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A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN'S report on Europe's economic recovery through free enterprise is based on his observations during three visits—in 1946, 1949 and 1951.

OLIVER CARLSON'S most recent article in the *Freeman* was "Hollywood's Premature Americans" (October 8). His earlier "What Really Happened in Pasadena?" (July 30) created nationwide interest.

TOWNER PHELAN, Vice President of the St. Louis Union Trust Company, is well known to our readers. His latest article was "Controls Won't Stop Inflation" (November 19).

ALICE WIDENER adds another presentation of Stalin's statements on Soviet policy to her "What Every Secretary of State Should Know" (the *Freeman*, July 2). Mrs. Widener has written radio features and magazine articles.

GEORGE E. SOKOLSKY, popular newspaper columnist and radio commentator, has contributed several articles to our columns; also the excerpts on the betrayal of China from the MacArthur Hearings, "Out of Their Own Mouths" (Section II, September 24).

FRANCES BECK is an inveterate reader of fiction and occasionally writes it. She lives in Oklahoma.

ROBIN BEACH, electrical engineer and author of "The Story of Electricity and Magnetism," has contributed book reviews to technical journals. Formerly head of the Engineering Department at Brooklyn Polytechnic, he now heads his own consulting firm.

PARKER TYLER, a frequent contributor to the literary quarterlies, is the author of "Hollywood Hallucination" and two other books on film subjects.

Forthcoming

In early issues we shall publish an appraisal of Sumner Welles by Forrest Davis; a discussion of the Socialist menace to our civilization, by George Winder; and an article by Louis Bromfield on the degradation of American liberalism.

the FREEMAN

NEW YORK, MONDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1951

THE FORTNIGHT

Just when one concludes that our truce negotiators in Korea have made every blunder in the book, they prove that still another can be made. After nearly five months of negotiations it suddenly occurs to them that the Communists can and probably will use an armistice to build up their offensive power for a final push. But by raising this question so late in the proceedings, and when they are apparently on the actual verge of a truce, our negotiators succeed in raising doubts about their own sincerity.

All this could have been avoided by the most elementary precautions. All that was necessary was a clear public statement by our government, last July, before a single session with the Communists, of the minimum terms on which we would agree to a truce. We could have said bluntly that unless the Communists agreed in advance to discuss details only on the basis of such minimum terms it would be pointless to enter into negotiations. The chief reason we did not do this is that it would have looked too much like what General MacArthur had been dismissed for proposing.

Better, we could have drafted our proposed truce terms in the form of a final detailed document and then considered seriously just what such a document would be worth even if we got the Communist signature. Instead, President Truman announced that an agreement with the Communists is not worth the paper it is written on, and then ordered the Army negotiators to act as if this were not true. And one reason why the Army commanders, in turn, order what is in effect a cease-fire and then deny they have ordered it, is that they are frantically trying to follow the fluctuating but unacknowledged directions from the State Department in Washington.

There are aspects of the removal of nine ECA officials in Austria which seem to invite Congressional interest. Although high American officials there explain the shake-up in terms of economy, according to a dispatch in the *New York Times*, most of the officials affected lay the shake-up to a clash between the State Department and ECA over policy toward Austrian use of Marshall Plan funds and control of East-West trade through Austria. This bears out recent dispatches to the effect that Europe swarms with representatives of U. S. agencies, busy reproducing in European capitals the confusion which causes Washington bureaucrats —as one of them put it—to "levitate" instead of getting anywhere. If the Administration is unable or unwilling to define a policy toward Europe and to see that all its agencies promote that policy, isn't it about time for Congress to take a hand? After all, it still has Constitutional power over the public purse. It could make a policy itself by clearly defining the purposes for which funds voted for Europe are to be used.

It is scarcely news that President Truman hates the press. But it came as news to us that the Administration was within an inch of getting a throttling hold on the finances of a free press during the closing minutes of the last session of Congress. The legislative clause in question was contained in Senate 2170; it would have given the Administration's price-control czar full authority over the size and allocation of the advertising budgets of private industry. This authority would have permitted the Administration to decide what constitutes "reasonable" advertising expenses, and to exclude from the "cost of sales" any outlay deemed "unreasonable." The proposed legislation, tucked in an "amendment" to an amendment, passed an absent-minded Senate by a 49 to 21 vote. It would have passed in the House of Representatives if John E. Lyle, Jr., of Corpus Christi, Texas, hadn't spotted the danger in the legislation to the whole concept of free speech. Mr. Lyle, it seems to us, deserves an editorial garland in every newspaper and magazine in the land.

There is a drive on to compel city authorities to put fluorine in drinking water. Fluorine, so the

dentists tell us, is good for children's teeth: it hardens them in their formative stages and so prevents decay. But there is also some fairly well-authenticated evidence that fluorine, in dosages repeated over a long period of time, can cause hardening of the arteries and diseases of the veins. The attempt to legislate political tampering with the reservoirs, then, turns out to have a "class angle"—it would help a small class of soft-toothed juveniles and hurt a larger class of hard-toothed adults. The moral for lovers of both freedom and common sense would seem to be this: let the doctors and dentists decide individual medical needs on an individual basis. We don't want to die of hardening of the arteries just to give a bureaucrat a job testing the fluorine content of the water supply.

The Associated Press reports the story of a 48-year-old Englishman who tried to get a good diagnosis of his case from the socialized medicos of Great Britain. Looking him over hurriedly, the harassed and distracted British doctors decided he was a gone goose: his legs appeared to be suffering from an incurable disease of the blood vessels, and they would soon have to be cut off. Death would follow in fairly short order. Far from resigning himself to obliteration, however, the 48-year-old Englishman, who happened to be an employee of a shipping firm, wangled himself a trip to America. Doctors in Connecticut gave him a diagnosis that took twenty days for its completion. It was finally determined that the Englishman's trouble was due to a spine condition which could be relieved by wearing a brace. The man will live, and he will keep his legs. We don't want to force any moral here, for one statistical item does not prove a trend. But we promise our readers to watch more closely than ever for the unfolding of items that may prove a trend exists.

It is with great sadness that we note the death of Kenneth Wherry, Republican Senator from Nebraska and floor leader of his party in the Senate. In the days when the Republicans were struggling for survival Wherry took on the exalted New Deal figure of George Norris and licked him in Nebraska. During his career in Washington Wherry did more than anyone else to drill and discipline the Republican Senators into a fighting phalanx capable of hamstringing, and eventually defeating, the more nonsensical New and Fair Deal bills. Wherry had convictions, he had pugnacity —and in a time of Milquetoasts he will be greatly missed.

Evidence accumulates that something has gone sour with the writing profession. The judges in the $10,000 1951 Harper Prize Novel contest have examined more than 600 submitted manuscripts and pronounced them all unworthy of the prize. C. Hartley Grattan, in the November issue of *Harper's Magazine*, argues that writers aren't writing these days for the simple reason that it is impossible to earn a decent living at the trade. Mr. Grattan hints that the public has sold off on writers because, for the past generation at least, they have had little clarity of vision; which is another way of arguing that they have had practically nothing to say. That Mr. Grattan is on the track of something significant is borne out by the current best-seller lists. In recent weeks the two leaders on the fiction list have been Herman Wouk's "The Caine Mutiny" and Nicholas Monsarrat's "The Cruel Sea." The non-fiction leaders have been Rachel L. Carson's "The Sea Around Us" and Thor Heyerdahl's "Kon-Tiki." All four of these books deal with the great salt wastes of the ocean. Can it be that the human race is so disgusted by what has been happening of late on the six inhabited continents that it wants nothing to do with authors who try to describe, or prescribe for, life on dry land?

A telling entry in James Forrestal's highly revealing Diaries, of July 28, 1951: "[Mr. Truman] said he was being very realistic with the Russians and found Stalin not difficult to do business with." Now this was said about Potsdam, not for public consumption, but in the deep secrecy of a Cabinet meeting—six months after (if we are to believe his surviving aides) F. D. R. had awakened to the rascality of his Yalta partner. During the last weeks of his life, we are authoritatively told, F. D. R. was desperately aware that he had been had by a ruthless liar; and was all set to recoup his losses. But fifteen weeks *after* F. D. R.'s death, Mr. Truman found Stalin not difficult to do business with! Where, oh where, were Messrs. Hopkins, Harriman and all those other F. D. R. intimates who, or so we hear from their court journalists today, had by then fully understood the nature of Stalin? Why, they were all in Mr. Truman's entourage. Didn't they tell him? Were they overawed by the staggering personality of the new President? Verily, the continuous disclosure of the lurid Yalta-Potsdam story rolls along like a soap opera—every day a new tortuous twist, every day the heroine relieved from one predicament only to be entangled in a new one, and never an end in sight.

In Lenin's memorable definition, so revealing in its technocratic coarseness, "Socialism is soviets plus electricity." By such standards, Communist China is making rapid progress. With soviets, of course, they have been blessed for quite a while, but now an AP dispatch from Hong Kong tells of the first electrocution of prisoners by Mao, that indomitable progressive. "More than thirty former Nationalist airmen have been put to death recently by this method." This, no doubt, is what "Technical Assistance to Backward Areas," so vociferously proposed by our "liberal" advocates of a rapprochement with Asiatic Bolshevism, would amount to: Export generators to Mao, and in no time he will have streamlined murder.

