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# FREEMAN

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no. 19

## *These Hated Americans*

GARET GARRETT

## *Record of the Hearings*

MORRIE RYSKIND

## *More Medicine for Less*

OLIVER CARLSON

Editors: John Chamberlain • Henry Hazlitt • Suzanne La Follette

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# the FREEMAN

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Editors, JOHN CHAMBERLAIN      HENRY HAZLITT  
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A WORD  
ABOUT  
OUR  
CONTRIBUTORS

JUNE 18, 1951

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It is not to be understood that articles signed with a name, pseudonym, or initials necessarily represent the opinion of the editors, either as to substance or style. They are printed because, in the editor's judgment, they are intrinsically worth reading.

GARET GARRETT was formerly chief editorial writer for the *Saturday Evening Post*, financial writer for leading New York newspapers, and editor of *American Affairs*. His previous articles for the *Freeman* were "Appeasement Economics," (December 11), "Fruits of Unity" (January 22) and "The Cry of Free Enterprise" (March 12).

MORRIE RYSKIND, whose "Record of the Hearings" appears on page 586, writes: "Hope you like this. I gave up the first three races at Hollywood Park to knock it out." Greater love for *Freeman* readers hath no man.

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### Forthcoming

In our next issue, look for an article on price controls by J. Orville Watts. William Henry Chamberlin will examine the principal clichés that fellow-travelers have spread about the nature of communism, and Hugh S. Tigner will assess the political philosophy of Bertrand Russell.

# the FREEMAN

NEW YORK, MONDAY, JUNE 18, 1951

## THE FORTNIGHT

Looking at the matter purely from the standpoint of Messrs. Truman, Marshall and Acheson, the dismissal of General MacArthur was worse than an outrage; it was a political blunder. If they had kept MacArthur, they could have continued to blame him for anything that went wrong in Korea. As it is, the Administration can neither afford defeat nor its own Pickwickian brand of "victory." If our troops are defeated, the Administration can argue, of course, that they would have been defeated anyway, even if the commanders in the field had been allowed to reconnoiter and bomb by airplane over Manchuria and even if Chiang Kai-shek's and Chinese guerrilla troops had been utilized. But when our troops have the enemy on the run, the complete senselessness of the Administration's military policy is plainly revealed. As soon as we get a tiny (though undefined) bit above the Thirty-eighth Parallel, we must stop.

The "pursuit phase" of the Eighth Army's campaign in Korea, announced Lieut. Gen. James A. Van Fleet on June 2, "has now ended with the clearing again of enemy units from South Korea." This plainly meant that he was acting in accordance with new orders not to pursue the enemy into North Korea. His announcement was so interpreted in British Government circles, which were "relieved" to hear it. Secretary Acheson before the Senate inquiry, however, professed complete ignorance about the meaning of the whole Van Fleet statement; alleged that it was "a statement of military operations which I am not competent to comment on," and, in short, took refuge once more in double-talk in order to befog responsibility.

But the meaning of the Van Fleet statement was as clear as daylight. It meant that as soon as our troops get just a little above the Thirty-eighth Parallel they must stop, allow the enemy to rest, to regroup, to bring in more arms and equipment through North Korea and Manchuria. He has our assurance that we will not molest him meanwhile by land in North Korea or by air over Manchuria, that his "privileged sanctuary" has been widened, and that we will wait until he actually starts shooting at us again. And yet the Administration and our Chiefs of Staff profess to believe that under such conditions the

Chinese Communists will "ask for peace." Why should they? They have everything to gain by keeping our own forces tied up in Korea indefinitely in fear of further attacks from them while they are guaranteed against attacks from us.

When not long ago the President's Council of Economic Advisers began to talk of a national income of \$300 billion, that seemed a distant goal. But it is coming into view. The Department of Commerce says the value of the country's gross national product in the first three months of this year was at the annual rate of \$314 billions. Its value in terms of what? In terms of money, of course. But what has happened to money? If a dollar today would buy as much as a dollar bought in 1939, you could buy this \$314 billion gross national product for \$153 billion. If what has happened to the dollar since 1939 continues to happen for another twelve years, the gross national product in the year 1963 will have to be valued in some other way, because the value of money will be zero, and you can not value anything in zero. Undoubtedly before that happens the money planners will have provided us with a new kind of money, or it might be that they would only abolish the silly zero sign.

To say that things are priced in money, and money is priced in things, is like saying that the total of prices charged will equal the total of prices paid. It has the truth of a circle, perfectly lucid, and gets you, as the sailor says, no forrader. If it buys too much you may say either that money is too dear or things are too cheap: if it buys too little you may say, conversely, that money is too cheap and things are too dear. Then you may just as well say it all backward. What in any case does *too* mean? But mark you, there is supposed to be a science of planned money, and the professors of that science undertake to say what is *too*. Two years ago they decided that all the currencies of Europe were *too* something — too dear probably. Anyhow, they decided that Europe's welfare required her money to be devalued. Great Britain led off. She thought she would be better off if her pound sterling bought fewer dollars, and therefore she declared it worth one-third fewer dollars than before. Other European countries did likewise with their money. The idea was that with these devalued currencies they would buy less and sell more in the world, and that was to cure the dollar



gap, which was a euphemism to express the simple fact that they were buying from the dollar world more goods than they could pay for. But what closed the dollar gap was something else, namely: first the Marshall Plan billions that were poured into Europe; and now the enormous American expenditures in Europe for free-world armament.

Now suddenly the planned money experts decide that in 1949 their *too* was wrong. They overdid it. Devaluation went too far. So they think it is time to change the value of Europe's currencies again — in a reverse direction. They must be revalued up. How much? Well, not too much, and yet enough so that what Europe buys from the world will cost less and what it sells to the world will be worth more. Less and more in what? In money, the value of which will be fixed at what the planners think it is worth. Which way are you saying it now — forward or backward? Not that it matters. Great Britain's pound sterling now is "pegged" at \$2.08. The only sane reason there could be for "pegging" it higher would be that the planners think it is worth more. But if it is worth more it would rise of itself in a free exchange market, and if it is not worth more, saying that it is will not make it so. Next to war, the manipulation of money is now the most exciting business of governments everywhere in the world, including our own; and the idea that equilibrium and economic welfare may be so achieved is the great popular delusion of our time. That is why there is no such thing in the whole world as a sound piece of money, except gold, and gold is something no American citizen is permitted to own, under pain of confiscation, fine and imprisonment.

In the very gristle of any organ of economic or social control there is a principle of cancerous growth. There is in it also a kind of instinct or vital will that causes it unerringly to seize upon any occasion for the extension of its power, even the temporary occasion, on the ground that when the emergency passes some of its new powers will survive, either as fact or precedent. This is illustrated by the proposed amendments to the Defense Production Act of 1950, when it comes to be extended this year. The amendments are proposed by the executive, and every one of them aims to advance its power over the economic life of the country. One would authorize the government to take immediate possession of private property merely upon filing in court a paper setting forth its intentions; the owner, never having been asked to sell, never having refused to sell, might not even know the government wanted his property until condemnation proceedings were under way. Another would give the government unlimited authority to acquire, condemn or build any kind of plant, factory or facility whatever, provided only that it was deemed necessary to the national defense.

In the original Defense Production Act Congress refused to give the Executive that power. Now it is being asked for it again. In a message to Congress the President defended the request by saying, "At the present time, with some exceptions, whether or not defense plants are built depends finally on the decisions of private businessmen." Why not? When have private businessmen refused? What now is wanting in the way of defense plants? Another amendment would remove all restrictions on the

lending power of the government for defense activities. Hitherto it has been limited. Another would give the Executive authority to create new corporations of its own at will, the effect of which would be to leave Congress with even less control than now over defense expenditures. Any government having the powers contemplated in these amendments, the National Association of Manufacturers truly says, could "at any time it so decided substitute government enterprise for private enterprise from one end of the country to another." It will not use them? Then why does it ask for them? It has produced no evidence whatever tending to show that they are necessary, or that our defense exertions are in any way arrested for want of them. The Administration simply wants them in its hand.

Sometimes, in our more phantasmagorical dreams, we have a vision of civilization collapsing under the weight of the paper work that seems necessary these days to run it. The final stage of our recurrent nightmare is always the same: we seem to be drowning in a Niagara flood compounded of inter-office memos, third-class mail, mimeographed statistical releases from foundations, pages of gobbledygook from Washington agencies, and copies of the agenda for the latest international confabulation on how to pervert the homing instinct in pigeons that are born behind the Iron Curtain. The final coup de grace usually comes from a person bearing a suspicious resemblance to Mike DiSalle; we go under for the third — and last — time when Mike opens a spigot and lets out the latest batch of OPS regulations. For a long time we consumed pounds — nay, tons — of nembutal and seconal in a vain attempt to outwit the nightmare by deadening our sleep to the point of dreamless stupor.

But it wasn't until May 25 that we got eight hours of good, solid rest. The reason? In the *New York Times* for that day we came across a story that seemed to indicate a whole coming regeneration of society. The story consisted of the announcement, by Dr. Luther Gulick, that New York City wasn't buying any more steel filing cabinets this year. "Too many carbon copies of unimportant memos are cluttering available filing cabinets right now," said Dr. Gulick. If Dr. Gulick's attitude toward paper work spreads, the worst can be averted. Get rid of those floods of inter-office memos, those innumerable reports typed in triplicate, those crowding sheets of directives, and mankind will at once find itself with the energy to handle such comparatively easy things as the Communists and the atom bomb.

Senator Aiken took the trouble to count the releases received in his office during one forenoon from the Office of Price Stabilization. The number was eighty-six of which six were about meetings of advisory committees from industry, coming to Washington at the taxpayers' expense to confer. One, for example, "the Advisory Committee on Underwear, Lingerie and Negligees," reported that "inventories are heavy and in process of liquidation." Another, the Advisory Committee on the Toilet Tissue Industry, had appointed a subcommittee to develop more facts about its own business. Other releases were about ceiling price regulations, about orders, about the main-



tenance of regulations and orders, about the interpretation of maintenance of regulations and orders, about the clarification of regulations and orders, and so on and on. It is worse than OPA, says Mr. Aiken. But certainly, Senator. Why shouldn't it be worse? The more it does the worse it is, and that is what it is for. The next one will know how to do still more.

The State Department has issued a directive to its employees. It goes: "Every employee of the Department and the Foreign Service has a responsibility in addition to his regular work of helping to formulate and carry out United States foreign policy. That responsibility is to contribute to an understanding of foreign policy by other Americans who do not have as constant access to information about developments in the field of international relations as department employees." In other words, every State Department man is supposed to be a propagandist not only abroad in contact with other people, but at home, in contact with his own fellow citizens. We're glad to get that straight: what it means is that no State Department employee is permitted to criticize his boss or his boss's ideas in public. But what we can not fathom is a further question: How can anyone "contribute to an understanding" of a policy that passeth understanding?

Representative Cox of Georgia is perturbed by people who want to hang Dean Acheson. On the floor of the House the other day he quoted a scholar and a seer, an ex-Senator of the U. S. who is well acquainted with the history of Mexico. Said Representative Cox's scholarly ex-Senator friend: "I recall that in 1914, when Villa captured General Carranza, who, as you recall, wore a great beard, friends of the old general, who feared for his life, influenced a number of Senators, of whom I was one, to send a telegram to Villa not to hang General Carranza, to which we received the classic reply: 'Hang General Carranza? Why, no! I am not going to hang him. I am going to shave the old rascal and show the world what a fraud he is.'"

If you are confronted with a record of acts and decisions that have turned out to be progressively and cumulatively disastrous, you are bound to ask: "Was it the blundering of stupidity or was it a sinister design?" As an American you are loath to entertain the suspicion of sinister design. On the other hand, your reason tells you that stupidity can not be consistent. Blunders are not all of one kind; it is infinitely contrary to the law of averages that they shall fall in a line or form a definite pattern. What, then, will you do with the fact that as concerning Soviet Russia, from Yalta to this day, every blunder in American foreign policy has turned out to be what the Kremlin might have wished this country to do? All you can say is that if there had been a sinister design it would look like this.

The Kremlin must have been reading the tales of the Arkansas Traveler, especially the one about the man accused of stealing a pot, whose defense was that he never stole it and anyhow it was no good because it was cracked. Soviet Russia owes this country 672 lend-lease vessels, and our government has been trying to get them back.

The Kremlin's answer is, first, that it thought we were going to sell it the ships; second, that we don't need them, and third, that they are all worn out and not fit to go to sea. There is a fourth reason, but that one is a matter of face, with no humor in it, and the Russians couldn't state it. They expected a postwar loan of five billion American dollars and didn't get it.

A new British organization called the Council for the New Era in Emigration has come into being. Its members include William Beveridge, author of Britain's "cradle-to-grave" security legislation; Frank Whittle, inventor of the jet engine, and other prominent Britishers from both major political parties. The object of the Council is to move at least twenty million of Britain's present population of fifty million to Australia, Canada, South Africa and the "Point Four" areas of the globe. The twenty million are considered by the Council to be "excess" population. . . . What this amounts to is a confession by prominent Britishers that where capitalism could support five people, socialism can support only three.

Professor Henry Steele Commager, speaking at the graduation ceremonies of Sarah Lawrence College, has come up with the idea that final control of education should be vested in the university faculties. Certainly the faculties must have some say in educational policy. Nevertheless, Professor Commager's idea, if pushed to its ultimate conclusion, turns out to be one of those specious half-truths that arise to bemuse us at least once every generation. What it amounts to is a suggestion that policy decisions in education should be divorced from the wishes of the paying customer, whether he be the student's parent or the trustee charged with raising the money for scholarships or endowment. Were Professor Commager to advocate a compulsion on Macy's patrons to take whatever goods a hierarchy of managers and sales clerks saw fit to dispense, he would rightly be accused of being a "reactionary." But for urging a similar thing in his own world the professor is proclaimed a "liberal." Well, all we can say of the Commager line on control of educational policy is: "*Caveat emptor* — let the buyer beware." The unsuspecting buyer might conceivably discover that Professor Commager's attitude springs from a theory long propounded in certain "intellectual" circles, the rather undemocratic theory that the customer is never — well, *hardly* ever — right.

Query to the American Civil Liberties Union: Where is the Merle Miller report on blacklisting, inspired by the publication of "Red Channels"? And is it true that Mr. Miller found there was good reason to believe that the Communists have all along had a blacklist of anti-Communists?

FAIR DEAL SENATOR: Isn't that right, General?

CHIEF OF STAFF: YessirYessirYessirYessirYessir.

FAIR DEAL SENATOR: Isn't that as you understand it, General?

CHIEF OF STAFF: YessirYessirYessirYessirYessir.

FAIR DEAL SENATOR: Don't you agree with that, General?

CHIEF OF STAFF: YessirYessirYessirYessirYessir.

# BITTER WHEAT

THE TWO MILLION tons of wheat we are lending to India will have a bitter taste. But the grain we sold to India — more than 400,000 tons in the first three months of this year — was sweet enough. And the food India bought in Russia and China was received with expressions of gratitude.

What is the matter with the wheat we are lending? Why is it bitter? Because it became involved in that kind of emotional debate that reduces to cinders everything but the question itself, which is left as it was.

The question was not wheat. To suppose that Americans would begrudge food to hungry people is absurd. Yet we so far forgot ourselves that many applauded a foul cartoon which represented a gross Congress saying to the starving people of India, "Do you expect to get something for nothing?" The question was not money. As now we think of money, the amount was not large; only \$190,000,000. But there was a crucial question, and it was this: "Can we buy the love and good will of the world with our billions?"

On one side were those saying yes. They held up the image of a mother in India pressing to her breast a starving baby. What would she think, what would Asia think, of a rich country that haggled over the terms on which it would part with some of its surplus food? Or they talked of a bridgehead to 350,000,000 Asians who could be saved for the free world with a little wheat and who, if they got too hungry, would fall to the Communists.

On the other side were those saying no; that we could only ruin our own country and find ourselves in the end bankrupt and alone. But they went far beyond that, to discuss Nehru's personal affection for Soviet Russia, the anti-American behavior of India in the United Nations, and the fact that every hungry nation in Asia was sitting in the galleries of Congress to see if India was going to get hers, for if India did, then they could claim theirs.

Altogether it makes another sad chapter in the story of American foreign policy. And it was not India's fault. The facts are as follows:

India found herself wanting two million tons of wheat to meet her normal annual consumption; and although this may seem a lot of wheat, it would be only two weeks' supply. Her shortage was 4 per cent. It was hardship but not disaster. There is scarcity in India but not yet famine. On May 1 last, Nehru himself said in a broadcast speech:

We have large areas in India today which are deficient in food and some which hover on the verge of famine, and yet there are also other parts which have produced surplus food grains. Taking India as a whole, the deficit is not as great as imagined.

In February India formally requested the American government's assistance to obtain two million tons of wheat to meet her emergency, and said she "would greatly appreciate if the grain be supplied on special and easy terms." She was not asking for a gift; only for a loan on easy terms.

But the State Department, believing that we can buy

the love of the world, decided that what India needed was not a loan but a grant, that is to say, free wheat. On April 3 it released a statement, first to Congress and then to the public, saying:

There is an additional intangible but highly important reason why a grant would be far more valuable to the United States than its cost. This is the first official request India has made to the United States for help. The response of the United States will be watched with the utmost interest by all the people of Asia who have seen the response which the United States has made in recent years to the nations of Europe for economic and military aid.

