhausting job of philosophical housecleaning have to be done? The fact is that the essentialist or fake-scientific type of thinking invented by Plato is still very much alive. Its influence has always been paramount in authoritarian periods. In the Middle Ages, in nineteenth-century Prussia, in Nazi Germany, in the USSR, it is the dominant doctrine; it is the system of thought upon which the ultimate justification of absolutism and privilege is based. Aristotle's defense of slavery, Hegel's exaltation of the state, Marx's deification of a class, Rosenberg's dogma of racial destiny and now the Leninist-Stalinist enthronement of "the Party" — all are derivatives of the platonic theories of knowledge and morals. Mr. Popper has no trouble showing that they invariably lead to the degradation of knowledge through the substitution of hair-splitting efforts to define the essential nature of things for simple observation of the way things (and men) behave. Unfortunately, Popper shrinks from the application of his own method to the deeper issue of platonism and morality. He records his indignation, reminds us of science, and lets it go at that.

> Plato identifies justice [he writes] with the principle of class rule and of class privilege. . . . But was Plato perhaps right? I do not intend to discuss such a question. If anyone should hold that "justice" is the unchallenged rule of one class, then I would simply reply that I am all for injustice. In other words, I believe that nothing depends on words, and everything upon our practical demands.

Just as everything depends on the results of a method of scientific investigation, so everything depends on the social outcome of a doctrine of morality. This amounts to the statement that scientific values and moral values are, ultimately, identical. And lest anyone should mistake his meaning Mr. Popper quotes Scripture: "Beware of false prophets [i.e., essentialist philosophers and fake scientists] which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. Ye shall know them by their fruits."

By their fruits he damns all of them but Marx, and him he excepts because Marx, in his opinion, represents a sort of mixed case. Popper concedes that Marx was first and last a methodological essentialist, that he never shook off the spell of Hegel (who was the worst of that tribe), that he proclaimed the inevitable destiny of the proletariat as others proclaimed the inevitable triumph of tribe, nation or race. But he reminds us that the middle of Marx's career was spent in gathering facts, thousands and thousands of pages of them, and in trying to derive from these facts of economic history a science of society. The saving point about Marx was that he insisted there could be such a thing as a science of society and that he went about the business of establishing it in a properly scientific way, that is, by the gathering and sifting of facts. Now all this is literally true but it comes to no more than saying that Marx intended to be scientific while spouting constantly about the immanent triumph of the proletariat. The actual *results* of Marx's dogma remind us that Mr. Popper forgot, perhaps deliberately, to finish that quotation from Scripture. The rest of it reads: "Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth

forth evil fruit." I say *perhaps* deliberately, because elsewhere in his treatise Mr. Popper lays down the dictum: *Once a Hegelian, always a Hegelian.*

The result of Mr. Popper's own duplicity of values is serious, and we may now hazard a judgment. He intended a great book. What he has produced is a great symptom. And what we can learn from it (aside from enjoying the splendid job of muckraking the author has done on a pernicious kind of philosopher) is why the burning horror of injustice and war to which Mr. Popper constantly refers is a poor sort of fuel for a philosopher of science and society to rely on at the finish, though it works plenty well as a starter. For in the first place Mr. Popper's horror of injustice is so unsettling that after minutely and destructively analyzing the works of all other authoritarian thinkers he reprints a good deal of Marx's "data" about the capitalistic exploitation of the working class without a word of criticism; in fact, he says it's true. The only figures in this mélange of quotations from Marx are as follows:

> Labor power is so quickly used up by capital that the middle-aged worker is usually a worn-out man. Dr. Lee, medical officer of health, declared that "the average age at death of the Manchester upper middle class was 38, while the average age at death of the laboring class was 17; while at Liverpool those figures were represented as 35 against 15."

One does not need to be an actuary to calculate that, if these figures are correct, practically no middle-aged workers could survive to become worn-out.

In the second place Mr. Popper's horror of war leads him to an uncritical endorsement of political as well as economic intervention. The affirmative or constructive thesis of his book is that "systematic piecemeal [social] engineering will help us to build up an empirical social technology, arrived at by the method of trial and error." In economics this means stunts like a compensatory fiscal policy or an ever-normal granary; in international politics it means the sort of action that was begun at the Nuremberg Trials, and which we are presently busy telling the Germans we are sorry for now. It means a fundamental revision of international law, actually the conversion of the law *of* nations into a kind of law *above* the nations. Popper insists that we can fairly sit in judgment on our enemies after we have beaten them into an unconditional surrender. As I have said, what we are beginning to realize is that this assumption is quite a gamble; it leads directly to the immoral proposition that might makes law, which is the next thing to saying that might makes right.