Bob Taft's Foreign Policy

THE EDITORS of the *Freeman* have not collectively made up their minds what candidate they want to support for the Presidency in 1952. We may, individually, have our favorites, but we want to see just who and what is offered in the primaries and/or at the conventions before we act as an editorial entity. However, we can see at least one probably frivolous objection to the leadership or the candidacy of any of the so-called "liberal," or "eastern," Republicans. We hate to say it, but it is becoming increasingly clear that the "liberal," or the "eastern," Republicans can not read.

This species of Republican has been telling us for years that Bob Taft is an "isolationist," that he is quite content to let Europe stew in its own juice or go down the drain, and so forth and so on. It has accused Bob Taft of following a foreign policy of "negation," or of being a "Formosa Firster," or of thinking in "Taft-Hoover terms" of building America into an isolated "Gibraltar." If one were to believe the various statements of the "liberal," or the "eastern," Republicans, Bob Taft has no clear-cut ideas in the matter of foreign affairs. Certainly, say the "liberals" in effect, he is not to be mentioned in the same breath with John Foster Dulles or the late Senator Vandenberg.

It so happens, however, that Bob Taft has the most meticulous blueprint for an American foreign policy that has been offered in our time by any American statesman. Moreover, it is a clearly "internationalist" blueprint. It covers not only the large generalities but also practically all the small contingencies. It is all summed up in Taft's new book, "A Foreign Policy for Americans" (Doubleday, $2.) Lest anyone aver that Taft is a Johnny-Come-Lately to his subject, let it be said at once that this book is a compendium of what Taft has been writing and speaking for a long time.

To commence with the largest generality of them all, Bob Taft believes that the United States should participate "responsibly" in a cooperative international organization to prevent military aggression, and to "attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world." (The words are Vandenberg's, but Taft specifically endorses them.) Taft would like to see the veto power eliminated in the UN, but on condition that the members of the UN agree to a definite law to govern their relations to each other. He would force the members to submit their disputes to adjudication and to abide by the decision of an impartial tribunal. In other words, he stands right where William Howard Taft, his father, stood on these matters.

This is strange doctrine for an "isolationist," or a "Formosa Firster." But there are even stranger things in the Taft book. The Senator, it would appear, is the leading advocate of drawing lines everywhere on the globe and telling the Russians and their satellites, "Thus far and no farther." He advocates a series of automatic penalties or sanctions if the Russians or their stooges should transgress. For Europe, or at least for those parts of Europe covered by the North Atlantic Pact, Taft would establish a Monroe Doctrine. Should any of the Pact countries be attacked by Stalin, the U. S. would automatically declare war on the Soviets.

So much for the Monroe Doctrine for Europe, a concept which would have horrified the late Senator Borah or any real isolationist. In addition to this Monroe Doctrine for Europe, Taft would take on the specific defense with "our own air and sea forces" of "any island nations" which desire our help. This goes for Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain. Included as "quasi-islands" in a proposed extension of the Taft program are Spain, Singapore, the Malay Peninsula and the whole continent of Africa. Taft is not against committing American "land troops" where there is a "reasonable chance of success." He would be in favor of using American ground soldiers to defend Suez, if necessary. Nor is he against using ground troops in Europe provided "we are reasonably certain of success through the efforts of our own Army and our allies." As for action in continental Asia, the Taft proposals come down to a form of lend-lease to opponents of Stalin. Taft is, as he insists, a moderate on the subject of aid to Asians; he doesn't want to see American land forces risked in mainland China. To those who twit him with being a Formosa Firster, he says: "I only insist that we apply to Asia the same basic policy which we apply to Europe. As I have said, that policy is to check communism at every possible point where it is within our capacity to do so."

A good bookkeeper and accountant of both the kinetic and the potential American energy supply, Taft is for seeking the most effective forms of armament and disposal of available manpower. Following the same sort of policy which won the great Napoleonic struggle for Great Britain, this means that the United States should concentrate primarily on air and sea power. The great infantry levies, where necessary, should come from nations that are in close proximity to the battlefields; otherwise a logistical nightmare must ensue. It would be militarily ineffective for America to put large armies into continental Europe or Asia; too much energy must be expended in servicing mass armies when they are thousands of miles from their home bases.

Taft's proposals even extend to the field of warfare by propaganda and infiltration: he wants to see OSS wartime methods used to carry the cold war into the Soviet satellites, and even into Russia itself. He believes that "a comparatively small amount of money, if well spent, could succeed in

substantially building up a love for freedom in Soviet-dominated territory."

Bob Taft's program, summed up, is a counsel for dangerous living in dangerous times. His insistence on "drawing lines" and providing for automatic penalties and sanctions must entail considerable risk of turning "little wars" into World War III. But risk is a necessary concomitant of any effective policy today. Whether it is the mark of good statecraft to let your enemy know just where and when, and with what means, you intend to fight is a question; certainly the method of saying "Thus far and no farther" deprives a nation of the opportunity to win diplomatic victories by judicious use of the bluff. Taft, however, is constitutionally unable to deal in bluffs. He wants the cards to be face up.

Since Taft believes as he does, one would logically expect the *Chicago Tribune* to be against him. One would also logically expect to see friendly words in his behalf in the *New York Herald Tribune*, whose August Hecksher seems to be the leading Republican anti-Taft journalist of the eastern seaboard. But, as we suggested at the beginning of this editorial, logic does not move the opponents of Bob Taft. Inasmuch as they seem unable to read correctly what he has to say, it is hardly queer at all that they tend to think of him as a wyvern, or at least a hippogriff.

Truman's Second Bankruptcy

IN A despicable reversal of the fine American tradition which resents civil government exercised by the military, the Administration keeps ordering honorable soldiers to do its dirty political work. In Panmunjom, weary American officers have been obediently negotiating, not a soldier's well-earned truce, but Mr. Truman's second declaration of bankruptcy. The first one catapulted him from the pursuit of haberdashery to that of statesmanhood. If the second does not propel him into oblivion, the American people will deservedly lose their shirts.

The Administration's court journalists, of course, will now excel their previous records of a dialectical prestidigitation that can prove black white, Philip Jessup an indispensable patriot, and defeat victory. In particular, the nation is to be bamboozled with the outrageous fiction that our growing military strength has made the Communists recant their original plans and cut their losses.

But the bankruptcy courts of history, much less lenient than those in Missouri, insist that liabilities be filed in full. There is no Pendergast to fix Clio. The way Mr. Truman's books look to her (and, unfortunately, to Stalin too), the side that is cutting its losses in Korea is the United States. Now that the Korean war seems to be ending even more ignominiously than it began, the American people had better face the sickening truth: Since June 1950, the global strategic position of the United States has deteriorated so perilously that, however big the price Stalin has paid (in other peoples' manpower, mind you), he has bought one of history's sensational bargains.

To begin with the latest disclosure of facts: America's air supremacy—the axiomatic precondition of any American strategy—has been lost. That much was officially acknowledged by General Vandenberg on his recent return from Korea. And anyone who thinks Stalin may overlook the proximity of General Vandenberg's admission to the ceremony in Panmunjon is crazy. Stalin, who isn't crazy, appreciates better than the artfully misinformed American public that the ascendancy of his air power stems, not just from the geographic advantage of a privileged sanctuary, but from a breakdown of our Administration's total strategic concept.

What is—or rather, what was—that concept? Some time ago (and without letting the American people in on the debate), the Administration bought the idea of fighting "little wars." Rather than follow Senator Taft's recommendation (to draw a line, and make it unmistakably clear to the Soviets that any transgression, no matter how "little," would be immediately answered with reprisal that would pit our whole air-sea strength against Russia proper in the case of Europe, or bring a dangerous sort of lend-lease to the aid of Chiang Kai-shek in Asia), the Truman advisers aroused the retailer in the President. By fighting two-bit wars one after another, they persuaded him, he might spread the risks to his capital resources and keep forever in business.

The main trouble with the strategy of "little wars" is that it bleeds the nation, yet does not buy insurance against World War III. The adherents of this strategy must carry the burden of total mobilization without the only rewarding advantage—the hard-gained freedom of initiative to throw one's *best* punch at the opponent's *weakest* spot. The disciple of the retail school of generalship must prostrate himself to keep constantly stocked up for all possible comers, and can never really win a decisive victory anywhere.

Once having formed in the brains that conceived the doctrine of "little wars," the cancer of defeat creeps through the entire organism. For one thing, not even Mr. Truman's court journalists can much longer pooh-pooh the armament debacle. America, being what it is (a civilian economy bent on the pursuit of the consumer's happiness), never has turned, and never will turn, to armament production in earnest unless a big threat is demonstrably here. And so, after eighteen months of the "little war" in Korea, our aircraft production which was scheduled to grow five times over in one year, has less than doubled.

Of course, the lullaby-liners will continue to dispense the official soporific—that the armament morass is actually a floor of concrete about to dry;

that the slow pace at the start will pay off in output miracles just around the corner; and that, anyway, if there *is* trouble to speak of, it is due to the predatory greed of Big Business. But the truth keeps seeping down to the grass roots: Businessmen, desperately trying to get armament production going in earnest, keep hearing in Washington that "it's all over."

Yes, the awful truth is that the smart boys in the alphabetical agencies, whenever they feel they can afford frankness, speak of nothing but "reconversion to peace."

But though we do not get the arms, we are paying for them; and twice. For the fallacy that appeasement could inspire a war economy is costly. On the one hand, the American taxpayers are sucked into the eeriest inflation of all times—prices spiraling ever higher (because of an inflated government's fiscal largesse), while the supply of consumer goods in the "soft" lines threatens to inundate the market (because so little productive force is siphoned into actual armament). If for no other reason, the retailer from Missouri will be remembered for the original twist he has given to the science of economics: He has brought about what heretofore, in theory and practice, was deemed almost impossible—inflation amidst markets that contain whole areas of glut.