The argument, *videlicet*, that because we had given so much to Europe, now if we made a loan to India instead of a gift, Asiatic countries would be hurt and jealous, and they were all watching.

Then when it began to be said that India had means, that she could buy the wheat, that she could certainly afford to take it as a repayable loan, Mr. Acheson appeared before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House and made this statement:

When those of us in the executive branch of the government considered the Indian suggestions that the 2,000,000 tons of food grain might be made available on a long-term credit basis, we discovered that the problems created were much the same as those involved in the use of India's sterling balances. India hopes to finance part of its six-year development program by loans. Its debt-servicing capacity is limited. If its credit were pledged for grain, it would be unable to qualify for the hoped-for development loans. In addition, credits for the acquisition of consumers' goods such as foodstuffs required to meet an emergency situation are economically unsound, as they provide no basis for the creation of income and foreign exchange to repay the credit. It is clear to me that our own interest and India's interest require that we provide the grain on a grant basis.

The six-year development program referred to by Mr. Acheson is set forth in the *India News Bulletin* (official) of March 7 last. Its estimated total cost is \$3,864,000,000, or \$644,000,000 a year, of which "India estimates it can furnish from internal sources about \$2,163,000,000. The remainder, a sum of \$1,701,000,000, will have to come from outside sources."

So, for all the bonfire, neither was the State Department thinking primarily about wheat or famine in India. It was looking toward a Marshall Plan for Asia. Its argument reduced to this, that if India could get for nothing the wheat she was willing to buy on a long-term loan, she would be in a better position to borrow money and receive grants on her six-year development plan. Her wheat shortage is in part caused by diversion of resources to "industrialization". Our State Department wishes to finance a further diversion.

The decision of Congress was to provide the wheat on a loan basis, with "special and easy terms," which is what India had asked for in the first place. But meanwhile the State Department had led the Indians to expect a gift, and they were disappointed, and the garment of friendly relations was badly torn.



## UNCLE SAM, EXECUTIONER

THE JOINT Chiefs of Staff have made it clear to the Senate investigating committees that the military policy in Korea is one of experimental slaughter, designed, they hope, to weary Communist China with fighting, so that it may one day sue for peace.

That being the Grand Design, it becomes pertinent to know just who are these slaughtered Chinese. Dispatches from Korea during the current Red offensives have mentioned the presence in large numbers of former Nationalist troops; and in a recent column, Mr. Hanson Baldwin, military commentator for the *New York Times*, confirmed these reports. He said:

Most of the Chinese in prisoner-of-war cages near Pusan were — up until the last enemy offensive — former Nationalists, a fact that tends to sustain, at least in part, the contention of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that the use of his troops in Korea might lead to large-scale desertions and defections by the enemy.

All this bears out information conveyed to us early in May by Chinese underground sources. The Chinese Reds, we were told, had adopted a new policy aimed at using the American Army to liquidate thousands of former Nationalist troops whom the Communists did not trust even after having subjected them to intensive indoctrination. These elements of the Red Army had either surrendered or defected to the Communists during the debacle of 1949; and the Reds feared that in case of Nationalist landings in strength on the Chinese mainland they would desert to their former comrades. But to attempt to disarm and liquidate them would have been to risk dangerous mutinies and mass desertions to the guerrilla forces now operating over much of Southern China.

From Mao's point of view the solution adopted was a brilliant answer to the policy of slaughter announced by the Joint Chiefs. So long as he has former Nationalists to be exterminated, that policy is actually to his advantage. Meanwhile the repeated waves of attack are having a punishing and demoralizing effect on the troops of our South Korean allies, according to dispatches from the front; and that, too, is greatly to his advantage.

Of course Mao would not dare to send these former Nationalists to the slaughter en masse if it were not for Washington's stubborn refusal to use the troops Chiang has repeatedly offered — as Mr. Baldwin suggests with what seems to us overcareful hedging. Last November General MacArthur wanted to accept 60,000 of Chiang's troops. Had he been permitted to do so, these loyal Chinese would no doubt have been able to induce many surrenders among the Red Chinese forces. But the Government on Formosa remains the one UN member which has offered substantial help in Korea; and the one member which has been permitted to send no aid at all. Even the 375 interpreters from Formosa who are being used to query Chinese prisoners are being kept in rear areas, according to Mr. Baldwin, "and barred from any front-line operations because of political reasons."

What political reasons? Does anybody in Washington want to continue liquidating Mao's enemies for him? Even so, 375 interpreters could hardly bring about the

substitution of mass surrender for mass slaughter — unless, of course, the Army cooperated by placing loud-speakers at their disposal.

We wish the Senate investigating committees would put a few questions to Mr. Acheson and the generals about this mystifying situation.

## GENERALS DIE IN COMMITTEE

WHY DID Generals Bradley and Collins find that they had pressing business in Europe right after they had tried to justify General MacArthur's hasty dismissal? Could they be on a mission to persuade General Eisenhower to appear before the Senate committees and bolster up their shaky prestige? Our guess is that Ike is too canny to put any such strain on his own. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff (excepting part of Admiral Sherman's testimony) reminded one of Rabelais's group of friars on their way "to sift and garble some articles of faith against the new heretics."

MacArthur hadn't been guilty of insubordination, the chiefs admitted (only General Collins dared accuse him, and had to eat his words within 24 hours). But he couldn't go along with basic policy. Well, here is a passage on policy read into the record by Senator Saltonstall from their own "Report For the Senate Committees on Korean Operations":

On 15 March 1951 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had an informal conference with representatives of the Department of State. . . . *It appeared to be generally agreed that at some future meeting an agreement should be reached on the objectives in Korea. (Italics ours)*

So help us. That is the kind of no-policy with which MacArthur couldn't go along, and all honor to him.

The chiefs, in trying to justify Truman's action, advertised to the world their own fears and their country's inexcusable military weakness. And they directed this unsoldierly argument against MacArthur. He was threatening to precipitate World War III by getting Stalin really angry. Besides, such offenses as wishing to fight the enemy on equal terms, inviting the enemy to request a cease-fire, and stressing the importance of Formosa and all Asia to U. S. security had endangered the Constitutional principle of civilian supremacy over the military.

Had they, as the President's legally constituted military advisers, ever demanded that this dangerous man be supplanted by a more reliable commander? Unanimously they testified that such action had never occurred to them.

Why not? What kind of military advisers were these who thought a commander was endangering his country's safety and its Constitution, yet made no move to dismiss him until it was suggested to General Bradley by way of an anonymous telephone call? Are they as disloyal to their country as that sounds, or are they only acting as docile yes-men to the Administration? In either case they have forfeited any valid claim on the confidence of their fellow-Americans.



# THE TIMES "FRAMES"

## A QUESTION

WHEN the *New York Times* undertakes a survey, it ordinarily produces a good one. Recently, however, it produced a turkey. We refer to Mr. Kalman Seigel's analytical survey of the state of freedom of thought in "72 major colleges," which appeared in the *Times* for May 10 and 11.

According to Mr. Seigel, the survey turned up complaints of a "subtle, creeping paralysis of freedom of thought and speech attacking college campuses," a "widening tendency toward passive acceptance of the status quo, conformity, and a narrowing of the area of tolerance." We have no doubt that Mr. Seigel has a good pair of ears; we ourselves have heard all sorts of complaints that campus "liberals" are being persecuted, that "McCarthyism" has scared everybody into a state of complete intellectual numbness, that loyalty oaths prevent professors from having their say, that fear of being tagged "pink" has dammed the flow of constructive criticism, or caused timorous students to back away from open advocacy of such things as social security or the Rochdale Cooperative Movement.

Unfortunately for our own popularity in "liberal" circles, we don't believe the complaints have any foundation in the "facts" which Mr. Seigel presents as true. If anyone can produce a single American undergraduate who is in serious trouble for supporting anything to the right of out-and-out Stalinism (which can not be stretched to fit into any valid concept of liberalism) we will eat three beer bottles and a galvanized garbage-can cover in Times Square at high noon of July 4 in front of any reporter the *Times* cares to designate.

It so happens that we have a fairly good memory. At any rate, we seem to remember that Senator Joe McCarthy started fulminating about alleged Reds and Pinks in the State Department in the winter of 1950. Prior to his onslaught against the State Department Joe McCarthy was just another senator; his name caused no one to quake. Yet it is a fact that in the pre-McCarthyist spring of 1949, when we visited the University of Wisconsin campus in Madison, we discovered that the students were bored with political thought. There was little intellectual activity in politics, whether of the Right, Left or Center. The students didn't necessarily disbelieve in the Welfare Statism sired by the old La Follette Progressivism that had once made Wisconsin and its university symbols of a crusading bellicosity in political thought. No, they were just bored to death by all the old ideas; there wasn't a kick in a carload of them. Indeed, no less a person than ex-Governor Phil La Follette's personable son Bob informed us at the time that politics was a mug's game; he wanted to have none of it.

The point is that political apathy — or, as Mr. Seigel puts it, a "widening tendency toward passive acceptance of the status quo" — long antedated the emergence of

Joe McCarthy or the hatreds stirred by the Hiss case or the heating up of the cold war after Soviet Russia had stolen the secrets of the A-bomb. And the cream of the jest is that the apathy has nothing whatsoever to do with any "passive" acceptance of the ideas promulgated by the National Association of Manufacturers, or the DAR, or the American Legion. Mr. Seigel hints that there are pressures working in our broad land to produce conformity in the classroom. But if there is a conformity, it is a conformity not of the old Right, but of the new Left. The "widening tendency toward passive acceptance of the status quo" is a tendency to take a commingled Keynesianism, Fabian collectivism and tired Statism as a gospel beyond question. And the occasional undergraduate who makes so bold as to profess a belief in economic laissez faire, or in the anarchism of a Thoreau, is looked upon as a queer fish, if not a dangerous radical.

If Mr. Kalman Seigel or the *Times* doubts our word for this, we would like to cite the experience of William F. Buckley, Jr., who was chairman of the *Yale Daily News* in 1949-50. Mr. Buckley was that *rara avis* on the campus, a real historical conservative. In fact, he was so much out of the ordinary that people in New Haven haven't yet got over a sense of bewildered surprise that Mr. Buckley could actually exist, much less achieve a prominent position on a college publication. For a single exciting year Mr. Buckley jolted the apathy at Yale; he stood foursquare against the "widening tendency toward passive acceptance" of the Keynesian-cum-Fabian status quo. Naturally he was called a Fascist — and this in spite of his belief in (and practice of) free speech.

It so happens that Mr. Buckley has recently done his own survey of the latter-day intellectual status quo that pertains in at least one American university. Writing in *Human Events* for May 16, Mr. Buckley has analyzed some of the texts used in Yale economics courses. His quotations are interesting. For example, the Yale undergraduate learns from Morgan's "Income and Employment" that freedom to engage in business for oneself "is not a basic freedom." He learns from Tarshis's "The Elements of Economics" that inequality of income which seriously vitiates "maximum social well-being" must and will be abolished by State intervention through taxation. He learns from Bowman and Bach's "Economic Analysis and Public Policy" that, since there is no right of private property, the State must remedy the appalling inequality of income which "most Americans regard as inequitable." And so it goes. The new orthodoxy in Yale economics is Keynesian Statism, not any allotrope, whether "rugged" or not, of the old individualism which Yale still depends upon for its endowment funds.

Mr. Buckley's survey does not cut so wide a swathe as Mr. Seigel's. But if further evidence is wanted that the

new orthodoxy is of the Left, not the Right, there exists a study made by Benjamin H. Namm, Chairman of the Board of the Namm Stores of Brooklyn, N. Y. Mr. Namm's report, "Collectivism in the Classroom," is based on an analysis of economics textbooks used in a hundred or more American universities. A few of Mr. Namm's quotations may serve to set the intellectual climate of the new day:

"The statement is sometimes encountered that 'a poor country like England can not afford a Beveridge Plan calling for cradle to grave security' . . . Such a statement is just not good economics."

"Can it be truthfully said that 'internal borrowing shifts the war burden to future generations while taxing places it on the present generation?' A thousand times no!"

"On the other hand, Socialist Britain (in 1948) has more liberties than did the United States in the 1920 era of rugged individualism."

"No longer is modern man able to believe 'that government governs best which governs least.'"

"About one-fourth of the money income in the United States consists of profits."

Such is the pabulum that is the orthodoxy of the moment in the American university world. It is an orthodoxy that Joe McCarthy has done nothing whatsoever to disturb. Nobody is being "persecuted" for teaching it, nobody is being forbidden to read, write or mouth the junk that passes for economic and political thought in the modern university world. Indeed, "liberalism," far from being scared of anybody, reigns smugly and contentedly over an intellectual world that is just about as placid and uninvigorating as the Sargasso Sea.

The trouble with Mr. Seigel's *New York Times* survey is that it never once tries to get below the surface presented by the careless assumptions of the moment. One of these assumptions is that "McCarthyism" has somehow inhibited everybody. The Communists cultivate this assumption day in and day out. But where is the evidence that Joe McCarthy has shut anybody up? It may be true that he has closed the mouths of a few scared rabbits and congenital morons who aren't worth hearing from anyway. But what assails our sensitive ears these days is not silence, but the shouts of thousands of supposedly scared academicians crying anathema on Joe McCarthy! There is plenty of freedom of speech today, and Joe McCarthy is the prime butt of most of it.

Since the *Times's* Mr. Seigel has failed to give us a good account of what inhibits a vigorous intellectual life on the American university campus, we should like to see another reporter put to work on the job. Let him take for his starting point a passage from Rebecca West's recent critique of Alistair Cooke's "A Generation on Trial: U. S. A. v. Alger Hiss," which appears in the *University of Chicago Law Review* for the spring of 1951. Says Miss West:

It is never possible to serve the interests of liberalism by believing that which is false to be true. The liberal must have as exact a view of the universe on the common-sense plane as it is possible for his perceptions and his intellect to give him . . .

When it comes to investigating the "status quo" in the colleges, the "exact view" should begin with what is

actually being taught and absorbed on the campuses, not with certain preconceptions that spring from clichés that cumber the air because the Communists know how to insinuate them into the minds of unthinking "liberals" everywhere.

## THE MILITARY BUDGET

FAR MORE than half the Federal budget enjoys a kind of immunity from criticism because it is for defense. Nobody likes to challenge a military estimate. Congress is loath even to ask for what statisticians call a breakdown of the figures, to show what the money will be spent for — if in fact it can be spent.

It is notorious that the military establishment always asks for more money than it can spend. After World War I and again after World War II it turned up with enormous unexpended balances. And from one fiscal year to another it happens that it has not been able to spend the whole of its appropriations, yet because it has possession of the money it clings to it like the abalone to the rock; either that, or toward the end of the period it begins to spend its money furiously, just so it will not be embarrassed by having to admit that it had asked for more than was necessary. Its position is quite simple. It says, "The only mistake we can really make is not to have enough."

That of course is true, only it puts the civilian authority on a spot. One of the few civilians who could take care of himself on that spot was B. M. Baruch as head of the War Industries Board in World War I. When he had to bear down on the extravagant estimates of the military people they would say to him, "Do you want to lose the war?" His retort was: "Yes, I want to lose the war. Now let's talk some common sense."

Important as it may be to cut the non-defense expenditures of the Federal government, if you hold entirely to that, with defense expenditures running from \$40 to \$60 billion a year, you will be flogging the little donkey. Such an item in the 1952 budget estimates as "Military services [no details] \$41,421,000,000," is callous, to say the least. Congress feels rather helpless. From time to time it hears of grotesque instances of waste and bungling in military procurement. Whether they are exceptional or common it does not know. It is likely that a committee will be appointed to try to find out, something like the well-remembered Truman Committee in World War II; but it would probably find itself chasing the horse that walked out of the barn.

To the Fourth Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1951, Senator Case offered the following amendment:

There is hereby rescinded 5 per cent of the gross amount appropriated to the Department of Defense in this act, and that amount is hereby reappropriated to the Treasury.

Senator O'Mahoney protested that inflation had already reduced by as much as 25 per cent the buying power of the money appropriated to the Department of Defense, so that the Navy alone, for example, had lost 600 submarines and 2500 fighter planes; and here was a Senator wanting to cripple it more. Senator McKellar said: "The question now is whether we are going to ap-



propriate money to defend our country or whether we are not." To which Senator Capehart retorted that allowing all you would for inflation, how could the Department of Defense account for such facts as had already been reported to a Senate Committee, namely: a rise in the cost of a switchboard from \$994 to \$4,802; in the cost of a special type of radio set from \$4,597 to \$20,185; in the cost of a sound ranging set from \$4,959 to \$15,000? And so on through many items.

Senator Case's amendment was voted down. The Department of Defense got its money. Moral: none. There is no efficient way to build a war machine in haste. It might have been built with forethought; now in place of forethought we have to use the cataclysmic power of billions spilling over. Senator Byrd states the dilemma: "My concern is double-edged, because as a member of the Armed Services Committee I am fearfully aware of the military potentialities and what it takes to meet them, and as a member of the Senate Finance Committee I am fearfully aware of our approach to insolvency and confiscatory taxes."

## RECORD OF THE HEARINGS

By MORRIE RYSKIND

**T**HE FREEMAN is proud to present below what it considers the most important revelation since the Pumpkin Papers. Herewith are the minutes of the joint meeting of the House and Senate Un-American Military Affairs Committees. For obvious reasons, the press and public were barred and no notes were taken, except by a young lady acrobat our correspondent had secreted in one of the chandeliers. Considering the fact that she doesn't take shorthand, and making due allowance for her unfamiliarity with some of the personages involved, we nevertheless feel that the record, faulty though it may be in some respects, should be presented to the American people. THE EDITORS

Q. Your name, please?

GEN. MARSHALL. I regret I have not the necessary notes with me, but I shall be glad to bring you the information at some future date. Or the Committee can get it from Secretary Acheson, since that is more in his province.