This is a sorry conclusion for a man who started out with the downright statement that he spurned the question of whether class or race or state coercion was compatible with justice; no, he would not so much as tolerate the idea. Yet, after puncturing the fallacy of the philosopher-king, he winds up by advocating a universal scientification of politics, while admitting in the same breath that the sociologist-kings, whom he would install, don't have any science as yet. What they have is scientific method! An humble person may be permitted to ask: suppose all these methodological nominalist politicians are allowed to run the works, *what's in it for me?* Here are the answers given by Mr. Popper: 1) Science has done great things; 2) Sociology can become a science; 3) And anyway faith in science "has the same right as any other creed to contribute to an improvement of human affairs."

ASHER BRYNES

RUSSIAN MASTER OF ENGLISH

Conclusive Evidence, by Vladimir Nabokov. *New York: Harper. $3.00*

Although this is a personal memoir of an expatriate Russian, it is as remote from the I-escaped-from-the-Soviets rodomontade thriller, once a staple émigré Russian product, as Proust's "Remembrance of Things Past" is remote from schoolgirl diary gush.

Nabokov does not fit into any conventional political category, or, for that matter, into any political category at all. If he is a "White" Russian, it is because he was forced to flee with his family to the Crimea in November 1917; then, after knocking about Europe for twenty years, to the United States where he now teaches at Cornell. His experience, however, did not make him into that reflexive political automaton who staked the return of his fortunes on the restoration of a Romanov. Nabokov's father, a rich nobleman, nourished on the translation of the Victorian liberal century into Russian, had never made any bones about his opposition to the Tsar. He had been a founder of the Russian Liberal Party and had risked his life and fortune in a struggle to curb the excesses of the regime (he occupied a post in the Kerenski Cabinet in 1917 and died in Berlin in 1919, assassinated by fanatical Russian restorationists).

Vladimir Nabokov, unlike his father, proved indifferent to politics, indifferent to the loss of his family's huge estates. He became the kind of transcendental literary artist, born in an age of seemingly final and hopeless chaos, whose work, inner, erudite, symbolist, can be considered, to some degree, the product of his hermetic isolation. Thus Nabokov's exile, seen in this light, becomes a kind of parable of which his work is the pith. The truth of the matter is, as his short stories and novels have shown, Nabokov is one of the most gifted and masterly prose writers of our time.

His education, formally completed at Cambridge but actually obtained in his father's library of literature and science, is fantastically brilliant — not in the sense, say, that an Aldous Huxley's education is brilliant, but in the vivid, literal meaning of the term. Nabokov was an intuitive child-artist tracking down the color and smell of every word he could lay his hands on and rubbing its essence on a mind preternaturally sensitive. His English, first acquired in the manner of the Russian aristocracy which tutored its children in English and French and seldom spoke Russian, is used now as a plastic medium, somewhat as a painter uses his materials or a musician juggles his abstract themes. This is the source of Nabokov's "poetic" prose — the emotional strain and hyperbolic excess we tend to think prose-poetry is totally absent from his work.

In this memoir, Nabokov's prose evokes from the physical particulars of his childhood and adolescence unique actualities of feeling that accompany most growing-up anywhere, but here concern themselves with an unusually gifted child in a setting of great privilege and wealth. However, one receives an unforgettable

impression, not of an arrogant nobility, busy at pleasure, but a sense of simple family warmth and dignity gracing an expansive and cultured confine — an era of family life, based on the land, that vanished last in Russia. Nabokov indicates quite clearly that this was no pastoral paradise. There was recurrent rioting in the streets and villages. The Tsar's Cossacks ran wild, once shooting down, in the St. Petersburg park, children who had taken refuge in the trees.

But none of this is historical or sociological treatise. His father's estates, his trips abroad, the ambience of his mother's love, his Byzantine wealth (a year before the Revolution Nabokov inherited his uncle's estate worth, he says, two million dollars, and was to inherit more) — all this functioned as merely the material at hand for an artist's dredging sensibility. Later, when Nabokov was pauperized, he was still abstracting his images from his immediate environment and not, like so many émigrés, merely crying for the good old days. Here an artist's curiosity and capacity for wonder functioned as a kind of courage.

Nabokov's imagery, usually felicitous, sometimes plays him false. He will often confound the reader with an appearance of preciosity by using a technical term, usually obscure, in the midst of an exciting passage, perversely stopping the reader dead in his tracks. But whatever defects there are in Nabokov's work, they come from a single-minded pursuit of a rich and lofty style, an exciting elegance of form not usually sought for by writers of prose. There is more truth of human experience in his memoir than in carloads of current ground-out novels.