On the other hand, the American taxpayers must again bail out the European fellow-travelers of Mr. Truman's toboggan ride. That weirdly invisible armament bleeds Europe even more profusely than the U. S., simply because the demoralized Old World has an even greater aversion to sacrifice for a patently phony armament effort. To keep the appearance of Europe's defensive alertness, the Marshall dole will have to start all over again: In 1952, when according to Marshall Plan No. 1 Europe was pledged to stand on its own feet, the notorious "dollar gap" in Britain and France may be wider than ever.

Here is where Stalin can chalk up the second triumph of his Korean gamble. Orthodox Leninist strategy has always been based on a two-in-one bet: What Communist aggression can not yet achieve, economic chaos will contribute. With his Korean thrust, Stalin scored on both grounds: He has successfully probed the idiocy of Truman's "little war" strategy; and he has sent the West on an economic spin which, to him, is full of promise.

This, in sum, is the Korean balance sheet:

1. The combined military strength that 57 nations were willing to contribute, led by the mighty United States, did not suffice to beat the aggressor and unify tiny Korea.

2. Though the Western economy has been strained, the armament lead of the Soviet bloc may be larger at the end of 1951 than in June 1950.

3. Europe's faith in collective security is weaker than in 1949: The diplomatic cant of banquet speeches notwithstanding, the European nations are now convinced that an attack on any of them will not be answered by the only effective counterblow—punitive action against the Kremlin.

4. The West's demonstrated moral impotence has incited the Near and Middle East to rebellion, and has pushed India further down the Nehru road of blatant servility to the Soviets.

5. Driven by the inherent madness of his doctrine, Mr. Truman has supplied Stalin with the infamous "disarmament" proposal which offers the Soviet Union lasting supremacy in military effectiveness.

6. Two of the last few years of American atomic supremacy have been irretrievably whittled away.

On the credit side, Americans have gained the certainty that they are governed by a team of unprecedented bunglers. A patriot may wonder whether the price for such a lesson has not been excessive—100,000 American casualties in a war which, if Dean Acheson had not virtually invited the Communist attack on Korea, might have been avoided. And what makes the doubt unanswerable is the fact that Mr. Acheson still holds his job. The end of Acheson's war will find the gentleman still in the State Department. This fact makes it look as if Clio *could* be fixed after all. But let us not jump to conclusions before the 1952 returns are in.

Primer for Appointees

ON OCTOBER 19 James Reston, in the *New York Times*, offered "a few simple rules" for candidates needing Senatorial confirmation for public office. Among them: "Be sure you are for the things that are going to be popular six or seven years from now"; "Don't join anything, ever"; "Don't write books"; "Keep up with the Senate's favorites"; "Stay out of the Far East . . ."; "If possible, have at least one reformed Communist testify on your behalf, preferably Louis Budenz. . . ."

These "rules," inspired by Mr. Philip Jessup's difficulties with the Senate, moved Mr. Alex L. Hillman to devise a set to be followed in securing nomination for office. He sent these to the *Times*, which does not appear to be interested. The *Freeman* is. Here, with a few space-saving omissions, is the Hillman letter that the *Times* did not print:

To the Editor of the *New York Times:*

May I congratulate you on the journalistic enterprise evidenced by Mr. James Reston's article, "How to Win the U. S. Senate in 14—Ah, Simple—Lessons." . . . You have launched a unique educational effort, of the self-help type, for aspiring politicians. My only complaint is that the Reston course of instruction begins at the wrong point. His "few simple rules" apply to the process of obtaining Senate confirmation. But first the aspiring candidate must be nominated by the White House or the State Department. The initial lesson should more properly,

therefore have offered helpful hints for getting the nomination; that is, logically, Lesson Number One in Mr. Reston's course. . . .

Here are a few simple rules for those seeking an executive nomination:

1. Be sure that you were completely wrong six or seven years ago about all . . . international issues . . . of critical importance today. The closer your score is to 100 per cent . . . the better your chances.

2. You must show a record of having joined at least half a dozen Communist front organizations loaded with familiar fellow-traveler names, thus giving evidence of a big heart and generous do-good instincts, untouched by the niggardly and suspicious spirit of those who bother to investigate the real purposes and real control of such organizations. . . .

3. You must never—at any rate before 1948, when we started our "get tough with Russia" policy—have uttered a syllable of criticism of the Soviet Union, its totalitarianism, its slave labor, . . . its fifth columns abroad. Anything so dastardly would have netted you the label of Red-baiter or Fascist and automatically removed you from the roster of possible nominees.

4. Criticism of Stalin and his works after 1948 will not be held against you, provided you are careful not to admit or apologize for previous support of this gentleman and his policies.

5. If you happen to be a journalist, writer, or diplomat, you must have taken the precaution of not living in the Soviet Union or otherwise exposing yourself to unpleasant knowledge and understanding. If you had the misfortune to learn the facts of life—and the indiscretion to publish them —you are in the same sorry category of social outlaws as Eugene Lyons, William Henry Chamberlin, W. L. White, Isaac Don Levine, William C. Bullitt, and their ilk.

6. It helps a lot if you have written books or articles clearly attesting your angelic innocence and broad-minded ignorance. Books and articles, that is to say, that accepted at face value all the propaganda claims of the Kremlin and its foreign press agents, and denounced as reactionaries any Americans who rejected such claims. Should you be able to qualify as having served before 1948 as a Sovieteering press agent yourself, your priority . . . will be that much higher.

7. If you rate as a Far East expert, you must be able to offer clear evidence of the . . . approach which accepted the Chinese Communists as mere agrarian reformers. Note that no one who regarded the Chinese Communists as Communists and their victory as a calamity for American interests has been offered executive appointments or been permitted to keep an executive job. . . .

8. . . . it is desirable that you should have given positive service to the cause by depriving the Chinese Nationalist Government of munitions and otherwise hastening Mao Tse-tung's complete victory. Insistence that Formosa and North Korea be turned over to Stalin will weigh . . . in your favor.

9. A long stint on the operational level of the Institute of Pacific Relations is clearly a big plus. That will have given you the broadening benefits of direct collaboration with Communists like Frederick Vanderbilt Field, spies like Alger Hiss, and assorted specialists like Owen Lattimore and Joseph Barnes. It will also have afforded you . . . intimate contact with the editorial and photographic studios of the magazine *Amerasia* through overlapping staffs and social intercourse. Not even Senator McCarthy will deny that Mr. Jaffe of *Amerasia* and Mr. Field of the IPR knew more about Soviet policies and objectives than anyone in the State Department and could therefore be better guides and teachers.

10. You must have believed . . . until quite recently, that Stalin is a democrat at heart, the Soviet regime a new kind of democracy, and the Politburo a dependable partner in the Great Design for world peace under world law.

11. If by unhappy chance you are one who did know the truth about the Soviets prematurely [never] allude to your mistake in not having been mistaken. . . . Since the government and its entourage were utterly bemused on this subject, it is only human that they should hate being reminded of the fact. . . .

12. You must demonstrate your firm belief that Europe must be defended to the limit with American lives and billions, and that, should any Europeans refuse to cooperate, they must be forthwith bribed to do so. Never ask embarrassing questions about (a) the extent of European contributions to defense; (b) how much in income taxes is paid by Frenchmen, Italians, etc., as compared to how much is paid by Americans. Indeed, any snide allusion to the American tax load will reveal that you're a stingy, short-sighted fellow undeserving of any nomination.

13. You must never suggest that, since there are Chinese troops on the Communist side in our undeclared war with China, it might make sense to permit Chinese troops also on our side. The privilege of dying in defense of Korea must be maintained as primarily an American monopoly.

14. Finally . . . your greatest claim to a nomination is proof that you have been directly and personally involved in policy blunders vis-à-vis the Soviets and Red China. That obviously qualifies you for more effective action in dealing with the consequences . . . and . . . guarantees your . . . cooperation in denying and concealing such blunders. If you have any friends on Capitol Hill who consistently fought the Communists or raised carping doubts about the sublime wisdom of the Teheran-Yalta-Potsdam deals, hasten to disown and attack them.

Now, having studied Lesson Number One, you are better prepared to tackle the second lesson so brilliantly presented by Mr. Reston.

ALEX L. HILLMAN

Europe Turns to Freedom

By **WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN**

Mr. Chamberlin discusses the postwar trend to free enterprise in Continental Europe, and finds it the essential means to economic recovery.

A FAMILIAR theme song among misnamed liberals is that economic freedom is a luxury which only a rich country can afford. The United States, so the argument runs, has been so favored by Providence that it can put up with the obsolete and wasteful methods of private enterprise. But for less favored lands, in Europe and elsewhere, collectivism in some form—Communist, Socialist, Fascist, Statist—is a necessity.

What is never clearly explained is how the United States, still relatively the most individualist of the large countries of the world, contrives to produce such enormous surpluses for distribution abroad, while maintaining comparatively the highest living standard in the world at home. Britain's experiment in socialism since the war has been "grim" enough (to use a favorite postwar British word) for the average Briton. It would have been much grimmer if it had not been for what Winston Churchill once bluntly called the American dole.