Q. General Bradley, who first spoke to you about the possibility of firing General MacArthur?

JOHN GARFIELD. I can't recall. These fellows would call me up, knowing I was a liberal and I would just say, "All right. Put my name down."

Q. Mr. Ferrer, you concede you may have been involved in some Communist fronts. Can you tell us who induced you to join them?

GEN. BRADLEY. I gave that information to the President in my capacity as confidential adviser, and feel it is privileged. I can not answer unless so directed by the President. Any bets?

SEN. KEFAUVER. I would remind the chair that any betting that is done must be performed under the auspices of my committee.

THE CHAIR. The chair so rules.

Q. General Marshall, when you went to China to ask Chiang Kai-shek to form a coalition government with the Chinese Communists, who gave you the directive for that mission?

GEN. VAUGHAN. I have nothing to say, because whatever I say is misquoted and used against me.

Q. General Garfield, did General MacArthur ever disobey a military order from the Chiefs of Staff?

GEN. COLLINS. Well, not exactly. But we asked him to put only South Koreans at the Manchurian border, because otherwise it would have looked as though we wanted to win this war instead of just containing it. Because if — and we might as well face the possibility — we should win this war, Russia is liable to throw the atom bomb and we need those troops for Europe for Russia to throw at. So we naturally concurred in the firing of MacArthur, though we admired him as a military figure.

Q. General Schulberg, you say you left the Communist Party before 1940, yet you attacked the investigatory powers of this committee in 1947, signed the *amicus curiae* brief to the Supreme Court in defense of John Howard Lawson and Dalton Trumbo, and voted for Henry Wallace in 1948. How come?

PRES. TRUMAN. Well, I was going to fire the SOB (here some forty-two words have been deleted by the military censor and the Post Office) over a year ago — I mean, under a year ago — I mean — anyway, I'm President!

Q. Now, General Ferrer, you didn't know Benjamin Davis was a Communist although he ran openly as one?

GEN. GARFIELD. I never met a Communist in my life. You've got to remember I look at these things globally, and General MacArthur was looking at them only from the standpoint of Korea.

Q. General Vandenberg, when you wrote the article about our air force for the *Saturday Evening Post*, weren't you guilty of the same insubordination with which MacArthur is charged?

SEC. ACHESON. I might point out that at that time we were certain that the Chinese Communists were merely agrarian reformers, while Representative Martin, to whom General MacArthur wrote, is a leading member of the war party in the United States. Besides, my understanding is that President Truman doesn't read the *Post*. This information came to us at the meeting at the White House: Those present were Gen. Marshall, Sec. Pace, Averill Harriman and myself and the President. We didn't know who was going to leak first, so we fired MacArthur immediately.

(A motion to adjourn *sine die* was now made and upheld by a strict party vote, with the lone exception of Senator Wayne Morse who temporarily deserted his party to vote with the Republican minority. As soon as this was discovered, the Republicans hastily switched their votes. In conclusion, the Chairman briefly thanked the men who had testified.)

THE CHAIR. I want to thank all of you, Generals Marshall, Bradley, Ferrer, Collins, Vaughan, Garfield, Acheson, Schulberg and Vandenberg, and Commander in Chief Truman, for the cooperation you have given this Committee by confessing so freely and honestly.

We are sure the public will accept your frank admissions at face value and we hope you will all have your Hollywood contracts renewed at even higher salaries than before. Meeting adjourned.



# THESE HATED AMERICANS

By GARET GARRETT

**T**HE WINDS that blow our billions away return burdened with themes of scorn and dispraise. There is a little brat wind that keeps saying:

"But you are absurd, you Americans, like the rich fat boy from the big house who is tolerated while he spends his money at the drug store and then gets chased home with mud on his clothes. He is bewildered and hurt, and yet he wants so much to be liked that he does it again the next day. But this is parable and you are probably too stupid to get it. If you do you won't believe it, and so no harm is done. You will come again tomorrow."

Another wind says:

"You worship success, you Americans. You have thereby ruined all your spiritual and moral values, such as they were. Your controlling idea is Babylon for the masses. Since success is your idol you are unable to understand the souls of other people or that they have souls. You are unable to comprehend the spiritual content of communism and are deluded to think you can shoot it out of the world."

**How shall one answer insulting winds?** You do not assert your possession of spiritual values. But as for success, we may be sure that if it seems to be acclaimed here more than anywhere else that is only because it is magnificent here and because it multiplies the satisfactions of common life in a manner that is the envy of the whole world.

Having lived the most fabulous success story in the history of the human race we are rich — so rich that the next richest country is by comparison poor. In a world where one-third of humanity barely subsists on the poverty level, this is a fact that can not be forgiven. Yet one may be permitted to suggest that its magnitude is not the only unique fact about American wealth. First, we made it all for ourselves, the hard way, by our own free labor, and the primary ground of it was a life of Puritan thrift, self-discipline and austerity, while the rich in Europe, exploiting their own and their colonial labor, lived in dazzling luxury.

Secondly, American wealth has been shared with the world. That idea is still so strange that the meaning of simple words needs to be emphasized.

Never before in the history of mankind has one rich nation literally shared its wealth with others. In World War I we made very large loans to our associates, which afterwards we expected them to repay only in part, but which they nevertheless repudiated in whole, not because they couldn't pay but because it was too hard to pay and because the Americans were already too rich. And this was the beginning of capitalism's fatal leukemia in Europe, especially in Great Britain, where the movement to repudiate war debts to America originated — fatal because capitalism rests on the inviolability of contract.

Then came World War II, and remembering the humiliation of being called Shylock for expecting to get any-

thing back on account of Europe's war debts in the first case, we said: "This time we erase the dollar mark." That was the meaning of Lend-Lease. After the war our allies would owe us nothing. All the dollars did was to measure the quantity of things they required of us — not a debt to be repaid.

During the war and five years of postwar time what with Lend-Lease, global emergency relief, the \$4 billion loan to Great Britain, the Marshall Plan, military aid, the North Atlantic Pact and all, the amount of American wealth distributed throughout the world was roughly equal to the total national wealth of the next richest nation, namely, Great Britain. The postwar Marshall Plan was pure giving. We said to the nations of Europe, all of them at first, including Russia: "Estimate what your deficits will be for several years, count it all up, and send us the bill." Russia and her satellites declined. All of Western Europe accepted, with expressions of affection and gratitude. Winston Churchill called it the most unselfish act in the history of the world.

In that spirit we sent them food, fuel, raw materials, machines and even money to pay their debts. We built new factories for them, and powerhouses, and restored their railroads, besides irrigation works, modern roads and agricultural projects in their colonies. Roughly, they used two-thirds of our Marshall Plan money for restoration and the other third for expansion on lines competitive with American industry, so that they might be able to compete with us in the markets of the world to better advantage; and by the end of 1950 western Europe's productive power not only had been fully restored; it was 30 per cent greater than before the war. That was sharing. Never had such a thing happened or been imagined before in this world.

**Nevertheless, a shrill Socialist wind from Britain says:**

"Now you are guilty of hypocrisy. It is not for the sake of the world you do it. It is for your own sake. You have had a surplus you could neither consume yourselves nor sell to others, and to get rid of it you were obliged to give it away, for if you did not somehow get rid of it you would drown in it. Such is the riddle of your capitalism. Therefore, instead of taking merit for giving your surplus away you should be grateful to other people for receiving it."

This hurts, coming from the British, who have been the principal beneficiaries of our sharing. And there was no surplus. It was not surplus we gave away. It was wealth; and it is nonsense to say we could not have used it ourselves — if not in the same forms in which it was distributed abroad, then in other forms, since wealth is a thing that may assume any form. True, our standard of living went on rising, but that is not to say it might not have advanced much more if we had employed here the wealth we gave away. Could we not use the dams and power plants we built in western Europe? Or the roads

we built for Europe's colonial dependencies in places we almost never had heard of before? Could we not have used our money to reduce our own public debt, instead of giving it to Great Britain to reduce her public debt on the ground that it would improve her credit? What an odd paragraph this will make in history, if it is remembered, that we increased our national debt to enable Great Britain to reduce hers.

There is a cruel wind saying:

"But you are dangerous, you hair-trigger Americans. You brandish your weapons in a reckless manner. You are too ready to use the atomic bomb."

**The British say that.** A rift in Anglo-American policy toward Asia was so explained. While saying for themselves that they could hope for a diplomatic settlement with Red China, the British made the rash Americans appear to prefer a military solution. Soviet Russia's propaganda, aiming to fix upon us the guilt of warmongering, was thereby strengthened, and in the whole world the question began to be asked: "For all they say, are the Americans really a peace-loving people? Even though they think they mean what they say, is it not possible that their insatiable economy, to go on expanding, demands the military stimulus?"

That question may give Americans a good deal of prayerful thought. As a peace-loving people we do have a terrific war history — one world war to make the world safe for democracy, soon another one much more terrible to kill the aggressor everywhere forever; now a defense of the whole free world, which makes it impossible for us to stay out of war anywhere; the bones of Nevada cracking under the stress of experimental atomic bomb explosions — and the economy expanding all the time.

But there is another history that belongs to us too, and it is more significant because it represents the activity of our own free will.

After World War I we had incomparably the greatest navy in the world. What any other country might have done with it need not be suggested. What did we do with it? We called the Washington Conference on Naval Disarmament and made there the only forthright proposal for real disarmament that was ever heard. We said to the other naval powers of the world:

"Look. Ours is by far the longest sword. Measure it. This is what we propose. We will break our sword to the length of the next longest one, if everybody will agree to stop there. That will end the mad armament race, in which as you well know we have the unlimited advantage. None of you can hope to overtake us. We can build a navy twice as big, three times as big, and we will do it if necessary."

**Was that the voice of a peace-loving people?** The other naval powers, principally Great Britain, France and Japan, were stunned. They could hardly believe it. A treaty was signed accordingly. We towed our ships out to sea and sank enough of them to give Great Britain parity with the American Navy. The sequel was that no other signatory power absolutely kept faith. Great Britain increased the range of her guns. Ultimately, Japan denounced the treaty.

But the story of America at war is perhaps too fantastic, so that a suspicious world walks round and round

it, saying it can not be true as it looks; there must be something very wrong with it, a global gimmick, a secret forethought, since people are born selfish and really can not behave like that. If in all history there is such a thing as a nation engaging in two world wars and renouncing beforehand any material gain or advantage whatever, and meaning it — where is it? We have done it twice. We have helped the other victors to divide the loot among them, taking nothing for ourselves, and then we have shared our wealth with the victors and vanquished alike to restore their lives.

Yet there is a chill sardonic wind rising in France that says:

"You are imperialistic all the same, whether you realize it or not. Call it moral imperialism if you like, and so beguile yourselves. You are trying to make the kind of world you want. You are trying to impose the American way of life on other people, whether they want it or not. Suppose they don't want it. Will you oblige them to choose between two forms of coercion — one way to embrace communism and the other to accept the American way of life? Are you not saying to other people, 'You can have any kind of government you want provided it is anti-Communist?' And morally, wherein does this differ from what the Russians are saying — that people can have any kind of government they want provided it is anti-capitalist and anti-American?"

**An Arab philosopher rises to tell us that our sin is to put our trust —**

... far more in gadgets and in the manipulation of emotions than in the truth and potency of ideas. The idea of taking a college degree, getting married and settled, rearing a family, having a dependable job, making lots of money and having a solid and ever-expanding bank account — this ideal, conceived purely in those terms, is not good enough.

And we are so chagrined by this description of the futility and boredom of the life we live as to forget that what the East desperately wants and thinks we should help it to achieve is a higher standard of material living.

The Arab says we shall be like that until we learn to go out of ourselves to a region of joy,

... where it is more blessed to give than to receive.

This to a nation that has never had a chance to receive, only to give; to a nation that is, incredibly, for all the rest of the world a charitable organization. This we forget and say instead, "Hear! Hear! It is wisdom from the East."

The Arab continues that as he contemplates the values of the West,

... Asia — if I must be frank with you — is not impressed. In fact, despite all her darkness and misery, Asia can still do better.

Well, these Americans have not swallowed the sun. The Asians have exactly as much of it as we have. If they can do better, why don't they do it? Why do they demand our help? With our share of the sun we have aimed only to make the kind of life we wanted, and we did it all on our own. Why haven't the Asians made the kind of life they want? The wealth of Asia once dazzled a barbarian Western world. What became of it? What became of the genius and will that built palaces and temples which are



still wonderful as relics in the pages of the *National Geographic* magazine? What became of the science and technology that made the first paper, the first gunpowder, the first mariner's compass and did the first printing and first clothed the body in silk?

By now making a virtue of poverty and preferring their miseries to the boredom of good living, the Asians may have saved their souls. If they think so, it is not arguable. But for them now to be saying that to receive American wealth to improve their standard of living will not hurt their souls, whereas the giving of it may save the American soul, is too much of a strain on their garment of spiritual superiority. It rips in the critical seams. As philosophy, these winds from Asia are punk; as propaganda they appeal to the softness of American character.

Since the world is people and the one universal tragedy in it is human behavior, we may know that the richest and most powerful nation will not be loved. It must expect to be feared, to be hated because it is feared, to be maligned and misjudged. Last before us it was imperious Great Britain, whose other name was perfidious Albion. Now it is our turn. But why should we be so tender-minded about it? Why do we suffer the censorious opinions of the world to be as sackcloth on our skin and ashes on our forehead? Why must we accept the expectations of other people as the measure of our obligation to them?

**It was not always so.** Since Washington until this generation Europe was Old World and America was New World; and even as we broke the tradition of orbital separation the feeling for it was so strong that we said our role in World War I was that of *associate*, not *ally*.

The questions we ask are new. They have arisen in our time and they have a certain history.

About 1900 began the flowering of that alien graft upon our tree of sapience called the intellectual. He was the precious product of our free academic world — a social theorist who knew more than anybody else about everything and all about nothing, except how to subvert the traditions and invert the laws. He was neither creative nor inventive; therefore there was no profit for him in the capitalistic scheme, and his revenge was to embrace Old World socialism. As teacher, writer of textbooks, master of the popular diatribe of discontent, he was primarily a sower of contrarious ideas. Living comfortably on the fringes of capitalistic opulence, he compared his income with that of a bond salesman or a self-made executive and was moved to scorn the profit motive and trample upon private wealth.

In the academic world this disaffected intellectual multiplied by fission. One made two, two made four, and so on. Their superior manners and university passports caused them to be received in the houses of the rich, where they dined on fine plate and denounced success. Standing on the eastern seaboard they gazed dotingly on Europe, which, they said, was twenty years ahead of America in social consciousness. Notwithstanding our "cultural lag" Europe would have been glad at any time to trade her standard of living for ours. What did that mean? To the intellectuals it meant nothing. All they knew about the American affair — all they wanted to know — was what was wrong with it. They could see only its pimples and festers and treated these minor

excrecences as symptoms of deep disease. Their influence for a while was underestimated, especially by those who thought their free enterprise world was too strong to be in danger, and said: "A little radicalism is perhaps good for us. It will make us think."

And so it was that after 1900 we began to import political ideals from Europe. This was reversal. Until then for more than one hundred years Europe had been taking ideas from us — ideas of liberty from the Declaration of Independence, ideas of limited government from our Constitution, and then, though very dimly, the idea that wages were paid not out of profits but out of production, which meant that profit and wages could rise together, if only you went on expanding production.

But now, from the intellectual's transmission belt, we began to take ideas from Europe — ideas of social security from Germany, ideas of slow socialization from the British Fabians, and from Great Britain also the idea of political laborism, in contradiction of the American idea, as expounded by Samuel Gompers, that the ground of organized labor's struggle was economic, not political. Gompers had once said that he would sooner be shot than become a number on a social security card. A right division of the economic product, and then let the wage earner do as he would with his own; that was the American philosophy. The intellectuals represented socialism to be a working class movement. That certainly was not true here, and F. A. Hayek is probably right when he says that "socialism has never and nowhere been at first a working class movement." Historically, it has always been first a movement in the minds of the intellectuals.

**The first great turning was accomplished** with the ease of a Pullman train passing from one track to another over a split-point switch. The landscape hardly changed at all for a while, and then gradually, and when people found themselves in a new political region, there was no turning back.

The event was the amendment of the Constitution in 1913, giving the Federal government power to impose a progressive tax on all incomes. This idea was not only European; it was Marxian, one of the cardinal points of the Communist Manifesto. President Wilson disarmed opposition by saying the Federal government would use this power, if at all, only in time of emergency; and yet, as we now know, the obsequies of limited government ought then to have been performed. Only the intellectuals knew what it meant. Nobody else dreamed, least of all perhaps President Wilson, that the Federal income tax would be used not for revenue only, which was until then the only kind of taxation Americans knew, but for the purpose of redistributing the national wealth from the top downward, according to European ideas of social amelioration.

The Federal income tax was but one tool and had not its full leverage until other turnings took place. It was not until the first year of the Roosevelt era that the intellectuals achieved political power at the foot of the throne. Then the Federal government seized control of money, credit and banking and introduced an irredeemable paper money currency. Next the Federal Reserve System, which was never, never to be a political instrument, became an engine of inflation, and the New Deal Treasury perfected a method of converting public debt into dollars



— a process now called the “monetization of the debt.”