NEIL WEISS

URBANE MUSIC CRITIC

Music Right and Left, by Virgil Thomson. *New York: Holt. $3.50*

I have always found myself alternately engaged and irritated by the music criticism of Virgil Thomson — which probably means that, for me, he is performing admirably the provocative function of a critic. He is not a man I would read in order to learn whether the latest Violetta or Brünnhilde at the Metropolitan or the new pianist at Town Hall is really worth going to hear. For such information I depend on more systematic judges like Olin Downes or Irving Kolodin. But every once in a while I find Thomson in the position of the little boy in the Hans Andersen fairy tale, pointing out all by himself the indubitable fact that certain accepted musical emperors haven't any clothes on. And these moments — among them I recollect certain very apt remarks about Jascha Heifetz and Serge Koussevitzky — are worth a great deal to me. I also admire Thomson's urbanity and consider him by all odds New York's most lucid writer about music. I like, moreover, the fact that he always writes in the first person, avoiding the oracular pose that is one of the minor curses of much of today's music criticism. One is always aware that he is expressing a personal opinion rather than pronouncing a verdict. These qualities are all present in "Music Right and Left," the latest of a series of reprints of his reviews and articles from the *Herald Tribune*.

What irritates me about Thomson is his prejudices, and this, I suppose, is because I do not share them. He is apt to regard music as an intellectual exercise and a source of sensual pleasure. There is, of course, no law against this, since music may be both these things. But music is also a lot more — an art capable of expressing profound emotional, poetic and spiritual ideas. In his overemphasis on its intellectual and sensual aspects, I find Thomson continuously propounding a system of critical values with which I often disagree. The system causes him, for example, to overrate outrageously men like Ravel, Satie and Stravinsky whom I consider minor decorative artists, to take very seriously the academic technical mumbo-jumbo of the twelve-tone disciples of Arnold Schönberg, and to dismiss or slyly deprecate a number of men I consider composers of considerable originality and distinction — among them Mahler, Strauss and Sibelius. Thomson is, of course, fashionably anti-Wagnerian, which is perhaps healthy as a corrective in our particular generation. Still, I can not help foreseeing an era when the *avant garde* which Thomson represents will suddenly rediscover Wagner and come to realize that, for all his pomp and gigantism, there is probably more real genius in the "Bachannale" from "Tannhäuser" than in the entire output of many a subsequent composer who has spent valuable time trying to prove that Wagner was a sort of musical oaf.

The thing that irritates me most, however, is Thomson's airy propagation of the preposterous idea that the French are music's chosen people. Without batting an eye over the obvious evidence to the contrary, he will assure you that French symphony orchestras "when they are good" are the best in the world. He will go into ecstasies over minor features of French operatic diction, while ignoring entirely the great German and Austrian contributions to opera production which constitute probably the most lively and skilled operatic development of the recent past. He will ignore the incredible state of artistic and technical dilapidation that obtains at the Paris Opera, which hasn't, in the twenty-odd years of my experience, been able to compete in any way with the major opera houses of Germany, Austria and Italy, or even with our own Metropolitan. He will overlook the patent fact that France, throughout her musical history, has been far more remarkable as a source of well-schooled mediocrity than of genius. (If I were to name a list of the dozen men I consider the greatest composers of the past, there wouldn't be a Frenchman on it except the Gallicized Pole Chopin.) Thomson thinks the late Eric Satie a major figure; I think him a moderately amusing dilettante. Thomson seems to regard Paris as the fountainhead of nearly all that is pre-eminent in the arts of composing and performing. Offhand, I can not find its recent products pre-eminent in any category except perhaps (thinking of such masters as Leon Bleuzet and Marcel Tabuteau) that of oboe playing.

Yet, after making all these objections, I must admit that there is nothing of the doctrinaire about Thomson. For all his prejudices, he does approach each job of criticism with a fresh ear. I have caught him, surprisingly to me, saying a good word about Anton Bruckner, whom I consider a truly great composer. I have observed him (in this book) gallantly changing his mind about some of the pretentious tinkling and hooting of Olivier Messaien, and pretty nearly agreeing with me (despite his

pro-Parisian leanings) that Arthur Honegger's "Jeanne d'Arc au Bûcher" has a great deal of noise in it. I like his recent firm stand against Eduard Hanslick, whom everybody else was about to resuscitate as a great and persecuted genius of music criticism. And again I was agreeably surprised. The mere fact that Hanslick disliked Wagner didn't lure Thomson (who also dislikes Wagner) into liking Hanslick. So I shall continue to read Virgil Thomson with alternate pleasure and irritation, much of the pleasure coming from the fact that he does not always say what I expect him to say. If I've got to read music criticism, I prefer to read his.