The theory that there is some magic virtue in collectivism also breaks down in the face of the unmistakable fact that invariably the countries with the freest economies (Canada, Belgium and Switzerland are good exhibits) combine satisfactory living conditions at home with solvency in their international transactions. One of the strongest impressions I have brought back from three visits to Europe, in 1946, 1949 and 1951, is that free enterprise, far from being a luxury, is an economic necessity if the European continent is ever to stand on its own feet again.

The experience of West Germany is a conspicuous example that supports this proposition. The story of Ludwig Erhard, Minister of Economics in the Bonn government and main individual sparkplug of the astonishing German recovery during the last three years, is not as well known as it should be. It proves that economic freedom, honestly applied, far from being an expensive luxury, is an immense generator of wealth-producing energy.

The Erhard Story is that of a man who bet on freedom as the road to recovery for a war-wrecked country—and won. The magnitude of the achievement can be understood only by those who saw Germany in the hunger, ruin and virtual economic prostration of the first years of occupation.

At that time the majority of city dwellers were undernourished. Innumerable rules and regulations, some inherited from the fallen Nazi regime, some imposed by the Occupation authorities, stifled initiative and paralyzed constructive effort. The currency had broken down so completely that a carton of cigarettes sold for 1500 marks in Berlin. Indeed, cigarettes had replaced worthless paper money as a regular medium of exchange.

A more constructive policy toward Germany, introduced belatedly and followed with grudging slowness to its logical consequences, began to show some results in 1948. A new currency with real purchasing power replaced the flood of worthless paper marks. The Germans were gradually given more control over their own economic affairs. ECA aid was made available to West Germany.

Erhard Revives Economic Liberalism

This was Erhard's hour of opportunity. More than any other individual, he shaped the lines of German reconstruction. And, to an accompaniment of Socialist opposition at home and head-shaking among foreign observers, some of them American Keynesian New Dealers and British Laborites, he set his course by the compass of classical economic liberalism.

Erhard made a clean sweep of food rationing, of price and wage controls. Into an economy drugged with home-grown Statism under the Nazis, replaced by a multitude of foreign rules under the Occupation, he injected what had become the revolutionary incentives of personal initiative and the free market. And anyone who visits Germany today with some knowledge of conditions a few years ago can hardly escape the conviction that the experiment has been successful. The large cities of West Germany, Frankfurt and Hamburg, Stuttgart and Munich, dead in appearance after the end of the war, have come alive as if by a miracle.

Of course the vast heaps of rubble, the tremendous areas devastated by air bombing, did not vanish overnight. But a wave of building and repairing swept over the country. For the first time the visitor to Germany was impressed not only by how much had been destroyed but by how much was being constructed. The principal avenues blossomed out with filled shop windows, restaurants, moving picture theaters.

Critics of the return to freedom complained of social and economic inequalities. But people of all occupations and income levels benefited from stable currency, from the vastly increased choice of foodstuffs and manufactured goods, from the normal functioning of railways and streetcars.

Impressive facts and figures, confirmed by the evidence of one's own eyes in Germany, prove the

success of Erhard's economic policy. Industrial output in West Germany is now over 30 per cent above the figure for 1936 and has doubled since the free economy came into operation. When German exports were under foreign control, in 1940, they were about one billion dollars a year. Now the rate is over three billion dollars a year; and this fact is reflected in the importation of a much increased quantity and variety of foreign goods.

Wuerttemberg-Baden alone, of the eleven West German states, built almost as many housing units as the whole of France in 1950. Records are constantly being broken in the production field, and new branches of industry, notably in electrical equipment and textile machinery, are developing to replace those which are cut off behind the Iron Curtain of the Soviet Zone. Numerous fairs and exhibitions testify to the reviving vitality of the German economy. During the past spring and summer one could see an impressive automobile show in Frankfurt, a paper and printing display in Duesseldorf, an agricultural exposition in Hamburg, a confectionery exhibition in Stuttgart.

And Germany is regaining lost foreign markets. According to a recent report of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, German exports of chemicals to European countries were 67 per cent of British during the period January-September, 1949, and 208 per cent from October 1950 to March 1951. Corresponding figures for metals and manufactures were 73 and 182 per cent, for machinery 27 per cent and 91 per cent. This competitive gain at the expense of Socialist Britain is significant. For, with all due allowance for British war losses and impoverishment, the terms of competition between the two countries can not reasonably be considered unfavorable to Britain.

Physically as well as ideologically, Erhard is a striking contrast to Sir Stafford Cripps, the outstanding personality in the Socialist leadership of Britain. Cripps is a spare, ascetic invalid who sees intrinsic virtue in austerity. Erhard is a big, hearty man who enjoys a good meal and a good cigar and wants his countrymen to share these enjoyments as widely as possible. In an hour snatched from the many duties of his post Erhard, talking in machine-gun fashion, outlined to me in his Bonn office his economic credo.

"I am for the free market. I am against state controls and rationing. I am for the widest possible multilateral trade. I am against two-way barter deals and narrow restricted trade in so-called essentials. I believe these principles are good for Germany, for Europe and for the world. If America wants a big European market, free from artificial barriers, Germany is in fullest agreement with this policy and is doing everything in its power to bring this about. Germany under the Nazis, other countries under Statist regimes, have suffered only harm from autarchy, false and unreal self-sufficiency, fixed wages and prices, frozen economies."

It would be misleading to suggest that Dr. Erhard's economic medicine has or could have cured all Germany's deep economic wounds. The absorption of nine million uprooted, destitute refugees has represented a staggering social burden. The division of the country, the confiscation of German foreign assets, the dismantling, the controls still enforced in the heavy industries, the tremendous direct war destruction; all these things tend to keep down the standard of living. If Germany is an economic phoenix, it is a phoenix on a shoestring, with very short reserves of fuel, hard money and raw materials.

But if one compares the Germany of 1951 with the Germany of six years or even three years ago, one gets an impression of a miracle of economic recovery, probably the most impressive achievement of its kind in postwar Europe. ECA aid and the scrapping and relaxation of punitive foreign controls have helped. But the main factor in this recovery has been the intelligently directed hard work of the Germans themselves, released and stimulated by a free economy.

The Einaudi Story

And, as there is an Erhard story in Germany, there is an Einaudi story in Italy. Formerly a professor of economics, later Governor of the Bank of Italy and Minister of Finance, Luigi Einaudi is now President of Italy. He is the most eminent in rank of all the members of the Mont Pelerin Society, an international association of economic and political thinkers devoted to the principles of classical liberalism.

Einaudi received me last spring in his official residence, the huge Quirinal Palace. In his informal, modest way he explained his outstanding economic achievement, the stabilization of the lira after war and postwar inflation had undermined all faith in it.

Einaudi did not set about this task by spectacular methods or by multiplying physical controls and threatening all who exchanged money on the free market with jail sentences. Quite the contrary. He did what any sensible banker or finance minister would have done in the far-off days of the gold standard, resorting to the simple, obvious remedies now almost forgotten from disuse. He cut down credit, increased the percentage of local bank deposits which had to be placed with the Bank of Italy. He struck the inflation at its source by restricting the output of new money. He spurred exports by permitting Italians who sold products to America to keep part of their dollar receipts and spend them as they chose, instead of requiring that they be converted at an unrealistic rate of exchange.

And Einaudi's simple, unbureaucratic methods worked. The lira for several years has been one of the most stable currencies in Europe. Basing their calculations on a firm currency, Italian producers have revived old industries and started new ones.

Einaudi possessed no magic for turning a poor country into a rich one. Because there are more Italians than Italy can comfortably support, most farms are small and most farmers poor, and there

is chronic unemployment. Because both the government and the trade unions try to "make work," public offices are overstaffed and one rarely meets an Italian manufacturer who does not complain that he is compelled to keep on his payroll more men than he really needs. The result is that wages are comparatively low, while the employers, burdened with heavy overhead costs, are handicapped in competition on foreign markets. But, within limits imposed by the Italian demographic position, the Einaudi policy has been successful.

Retreat from Statism

It is perhaps not sufficiently realized that the swing to the Left which was so pronounced almost everywhere in Europe immediately after the war has now gone into reverse in many countries. The word *"dirigism,"* meaning a state-controlled economy, is in disrepute in France today.

There are so many parties and so many political cross-currents in France that it is seldom possible to draw a clear conclusion from a French election. But it is significant that two political groups which have displayed increased strength in the national election of last June and the more recent cantonal elections are the Radicals (a mildly right-of-center party) and the Independents, a still more conservative group, ferociously opposed to anything savoring of *dirigism*.

The economic trend in France has been steadily away from Statism. Rationing, which was always a mockery and led to corruption and racketeering suggestive of prohibition in the United States, has long been an unlamented memory. Snoopers no longer harass the traveler with questions as to whether he is taking French francs into or out of the country (the surest sign of a weak and wobbly currency). As the Communists have, for all practical purposes, seceded from the national political community, and the Socialist vote has diminished appreciably, the believers in a free market economy have the field pretty much to themselves.

Belgium stands in the front rank of reviving economic liberalism in Europe. A field study of the effects of collectivism and individualism in politically free countries might well concentrate on Great Britain and Belgium.

I received some advance briefing on the subject from an observant woman in the Belgian Embassy in London, where I had gone to obtain my Belgian visa after spending a month in austere Britain in 1946. "In Belgium," she said, "a peasant will take a good deal of care to raise a chicken or a pig, because he knows he can get a good price for it. Here there are so many regulations and restrictions that it doesn't seem worth while to many people to raise pigs or poultry. As the English are in the habit of saying: 'They couldn't care less.' "

Even in 1946 Belgium was freer from controls and better stocked with consumer goods than any country I visited in Europe, except Switzerland. And a visit to Belgium in 1949 left an unforgettable memory of the visible energy and efficiency which are generated when incentive is not blunted by rationing, excessive taxation and similar measures.