By this chain of events a revolution was brought to pass, almost unawares. Many people are still dim about it. The revolution was that for the first time in our history the government was *free*. Formerly free government was understood to mean the government of a free people. But now that meaning changed. The government itself was free. Free from what? Free from the ancient limitations of money. It no longer had any money worries; it had no longer to fear a deficit because it could turn a deficit into money; the bigger the deficit the richer the government was. It had only to think billions, and behold! the billions were in the Treasury.

After that it was merely nostalgic to talk any more of controlling government or limiting its powers of self-aggrandizement. What had limited it before was the public purse, which the people filled. Now, by this new magic, it could fill its own purse, and scatter beneficence not only at home but throughout the world. If it had not possessed the wand that could command billions at will, the story of this country's relations to the rest of the world during the last twenty years might have been very different; and indeed one might almost say that for want of dollars World War II would have been impossible.

But if dollars made it possible, still dollars did not do it. The American mind had to be reconditioned for intervention a second time in the quarrels of the world.

After World War I American feeling soured on Europe. To President Wilson's impassioned question, “Shall we

break the heart of the world?” — the American people said, “Even so,” and refused to join the League of Nations. In the resolve to keep out of another world war they went so far as to scuttle their ancient tradition of neutral rights, and passed a neutrality law forbidding the sale of arms and ammunition to any combatant nation and — remembering the “Lusitania” — forbidding American citizens to travel abroad in wartime on any but neutral vessels.

Such was the state of feeling when in 1937, with the New Deal at a low ebb, President Roosevelt made his startling “quarantine speech” in Chicago, aimed at the German aggressor. This was a sign of release for the intellectuals, whose evangel of nationalism until then had been hindered by its unpopularity. They went to work for the second crusade. Both their convictions and their political ambitions harmonized perfectly with the new foreign policy of intervention.

In the orchestration of this policy the intellectuals had the drums, the percussion instruments and the brass; the Administration played the strings and the woodwinds. To the science of propaganda a new book was added. Never before in a free country, with no actually imposed forms of thought control, had the mind of a people been so successfully conditioned. In three years “isolationist” became a smear word, supposed to be politically fatal, and to say or think “America first” was treason to mankind. Nine months before Pearl Harbor the country, actually and illegally, was at war with Hitler.

## MORE MEDICINE FOR LESS

By OLIVER CARLSON

**I**S A socialized, government-operated national health service the only road to low-cost, effective and efficient medical care for our population? Is the medical profession unable or unwilling to cope with this problem?

Every wage earner and almost every salaried employee is acutely aware of the increased burden of medical care to himself and his family. The five-dollar office calls, the ten-dollar home calls, plus the high costs for X-rays, drugs and penicillin shots, outweigh the publicity and advertising blurbs of the AMA to “keep politics out of medicine.” The average man, though he may be mistrustful of politicians and fed up with the red tape of governmental bureaucracy, might choose state medicine because it appears to cost him less than private medicine.

To more than a hundred thousand people in and about Los Angeles the heated debates on the merits or dangers of socialized medicine are largely academic. Their medical needs have been solved by the unique 22-year-old Ross-Loos Medical Group. This highly successful organization is a pioneer in low-cost group medicine; but even more important is its ownership, structure and outlook.

Ross-Loos is *not* a charitable organization. It has *never* been assisted in any way by any philanthropy or Foundation. It has never asked for — nor has it ever received — financial or other aid from any unit of government, federal, state or local. It is not a cooperative.

The Ross-Loos Medical Group *was* and *is* privately owned and operated. From its modest beginnings in April 1929, when the founders, Doctors Clifford Loos and Donald E. Ross, had fewer than 400 doubtful subscribers, the medical group they founded has grown and prospered. Ross-Loos has made money for its owners by giving high-quality, low-cost medical care to those groups and individuals who *voluntarily* subscribed to its services.

Today this organization has more than 40,000 subscribers (who, with their dependents, number about 125,000 persons). There are 150 physicians and surgeons on its staff — of whom about 20 have been made partners in the enterprise. Some 3000 office or home calls are handled each day of the week. Nearly 5000 operations are performed each year. The Ross-Loos Medical Group owns a thirteen-story office building in downtown Los Angeles and a dozen smaller buildings in outlying communities. It operates its own pharmacy. It possesses some of the finest and most up-to-date medical and surgical equipment in all the West.

The hundred-fold growth of Ross-Loos can not be attributed to high-powered publicity and advertising campaigns. *The organization has never spent a cent for advertising in its entire history. It has never employed a public relations man or agency to sing its praises.* Quite the contrary, Doctors Ross and Loos have discouraged

newspaper and magazine writers from telling the story of their organization, because they felt it wasn't ethical to court publicity.

Certainly the charge can not be made that the spectacular increase of Ross-Loos subscribers was due to pressure imposed by governmental agencies, labor unions, employers' organizations or other groups. True, many groups such as teachers, firemen and policemen belong, but no member of any group can be forced to become a subscriber. No subscriber is compelled to belong for any stated time. He can drop out whenever he pleases, and without having to make any explanation of his decision to anyone.

**The only way to account for the continued growth of Ross-Loos is — satisfied subscribers.** By word of mouth, they told their friends and neighbors about it, thus recruiting new subscribers. The Ross-Loos Medical Group has succeeded precisely because it has been able to give more and better medical services — and at a lower rate — than could private doctors and clinics.

When I subscribed to the Ross-Loos service nearly fourteen years ago it cost me \$2.50 per month. Today I am paying \$4 per month. For this monthly fee I am entitled to complete medical and surgical care, including hospitalization. I can make as many office calls as I desire without additional charge. When I am bedridden or otherwise incapacitated from making an office call, I can get home calls at any hour of the day or night without extra charge. All prescribed medicines, drugs and dressings are supplied to me without additional payment. I need pay nothing extra for laboratory tests, X-ray examinations, physiotherapy treatments, eye examinations, or ambulance service to a distance of 15 miles. In short, for my \$4 per month I can have anything from a sore throat or a broken toe to a brain tumor treated by the medical group.

My dependents — that is, my wife and children and any other relative who lives with me — get the same services at greatly reduced rates. An office call costs them \$1.25; a home call (daytime) \$2, and (night) \$2.50. Minor operations, such as a tonsilectomy, cost them not over \$20. A confinement case, including delivery as well as prenatal and postnatal care, costs \$50. These fees are so reasonable that I try to have myself and my dependents looked after at the first signs of illness — not to wait till we are seriously ill. Furthermore, Ross-Loos encourages me to follow that practice — which brings me to another unique feature of this group.

The underlying philosophy of Ross-Loos differs fundamentally from that of almost every other medical insurance or group plan. Most of these, including that now in force in Great Britain, as well as the plan so ardently advocated by Social Security Administrator Oscar Ewing and the Truman Administration, are based upon a fee-for-service to the doctor, who gets a fee each time he visits or is visited by a patient. It is, therefore, in the direct economic interest of the doctor to keep his patients coming back to him as often as possible. An overwhelming mass of testimony to substantiate this charge has been appearing in British newspapers and periodicals for the past two years.

The Ross-Loos system, on the other hand, may be said to be based upon the old Chinese system; a doctor is paid

as long as his patients are well. In other words, the emphasis at Ross-Loos is on *preventive medicine*, with every doctor on the alert to make sure that infections and diseases are treated at their outset. *The continued good health of the patient is of paramount importance to the continued existence of the group.* This has been achieved by paying every doctor an annual salary, plus a bonus at each year's end. Each member of the Ross-Loos medical staff is encouraged to probe for hidden disorders or physical weaknesses which might bring them on. Where general practitioners on the staff are uncertain of diagnosis, they immediately send their patients to the specialists for observation. And subscribers are urged to make use of the full facilities of the organization at all times. In actual practice this has paid off in better health for the subscribers and in bigger salaries and bonuses for the medical staff.

There is no limit to the number or kind of treatments a patient may request. "By seeing the patient freely at his request, even for minor conditions," says Dr. Ross, "we are saved the expense, and the patient is saved the hazard, of serious illness."

All of the doctors at Ross-Loos with whom I have spoken insist that the group does not have more than its share of neurasthenics. Subscribers are urged to seek medical attention whenever necessary, but not to abuse the privileges of membership. After all, they pay for their services, and if an undue proportion of them were to take up the time of the staff for unnecessary calls, the monthly fee from all subscribers would have to be increased.

**There is nothing of the public clinic** about a Ross-Loos medical center. Offices are spotlessly clean. Nurses and attendants are courteous and efficient. All waiting rooms and offices have been painted in soft, harmonious colors, and are comfortably furnished. Procedures, too, have been streamlined so that patients need wait but a short time to see a doctor.

The renowned Dr. Siegrist of Johns Hopkins University declared after a careful survey of Ross-Loos, "If I were president of a life insurance company, I would not hesitate to grant [Ross-Loos] subscribers special rates." The organization, he found, had been almost spectacularly successful in cutting down illness among its subscribers. When he learned that almost every member of the Los Angeles Police Department was affiliated with Ross-Loos, Dr. Siegrist wrote: "I am convinced that a policeman in Los Angeles has more and better care than many a millionaire." The Ross-Loos organization, from its inception, has insisted that all subscribers pay the same monthly fee and get the same service, irrespective of income.

For many years the Ross-Loos Medical Group did not accept individual memberships because of the additional expense involved in bookkeeping. But for the past ten years individuals have been accepted. Their monthly fee is slightly more than that of group members, to make up for the additional overhead involved. Subscribers' fees are paid in advance, usually on a quarterly basis, to someone designated by the group with which the subscriber is affiliated. That person (or committee) then conducts all affairs for the group with the business office of Ross-Loos. Many of these groups number only a score or so of subscribers; others run into the thousands.



Because the organization is privately owned and operated, it must be efficient in order to survive. It can not pass on to the general taxpayer, the Community Chest, a labor union, a big business corporation, or a philanthropic foundation any deficit it might incur. Ross-Loos must pay its way, all the way, all the time. Hence it can not afford to become a haven for broken down doctors, careless nurses, and inefficient clerical or technical help. On the contrary, its continued existence and success depend upon a streamlined organization, with a competent as well as courteous staff.

Every new subscriber to Ross-Loos is told in the small information brochure given him when he has been accepted for membership:

The entire staff wishes you as a subscriber to use this service freely, and it is one of the aims that the sacred relationship between patient and doctor be at all times respected and maintained. When you become a patient you will be considered as an individual needing medical aid; you are a paid private patient of your doctor and are never considered in any other light. If for any reason a patient is not entirely satisfied with the doctor in attendance on his case, he may have another doctor assigned by merely requesting so of any of the attendants.

Thus, the Ross-Loos Medical Group is highly sensitive to the emotional and psychological responses of its subscribers. Members of its staff whose personality traits set up emotional barriers or hostility in its patients must either change their ways or get other jobs.

Of course, there are some subscribers who grumble about the services rendered. Others drop out. But from the survey I made I was surprised to find the percentage of drop-outs extremely small. On the other hand, almost every subscriber with whom I spoke said the service had saved his family money. "I've got four kids and a wife to worry about," said one man. "Doctors' bills every winter and spring used to drive me nuts, but that's one problem Ross-Loos solved for me."

Another remarked: "Ross-Loos has saved me so much in medical and hospital bills that if we never got another bit of service for the next ten years, we would still be ahead financially."

When I asked Dr. Ross why his medical group had not expanded beyond Los Angeles, he explained that he and his partners were opposed to it. Close supervision would be impossible. The intimate relationship between doctor and patient would be lost. Bigness in itself, he thought, might turn out to be a handicap. But both Doctors Ross and Loos insist that what they have achieved in Los Angeles can be duplicated anywhere else in the country.

These two pioneers had to wage a long struggle with their more conservative colleagues of the American Medical Association to convince them that group medicine the Ross-Loos way is a bulwark to perpetuate and strengthen private practice against the encroachments of state control and compulsory health insurance.

The Ross-Loos system has succeeded precisely because it has been able to give the average family more medical service for less money, and the average doctor better equipment and more money for fewer hours of work. And that is why, to the more than 100,000 people in greater Los Angeles who are benefited by the system, the arguments about socialized medicine seem unrealistic and unnecessary.

## THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID

I have been tempted to go to court and have my last name changed in protest over the way Cousin Harry is making such a mess of our country.

ROLLAND TRUMAN, attorney and distant cousin of the President, quoted in the *Los Angeles Herald Express*, January 24, 1951

The most urgent problem for the British Commonwealth was to persuade America to place limits on MacArthur.

PROF. W. MACMAHON of Australia in a broadcast reported by the *Baltimore Sun*, March 30, 1951

The President asked me to get a lawyer to consult with him over the wording of the Polish boundary statement. I called Alger Hiss. . . .

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, "Roosevelt and the Russians," 1949

For three long years I have been going up and down this country preaching that government . . . costs too much. I shall not stop that preaching.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, Speech of Acceptance, July 2, 1932

The greatness of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at Teheran was shown in the fact that they all operated on the higher level of statesmanship which searches for and finds the common interest which can be advanced by joint action, without any suspicion arising that one is trying to gain advantage at the expense of the other.

EARL BROWDER, "Teheran," 1944

The truth is that, despite the vicious Hitlerisms of Hearst and of the Patterson-McCormick newspaper axis, there are many things of which the Soviet Union has reason to be proud. In certain respects we could do well to learn from Russia; yes, even to imitate Russia. . . . I do not see what possible cause for an embroilment there could be between the United States and the Soviet Union after the present war.

HAROLD L. ICKES, then Secretary of the Interior, addressing the Congress of American-Soviet Friendship, November 1943.

I give the people in Peiping credit for being intelligent enough to see what is happening to them . . . since there is nothing in it for them, I don't see why [the Chinese Communists] should yield to what is undoubtedly pressures from the Communist movement to get into this Korean row.

DEAN ACHESON, as quoted in the *New York Times*, September 11, 1950

The Freeman invites contributions to this column, and will pay \$2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged.

THE EDITORS



# EPU—OR HONEST MONEY?

By WALTER SULZBACH

THE European Recovery Program is slowly fading out. More or less it has been merged with the European rearmament program and for obvious reasons the latter has superseded the problems of two years ago. Because world conditions have deteriorated so badly since the time it was launched, we shall never know how far the Marshall Plan has really succeeded or failed. But the widespread assumption that it has been a huge success should be accepted with caution.

It is true that the beneficiaries of ECA have scored great economic gains since 1948. But all countries recover at all times when war gives way to peaceful reconstruction. The countries that have received no Marshall help have also recovered; and any individual or country which is favored with grants that need not be paid back will of course be better off than if it had had to draw merely on its own resources. During the past few years France has spent as much on her campaign in Indo-China as she has received from the United States. It stands to reason that if France had not received Marshall help and had not been involved in Asia, she would be as well off as she actually is.

One thing is certain: If the international scene had not deteriorated the European economy would have faced new difficulties at the end of the Marshall Plan in 1952. For Marshall help was given without being made dependent on promises of the beneficiaries to remove their current restrictions and make their moneys convertible. Consequently, trade among the several European countries as well as with the dollar area has made very little progress even though more goods have everywhere been produced and consumed. Inflation and unbalanced budgets have been ubiquitous; and the trend toward autarchy, once the results of the various devaluations had been consummated, would have set in anew.

As a consequence of the reluctance of the majority of the Marshall Plan beneficiaries to face realities and make their currencies convertible, and of our own lenience in that regard, Europe has drifted more and more into "bilateral" trade. What does that mean? A British exporter will sell goods to Greece without misgivings if he can be certain that his Greek customer is able to use drachmas for buying sterling. If the Greek is forbidden to purchase foreign exchange, the British government will see to it that Greece shall receive only as many goods from Britain as British importers are ready to buy in Greece. That is "bilateralism." Where it prevails international trade decays, for complicated arrangements between one country and another can never achieve the volume of trade that emerges under "multilateralism," the system under which private businessmen everywhere trade freely with each other and the governments do not enter the picture at all.

People have almost forgotten how international trade functioned before the first World War and to a large

extent before the great depression of the 1930s. Merchants sold their goods to merchants in other countries. Whether a Greek or a Chinese had to pay a small or a large sum in his own money when he bought dollars or sterling was a problem of no concern to the American or British exporter, as long as the importers were certain to get enough foreign currency to pay for what they bought. The Greek or the Chinese, on his part, did not care whether domestic money was "hard" or "soft," as long as he felt that he could dispose of the imported goods at a profit.

Other obstacles to the flow of goods across frontiers recently have been import quotas and high tariffs.

The European Payments Union (EPU) which began its activities on July 1, 1950, was conceived for the purpose of replacing bilateral with multilateral trade among countries with currency restrictions. The idea was that each country should be concerned with its net surplus or deficit with the group as a whole, instead of with its several bilateral positions. At the same time, trade should be generally liberalized and quotas reduced. Actually, 60 per cent of prevailing import restrictions have been eliminated.

It is difficult to explain in clear language how the EPU works, for, to quote the *Economist*, the subject "is hard on the reader, but it is hard, too, on the financial journalist and the government official."

Only Central Banks deal with the EPU. The latter keeps its books in an accounting unit which is defined in gold. Each accounting unit is the equivalent of one U. S. dollar. The EPU accepts the currencies of its members at their official values. Whatever they may fetch on the black market, as far as the EPU is concerned the British pound is worth \$2.80 and 350 French francs are worth one dollar.