WINTHROP SARGEANT

SENTIMENT AND SATIRE

Farewell to Otterley, by Humphrey Pakington. *New York: Norton. $3.00*

Although I have been an admirer of Humphrey Pakington's ever since the appearance of "Four in Family" in the early 1930s, I have hitherto missed out on his novels about the Washbournes of Otterley, of which this present book is the third. Less exploited than Angela Thirkell, and the beneficiary of no such cult as the latter has attracted, Mr. Pakington belongs definitely to the same general school, writes of English county families with a similarly wicked wit and has in the past been quite as funny, if not funnier. Lately, however, I gather that he has been taking his Tory world a trifle more seriously. Certainly, in "Farewell to Otterley," he has lost something of the élan, of the delicious cockeyed touch which distinguished his earlier chronicles of Severnshire. Still no sobersides, still capable of writing a superbly comic scene, he is not quite so adept at exposing his characters' frailties and views them, perhaps, a little too charitably.

Unlike its immediate predecessors, "Farewell to Otterley" has a contemporary setting and deals with the painful and pinch-penny present. The current generation of Washbournes, headed by the Admiral who once was "Young William," are faced by the prospect that they may have to lose Otterley, whose traditional splendors they lack the funds to maintain, and whose servantless halls have become a great burden. The only solution which suggests itself is that Tom, the son of the family, should marry a titled heiress, and this, with judicious prodding, Tom nearly does, but is deterred in the end by genuine romance. That his parents accept his decision cheerfully is part, of course, of their whole pattern of life — a pattern which the author quite obviously admires even when he is uproariously engaged in poking fun at it.

So much for the basic plot. Meanwhile there are other sideshows and divertissements which supplement the story of the Washbournes. One hears a great deal, for example, about the redoutable Lady Warnedon, who has figured in earlier novels; one re-encounters — very pleasantly — those old friends, the Warmstrys; and one follows the comic romantic fortunes of Susan Warnedon's son, Henry — a lout who almost makes off with Tom Washbourne's girl. All this, and more besides, adds up to a light, engaging tale in the typical Pakington manner, but it is a tale which occasionally fumbles and which lacks the giddy charm of "The Roving Eye" or of "Four in Family." Mr. Pakington, in "Farewell to Otterley," steers a rather unsteady course between sentiment and satire. His characters are neither as amusing as they used to be, as witty, as gay, nor are they sufficiently well-rounded, sharply enough drawn, for one to feel genuine concern about their plight.

EDITH H. WALTON

LOG CABIN ART

American Painting, by Virgil Barker. *New York: Macmillan. $12.50*

The Index of American Design, by Erwin O. Christensen. *New York: Macmillan. $15.00*

Virgil Barker's book is an annal of the development of Yankee art which shows it to have been cursed by trade and literalism. Pioneer lands have never been fecund earth for the artist; and the Colonial market-towns — Boston, Salem — were not places for Mediterranean affections or painting. Luther and John Calvin, who dominated the frontier mind, had a pernicious influence on art but were good for American household culture. A Shaker chair, settle, or sawbuck table are aphorisms in rectitude and a cleanly penury, and betoken a stable wedlock and family fervor. But neither John Calvin nor John Adams had the faculty for the image; and what is reckoned as American primitivism is often nativistic manual training art. Yankee painters did portraits and signs, and art was an occupation for women and girls, as one husband shows by giving notice that his "spouse mounts and paints fans." The Colonial artist was very likely as daft as his New England neighbors thought him, for one portraitist ornamented his shutters with the heads of sages.

The early Yankee was a log cabin esthete. One citizen, whose zeal for crude realism was very typical, wrote John Singleton Copley that one of his oils had people in it who were so natural that when his baby son was unable to shake hands with a man in the portrait, he "roared" and "shrieched."

John Adams, a busybody art connoisseur of the homespun indigenous school, wrote about portrait figures in much the same manner as the thwarted handshaking infant, saying, ". . . you can scarcely help discoursing with them, making questions and receiving answers." There are too few examples of early American oils in Mr. Barker's book, and though the reproduction of Eakins's "Max Schmitt In a Single Scull," or Copley's "Mr. Watson and the Shark," may provide a droll moment or two, they are of no benefit to the intellect.