The reasons were pretty obvious. The Belgians were working for "hard" money on a competitive basis, and they had plenty of incentive before their eyes. The shop windows of Brussels and of Belgian provincial towns were bursting with an abundance of foodstuffs and manufactured goods. Because the Belgian currency was convertible the consumer could take his choice of imported products: American automobiles, typewriters, fountain pens and cigarettes; Swiss watches; Dutch and Egyptian grapes; Spanish and Portuguese wines.

Austerity-ridden countries both inside and outside the Iron Curtain have been proceeding on the grim philosophy of trying to "starve themselves great." They have denied their peoples all but bare essentials in the hope of forcing exports or promoting internal development projects. What this philosophy, whether of the drastic Communist or the milder Socialist variety, overlooks is that austerity adversely affects individual effort and productivity. What is important is not only full employment, but efficient employment, not only how many people may be working, but the temper and quality of their work.

And here the record of Belgium, a small country with a little over eight million inhabitants, speaks for itself. With their method of the free market and the full shop window the Belgians have inspired so much working energy that for years they have not only saturated their home market with goods, but have built up surpluses with almost all their trade partners in Europe.

If the rest of Europe had followed the Belgian example and gone in for free economies and convertible currencies, Belgium, at least as early as 1949, would have been quite independent of American aid. At that time it had a surplus trade balance of about $400 million with other European countries and a deficit of about $200 million with the dollar area. The ECA was giving Belgium some $200 million in "conditional aid"—that is, purchasing Belgian goods to this amount, for subsequent distribution among needy countries on the handout list.

The same pattern of superior Belgian energy and productivity has persisted under the EPU (European Payments Union), an arrangement which is supposed to facilitate multilateral trade by providing a central agency for clearing trade surpluses and deficits. This is designed to eliminate the necessity for bilateral deals between countries with inconvertible currencies. Here is a significent excerpt from a Paris dispatch in the *Wall Street Journal* of October 18:

> **Belgium's soaring trade surplus, which has been alarming European monetary officials, rose to a new high last month. Belgium's surplus of exports over imports reached $500 million in September. During the first nine months of this year the nation's exports have exceeded its imports by 15 per cent.**

There certainly must be some element of superior energy and productivity in a national economy that year after year deluges its neighbors with surplus goods while maintaining an enviable standard of home consumption. Belgians were amused, not angry, while I was there in 1949, over a statement by John Strachey, then British Food Minister, that Belgian workers were worse off than the British because of the absence of rationing. "Maybe ten per cent of the Belgian people, the very poorest, have as many deprivations as the British, with their rationing," said one Belgian acquaintance. "If our workers were on a British diet, we would probably have a general strike, maybe a revolution," said another.

The trend away from state interventionism, toward the revival of genuine economic liberalism, is one of the most hopeful signs of the times in many countries of Continental Europe. This movement is not always wholehearted or consistent. Business firms which object to state interference are not always averse to cartel and price-fixing arrangements which rob economic individualism of much of its vitality.

Sometimes ECA officials with Keynesian views have put pressure on the Italian disciples of Einaudi to relax safeguards for the stability of the country. Erhard's policy in Germany would lead to still greater success if the arbitrary chopping up of German industrial companies by foreign edict would cease and if the complicated outside controls represented by the Ruhr Authority, the Coal Control, the Steel Control were abolished.

The Schuman Plan, an excellent idea in so far as it creates a large common European market where tariffs and subsidies will be abolished, would be a still better idea if it were not accompanied by the creation of so many international bureaucratic organizations. Economic liberals who defend the Plan use the familiar argument that half a loaf is better than no bread.

On the basis not of theory, but of proved performance in Germany, Italy, Belgium and France, economic liberalism has proved a powerful instrument for stimulating productivity, wiping out shortages and curing economic maladjustments swiftly and painlessly. It is also the philosophy which holds out the best hope of promoting closer European unity.

It is no accidental coincidence that true economic liberals like Ludwig Erhard and Luigi Einaudi and Paul Reynaud are enthusiastic champions of the unity of free European countries, which is the best shield against direct or indirect Soviet aggression. For economic liberalism, consistently followed, makes for supranationalism, free movement of men, goods and capital across national borders, national interdependence. Socialism and every other kind of Statism makes for national planning and its familiar accompaniments—trade controls, inconvertible currencies, barter deals, quotas, autarchy. Free European union is possible only on a platform of all-around economic liberalism.

This Is What They Said

The Missing Minutes

I REMEMBER that [John Paton Davies] was the author of the report stating that the [Chinese] Communists definitely had a non-Russian orientation. . . . I was shocked that he reported that the Communists had a non-Russian orientation because I had in my hand since the latter part of 1943 the minutes of a congress held in Yenan on the occasion of the dissolution of the Comintern . . . printed for consumption in the English-speaking countries. But I was told by my Chinese friend who brought it home from China and gave it to me in 1943 that it was suppressed in this country because the Communist line as dictated by the Kremlin was to influence the people of the United States to believe that there was no Russian orientation among the Chinese Communists. . . . Mao Tse-tung made that speech May 26. The Comintern was abolished May 23. He said, "It does not matter. Whereas we have received instruction from the Soviet Union over a long period of years, the change will not be very significant. . . ." He didn't say that they wouldn't receive any more instruction, but he said they would receive no more instruction from the Comintern. "Nevertheless," he said, "Communism is Marxist Leninism," and he said it over and over.

And when I read that . . . I said, "Well, this was said by the Communists on May 26 in Yenan and it was printed and published" . . . in October 1943 . . . "and yet our State Department men continued to report that there was no Soviet orientation and our popular writers on China, Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, and so on, continued to say the same thing." Was that then stupid, ignorant reporting or was it deliberate writing? That was a question which came to my mind again and again in 1944 and 1945 because the document was never sent in. I never saw it in the State Department when I went there. I never saw it in Naval Intelligence. No such document was ever given any publicity. I heard from the Chinese that it was suppressed in the United States. Therefore, gentlemen, will you excuse me if I had the effrontery to suspect that there was a deliberate attempt to confuse the American public and possibly the American government on the subject of the Chinese Communists and their policies?

EMMANUEL S. LARSEN, in testimony before Loyalty Hearing on J. S. Service, included in exhibits of Tydings Committee

The Freeman invites contributions to this column, and will pay $2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged. THE EDITORS

Emmett Lavery's Strange Crusade

By OLIVER CARLSON

THIS IS a time of memoirs and confessions, from Churchill and Jesse Jones to Budenz and Bentley. Erstwhile diplomats, cloak-and-dagger boys and Communist spies are giving us the low-down on how they operated.

One of Hollywood's screen writers, Emmett Lavery, has just revealed that he was engaged in fighting movieland's subversives at the time when almost everyone else thought he was their faithful friend and ally. Mr. Lavery, by his own admission, is both a pious and a modest man. He might never have let us in on his secret if it hadn't been for the recent Congressional Hearings on Communism in Hollywood. To be sure, Mr. Lavery did not testify in those Hearings, but he did attend them. And when he was introduced to the television audience at the last day's session, he let the public know that he, as a three-term president of the Screen Writers Guild, from 1944 to 1947, had pioneered the fight against Communist infiltration within that organization.

Unfortunately, Mr. Lavery gave no details. In the meantime, Hollywood is all a-twitter awaiting his revelations. These are bound to make fascinating reading, especially to that small and courageous band of long-time anti-Communist screen writers who were under attack by both Lavery and the Communists during 1944-47.

So far as we can now determine, Lavery must have set out upon his daring adventure in the fall of 1943. Fred Niblo Jr. told me recently about Lavery's actions at the Communist-inspired Hollywood Writers Congress of October 1943.

"I was under no illusions as to the party-line character of this congress," said Niblo. "I attended the sessions to observe, and also, if possible, to strike a verbal blow or two for Americanism. I saw Emmett and this gave me courage. Naively, I believed he had come with an attitude similar to my own. I was aghast, therefore, to hear him vote resoundingly "Aye" to every fantastic and left-wing resolution proposed to the packed audience.

"A month later," added Niblo, "the Hollywood screen writer, Emmett Lavery—obscure until then—became a director of the Executive Board of the Screen Writers Guild, which, as I testified to before Congress in 1947, was already Communist-dominated."

Sidney Buchman, who was president of the Screen Writers Guild in 1943, finally admitted under oath in October 1951 that he had been a Communist Party member at that time.

Lavery certainly fooled the Communists. From then on they viewed him as one of their friends and supporters. He presided at many meetings, such as that of the Council of Hollywood Guilds and Unions, June 28, 1944. The sole purpose of this carefully rigged meeting was to denounce and traduce the newly established Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American Ideals.

Less than a month later, on July 13, the Pacific Coast Communist *People's Daily World* reported with apparent satisfaction that "Lavery Heads Film Writers." Lavery had just been chosen the new head of the Hollywood Film Writers Mobilization, succeeding Robert Rossen. (This organization was cited by both the Attorney General of the United States and the California Committee on Un-American Activities as subversive and Communist.)