European exporters (acting through their respective Central Banks) acquire their claims not against European importers but against the EPU, which on its part becomes the creditor of the importing countries. The limit of each country's obligation to lend to the EPU, and of its right to receive credit from it, is set by its "quota." On the basis of the intra-European trade of 1948 all the participating countries together received an allocation of \$3,950 millions. Of these 8.1 per cent were given to Germany, 13.2 per cent to France, 26.9 per cent to the sterling area, etc.

At a certain point the debtors are compelled to honor a part of their obligations in gold, and the creditors are entitled to receive gold. The higher the debt, the higher the percentage to be paid in gold.

A careful analyst of this scheme could have predicted that the following was bound to happen: Careless importers would overdraw their quotas. The countries that have thrived on exports to these importers would have to curtail their production. A new measure of insecurity

would be introduced into intra-European trade. And, as the EPU approached the time for its liquidation (in 1952 or later), its members would be faced with an additional problem. In the case of liquidation every creditor country will receive its proportionate share of the EPU's then outstanding claims and will have to make its own arrangements with its debtors. At that time soft rather than hard currency countries, such as Belgium, will be its debtors. Consequently the creditors will incur precisely that kind of loss against which they had protected themselves by import quotas and bilateralism before the EPU came into being.

Now this is exactly what is already happening. Western Germany, the most important continental member of the EPU, has exhausted not only its original credit of \$320,000,000 but an additional credit of \$120,000,000 as well. The Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Turkey and Norway are faced with difficulties since they find it hard to replace their German market with other markets; and if they do not succeed they will have to limit their imports. As a result the Marshall Plan countries have decided to take a number of emergency measures, among which the following figure:

It is recommended that the creditor countries limit their exports to Germany as far as they entail payments before June 1.

A committee shall decide the distribution among the member countries of the purchases the Germans shall make before June 1. The Netherlands and the other countries already named shall be favored. The Germans will be asked to prepare for a curtailed import program after

June 1. The net creditor members of the EPU will be urged to buy from Germany as much as before, while selling less to her.

The Germans will be permitted to bring their import quotas back to where they were in the first place.

Into such an impasse has the EPU run only nine months after it was started. It would be hard to think of more arbitrary governmental curtailments of international trade than the ones now being introduced. It is governmental planning at its worst.

In view of the threat of another world war, the conflict in Korea and our vast rearmament program, whatever happens to the Marshall Plan and the European Payments Union may not appear to be very important. Possibly it is not. But the *lesson* to be drawn from the EPU story is as significant now as it will be in the future.

Freely convertible currencies and multilateral free trade are a boon. Currency restrictions and bilateralism are bad. Multilateralism simply can not be achieved as long as the elimination of currency restrictions is considered taboo. If bilateralism is abolished under conditions other than economic freedom, drawbacks of a different sort will emerge. What happened to Germany under the EPU may happen to other countries.

Where international trade is hampered by arbitrary planning, nothing less than the return to free enterprise will put it back on its feet. No scheme that may be concocted, be it ever so complicated, can do the job. There is only one sound device: the reestablishment of honest currencies and enough laissez-faire to allow businessmen in every country to work out their own salvation.

## STALIN, MASTER LINGUIST

By ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI

**L**AST YEAR linguistics and Slavistics in the Soviet Union suddenly took an unexpected turn. In April there appeared in *Voprosy Filosofii* a report about the great commemoration of the fifteenth anniversary of the death of Marr, who "created the new science of language, based on Marxist-Leninist methodology, . . . the only scientific linguistics." But on May 9 *Pravda's* annihilating criticism of Marr by Professor Chikobava opened a "linguistic discussion."

Soviet scholars, fearing a "provocation" and remembering the Lysenko "biological discussion," were very cautious in expressing their opinions until the sensational climax: On June 20 Stalin joined the linguistic ranks and himself revoked Marr's theory. He ended his article not with a critique but with a public castigation of Soviet scholars, unsurpassed in arrogance, making those whom he had forced to glorify Marr for two decades responsible for the sad state of Soviet linguistics. He said "It is my belief that the sooner our linguistics gets rid of Marr's mistakes, the sooner it can be led out of the crisis in which it now finds itself."

Any student of Soviet life is struck by the haste expressed in Stalin's lines — "the sooner . . . the sooner." What are the real reasons for this haste to revoke Marr? That they must have been extraordinarily urgent is

proved by the participation of Stalin himself in the discussion, and by his extraordinary brutality in discarding Marr, who for many years had acted in Stalin's name in linguistics. After the "universal genius" had laid down the new party line, the discussion was virtually ended. All articles appearing later are mere sycophantic hallelujahs to Stalin, who "opened by his article a new page in Soviet and world linguistics."

The American press was completely unable to explain why Marr's theory had been revoked. Communist propaganda has fabricated in this country such an effective "iron curtain" that one seldom finds an American linguist who has even heard of Marr's theory, enforced by terror for nearly a quarter of a century on linguists of all nationalities in the Soviet Union.

Let us review some of Marr's basic tenets which, in my opinion, played a decisive role in the revocation of his theory. Marr taught that all Indo-European linguistics, with their conception of an Indo-European family of languages and its original proto-language, was bourgeois nonsense. Just as there existed only one economic process in the entire world, so there existed also only a single language-creating process, because language is a superstructure on the economic base — like art, law,



etc. All the languages of the world, said Marr, developed from four original elements — Sal, Ber, Yon, Rosh — from which all words of all languages derived.

The classification of languages by bourgeois linguists into language family groups according to their relationship was also called "bourgeois nonsense, a fraud, racism"; there existed no Slavic, Romance or Germanic group, for all languages had to be classified according to Marr's "stage theory." That is a most important tenet, and here is Marr's tentative scheme:

1. Language systems of the primary period
  - a) Chinese
  - b) Living Middle and Far African languages
2. Language systems of the secondary period
  - a) Finno-Ugric
  - b) Turkic
  - c) Mongolian
3. Language systems of the tertiary period
  - a) Surviving Japhetic languages
  - b) Hamitic languages (Near and Far African)
4. Language systems of the quaternary period
  - a) Semitic languages
  - b) Prometheidan or so-called Indo-European languages

What brought about the various "stages?" They express major changes in productive technique which produced the "revolutionary jumps" of languages (Marr repudiated the "bourgeois" idea of evolution in language) from the primary into the following stages. But why have some languages not participated? According to Marr, they did not participate because they did not take part in the "over-all economic development"; they "got stuck"; they were "frozen" at a given stage, economically, socially, linguistically. These language systems are "obsolete"; their stagnation is final, according to Marr. One of his basic tenets is that from the very beginning of the development of language there existed only class-languages; national languages are also an invention of bourgeois linguistics. With the victory of the Communist revolution, there will be established a common economic basis the world over which will have a common language as superstructure.

**The application of this theory** had the following results: Inside the Soviet Union, linguistics faced complete bankruptcy. In the last twenty years the Soviet linguists have not produced a single outstanding work, and the largest Slavic nation, the Russian, is to this day without an etymological dictionary. The application of Marr's theory to non-Russian languages created the so-called "linguistic national oppositions" which had to be liquidated by the GPU and NKVD.

From Chikobava's critique we learn how tragic the problem of the younger generation of linguists in the Soviet Union appears to be. Only Marr's orthodox "pupils," usually half-illiterate party hooligans, could make a career; the talented younger generation created a kind of "linguistic underground" searching for ideas in the works of the pre-World War I scholars. Apparently a "linguistic opposition" was again growing and the party was confronted with the choice between "burning at the stake" all these works or revising its attitude toward Marr. Outside the Soviet Union Marr's etymologies and tenets were highly appreciated by Slavic scholars as the best humorous creations ever written.

The first reason for the revocation was that this state of affairs — inside, open bankruptcy; outside, ironical laughter which was also heard inside the Soviet Union — was very embarrassing for Stalin himself, because Marr continually wrote that he was "fulfilling the orders of the ingenious *Vozhd*," and besides, Marr was half Georgian. Thus the Russian "linguistic underground" in the present era of Russian "national bolshevism" chauvinistically blamed the Georgians for this bankruptcy of Russian philology; the more so since Marr's theory was for a rather long time enforced by another Georgian, Beria. That explains why Chikobava, also a Georgian, was ordered to start the discussion, and Stalin himself participated in it and made the Russian linguists scapegoats for this state of affairs. The Georgians are saving Russian linguistics since the Russians themselves proved incapable of applying Marxism-Leninism to linguistics!

However, Stalin's haste was not in my opinion due to these reasons. Rather, it was necessitated by the political and ideological implications of Marr's doctrines for Soviet Russia's cultural and political propaganda after its post-World War II expansion. Moscow's sphere of influence included East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria in Europe; China and Korea in Asia. A tremendous bulk of the population of our planet — some 800 millions — are forced to rotate around the Communist sun of the Kremlin. For these masses, Moscow has two ideologies.

The first is Pan-Slavism. The Soviet Union appears to the gullible West as the successful realization of "Slavic unity." Since 1941, and especially since World War II, Pan-Slavism has become a most important Soviet weapon, not only among Russia's Slavic neighbors but also in South America, Canada and especially in the United States. There are in this country special Pan-Slav organizations with many ramifications, listed by the Attorney General as "front" organizations for the subversion of the United States. Moscow included in its sphere of influence the leading European centers of Slavistics in Cracow, Prague and Sofia. Besides, Slavic Comparative and Indo-European Philology are taught by special chairs in the universities of all these satellite countries, even in Rumania and Hungary.

Now, how could Soviet Moscow conduct this Pan-Slavic propaganda, based on a special ethnic, cultural, linguistic kinship of the Slavic group, when the linguistic theory of Marr, approved by the Communist Party as Marxist-Leninist wisdom, did not recognize Slavic kinship at all? On the one hand, Moscow "realizes the Pan-Slav idea" and proclaims itself "the big brother and protector of Slavic nations inside the Soviet sphere and in the whole world." On the other hand the Marxist-Leninist linguistics of Marr denounce this Pan-Slav ideology of the Soviet government as the "humbug, racism and fraud of bourgeois linguistics," thus chopping off all four legs of the Soviet Pan-Slavic Trojan horse on which Soviet Moscow parades in the Slavic satellite states and hopes to reinvade Yugoslavia.

And who is defending the Soviet government against its own Marr's Marxist-Leninist linguistics by teaching that a Slavic group really exists and Marr's linguistics are humbug? The "bourgeois linguists" outside the Soviet Union! A real "show for the gods" — a tragi-

comic situation confronting the "universal genius" with an embarrassing dilemma. Either he must liquidate all centers of Slavistics inside the Soviet sphere, and with them Pan-Slavism, or he must liquidate Marr's theory.

The second idea with which Moscow leads the masses is that of the Communist world revolution for the "establishment of the World Soviet Union." The Soviet Union has, it maintains, solved the "national problem once and forever" through the "absolute equality of all nations, languages, cultures" in the Soviet Union. "Join us — do not miss the bus! Every nation outside the Soviet Union is invited!"

At the same time Marr's theory of stages introduced a virtual hierarchy among the nations of the Soviet Union and the world, denouncing the very idea of equality. What nation likes to learn from Soviet linguistics that its language is "backward, obsolete, frozen, without any hope of future development," and virtually sentenced to death? What non-Russian Communist likes to have his own mother tongue and his national feelings insulted in this way by Soviet linguistics?

Thus, inside the Soviet Union all the non-Indo-European languages were denounced by Marr as "obsolete, backward language systems." The Finno-Ugric, Turkic and Mongolian languages were even classed as systems of the secondary period, surviving fossils! Thus insulted were the Karelo-Finns, the Uzbeks, the Kazakhs, the Azerbaijanians, the Kirgizes, the Turkomen, the Estonians, all having their own "national republics"; and also the rest of the non-Russian peoples forcibly included in the Russian Federative Socialist Republic and enjoying "national republics" (the Tatars, Bashkirs, Buryat-Mongolians, Komis, Maris, Mordovians, Chuvashes, Yakuts, etc.).

We learn that the Russian Communist Party had to deal with a growing undercurrent of "national linguistic opposition" to Moscow because Marr's stage theory represented an officially approved discrimination against the mother tongues of these non-Russian peoples. Marr's stage theory established "master-race languages," and doomed the "backward obsolete languages" to die out. Thus the Marxist-Leninist teaching of language established, in effect, "Jim Crow" compartments for all non-Indo-European and Semitic languages, according to the language stage — like the discrimination on the basis of color in some Southern American states. After the rebellion of Tito, the Communist Party nervously investigated the question: Does not Marr's theory provoke Titoism inside the USSR and its sphere of influence?

But the greatest embarrassment came after the victory of communism in China. The Chinese language, according to Marr, is at the very depths of backwardness and primitivism, the primary period, on a par with the language of the African Hottentots. The Chinese, whose ancestors created a great culture, philosophy and art while Europe was still in a deep sleep, must surely have regarded this classification as an extraordinary achievement of Soviet linguistics.

Thus Marr's theory became for Soviet political and cultural propaganda a real nuisance and constant embarrassment both inside and outside the Soviet Union. While it was hailed in every publication of the Soviet

Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party as Marxist-Leninist and "based on the method of dialectical and historical materialism," this theory in reality rendered Marx, Lenin, the Communist Party and the Soviet Academy of Sciences ridiculous in the eyes of any intelligent person.

China, in my opinion, forced the hasty and brutal posthumous liquidation of Marr by Stalin himself.

The third probable reason for Marr's liquidation was his formulation of the task of Soviet linguists and philologists in the current "world revolution." Marr thought their task was "to speed up by artificial means the unification of languages," first in the Soviet Union, then in the whole world. Every student of Soviet matters was aware that in the Soviet Union this represented a program of gradual "russification" of all non-Russian nationalities, conducted simultaneously with the elevation of the Russian language, "as the language of Lenin and Stalin" and "attained socialism," to the dignity of the "international language of the world proletariat." This attempt of Marr to degrade linguists and philologists of all non-Russian languages to the level of "russifiers" and killers of their mother tongues, created in the Soviet Union from 1928–1939 a deep national opposition which resulted in the liquidation of many thousands of scholars, teachers and writers of all non-Russian nationalities.

After World War II whole peoples and their republics were liquidated because this "russification" had created such a hatred of Moscow that the population sympathized with the Germans. Thus were liquidated the Kalmyck, the Chechen-Ingush, the Crimean Tatar republics. The Communist Party understood the roots of these national oppositions and traced them to Marr's theory. Consequently, the Party asked itself: Can we afford, in the present international situation, such purges of linguistic oppositions in the satellite countries? Does not Marr's theory everywhere foster and stimulate anti-Russian nationalism among the satellites?

Finally, we may be sure that the Communist Party clearly realized what a deadly ideological weapon Marr's theory could be if used by the Western democracies in the war of ideas. Moscow remembers the echoes of the 1936 Promethean Linguistic Congress in Warsaw of the exiled scholars and linguists of the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union. And could the Soviets be really uninformed of the fact that in February 1950, I, as president of this Congress, and my American friends as members of the MLA, asked the General Secretary to organize a special section where the displaced scholars of the Ukraine and Byelo-Ruthenia could present Marr's monstrosity to American linguists and expose Soviet linguistics to scientific evaluation and hilarity?

Summing up the reasons for the revocation of Marr's theory by Stalin himself, we are sure that the decisive reason was the urgent need of a "new linguistic atmosphere" inside the Soviet Union, in the satellite countries and outside the Soviet Union. This new "linguistic atmosphere" must lessen the resentment of the "national oppositions among the non-Russian nationalities" against Moscow in its whole sphere of influence. In my opinion, the revocation is a purely tactical propaganda measure in the ideological preparation for World War III.



# CAN YOU USE MAGNA CHARTA?

By GEORGE WINDER

**T**HERE IS a radio personality we greatly enjoy in England. He is an old West Country farmer named Ralph Whiteman. He appears in the BBC's very best quiz program, together with three or four highly intellectual persons who answer questions concerned with life, philosophy, history, and politics.

It is distinctly a brilliant idea to place Ralph in such company, for it is amazing how frequently his slow West Country drawl steals the show, and brings the flight of his companions' intellectual subtleties suddenly to earth.

An excellent example occurred on a recent evening when someone asked if it would not be a good idea to present to the American people the ancient copy of Magna Charta, now in Salisbury Cathedral, as a token of our gratitude for Marshall Aid. Among the intellectuals there was a divergence of opinion. One or two welcomed the idea, while those of leftward tendencies were not so sure.

Ralph Whiteman spoke last, and his slow drawl settled the argument.

"Why not?" he said. "It may be of some use to the Americans. We certainly have no use for it here. Not any more!"

The point got home to the studio audience, for it realized well enough that many of the principles embodied in Magna Charta, upon which British and also American freedom is founded, no longer apply in Great Britain. We may still own the parchment Charter, but its spirit has escaped us. Perhaps it survives today in America — just one more refugee from Europe!

The principles expressed in Magna Charta were, not long ago, the cornerstone of the study of history for the British boy. They were drilled into him by his teacher in the hope of making him a better citizen. It would be rather embarrassing for any school teacher to do so now, especially if one of those bright youths who love to ask questions happened to be in the class.

Magna Charta, signed by King John in 1213, did not constitute a revolution. It was rather a counter-revolution, a throwing off of state controls and pretensions which had increased out of all reason.

Stephen Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury, founded his support for the new Charter on rights attained in the past. Addressing an assembly of clerics and barons in an effort to stir their latent love of freedom, he said: "A certain charter of Henry I has been found, by means of which, if you choose, you may recover your long-lost liberties."