Not unlike the volume on American painting is the book called "The Index of American Design," by Erwin O. Christensen. The reader, recalling a populist America, with fine artisan towns and Wisconsin dairy country whose soil was kneaded like a good loaf of bread (which we no longer know how to bake), will examine with savory pleasure the pictures of a ladderback chair with a seat of twisted corn husks, or an Iowan seat table, or an eighteenth-century pine Bible-box, or a whale-oil lamp that Melville's Ahab might have held. But American history in this book quickly falls to pieces and becomes nostalgia, the contemporary national sickness. In place of remarkable examples of rural craftsmanship we have

the pseudo-relics of the American junk-yard iconography — a copper weathervane cock suitable as an emblem for a Broadway rathskeller, a zinc cast deer, and a fake "primitive" circus wagon, reminder of the most foolish of all the Muses, the calliope.

To sum up, Mr. Barker and Mr. Christensen both seem to prove that worship of primitivism in U. S. art is merely an excuse for esthetic inertia.

EDWARD DAHLBERG

THE NEW TSARS

Soviet Imperialism: Russia's Drive toward World Domination, by E. Day Carman. *Washington: Public Affairs Press. $3.25*

To have made people believe that Soviet communism is a genuinely international movement is the greatest achievement of Soviet propaganda. If its many well-wishers had seen it for what it is — not an idealistic movement, aiming at social betterment, but a mere tool, serving the policy of expansion to which the rulers of Russia have devoted the human and material resources of their territories for hundreds of years — the number of fellow-travelers would be smaller, and many of the Communist parties in other countries might never have seen life. Unfortunately, Soviet camouflage has fooled not only adherents but even many opponents of communism.

Mr. Carman's sober, yet merciless, history of the last ten years of Russian expansion makes it clear that the relation of Soviet Russia to Tsarist Russia has been that of pupil to master, and that the pupil has left the master far behind. The Tsars in their day also liked to speak of the organization of world peace: Alexander I devised the Holy Alliance, Nicolaus II called the Peace Conferences at The Hague. But the Tsars' practical contribution to world organization was the incorporation of hitherto unconquered nations with Russia and promises of protection offered to minorities abroad as a stepping stone toward further conquests. Stalin has improved upon the Tsars by extending the circle of protected minorities: the Tsars had confined themselves to neighboring countries; Stalin claims the whole world.

Stalin's adherence to the Tsarist pattern extends even to the pretexts used in justifying expansion.

Among these rank, first, Russia's Historic Rights — what had once been grasped by Russia, however unjustly, was to remain Russian forever. Hence the claims to Port Arthur and Dairen and more recently, though so far only in the party press, to Alaska and California.

Next comes Security — the pretext used to justify the attack on Finland and, later, the setting aside at Yalta of the Atlantic Charter declaration of "no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." This declaration was solemnly subscribed to by the USSR on January 1, 1942.

Finally and most formidably, there is the principle of Self-Determination — once invoked to emancipate the Christian nations of the Balkans from Turkish rule, but now converted into a universal tool for indirect aggression by the creation of "People's Governments" for countries coveted by Russia, and by the organization of Communist front organizations abroad.

This last refinement of "Self-Determination" the Soviets may claim as an original contribution to Russia's foreign policy. It is not the only one; the other is their complete disregard of all international obligations. The Tsars might as a rule be expected to observe agreements to which they had appended their signature; the Soviets — as the record compiled by Mr. Carman shows — must, also as a rule, be expected to break them.

In view of the Soviet record it is amazing that there should still be among us people who set their hopes upon negotiations with Russia. We pride ourselves upon our aptitude for business: why don't we apply our business experience and judge our partners by their performance instead of rating them by their promises?

Can it be because our experiences in dealing with the Russians are too humiliating to be remembered? The indignity of Yalta where — in the presence of Alger Hiss — we virtually handed over Poland and prepared another Munich for China? The still greater indignity of Nuremberg where we allowed Hitler's partner in a war of aggression — Mr. Carman's book shows the extent of Russian guilt — to sit upon the judges' bench?

The moral of Mr. Carman's book is plain and easy to remember: Those who undertake to appease Russia — be they as big as China — are gobbled up in the end, but those who refuse to yield and are ready to fight — be they as small and weak as Finland or Iran — have a fair chance of surviving.

There is also another lesson — shocking to Marxists, disappointing also to many economists — to be found in this book: the motivating factor in this long record of expansion has with one possible exception — Tannu-Tuva — never been economic.

HUBERT MARTIN