LONE WOLF Lavery bored deeper and deeper into Hollywood's Red network, to the consternation of his old friends. Screen-writer Lester Cole had taken over the reins as acting president of the Guild when Buchman shifted to the job of Executive Producer at Columbia Pictures. The Cole-Maltz-Trumbo-Lawson machine had a stranglehold on the Screen Writers Guild at the time. Everyone assumed Cole would be elected president for the coming year, for the non-Communists were disorganized and dejected. But they had failed to reckon with the astuteness of Emmett Lavery. To the amazement of all but a handful of top pro-Communists, Lester Cole withdrew from the race at the last minute.

"I was present at that meeting on the night of November 8, 1944," said Niblo, "when, with face wreathed in smiles, and his arm on our hero's shoulder, Mr. Cole stepped aside and nominated Mr. Lavery for the presidency."

Mr. Lavery was so clever that the Communists never suspected him. In fact they helped to re-elect him to the presidency of the Guild for the next two terms. But how could they have suspected him? Lavery appeared to be playing their game. He denounced the Congressional and state committees investigating Communist and other subversive activities. He was quoted with approval by the *People's Daily World* on numerous occasions. He was chairman of the meeting which, on June 6, 1945, launched the new Communist-front organization, HICASSP (Hollywood Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions). Lavery at once became a member of the new organization's executive council. He declared in 1946 (as published on the front page of the *People's Daily World*) that the prime danger facing the world was still fascism—*not* communism.

Those who insisted that Hollywood was infested with Reds drew down upon themselves the oratory

and invective of Lavery. He debated the issue in public and over the radio a number of times, confounding his former friends by his dialectical arguments.

All the while that Lavery appeared to be fronting for the Commies, he was also loudly proclaiming his faith as a Catholic, his belief in America, and his loyalty as a New Deal Democrat. No one cheered him louder for these statements than the pro-Communists. Here, they might well have said to each other, we have a master of double-talk who will win many dupes and innocents for us. But little did they reckon that what Lavery was handing out was triple-talk to confuse the Communists!

Among the many who were confused by Lavery's actions was W. R. Wilkerson, editor and publisher of the *Hollywood Reporter*, the widely read daily trade paper of the motion picture industry. In a signed front-page editorial of September 12, 1946, captioned "My Dear Mr. Lavery," Mr. Wilkerson cited Lavery's long record of association with known Communists and Communist-front organizations. Then he asked:

> As president of the Screen Writers Guild, and as an acknowledged Catholic, don't you realize that you have a lot of people up in the air since you allow yourself to become an ally and apologist of men who are reputed to have long Communist records and who do not even deny that they are Communists? Don't you think that all of us here in the picture business are very much concerned about your beliefs, inasmuch as you are the top representative of one of our most important groups? And do you think your insistence that you are a Catholic, whose Church and its people are hated by Commies, relieves any of our concern? Don't you think that the insistence of all the hatchet-men of the Communist Party here that you are a good Catholic adds to our concern?

In the spring of 1946 Emmett Lavery entered the political arena as a candidate for Congress on the Democratic Party ticket. Shrewdly he picked as his campaign manager Victor Shapiro, well known as an extreme leftist. Shapiro was identified as a long-time Communist Party member at the recent Hollywood Hearings. Lavery's campaign committee (as may be seen from the printed letterheads) included no fewer than eight of the infamous "Hollywood Ten." His list of sponsors included a host of well-known fellow-travelers and party-liners.

Mr. Lavery was roundly defeated by the voters. He has never explained the whys or wherefores of this political campaign, but almost any day now he will probably tell us it was all done for the purpose of exposing the utter worthlessness of Communist support in political campaigns.

NOT TILL the end of 1947 did Lavery begin his break with the Hollywood Reds. At first they couldn't believe what had happened. Dalton Trumbo, who had been very close to Lavery during his Red interlude, not only denounced him in a lengthy letter mailed to hundreds of members of the Screen Writers Guild, but also wrote a caustic pamphlet entitled: "The Time of the Toad."

The intricate workings of Lavery's mind are hard to fathom. For example, in 1947 he and actor Albert Dekker debated Senator Jack Tenney and Mrs. Lela Rogers on Town Hall of the Air. The question at issue was whether communism was a threat to Hollywood. Lavery and Dekker denied it. In the course of the debate, Mrs. Rogers cited as evidence of pro-Communist influence an unproduced screen play by Lavery, which, she said, followed the Communist Party line.

Lavery's play, "The Gentleman From Athens," was never purchased by any studio, but it did have a few days run on Broadway. Lavery brought suit for $1,000,000 against Mrs. Rogers and a number of leading Hollywood anti-Communists (James K. McGuinness, Ayn Rand, Morrie Ryskind, Sam Wood) who, he charged, had helped Mrs. Rogers prepare her script for the debate. Mrs. Rogers's attack upon his play, claimed Lavery, injured its sale and income possibilities for him.

Although Lavery had openly announced himself as anti-Communist ever since 1948, that in no way interfered with his million-dollar lawsuit against the other anti-Communists. The trial took place in Los Angeles this past summer. The judge threw out most of the points upon which the suit was based, but the jury did bring in a verdict for $30,000 in favor of Lavery.

Lavery seems to have been kept steadily at work for the motion picture studios all through the years. (Maybe they knew he was just fooling the Commies during 1944-47.) Now that he has admitted that he was a leader in the fight against the pro-Communists in the Screen Writers Guild during his three years as its president, a great many of the screen writers who suffered so bitterly at his hands for their active Americanism during that period are waiting for him to enlighten them as to the exact nature of his anti-Communist activities during those years. Lavery's explanation (if he ever gives it) should at least be highly original.

I May Become a Communist –

When Stalin's portrait begins to appear on the second page of Soviet newspapers instead of the first;

When Moscow makes an official announcement that the Singer sewing machine was not invented in Russia;

When a Soviet citizen accused of conspiring against the government is freed on bail; when he skips bail and has it forfeited; when several organizations then start a collection all over Russia to have the forfeited bail replenished;

When our American Communists and fellow-travelers admit that Moscow was wrong at least once during the past year. ARGUS

The Weapon of Taxation

By **TOWNER PHELAN**

IN 1819 Chief Justice Marshall said: "The power to tax is the power to destroy." Twenty-nine years after Marshall's dictum in McCulloch *v.* Maryland, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels published the "Communist Manifesto." It was a blueprint for the destruction of "bourgeois" society. It advocated a "heavy progressive or graduated income tax" as one of the weapons to be used to destroy democratic governments and pave the way for communism. Marx and Engels were aware that a graduated income tax offers an almost irresistible temptation to abuse. Their immediate aim was to sharpen and intensify what they regarded as the class struggle. Their ultimate aim was to shatter the very foundations of the democratic state, to destroy it utterly and replace it with a proletarian dictatorship.

The late Professor Harold J. Laski also looked upon taxation as a *weapon* to destroy our society and replace it with socialism. In 1929 he participated in a symposium entitled, "The Socialism of Our Times," and in discussing the "Next Steps in American Socialism," said:

> The first step of all is to awaken the American people to a sense of the positive character of the state. . . . Pressure for higher taxation on unearned and large incomes is vital: the amount so raised to be used as grants-in-aid for social purposes, e. g., *education to the state.* The idea of the grant-in-aid is fundamental to the idea of a national minimum; and this, in its turn, lies at the heart of socialism.

"Education to the state" meant bribing the voter with the taxpayers' money and thereby educating him to look upon the state as Santa Claus. Laski realized that without such "education" socialism would be impossible. Laski gave as his reasons for advocating excessive taxation to be used for Welfare-State handouts that:

> It convinces the average man that the machinery of the state can be used to safeguard his interests directly. He sees that . . . *the weapon of taxation* is at his disposal.

The ideas of Marx and Laski have already borne fruit in the United States. We now have approximately forty uncoordinated Federal grants-in-aid programs in operation under which expenditures were about $2.2 billion in the fiscal year 1950. But this is just the beginning since most of these programs involve large contingent liabilities. If, as Laski said, "the grant-in-aid . . . lies at the heart of socialism," then we are well on the road toward complete socialism.

Both Karl Marx and Harold Laski looked upon excessive taxation as a weapon to destroy the existing type of society and to replace it with socialism. The goals of Communists and Socialists are identical—only their methods are different. Laski was not a Communist, but a Marxian Socialist. He differed from the Communists only in wanting to achieve socialism by peaceful means, rather than by violence, and in his mistaken belief that freedom of speech and other civil liberties can long survive under a Socialist regime.

What has happened in England presents impressive proof of the truth of Marshall's dictum that "the power to tax is the power to destroy." It would be an overstatement to ascribe all of England's difficulties to confiscatory taxation, but there can be little doubt that excessive taxation has played a major role in sapping the vitality of the British economy, lowering the standard of living, and redistributing not wealth, but poverty. Excessive taxation has been the principal factor in preventing the creation of new wealth without which the standard of living necessarily must decline. The London *Economist* correctly says:

> The standard of living of a nation depends . . . on the productive capital it possesses . . . much more . . . than on all other things put together.

The *Economist* points out that high taxation has dried up the sources of capital in England. It says:

> The level of taxation is too high not merely because it is unpleasant for the taxpayers, but also, for the strictly economic reason that it has an unhealthy reaction on the output of the community. All down the line, from the surtax payer to the unskilled laborer, the *disincentive* effect of high taxation is plainly visible. Even more damage is probably being done by the rapid depletion of the free working capital of business enterprises, and by *the virtual stoppage of private savings available for venture capital.*

How great a tax burden can we shoulder without undermining the strength and vitality of the American economy on which the survival of the free world depends? Economists are pretty generally in agreement that when the tax burden exceeds 25 per cent of the national income, that is more than a country can bear without undermining its solvency. Colin Clark, the eminent Australian economist, has made a study of what actually happened in various countries when the tax burden rose above 25 per cent of the national income. His studies show that when the expenditures go up beyond that figure, inflation sets in and prices rise and do not stabilize until the level of government expenditures falls to, or below, 25 per cent of the national income.