The great virtue of Magna Charta was that it recognized the rights of individuals. For that reason, it has survived in men's minds for more than seven hundred years. A generation ago its principles were as firmly established as when it was first signed at Runnymede. Men believed we might advance from Magna Charta by increas-

ing our liberties. No one thought we would ever go back from it.

But the Socialists of Great Britain, in the words of Ralph Whiteman, "have no use" for Magna Charta. Here are just three examples of the manner in which they ignore its covenants.

1. For generations an owner of land has had complete security in its title. If any adverse claims arose, he could always appeal to the King's Courts for protection.

Under the Socialist Agricultural Act of 1947, the Minister of Agriculture can take over any farm land which, in the opinion of a County Agricultural Committee, is badly farmed. Or he can take it over under another section of the Act, if he wishes to have it farmed in a different way. At present some forty smallholders in the County of Essex are threatened with the compulsory purchase of their land, for the sole reason that the Minister thinks that it could be more economically worked by one man as a large corn-growing farm. The forty men concerned have no right of appeal against the Minister's decision to an independent, traditionally-constituted Court of Law.

The only form of appeal which exists — and this only as the result of strong Conservative pressure at the time the Act was being debated in Parliament — is a strange quasi-judicial body called the Land Tribunal. This consists of three members, two of which are appointed by the Minister of Agriculture himself!

Without any set principles of law to guide it, this strangely-appointed Tribunal must decide whether the Minister's proposed confiscation — for, with the inadequate compensation always paid, that is the right name for it — shall proceed or not.

Yet Magna Charta laid it down 736 years ago that no free man shall be dispossessed of his property "unless by the lawful judgment of his equals, or by the law of the land." Until socialism came to Great Britain this had always meant a judgment by a jury in an independent Court, presided over by one of His Majesty's Judges.

2. Another article of the Charter provides that "All persons, except prisoners, outlaws, and enemies, shall be free to enter or leave the country in time of peace." Not long ago an Englishman could travel at will. If he visited the Continent, he did not even have to consult his banker beforehand, because an Englishman's check was always accepted by Europeans. Among the European nations, passports were required only for Russia, Turkey and Spain.

Today exchange controls completely circumscribe his right to leave the country, even when he has obtained a passport. Lately he has been able to obtain permission to visit the Continent provided he does not spend more than £75 on his trip. It is virtually impossible for him to visit America unless he can produce business reasons which satisfy the men in authority.

3. Article XLI of the Charter provides that "All mer-

chants shall have freedom to come and go, and to buy and sell in accordance with the ancient and right customs, except in time of war." Today merchants travel only with the permission of the bureaucrats employed by the Board of Trade. They can buy abroad only if they can persuade someone in the Board to allow them the necessary currency. If they sell abroad, they must hand over the money obtained to the government, and take in return British currency at a rate fixed by the state.

For the merchants of Great Britain to be so controlled is an extreme treason against British liberty, for a generation ago this freedom to trade was Britain's proudest boast, and was conceived to be not only the basis of her liberty but the very foundation of her prosperity and strength.

Magna Charta was the expression of a great upward surge towards freedom of an almost barbarian people. In this great document are expressed thoughts which helped to secure for Englishmen and Americans their freedom.

That ancient document which has lain so securely, and for so long, in the silent, decaying emptiness of Salisbury Cathedral should surely be transported to a people who still cherish its immortal spirit, of which it is the ancient, withering, slowly-failing body.

In the words of Archbishop Stephen Langton, it is a document "by means of which, if you choose, you may recover your long-lost liberties."

Well, as old Ralph Whiteman has said: "We certainly have no use for it. Not any more!"

Perhaps you have in America. Or have you?

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## LINES AND POINTS

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation seems to be the shortest distance from influence to affluence.

*Five-per-centers seem to have a new interest in Washington: Ten per cent.*

To judge from OPC appointments, it's an ill wind of inflation that doesn't blow the Democrats a lot of plums.

*Our foreign relations watchword seems to have become: "Handouts across the sea!"*

Military sanctions would involve withholding oil from the scamps of China.

*A fool and his signature on the Communist "peace" petition are soon started.*

Nothing fails like Kremlin forecasts of the collapse of the American economy.

*In recommending "taxes that hurt," President Truman inadvertently advertises that nothing new has been added.*

In Russia, cleanliness is next to impossible.

EDMUND J. KIEFER

## TO MAKE THE JARGON FIT THE CRIME

By CHARLES YALE HARRISON

RECENTLY one Friday evening, a young friend who is an elementary school teacher in New York informed me with mingled amusement and concern that he had transgressed one of the basic tenets of the New Program for Elementary Education.

It appeared that on this particular Friday his class had proved to be exceptionally unmanageable. All week long there seems to have been ample cause for considerable juvenile excitation. On Monday the class had been observed by the principal of the school, on Tuesday a group of newly appointed teachers dropped in to see how the New Program worked in actual practice, on Wednesday the District Superintendent honored the class with an unexpected visit, and on Thursday there was an atom-bomb safety drill. By Friday at two o'clock, an hour before the final bell, my friend's 36 little charges (if one may be permitted so archaic an expression) were almost completely out of hand. The permissive atmosphere in the classroom was climactic; the din was terrific. Exhausted and in desperation, he distributed 36 copies of a supplementary reader, and had the children read aloud in turn until the story was finished.

To the outsider, this action may appear to be innocuous enough, but in the eyes of the New York Sanhedrin of "progressive" education this is an offense so grave as almost to warrant turning the culprit over to the secular arm. For by having *all* the children read from the *same* book without regard to the varying conceptual faculties of his pupils, my young friend had been guilty of a heinous offense under the new dispensation. *He had created a teacher-dominated class!* Now it is true that by so doing he had restored order in his classroom and it is equally true that the children seemed to enjoy this novel, if reactionary, experiment in one of the language arts.

**All that is beside the point.** The pertinent fact remains that in a critical situation he had reverted to an outworn, discredited, traditional pedagogical method to achieve quiet in his classroom. (In the lexicon of so-called progressive education "traditional" is a dirty word.) Also, in confronting what was obviously a psychological problem, he had failed to employ something called "the mental hygiene approach." In short, my young friend had been guilty of practising undemocratic, if not police-state, methods.

The arcanum of the New Program calls for classroom work to be done by groups and committees of children. Under the benign and cooperative eye of our modern Pestalozzis and Froebels, male and female, the little dears work out their own programs, projects, and study objectives. As a consequence, the teacher in the "progressive" system has lost the last vestige of any authority he ever had. He is a guide, a counsellor, an amateur psychologist, a parliamentarian, a parental surrogate — anything but a teacher.

As might be expected, the democratic committee system in elementary classrooms, as on loftier levels, sometimes leads to ludicrous situations. For example, a



fourth grade science committee, one day late in June, was debating what the freezing point was according to the Fahrenheit scale; some children held that it was thirty-two degrees while others contended that it was zero. At an impasse, the youngster acting as chairman broke the deadlock by announcing: "All right, then, let's vote on it."

Here, surely, was the democratic process in full sway. The question was put and the zeros won the day, as they sometimes do even in more august assemblies. If the teacher, doubtless an unreconstructed traditionalist, had not resorted to prompt, authoritarian and effective remedial action, a dozen New York youngsters would have continued under the temporary delusion, established by classroom parliamentary fiat, that zero on the Fahrenheit scale was the point of freezing.

Of course, occasionally a committee of children may arrive at a startling, highly original and perceptive conclusion, as in the case of a nine-year-old chairman of a committee on interracial brotherhood who was asked for his definition of tolerance. Rising, the youngster declared in ringing tones: "Tolerance means that you have to love the guy you really hate," thus sustaining a widely held belief that brotherly love can not be legislated.

But I observe that I am wandering; therefore *revenons à nos moutons*. After my young friend had confessed the nature of his crime against "progressive" education, I hastened to assure him that there was a way of justifying his action. I remarked that in modern education form is everything; that between a "progressive" method and a traditional one there is sometimes nothing more than the thickness of a brief, scholarly paper on some aspect of the subject. The ideal outline for such a thesis, not more than a page or two in length, should, quite naturally, contain as much current jargon, cant and gobbledegook as possible. I added that it should also be spangled with references to recent authorities and if none could be found — why, what could be more delightful than inventing a few? Would I, my young friend asked, be good enough to prepare such a paper, since he feared he lacked the requisite literary skill. I replied that I would be happy to accommodate him. A few days later I sent him the outline, the text of which follows:

#### What Is Group Adhesion?

Group adhesion is that form of curricular activity which promotes, fosters and strengthens the child's sense of communal identification. Modern classroom procedures, particularly as stressed in the New Program for Elementary Education, quite properly call for less regimentation and a greater exercise of individual initiative. At this juncture it is necessary to caution the unwary against confusing individual initiative with such repudiated concepts as rugged individualism or unrestrained free enterprise (Lerner). Work by small committees and groups is in essence preparation for our future citizens' participation in the work of our free, democratic society.

However, when they are applied mechanically, and carried to excess without regard to the latest findings of modern pedagogy and psychology, committee and group work may result in emotional isolation (MacDonald). This is especially noticeable at the end of the school day and particularly between two and three o'clock when emotional tension is at its highest and when "the erg of

concentration" (Fuchs) or the span of attention, as it was once mistakenly called, is at its lowest.

Professor Albert K. Landsteiner in his monumental work, "Modern Education and Group Adhesion" (Phoenix House, 658 pp., \$7.50) points out that emotional fatigue brought on as a result of a saturation of committee and group work can best be channelized by a pedagogical application of group adhesion which, in turn, results in a restoration of the "oceanic feeling." (Ludwig Koestler defines the oceanic feeling as an affective identification with socially acceptable symbols: sea, mother, teacher, authority, the group, the community, society.)

Group adhesion is achieved by merging individual committees and groups into a larger community project where individual tension is relieved (or sublimated) through participation in the work of the largest democratic unit — the class. For example, at two o'clock on Friday afternoon when "the neurosis of excessive individualism" (Harrison) is at its height and when it is most likely to manifest itself in unrestrained asocial behavior, the modern pedagogue, applying Landsteiner's theory of group adhesion, will distribute to *all* members of *all* groups and committees comprising the class copies of one and the *same* reader. Each child, in turn, reads a paragraph aloud until the story is finished or until the three o'clock bell rings, *whichever comes first!*

At first glance, this theory may seem to advocate a reversion to the discarded method of regimented reading, but so to regard this activity is to view modern psychopedagogical methods in a mechanistic and uncritical manner. After a day of committee and group functioning, the child's personality has a tendency toward "ego separatism." Ego separatism, according to Smythe who coined the expression, is a neurotic emotional state caused by the isolation of the individual from the larger community. In children it manifests itself in anarchic behavior as a psychological defense mechanism.

The syndrome of ego separatism frequently is expressed in shouting, laughing, kicking, biting and other anti-social manifestations. Reading in rotation and from the same book, an activity in which the *entire* community (class) is involved, fosters the sense of identification with the largest group and thus practiced is equivalent to what is known in democratic parliamentary procedure (Roberts) as "the committee of the whole." When concretized on the theoretical level and implemented with painstaking care on the classroom level, it will be seen that group adhesion can only result in more emotionally secure children living in a free, democratic society.

Of course, in less technical language and in discussing group adhesion before lay organizations such as Parent-Teacher groups, it may simply, in the interest of brevity, be called *readin'*.

#### EQUATION OF THE FORTNIGHT

$$\begin{array}{rcl} 4500 \text{ FBI Agents} & & \text{The American Police State} \\ 1,500,000 \text{ MVD Agents} & = & \text{The Russian Police State} \end{array}$$

BERTRAM D. WOLFE

## FROM OUR READERS

### The Appeal to Fear

Please accept my special congratulations on your editorials on fear in the current *Freeman* (June 4).

I am not young, I am not well, I am not especially courageous, but I have been seething with indignation over this fear propaganda. Our men in Korea don't have time to be afraid, do they?

So America is put on record as being afraid! There must be a reason for this — outside of the (probably) genuine, shameless fear these men in power have.

"Even if we win"! Is it too late, or totally impracticable, to impeach Truman and his cabal or in some way boot them out?

New York City

NINA A. ROYALL

### Our Stake in Freedom

Your paper is the clearest of all I've read and speaks my convictions as I can't. I am the mother of a talented son (a portrait painter of no mean ability) who was killed in France, January 21, 1944, and I know what a stake we all have in this our country. My Al was a First Lieutenant in the AAF, stationed in England. He was shot down over France on his first mission with his own crew.

My other son was under fire 26 days on Iwo Jima. Now do you see why I feel the need of a publication such as the *Freeman*?

I am just a mother alone, and can't do much, but realize we must wake up before it is too late. Else my son died in vain. Keep up the good work and accept the thanks of one American.

Mill Valley, California

P. P. BROWN

### Mr. Justice Holmes: Man and Myth

I have read Mr. Burton Rascoe's very interesting article on the movie involving the life of Mr. Justice Holmes (the *Freeman*, May 7).

Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, the father of the Justice, was truly a great man who naturally overshadowed his namesake. The son apparently resented his father's greatness and suffered from an inferiority complex in his own person. He was naturally susceptible to these flatterers who took him in hand and praised him endlessly, but they took pains to provide him with thoughts and utterances taken out of their bag of tricks. Felix Frankfurter apparently not only worked upon his mind but he provided him over the years with radical disciples, such as Alger Hiss, as his secretaries. Having seen these people at work and having a personal experience with the manner in which they try to build up or destroy, I am not surprised at all at this desperate attempt to create a myth out of a very ordinary man.

Pembroke, Massachusetts

GLEASON L. ARCHER

... So little did Holmes subscribe to the doctrines of a "totalitarian" state or to "might makes right," that in a vigorous dissent, he opposed the use of evidence obtained by Federal officers through illegal means, and

often spoke out for the rights of individuals against government. I happen to disagree with several of Holmes's ideas; also I think he was sometimes inconsistent in a big way, e.g., his espousal of individual initiative as against his acceptance (at times) of nineteenth-century "scientific" determinism (as to which he differed from the consistent position of William James, the friend of his young manhood). But the net result of his influence has been to promote the welfare of the individual, something you wisely cherish.

New York City

JEROME FRANK  
Circuit Judge  
U. S. Court of Appeals

I agree thoroughly with what Mr. Rascoe says about the movie. But I think he should direct his attack upon the extreme Holmes cult. His attack is as unfair to a great judge as are the extremists who operate in his name. Mr. Justice Holmes was in reaction from the extreme historical jurisprudence of the latter part of the nineteenth century. What he said about the doctrine of that school can easily be represented as an attack upon all law. The extreme so-called realists, whose realism is a boast rather than a description of their doctrine, have made an unwarranted appropriation of Holmes as their patron saint.

Los Angeles, California

ROSCOE POUND  
Dean Emeritus  
Harvard Law School

### The Bureaucrat's Prayer

You may be interested in the "Bureaucrat's Prayer," which recently appeared in the bulletin of the Grace Church of Savannah, Georgia:

The Government is my shepherd, I need not work. It alloweth me to lie down on good jobs; it leadeth me beside still factories. It destroyeth my initiative; it leadeth me in the paths of the parasite for politics' sake. Yea, though I walk through the valley of laziness and deficit spending, I shall fear no evil; its doles and its vote-getters, they comfort me. It prepareth an economic Utopia for me by appropriating the earnings of my grandchildren. It filleth my head with bologna; my inefficiency runneth over. Surely the Government shall care for me all of my life and I shall dwell in a fool's paradise forever.

New York City

ADELAIDE HERING

### England Pays to Do Without


I feel that Rene Kuhn's article "Words Instead of Butter" (the *Freeman*, May 7) was a very candid analysis of a trend which I felt in England last summer. The meat rationing was the subject of an article published in the *New Statesman and Nation* recently. The article was called "The Cost of Doing Without"; it is perhaps significant that it plastered the government, yet appeared in a socialist organ.

One figure I remember is that last year it actually cost Britain £14 million more to subsidize the butchers than it would have cost to buy the meat from the Argentine at the inflated price. I shall never forget the punch line of the article, which was a classic of British understatement. The final sentence read, "Perhaps the cost of doing without is becoming too great."

Cheshire, Connecticut

ROBERT RUSSELL





# A REVIEWER'S NOTEBOOK

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

For over a decade Arthur Bryant, brilliant English essayist and historian, has been writing books about the ordeals and the triumphs of his country in the period of the French revolutionary upheaval and the Napoleonic cycle of wars. Although he is not as penetrating as the great Italian historian, Guglielmo Ferrero, on the subject of war and peace in the age of Talleyrand and Metternich, he still makes entirely satisfactory reading. His "The Years of Endurance: 1793-1802," which appeared in the dark days of 1942, impressed me as far more understanding of the phenomenon of Hitlerism (a variant of Bonapartism) than most of the excited yawpings then appearing in the British or the American press. His "Years of Victory: 1802-1812," which came later, was entirely relevant to our own period of victory over the Axis.

Now comes the final volume of Mr. Bryant's trilogy, "The Age of Elegance: 1812-1822" (Harper, \$4.50). True to my expectations, I found it far more informative about our present predicament in a world that unfortunately includes Stalin than anything that can be culled from journals and books which presume to be covering the year 1951. Mr. Bryant may be writing about Wellington's 1808-1813 campaign in the Spanish peninsula, but his loving re-creation of an ancient story is closer to the day's headlines than a passel of columns, say, by the Alsops when they are in a mood to tailor their commentary to the need of protecting their pipeline to the office of Mr. Dean Acheson.

The main thing that stands out from Mr. Bryant's pages is the tremendous common sense exhibited by the British a century and a half ago. This common sense extended from their dietary habits to their appreciation of literature. An island people whose numbers could not match Napoleonic France, the British of 1800 had a problem on their hands that must seem startlingly familiar to the American reader in 1951. The British of 1800 had the best, indeed, the *only*, factory system in the world, which meant they could produce for war as well as for peace. But there was always the problem of the right allocation of a limited amount of energy. The British cabinet ministers solved the problem of energy-allocation by making the decision that the United States of 1951 must make: they did not attempt to pile a conscript mass army on top of a factory system that requires a free society for its proper articulation. The army the British of 1800 did raise was qualitatively excellent, but it was deliberately raised to function at the end of an overseas supply line that naturally required a heavy draft of the national energy on its own.

Since the national energy of Britain in 1800-1815 had to be stretched to cover manufacturing, transport, the pro-

tection of the seas and the strategic and tactical needs of battle *per se*, the British statesmen of Napoleonic times made a careful study of the efficient care and feeding of allies. They learned to waste no motions. Out of the proceeds of a nation's trade and manufacturing they subsidized guerrillas and local armies all around the fringes of the Napoleonic empire. The Russians, the Prussians, the Spanish, the Austrians, the Corsicans and the Netherlanders were all, at one time or another, in the pay of "perfidious Albion." Meanwhile the British made tremendous use of their navy to support troop action everywhere. They put their own limited army under Wellington into Portugal and Spain — an army that sometimes ran to 50,000 men. This army fought a chivvy-ing kind of war until 1812, its prime motive being to keep the Spanish guerrillas in action on Napoleon's southern flank. It was not until the Russians caught Napoleon in his over-extended lunge to Moscow in 1812 that the army of Wellington went over to the offensive. It had waited for years for its chance, and it closed in on its prey for all the world like the fox-hunters of the English shires that had bred some of its most efficient horsemen.

The British choice of 1800 did not have the benefit of modern "public relations" support. That was all to the good, inasmuch as the art of cultivating "public relations," when indulged by government, usually ends by perverting the common sense of the electorate. Unconfused by the presumed needs of high-power governmental press agency, the British ratiocination of 1800 far surpassed any thinking on war and peace that Americans in high place have been able to produce since 1945 — or 1935. Like the Americans of 1951, the British of 1800 were in the business of supporting a loose and shifting coalition. But mark this: the British made their subsidies of arms, money and food conditional on fighting performance. There were no Marshall plans for Prussia, for Austria, for Russia — the continental powers got money and arms only when they showed an eager willingness to use them to the common end of beating Bonaparte. It was a question of "no fight, no subsidy." The British of 1800 insisted on a "matching" policy.

This seemingly cold-blooded attitude caused many continental citizens to curse the British. But the England of 1800 didn't want necessarily to be loved; it wanted to prevail in the name of a just peace. A strange blend of humility and complete self-confidence, the average Britisher of 1800-15 did not care what his allies were saying of him as long as he felt justified in the sight of God. The long-term end of the British was to defeat tyranny abroad without undermining freedom at home. As Mr. Bryant puts it, it was a matter of maintaining "cohesion

without coercion, wealth without slavery, empire without militarism." This formula naturally provoked envy, irritation and charges of hypocrisy on the European continent, but the British statesmen of 1800-15 knew that military coalitions depend on self-interest properly exploited, not on love universally cultivated and applied. As long as the Russians, the Prussians, the Austrians and the Spanish had personal motives for fighting the French, it did not matter to an Englishman whether he was loved or not.

"The Age of Elegance" draws no parallels; it is simply an objective, fully-documented story of how a nation lived and fought and made peace in the years between 1812 and 1822. But the modern reader can hardly get past a paragraph without thinking of Korea, or Formosa, or Germany, or Turkey, or Iran. When Mr. Bryant speaks of the Spanish guerrillas in the mountains, the modern reader thinks of anti-Communist guerrilla activity in the hill country of southern China. If we had the

common sense of William Pitt and his disciples, we would be subsidizing those guerrillas — and establishing aviation "drops" to give them the materials of resistance.

The modern parallel emerges despite everything from Mr. Bryant's treatment of the Congress of Vienna. Then, as now, the Western allies were troubled by the bear-hug "peace" tactics of a Muscovite collaborator. The Tsar Alexander, like Stalin, had an inexorable urge to push his "beneficent" control as far to the west as possible. Appalled at the prospect of Russian control of Poland and Russian "cooperation" with Prussia, Castlereagh of England and Metternich of Austria turned at once for help to the Frenchman Talleyrand, emissary of their defeated enemy. They made a deal with France to put restraint on their own wartime ally in the east. Reading about this quick postwar shift in national alignments in 1815, the reader can not help thinking of the need for a few modern Talleyrands in Germany and Japan. Would to heaven we knew who they are!

## BARBARA WARD'S BLINDNESS

By EUGENE LYONS

**Policy For the West**, by Barbara Ward. New York: Norton. \$3.75

Let me sum it up bluntly at the outset. Miss Barbara Ward's "Policy for the West" seems to me a prescription for political futility, economic self-bleeding and moral surrender. Except for the ritual condemnation of Soviet ideology and methods, the program she recommends for the West should be neatly to the taste of the masters of the Kremlin, for it contains no direct threat to their survival and even promises not to interfere with their system of power.

The applause from the press reviewing stands was still ringing in my ears when I began to read this much-touted volume. Having finished it, I found little trace of the "hope" and "inspiration" the reviewers purported to see in the Ward scheme. "Policy for the West" seemed to me a humanly callous book and, despite the lady's invocations to faith in freedom, suffused by a kind of calculating cynicism.

Nowhere in its 312 mellifluous pages — Miss Ward certainly can write — did I find a word of simple compassion for the tormented peoples of the Soviet sphere; nowhere even a prayer for their eventual release from captivity. Indeed, anyone in search of proof that Stalin's multitudinous victims are part of the human race, entitled to some of the freedoms and decencies and material comforts Miss Ward is eager to preserve for Anglo-Saxons and confer on lesser breeds not yet in the Soviet stockades, will not find it in her book.

She spares no phrase of sympathy for the Soviet populations, offers them no prospect of liberation, and thus reduces all the current talk of friendship for the Kremlin's subjects — all the implications of what is called psychological warfare — to gibberish. Were the Ward plan to fall into the hands of Hungarian or Polish

or Russian democrats within the Communist domain (and there are tens of millions of them), they could only regard it as a warning to abandon all hope and to rally, in utter despair, around their hated oppressors.

Miss Ward's program amounts to a cold-blooded preparation for a bargain with the Soviet tyranny, once we acquire positions of strength impressive enough to induce the Kremlin to begin bargaining. Her announced aim is to freeze the world in its present divided state — to perpetuate the totalitarian monstrosity as the price for salvaging the non-Soviet part of the globe. Mr. George Kennan, in his celebrated "X" article in *Foreign Affairs*, at any rate held out the hope that the Stalinist empire, if successfully "contained," might begin to disintegrate from within. Miss Ward is more hard-boiled or, as she probably would put it, more "realistic."

She offers only the despairing possibility that if the West makes itself supremely strong and supremely "good" (cleaning its own house, revitalizing its own democracy, raising living standards in backward areas, etc.) it *might* "deter the Soviets from further aggressions and persuade them to negotiate or at least to live as they did in the twenties and thirties, primarily concerned with their own affairs." As for making Soviet Russia disgorge any of its conquests, let alone relaxing the terrors and reducing the horrors in Russia itself — nothing so bold or decent seems to have entered into the lady's calculations.

Surely hers is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the containment illusion. Its aim, she underlines, "is not to drive the enemy to defeat but to secure a settlement with him." Acceptance of the communist regime in Russia and in all the satellite nations as a permanent affliction to be permanently endured and contained is the fundamental premise of the whole book. The one-third of mankind already under Kremlin duress is written off, condemned



to eternal servitude, without so much as a sigh of regret. In order that the reader may make no rash discounts of this tough position, Miss Ward explicitly consigns China and implicitly also Korea to the fenced-off world to be placated and contained.

If she is aware that there are alternative courses she fails to acknowledge them. At no point does she take cognizance of possible policies geared to recapture the initiative for the West, exploit the weaknesses and contradictions within the Soviet sphere, forge a united front with the Soviet peoples, and ultimately liberate them and ourselves from the Stalinist incubus.

Significantly, it does not occur to her to distinguish between the Kremlin and its unhappy subjects or, in any genuine sense, between the puppet regimes and their restive populations. Had she bothered, just once, to survey the historical landscape from the vantage point of the captive Czechs, Poles, Russians, etc., she might have been tempted to reappraise her "policy for the West." Whatever doubts there may be about the hostility of Russians to their dictatorship, there are none at all about the hostility of the satellite peoples to their Red masters. Whether those hostilities are translated into overt resistance depends, in decisive measure, upon the encouragement, understanding and support of the outside world. But these Miss Ward's blueprint rules out by definition. "Containment," as she describes it, comes close to incarceration, so far as Stalin's victims are concerned.

Before the war, Miss Ward argues, the Soviet Union did not constitute a threat, because the West was relatively stronger and would presumably have slapped down aggression. Therefore, "the Western task is . . . to secure conditions in which the Soviet Union is prepared to wait."

This slurs over the fact that even in the twenties and thirties Moscow was not exactly a passive waiter, as witnessed by its conquest of Outer Mongolia, Tannu Tuva and Central Asian principalities; the initial Soviet intervention in China; the undeclared war on Manchuria in 1929; the swipes at Sinkiang, Rumania and other regions. It ignores the debilitating indirect aggressions by Communist fifth columns in all countries. And, of course, it evades the other half of her own logic, which is that another and on the whole easier way to make the West relatively stronger again is to dedicate ourselves to making the Soviets weaker.

Even in its period of "waiting," the Kremlin spared no energies, resources and ingenuity to undermine and if possible overthrow the non-Soviet civilizations. It fomented civil wars, sowed confusions and alarms, subverted loyalties, subsidized revolutionary cadres everywhere beyond its own frontiers. Even if we compel negotiations and settlement, through heroic exertions and bankrupting expenditures of the kind Miss Ward outlines, such mischief is certain to continue. The Soviets are not famous for carrying out their bargains. But while the Kremlin continues to dig under the foundations of the free world, no Western action aimed frankly at weakening and ultimately overthrowing the Soviets has any place in Miss Ward's amazing blueprint.

The job of creating conditions in which the Kremlin might conceivably be "prepared to wait," as detailed in chapter after chapter, is certainly colossal. So colossal

that it would soak up our major resources and energies for generations, and at that would be waste effort, according to Miss Ward, unless the West chose to follow the specific Keynesian formulas of salvation on which she happens to be sold. Her policy for the West falls into two main categories: the development of military strength and the achievement of a long array of social and political reforms.

Militarily, we must hasten to create "an effective defense system in Europe and mobile forces along the Soviet perimeter," backed by all-out "plans held always in readiness for the total mobilization which would be necessary if the Russians, in folly or miscalculation, took the plunge into general war." The Western Powers

are faced with the problem of defending the gigantic periphery of the free world, knowing all the time that they, as defenders, can not pick the scene of action. Their only expedient is, therefore, to create small, highly armed police units which can be dispatched with sufficient speed to any point of conflict in time to reinforce the resistance of local forces.

In other words, she prescribes massive preparedness to fight endless Koreas at times and places *selected by the Soviet hierarchy*, while guaranteeing in advance that the growing Western strength would not be used to discommode the real aggressor in his home fortress. Her military advice is to limit ourselves forever to symptoms and ignore causes; to enable the Kremlin to fight an endless series of limited wars with puppet forces while conserving and building up its own forces.

#### She Needn't Apologize

At the political-social end, Miss Ward's program is so huge, exorbitant and controversial that I can not attempt to summarize it. "There are grave weaknesses and inconsistencies in Western society," she says, "and these, more than anything else, give the Communists their opportunity." There are "cracks and fissures" in our social setup. (Does she know any system in all mortal history without them?) We have sinned and are sinning against colonial peoples, against our minorities and underprivileged, against the underdeveloped nations. Hence, we must dedicate ourselves forthwith to atonement, universal justice and universal prosperity.

"Universal" perhaps overstates the case, since she is wholly indifferent to the suffering and injustice and penury in the Soviet third of the globe. Why Greece and Italy and the Philippines must be "saved," but not eastern Germany or Bulgaria or Tibet, remains unexplained. Miss Ward's zeal for freedom is strangely selective.

Many of her specific proposals for improving the Western world and imbuing it with idealistic purpose, unity, faith, etc., make sense. We are all against depressions, famines, disunity and sin. But to assert, as Miss Ward does repeatedly, that our "only hope" lies in this self-perfection makes defeatist nonsense. Human society being what it is, perfection will assuredly not be attained; her multifarious proposals will assuredly not be carried out in toto. Yet "containment" would in that case, by her own logic, be doomed to failure.

Miss Ward concedes that even in its present sorry state the Western segment is infinitely better and better off,

more democratic and humane and successful, than the Soviet segment. But apparently the immense differentials are still not great enough to immunize us against Communist subversion. At what remote point, precisely, the condition of immunity will be reached is not clear.

And how long must we devote ourselves to the assorted tasks, each of them gigantic, which add up to our "only hope" of inducing the Communists to wait? "The next twenty or thirty years — crucial years for containment" is one answer; "for a generation to come" is another. These, however, are the most optimistic variants. A less comforting answer is given on page 203:

The holding of the frontiers of freedom — which is the essence of defense policy under containment — may last as long as Britain's "Eastern Question" lasted. It may even have to endure as a permanent feature of our civilization — as the Roman frontier endured through hundreds of years.

### Why Share With Barbarians?

Such, incredible as it may sound out of its mellifluous context, are the "hope" and "inspiration" which appear to have evoked almost unanimous critical enthusiasm in press galleries where a muddled Acheson-style "liberalism" prevails. Almost unlimited sacrifices and effort and armanent for a generation, perhaps for centuries, which if successful will gain us — what? The Kremlin's blessed consent to negotiate a settlement for conserving the *status quo* of a world half-free, half-slave. Communist consent to being appeased and re-appeased, forever. The privilege of sharing this earth forever with a barbarian clique, without lifting a finger to help the enslaved millions or to retrieve any of the ground already lost to aggression.

Surely the Politburo, from its own viewpoint, could scarcely prescribe a more satisfactory program for the West. It would guarantee Soviet military initiative, siphon off maximum Western effort and economic vitality, without constituting a decisive menace to the Soviet system.

"This — the policy of containment — may make formidable calls upon Western resources and Western patience," Miss Ward agrees, "but in so far as it is given to us to see the future, it offers a chance and a hope of peace." Pessimism and futility have not been more abjectly attested in all the long debate on world affairs since the start of the cold war.

Fortunately the fault is with the author's mental astigmatism and moral apathy. The picture is not as hopeless as she assumes. We do not need to renounce all the leverages represented by tensions in the Soviet area; by the piled-up discontents and despairs of the captive peoples; by Titoist rumblings and guerrilla warfare and the mighty flood of fugitives from Stalinism; by the economic stupidities and moral depravities inherent in that congeries of police states. Having conceded that her "policy for the West" does not remove the continual possibility of a showdown war, Miss Ward is in no position to renounce all other policies on the cry that they might provoke war. That risk must be faced in a perspective of endless Koreas and police actions no less than in a policy for weakening the Soviets in concert with its tortured populations.

Miss Ward describes communism as "one of the most

tremendous fakes ever perpetrated on bewildered humanity," resting on doctrine "profoundly and terrifyingly reactionary." Instead of basing her analysis on this central truth, however, she counsels concentration in a guilt-conscious spirit on the "cracks and fissures" in the free world. We must throw away all the advantages of our existing superiority, she declares in effect, in a quixotic search for some super-superiority. Then, after a long, long while, we may be rewarded by the boon of co-existence with communism. Then we may be in a position to consign 800 million fellow-men to eternal damnation by formal agreement with their despots.

"The weakness of the phrase 'containment' is its negative and defensive ring," Miss Ward concedes. But she does not even try to show that the negative and defensive qualities are only in "the ring," not in the reality. The Romans lived in a much larger world, when their marches could be watched for centuries. Despite that they were finally overwhelmed by the barbarians. That ancient containment invoked by the book, let it be remembered, ended disastrously. Western containment, in a world shrunk to a neighborhood and in a time when events move with the speed of jet-planes and radar, will crumble in disaster not in centuries but, at most, in decades. The current barbarians can not and must not be contained — they must be eliminated.

## THE SYMPTOMATIC KEYNES

*The Life of John Maynard Keynes, by R. F. Harrod. New York: Harcourt, Brace. \$7.50*

As is customary with biographies, Professor Harrod's volume provides an abundance of information about insignificant happenings and uninteresting people who crossed the path of his subject. The whole of page 171, for instance, is devoted to the description of a lady who happened to be the niece of an authentic duke. We are told how she dressed, how and where she lived, what her eccentricities were and many other things. Perhaps the lady was really a very eminent woman, perhaps no less remarkable than Mathilde Wesendonck. But she missed her Richard Wagner, and her only claim to fame is that on July 2, 1914, she entertained the Prime Minister and John Maynard Keynes at a small dinner party.

Not only the social side of eating and drinking is amply dealt with, but also the business side. Keynes founded a theater in Cambridge and paid attention to the detail of its management. "Nothing was too trivial for him," says Professor Harrod.