Colin Clark quotes Lord Keynes, the high priest

of deficit financing and government-planned inflation, as writing him in May 1944 that: "In Great Britain after the war I should guess that your figure of 25 per cent as the maximum tolerable proportion of taxation may be exceedingly near to the truth." Clark states that:

> In the United States, taxation did not pass the critical limit until 1943, and even in the worst years of the war it rose no higher than 29 per cent of the national income. Suppressed inflation (rationing and price controls) ended in 1946; whereupon open inflation continued at a moderate rate until 1948, bringing taxes down to almost exactly the 25 per cent level.

Based on the 1950 tax bill, the latest estimates of Federal taxes amount to about $65 billion; state and local taxes, to about $20 billion. The new tax bill will raise an additional $5.75 billion in Federal taxes, making a total national, state, and local tax burden of nearly $91 billion, or nearly one-third of the national income. History demonstrates that such a tax burden is too great, that it generates inflation and gravely damages the economy.

There are only two ways to reduce the tax burden. One way is by an increase in deficit spending. This method would aggravate and intensify our present inflation. The second way is to cut expenditures in the places where cuts will not impair our defense program. President Truman in his 1951 Midyear Economic Report said: "The Budget which I have submitted to the Congress for the current fiscal year represents a minimum program." This is a completely unrealistic appraisal of the situation. Since 1947 *peacetime non-war expenditures* of the United States have more than doubled from $6,103,000,000 in the 1947 fiscal year to $12,478,000,000 budgeted for the fiscal year 1951. The budget for the fiscal year 1952 calls for a reduction of only $574,000,000 in these peacetime expenditures. These figures do not include expenditures for national defense, foreign economic aid, veterans' benefits, and interest on the national debt.

Five classifications of peacetime expenditures in the 1952 budget total $8,836,000,000, or more than three times their 1947 total of $2,650,000,000. Nondefense expenditures in 1947, although only half the current level, nonetheless included a great deal of spending that could have been eliminated. For instance, in 1947, Federal, state, and local governments distributed $9 billion in welfare payments to individuals under various programs. These payments exceeded the total wages and salaries then paid in the automotive, iron, steel and rubber industries combined. It is nonsense to say that our peacetime expenditures can not be cut in half and reduced from the $12 billion to the 1947 $6 billion level. In fact they should be cut by a greater amount. It is dangerous demagoguery, in the critical situation we now face, not to attempt to reduce these expenditures in order to protect the American dollar and the solvency of the American economy.

Further billions can be saved without harm to national defense by cutting some of the outlays labeled as war expenditures. Veterans' benefits are so classified and amount to $4,911,000,000 in the 1952 budget. A large part of this goes to provide wholly unjustified free medical and hospital service and pensions for veterans *whose ailments and disabilities are in no way connected with their military service.* Senator Byrd estimates that $3.5 billion could be lopped off the foreign aid program without hurting our defense effort. There is no possibility of eliminating waste in the defense effort unless military expenditures are made subject to civilian review, not merely on a basis of a critical analysis of the principal categories of military expenditure. The military has emerged from its pre-Korean role of "the forgotten man" to its present role of "the sacred cow." The way to reduce military expenditures without harm to the defense effort is for Congress to insist upon critical civilian review. It is shocking to note that the Senate Appropriations Committee, in passing on a $57-billion military appropriation, had the assistance of only one technical staff member. The Senate Appropriations Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee need the assistance of a large technical staff to enable them to pass intelligently upon the huge budget requests of the military.

Economy Through Prevention

Although Congress has accomplished little in reducing expenditures, it has done a marvelous job in preventing a huge increase. Mr. George C. Smith, Secretary of the Government Expenditures Committee of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, points out that: "The President's major requests made in the January Budget Message and later in the year come to a grand total of $105.5 billion." Congress actually voted $91.7 billion or $13.3 billion less than Mr. Truman asked.

Mr. Smith points out that this saving was made in two ways: First, the economy drive in Congress, spearheaded very largely by Senators Byrd and Douglas and backed by public opinion, forced Mr. Truman to reduce his supplemental budget requests very substantially as compared with the amounts which in his January Budget Message he said he would ask Congress to grant. Second, Congress cut still further the amounts requested. What Congress did was to prevent a vast threatened increase in the budget, rather than to cut back the swollen peacetime budget to the 1947 level or below. The budget can and should be slashed by an additional $10 billion. Such a reduction could be made without in any way impairing the national defense.

The tax bill recently passed by Congress provides additional taxes of about $5.75 billion. The Administration first requested $16 billion, and later, under the pressure of public opinion, reduced its demands to $10 billion. A $10-billion reduction in government expenditures, coupled with the new taxes recently voted, would provide as much money as the Administration first wanted to raise in new taxes alone.

How important is it to get $10 billion by reducing expenditures rather than by adding to the current intolerable level of taxation? Last February, Secretary of the Treasury Snyder testified that individuals had about $68 billion of taxable income left after the payment of income taxes. A little over $50 billion of this amount, or 73.7 per cent, fell in the income tax brackets of less than $2000. There was only $9.7 billion in tax brackets over $4000 and $6.5 billion in the tax brackets over $6000. Thus the tax bill recently passed by Congress will take from the taxpayer an amount almost equal to the combined incomes, after taxes, of everyone with a taxable income above $6000.

To raise the $10 billion the Administration requests would take from the taxpayer a greater sum than the combined incomes of all people with taxable incomes above $4000. It is unthinkable that the government can raise such sums in additional taxes without sabotaging the American economy.

The obstacles to reducing Federal spending by $10 billion—and doing so without harm to the defense effort—are political, not economic. It would require a retreat from Welfare-State socialism and would step on the toes of important pressure groups which have a vested interest in government subsidies. The real question, which Congress has made a courageous effort to meet and which the Administration completely ignores, is: Do we want to maintain a solvent America, protect the integrity of the dollar, and stop inflation?

Not only must the tax burden on the American people be reduced, but it must be redistributed so as to have the least disrupting effect upon the American economy and the maximum effect in stopping inflation. As the President's Council of Economic Advisers observed in their December 1950 report to the President,

> The really challenging tax issue is *from where* taxes should be collected. . . . If the taxes are to have the desired effect in offsetting inflation they must be imposed *where they will reduce spending.*

Judged by this criterion, the bill recently passed by Congress is one of the worst tax bills ever enacted. Nonetheless, the tax bill, bad as it is, is excellent by comparison with what the Administration wanted.

We are faced with a prolonged, but indefinite, period of semi-mobilization involving great economic stresses and strains and inflationary dangers. In such a situation our tax structure should be designed to have the maximum effect in restraining inflation and the least effect in retarding production and in destroying incentives to work, save, and invest. The bulk of the spending is done by the lower income groups. They consume most of the nation's goods and have, in the aggregate, the overwhelming bulk of personal income left after Federal taxation. People with taxable incomes of less than $4000 have 85.7 per cent of all personal income left after taxes. Therefore, if our objective is to restrain inflation and impose taxes *"where they will reduce spending,"* the additional burden should be placed mainly on this group—people with taxable incomes of less than $4000.

It has been estimated that a reduction in the Federal income tax exemption from $600 to $500 would add five million people to the income tax rolls and would produce about $2.5 billion of additional revenue. If restraining inflation is our basic objective, then the personal exemption should be reduced at least to $500, and probably to $400. This would do far more to siphon off excess consumer purchasing power than does the new tax bill. Furthermore, broadening the tax base and making millions of people who now pay only indirect taxes pay income taxes would make them realize that government extravagance hits them personally. When their tax burden is indirect, they are likely to feel that "the other fellow" is paying the tax. The tax base should be broadened not only by reducing individual exemptions, but also by taxing the incomes of favored groups that now escape entirely. When the tax burden is heavy, it is particularly important that the base be broad and that everyone share the burden.

The Effect on Production

We turn now to the effect of confiscatory taxation on production. With 85 per cent of the income, left after personal income taxes, in the hands of people with taxable incomes of $4000 and less, it is obvious that people in the upper and middle income brackets are bearing an excessive tax burden. Included in this group are nearly all the people who make our economy strong and dynamic and who create the jobs upon which our welfare depends What motives make these people perform their economic functions, which are so vital to our economy? J. Cameron Thomson, of the Committee for Economic Development, testified on this subject before the Senate Finance Committee and said:

> Who is this man? He is the owner and operator of a moderate sized business. He is a policy-making executive of a fairly large corporation. He is an investor with enough assets to be willing to take risks in a new venture. He is a successful engineer. He is, in short, a person whose decisions are crucial to the vitality and progress of the economy. There are not many such persons. But their importance is out of all proportion to their numbers. . . . What makes this group of persons function? In other civilizations leading classes have been content to continue doing what they and their ancestors had always done, to invest their wealth in palaces and jewels, to spend their time in luxurious pleasures. What makes people in our society willing to risk their wealth in productive ventures and devote their energy to the search for better ways of making better products? A complete answer to this question would list a great many factors. But certainly an important part of the explanation is that there are opportunities in this economy to make money by taking risks and working effectively.