By a happy and successful idea, a restaurant was attached to the theater, and I recall receiving a letter from him asking me to write a testimonial for a chef. . . . He was anxious to encourage expenditure upon wine in the restaurant rather than upon cocktails and spirits. . . . He gave an instruction that, instead of the usual addition of 50 per cent to the cost price, only 2s. 6d. should be added in the case of champagne, with the consequence that profits on that item actually rose!

Such small-talk would do for the many things Lord Keynes was and did besides being Keynes. He belonged to many groups and circles, to the University of Cambridge, to the Bloomsbury Bohemia of the last years preceding World War I, to the active friends of the theater



and the ballet. He was a "society" man and a collector. He wrote a noteworthy Treatise on Probability. He played a role in the Liberal Party. He spent a good many of his years as an official, as a government economist. As such he cooperated in the drafting of many ordinances and international conventions, the vast paper work that accompanies the decline of Western civilization, freedom and prosperity. None of these activities elevated him above the rank of the hosts registered in Who's Who and daily mentioned in the newspapers. But other questions remain: Was Keynes not perhaps more? Was he not a man who shaped the ideas and policies of his age? Was he not an historical character? Such are the problems a biography of Lord Keynes ought to deal with.

There are people who believe that the two books of Keynes that became best sellers — "The Economic Consequences of the Peace" (1920), and "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money" (1936) — decisively influenced the course of British policies and of world affairs. It is said that the first of these books inaugurated the anti-French and pro-German tendencies of Great Britain's "appeasement" policy which virtually encouraged the rise of Nazism, permitted Hitler to defy the essential clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and finally resulted in the outbreak of the Second World War. It is furthermore asserted that the second book generated the "Keynesian revolution" of economic policies. The abandonment of the gold standard and the adoption of outright inflationary or "expansionist" fiscal methods; the New Deal and the Fair Deal, the full-employment policy, the intensification of anti-importation measures and many other kindred ventures are ascribed to the "unorthodox" ideas propagated by Keynes. If these assertions are correct, Keynes appears as the most influential personality of our age, whether the effects of these policies are to be considered as beneficial or disastrous.

Because of limitations of space we must set aside the first of these two questions and concentrate upon the second. Keynes was definitely not the inaugurator of a new economic policy. The governments did not have to wait for his advice in order to learn that inflation is a handy means to fill the empty vaults of the treasury. The Keynesian policies were practised by governments and powerful political parties long before they were advocated by Keynes. Keynes's writings were enthusiastically received by people who found in them an apparently scientific justification for what they had already done for a long time in defying the teachings of economics.

For nothing was more contemptible in the eyes of the post-Victorian English than the ideas of laissez faire that had multiplied England's population and secured to the average Englishman the highest standard of living in Europe. Lords and commoners, divines and atheists, manufacturers and union members, Fabians and Colonel Blimps — all agreed in rejecting the "dismal science." They hated the theory according to which there was but one means toward the general improvement of peoples' material well-being, viz., to increase the per head quota of capital invested. They longed for short cuts to an earthly paradise: a protective tariff, a cheap money policy, the closed shop, doles and social security. They did not want to be told by the economists that it is the policy of the unions that creates unemployment as a lasting

mass phenomenon and that the periodical recurrence of crises is the inevitable outcome of the easy money policy. They knew better: all evils were caused by capitalism.

To such people the Keynesian slogans appealed strongly. Here they found what they were looking for. If demand lags, create "effective" demand by expanding credit! If there is unemployment, print more money! If you want to increase "the real national dividend of useful goods and service," then "dig holes in the ground paid for out of savings!" And, first of all, do not save, spend!

The triumph of Lord Keynes's last book, the "General Theory," was instantaneous. Although reasonable economists refuted his doctrines, it has become the gospel of the self-styled progressives all over the world. Today many universities simply teach Keynesianism. It is really paradoxical. Nobody can any longer fail to realize that what is needed most is more saving and capital accumulation and that the inflationary and expansionist policies are on the verge of complete breakdown. But the students are still taught the dangers of saving and the blessings of expansionism.

Lord Keynes had, as his biographer points out, "a very rare combination of gifts; his endowment in any one of them would by itself have made him a notable person." But politics and history are not concerned with the virtues Professor Harrod registers in his detailed catalogue. They ask: did he enrich mankind's treasure of ideas and did he influence the course of events? The answer to both questions is in the negative. The ideas he professed were untenable and, even so, not original. The books he wrote supported firmly established policies which would have gone on without this support. He was highly renowned, famous and popular in an age of decay and disintegration, but his writings were not the cause of these disasters; they were only symptoms.

LUDWIG VON MISES

## THE STORIED KING

*Life On the King Ranch, by Frank Goodwyn. New York: Crowell. \$5.00*

The storied King Ranch on the Gulf Coast of Texas has been a land of mystery for ninety-nine years. Stretching over nearly a million acres of flat, rich range, brush and sifting sands, it is so vast that as big a thing as a shining automobile can be lost on it for years.

Once a man drove a new car out on the ranch and got it stuck hopelessly in the sand. He walked to the nearest town and returned with a wrecker, and then he and half a dozen cowboys couldn't find the car; it wasn't seen again until a dozen years later when a man on a brush-ripping bulldozer bumped into it.

In the almost tropical climate, the brush grows about as rapidly as Jack's beanstalk. One day a cowboy saw a wrecked fighter plane, which had been missing a few years, resting among the upper branches of large mesquite trees. The plane was badly smashed, but the limbs of the trees were not scarred. Investigation revealed that the plane had crashed in a clearing and that the mesquite had grown up and lifted the airplane ten feet off the ground.

Despite publication of Mr. Goodwyn's interesting book, the King will continue to be a mystery empire,

especially in the eyes of curious Texans who have been raised on highly colored legends about the rancho old Captain King established in 1852. We find an odd puzzler in the book: Mr. Goodwyn has accomplished what he set out to do, but still he hasn't told the story of the King Ranch. Persons who yearn for the full, rich narrative of the empire of ruby-red cattle, spouting oil wells and Kentucky Derby-winning race hosses, such as Assault, are due disappointment when they realize that Mr. Goodwyn has related *his* life and experiences on the ranch — with a few allegories thrown in for good measure. The book is largely an autobiography, and, almost incidentally, Mr. Goodwyn gets in some of the main points of the vast King spread; these include the development of the Santa Gertrudis breed of beef cattle, the killing of predators, the raising of fine horses, the discovery of oil and a program of ripping up hundreds of thousands of acres of brush and the planting of the cleared land to nutritious grass.

The author, presently a professor of Spanish at the University of Maryland, spent his childhood on the ranch and later was a teacher in one of the King's schools and also a justice of the peace whose main official duty was that of performing wedding ceremonies for Mexican couples on the ranch. He soaked up lore and folk songs and learned to make a guitar sing heart tunes of border-country love. But a yearning for things more scholarly pulled him away from the somnolent villages of the King domain. He is an established writer with two previous books, one of which, "The Magic of Limping John," was selected by the Texas Institute of Letters as "the best Texas book" of 1944. Mr. Goodwyn is a cousin of J. Frank Dobie, the range boss of tale-spinning in the sunny Southwest. Now if Cousin "Pancho" Dobie could be turned loose on the King range with full liberty to nose into the records and track down the legends, what a wonderful book he could turn out! But he isn't apt to ride into this rich pasture of lore.

Up to now Bob Kleberg, president of the King Ranch, hasn't consented to the writing of the King Ranch story, for, as he has said in letters, he doesn't want the family and the business operation revealed as a full-dress yarn would have to do it. The family has always been publicity-shy, and because of this the King is known as "a walled empire." There have been all sorts of rumors about supposed happenings behind the "iron curtain" which has been guarded by cowboys with saddle guns about the size of light artillery. In recent years, the King has been more hospitable, and many invited guests visit there.

No other cattle outfit in the world has anything like the color of the King Ranch. It is a land of lore, of dunes, of brush, of legend and mystery. For many lonely miles the whitecaps come leaping out of the Gulf and lap at its sandy shore. There are gray, stooped old men who were born on the ranch and have never made a boot track off it, and don't want to. Many of the Latin-American hands can't speak English, and there are flashing eyes and hot blood.

While Mr. Goodwyn doesn't tell the real story, his book is well written and is highly entertaining; he set out to tell his experiences and he has done a good job of that.

LEWIS NORDYKE

## POPULAR CULTURE

**The Great Audience**, by Gilbert Seldes. New York: Viking. \$3.75

The familiar essay is in ill repute nowadays. A cult of objectivity seems to have overtaken our letters, and writers prefer to express themselves through facts and statistics culled from encyclopaedias and research bureaus rather than through the direct revelation of personality. In "The Great Audience" Gilbert Seldes has returned to the nineteenth-century tradition of belles-lettres and has presented us with a dissertation on the movies, the radio, television and comic books in the manner made famous by Charles Lamb and William Hazlitt.

With disarming frankness and an almost naive charm Mr. Seldes sets forth his likes and dislikes, his hopes and fears, and even his prejudices. He thinks that Hollywood movies are less mature than British films, that many actresses do not know how to act, that many writers can not write, that John Ford's "The Informer" is a great picture, that most radio programs are geared to an adolescent level, that comic books are detrimental to the nation's young, and that American intellectuals as a class have tended to isolate themselves from the realities of common life. He complains about the effects of censorship upon our films and castigates Hollywood producers for catering to a huge mass audience that attends movie theaters by force of habit, while the needs of another and potentially even larger audience of people with taste and refinement have been completely neglected.

Mr. Seldes, of course, has a constitutional right to express his views; and since he writes with elegance and ease and wit, I would not quarrel with him merely on the score of opinion alone. But unfortunately he has mistaken the nature of his own book completely. Instead of presenting it as a familiar essay whose only justification need be charm of style (who takes the absurd story of Ho-ti and Bo-bo in "A Dissertation on Roast Pig" seriously?), he fancies it as an expert analysis of the movies, the radio, television, and comic books, and their effect upon the people who patronize them. He also thinks of his book as a profound critique of our tastes and standards, and by implication, of our entire civilization; and it seems to have been accepted as such by many critics, Mr. Edmund Wilson even pronouncing it a "definitive" work.

I find little justification for such pretensions. Mr. Seldes lacks the qualifications for the kind of study he evidently intended. To analyze the influence of the movies, radio, television and comic books upon our civilization one must first have a broad conception of the idea of civilization itself. One must be a trained sociologist, a political scientist, a historian of culture. Preferably a man with the profound insight of a Toynbee, a Sorokin or a Veblen is required. Mr. Seldes himself, I suppose, would hardly claim to possess such insight; and, indeed, I would not even mention such an obvious point if I were not so flabbergasted by the aura of respect with which this book has been surrounded.

Mr. Seldes's inability to handle his subject is apparent from his numerous errors of fact and the misleading statements scattered across his pages. The very opening sentence of his section on motion pictures contains an error. "Except for the makers of baby foods," he de-



clares, "no industry in the United States has been so indifferent to the steady falling away of its customers as the movies have been." But the Hollywood producers are not indifferent to this problem, although they have not as yet found any answer except to wage a spurious advertising campaign to the effect that "the movies are better than ever."

Mr. Seldes is also misleading in his idea that movies are made for a single mass audience. This is an oversimplification of an extremely complex situation. Not all films are made for the same audience. The industry recognizes differences in taste and preference and, within limitations, tries to satisfy them. The recent cycle of films dealing with Negro discrimination ("Pinky," "Lost Boundaries," "Intruder in the Dust") — to mention but one example — is not intended for the same audience that attends Monogram's "quickies" and Republic's "Westerns." It is quite true, of course, that Hollywood rarely produces films primarily for intellectuals, critics, concert-goers, art addicts, and similar select groups; but this is an old complaint.

Mr. Seldes is also mistaken in declaring that "democracy created capitalism, not vice versa." Such historians as Henri Pirenne, William Cunningham and Werner Sombart have shown conclusively that the origin of capitalism is to be found in the Middle Ages, and that the rise of a merchant class in the medieval cities led both to the establishment of absolute monarchy in England and France — this was a great improvement over feudal anarchy — and then to its overthrow in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Capitalism, it would be more correct to state, created democracy: this is one of its shining achievements.

A rigorous analysis of this book would impeach its entire text. In fact, the author commits the very faults that he attacks in others. He denounces Hollywood films for their lack of reality and for the dream world which they frequently present; but many of his own conceptions are equally nebulous and remote from reality. "I am," he declares sententiously, "proposing a revaluation of the popular arts in terms of physics rather than aesthetics, in terms of social effect rather than private pleasure." The "physics" here is purely imaginary; and as for appraising art in terms of its social effect, an idea which Mr. Seldes presents as though he were discovering a new theory of the universe, the Marxian critics have been doing this for decades, and the Catholic Church for centuries.

When Mr. Seldes states that the radio and the movies "create the climate of feeling in which all of us live," he is, I fear, once again transcending the limits of reality. As a scientific concept, the term, "the climate of feeling," has no more validity than the glamour of a Hollywood movie: it can mean anything from an adolescent necking party to a convention of the DAR. It may also be noted that the "climate of feeling," whatever it means, has been created in our age by many factors, such as the end of Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier, World War I, the Russian Revolution, the Great Depression, the rise of Fascism and National Socialism, and World War II with its aftermath. Mr. Seldes's tendency toward excessive simplification, the result of his lack of training as a sociologist or a political scientist, at times veers dangerously close to absurdity.

Mr. Seldes questions the competence of Mr. Walte. Winchell to act as a news analyst. What right, he asks, has this "entertainer," this "unabashed gossip" with a "staccato delivery," who is hardly "an expert on international affairs," to "advise congressmen and denounce ministers of state"?

Here Mr. Seldes has delivered, although he may not realize it himself, a valid criticism of his own work. What right has he to analyze the effect of the popular arts upon our culture, a problem that has confounded religious leaders, psychiatrists, philosophers, sociologists and statesmen?

Mr. Seldes is as much of an "entertainer" as Mr. Winchell. This, indeed, is the real value of his book. As an essay in familiar style "The Great Audience" can be accepted for its charm and readability; but as a serious study of the effects of motion pictures, radio, television and comic books, it can not be seriously accepted.

HARRY FELDMAN

## RENAISSANCE MAN

Michelangelo, by Michele Saponaro. Translated by C. J. Richards. New York: Pellegrini and Cudahy. \$4.00

This short biography of Michelangelo dramatizes his life of struggle, whether with marble or the spirit. The Renaissance ended with Michelangelo's long career. He was the prototype of the Renaissance man: master of sculpture, painting, poetry and architecture. In his youth he astonished the Florentines with his "David"; in his old age, his cupola crowned the building of St. Peter's. He was a giant in a turbulent age much like our own, an age which saw Italy sink to foreign servitude for two centuries. Some of Michelangelo's titanic compulsion animates this "Life," which is romantic in attitude and episodic in form. The twenty photographic plates are excellent.

EDWIN CLARK

## INHABITANTS OF THIS HOUSE

The inhabitants of this house, with winter's leave  
To move about in seasonless reprieve  
And, as if we were somehow theirs, to share  
With us our stubborn artifice of air —  
Slight, delicate moths with powder-mottled wings,  
Ungainly wasps with slackened winter stings,  
Pin-point, crab-legged spiders, bronze-bellied flies  
And ancient jewels of beetles, with great, false eyes —  
Must have some view of this, the enfolding world  
From which, were man to blast it, they would be hurled.  
Companions of our patience, as we wait  
For what, if death were fatal, would be fate,  
They are silent as are we, the powerless  
Possessors of a power to dispossess.  
Silent, and enviably unconcerned,  
Not knowing all the worlds which have been burned  
Nor those in danger of burning, only sure  
That they possess the endurance to endure  
Having no fear with which to nourish doubt  
Nor wit to turn their wisdom inside out.

RAYMOND HOLDEN

# THIS IS WHAT WE SAID

FROM EDITORIALS OF THE FREEMAN

OCTOBER 16, 1950

It would have set an epoch-making precedent if in Korea notice could have been served on any would-be aggressor that a real, balanced international force would instantly resist his aggression. If all the leading nations of Europe that are members of the United Nations had sent even token ground forces in a way that really involved their prestige, Stalin would have had a warning that might have been serious enough to deter him from further adventures.



NOVEMBER 27, 1950

We wouldn't bother with the anti-MacArthur campaign if it were not so virulent, insistent, continuous and pervasive. Who starts these periodical anti-MacArthur rumors? They seem to come from certain well-established pipelines into both White House and State Department. Yet Truman depends on MacArthur to win our battles in Korea without the expenditure of vast numbers of American lives. Out of gratitude to his able military representative in the Far East, we think Mr. Truman ought to take a look at the pipeline situation in his own Washington bailiwick.



DECEMBER 11, 1950

The very minimum need, if we are now to follow a balanced foreign policy, is the immediate resignation of Secretary Acheson. By his past record he has forfeited the confidence and trust of the country. But this is not the worst of it. Even in this critical hour he has been using his position, working through his subordinates in the State Department and through a newspaper group, to try to throw the entire blame for the present disaster on General MacArthur.



APRIL 9, 1951

The trouble with this clear and statesmanlike declaration on behalf of the UN [General MacArthur's offer of a cease-fire] is that it assumes a clarity and firmness of purpose of which neither the UN nor our Department of State has so far given any sign. Does our State Department intend that there shall be a sell-out in Korea? If so, that would explain its failure to declare its objectives.

the **FREEMAN**

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