The present tax structure puts pressure upon the owners of small businesses to sell out and retire rather than continue in business. If the principal owner of a moderate-sized corporation remains in

business, his salary and dividends are taxed in very high brackets, but if he sells out, his profit is taxed as a capital gain. The only way he can draw substantial sums from the business without paying most of it to the government is by selling out and retiring. Furthermore, if the bulk of his estate is invested in the stock of a moderate-sized corporation, his estate may be faced with a difficult problem in raising money to meet death taxes; whereas, if he sells out and retires, he can place the proceeds of the sale in marketable securities and put his estate in a liquid position. This premium which our present tax laws place upon getting out of business is unhealthy and has an adverse effect upon our economy.

The immediate effect of increasing taxes on corporations is to cut profits. In the long run, however, taxes upon corporations are paid mainly at the expense of the consumer and of the wage earner. This is true because no corporation can remain in business unless it earns enough to cover all expenses, including taxes. No corporation can expand and increase its investment in plants, machinery, equipment, etc., except on a basis of profits, which it can plow back into the business, or which are large enough to induce investors to supply capital through the purchase of the corporation's securities.

A high level of corporate taxes seriously distorts managerial judgment and justifies many expenditures on the part of a corporation that would not be justified under a lower level of taxation. An uneconomic expenditure (which means a waste of resources) may become an economically justified expenditure if the government pays half the cost of it. The worst tax of all is the excess profits tax, which penalizes growth of companies and breeds corporate waste and extravagance.

If our objective is to restrain inflation, to encourage production, and to keep our economy dynamic, then there is vital need for a thoroughgoing reform in our tax structure. If we wish to prevent a future disastrous fall in our living standards, it is vitally necessary that we heed the warning of the London *Economist*, which the British ignored. In 1948 the *Economist* said:

> It is all too easy for a democratic universal suffrage community to allow capital formation to be pushed to the wall. . . . Capital creation may be necessary; but there are very few votes in it. Yet the penalties for neglecting it, though they may take some time to mature, will in the end be inexorable. An installment is being experienced now. But if underinvestment continues much longer, then it may be wholly impossible to rescue the British economy. . . .

If we are not to go the way of England and see our great, dynamic economy first slow up, then stagnate, wither away, and eventually perish, we must reduce the burden of taxation substantially and reform our tax structure so as to create incentives to work and to invest.

Pattern for Confession

By **ALICE WIDENER**

SOMETIMES the truth is spoken in a negative way in the form of a denial, or of a confession made under strange circumstances. And so it is perhaps natural that now, when Americans stand aghast at the progress of Communist tyranny in a world they fought to free, an important truth has been told them in the form of a confession made by a muddleheaded man with his back against the mountainous wall of his own mistakes.

That man is former Vice President Henry Agard Wallace. The strange circumstance was his urgent need, on October 5, 1951, to answer a charge made before the Senate Internal Security Committee that seven years ago he gave President Roosevelt advice on China that followed the Communist Party line. Wallace's confession was:

> The report might have followed the Communist Party line. I don't know what the Communist Party line was at that time. I'm no expert in the field.

And the real meaning of it was this:

"As Vice President of the United States in a time of world crisis, I was entrusted with a vitally important mission to bolster the forces of freedom in a fight against a powerful enemy. But since I was totally ignorant of the basic facts concerning the enemy, I failed to identify him and may have helped him."

There, in plain words, is the explanation why freedom-loving peoples today live in fear of Communist aggression and enslavement. And there, in plain words, is the answer to an almost endless series of questions: Why Yalta? Why Poland and Czechoslovakia? Why Hungary, Rumania, Albania and Yugoslavia? Why East Berlin and Austria? Why China and Tibet? And why the bloody fighting that makes of all Korea a Heartbreak Ridge?

The basic historical fact of present-day international affairs is that American ignorance made possible the successful expansion of the Soviet Union in the period 1944-1951.

During the last seven years of the first half of the twentieth century, the United States was entrusted with the main defense of freedom against communism. But two Presidents, three Vice Presidents, and five Secretaries of State recklessly disregarded the fundamental maxim: Know thine enemy. Roosevelt, Wallace, Truman, Byrnes, Marshall, Acheson presumably "didn't know what the Communist Party line was." As a result the Demo-

cratic Administration failed to identify the enemy and aided him in both Europe and Asia.

Today everybody knows that disastrous things have been done to all nations engaged in the fight against the world dictatorship of communism. But the most potentially disastrous thing of all is the Administration's attempt to excuse its ignorance with the dishonest alibi that nobody can have expert knowledge of communism and that there is no way of knowing what will be the Communists' next move in world affairs.

"Only Stalin knows," said Truman, "and he's not telling." And the eminent Anne O'Hare McCormick of the *New York Times* wrote about the Chinese-Russian situation in October 1951: "No outsider really knows the score." Yet Joseph Stalin has told the world exactly what his foreign policy and intentions are, and precisely how and where he expects to implement them. The Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union leaders have furnished the world with countless candid-camera shots portraying all the intimate details of their relationship.

Either the Administration has not bothered to find out and face the facts on communism, or it has disregarded and concealed those facts.

IN THE earnest hope that somebody in the Administration will read and pay attention, I present the following list of Stalin's and the Communists' clear statements on policy and strategy. These are the basic facts necessary for the formation of effective and realistic United States domestic, foreign and military policies.

Basis for United States domestic policy in dealing with Communist infiltration:

(The quotations in this section are from "Foundations of Leninism," by Joseph Stalin. New York: International Publishers, 1939.)

> The scientific definition of communism is the dictatorship of one class, alone unto itself, based on power, absolute power, and not on any laws and regulations. . . . The dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule . . . unrestricted by law and based on force . . . of the proletariat. . . . In other words, the law of violent proletarian revolution . . . is an inevitable law of the revolutionary movement. Lenin is right in saying: The proletarian revolution is impossible without the forcible destruction of the . . . state machine and substitution for it of a new one. (pp. 53, 56)

> To a reformist, reforms are everything. . . . To a revolutionary, on the contrary, the main thing is revolutionary work and not reforms; to him reforms are byproducts of the revolution. The revolutionary will accept a reform in order to use it as an aid in combining legal work with illegal work, to intensify under its cover the illegal work for the preparation of the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. (p. 104)

> The Party is the highest form of class organization of the proletariat. This does not mean, of course, that non-Party organizations . . . should be officially subordinated to the Party leadership. It only means that the members of the Party who belong to those organizations and are . . . influential in them, should do all they can to persuade these non-Party organizations to draw nearer to the Party. . . . But the parties of the Communist International, which base their activities on the task of achieving and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, can not afford to be "liberal" or to permit freedom of factions . . . the existence of factions is incompatible either with the Party's unity or with its iron discipline. (pp. 115, 120, 121)

Basis for United States policy on Europe:

> The party of the proletariat decisively rejects what is known as "National Cultural Autonomy."
>
> When a life-and-death struggle is being waged, and is spreading, between proletarian Russia and the imperialist Entente, only two alternatives confront the border regions: 1. Either they join forces with Russia . . . *Or* they join forces with the Entente. . . . There is no third solution. So-called independence of a so-called independent . . . Poland, Finland, etc., is only an illusion.[1]

Basis for United States policy on North Africa:

> In countries like Morocco . . . the task of the Communist elements is to do everything to create a united national front against imperialism. . . .
>
> In such countries as Egypt . . . the Communists can no longer make it their aim to form a united national front against imperialism. In such countries Communists must pass from the policy of a united national front to the policy of a revolutionary bloc of the workers and petty bourgeoisie. . . . A party with such a dual composition is both necessary and expedient . . . as long as it facilitates the actual leadership of the revolutionary movement by the Communist Party.[2]

Basis for United States policy on China:

> Military questions in China are . . . the most important factor in the Chinese Revolution.[3]
>
> . . . The American imperialists are going to miscalculate, because they overlook the historical role which China is called upon to play in Asia and on the Pacific. . . . China will become a menacing threat for the capitalist world of three continents. China must inevitably clash with American imperialism. . . . Revolutionary China . . . can become in alliance with the USSR the greatest world factor in the Far East.[4]

Basis for United States policy on the Middle East:

> The road to victory of the revolution in the West lies through the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries.[5]

In view of the above statements, *all made publicly by the Communists* before 1930, is it not time for the bunglers who still control our foreign policy to make a general confession in the Wallace style? The Democratic Administration should admit:

"We did not know what the Communist Party line was. We were not experts in the field."

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1 "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question," by Joseph Stalin. Printed in English in the USSR. New York: International Publishers, p. 79
2 Op. cit. pp. 216,217
3 Joseph Stalin, November 30, 1926. From "China In Revolt," p. 9 New York: Daily Worker Publishing Co.
4 Dmitri Manuilsky, *ibid*, pp. 45 and 46.
5 Joseph Stalin, "Foundations of Leninism," p. 78

The Moment of Decision

By **GEORGE E. SOKOLSKY**

IT WAS March 1918. Those of us on "The Express Get-away" regarded ourselves as fortunate that we had been permitted to leave Petrograd via Siberia. Others were sent to Murmansk, where, we later heard, many died of pneumonia; others were sent into Germany where, we heard, they were made prisoners of war.

On our train were Americans, Chinese and Japanese. Most of them were diplomats who were returning to their own countries because the Bolsheviks had politely told them to go. There were some businessmen, some missionaries, a few women. My companion on this trip was Yun Chang, the son of Prince Palata, the head of the Turgot Mongols, a lineal descendant of Genghis Khan. He was a boy, 13 years old, who had been in the Tsar's Page Corps and was now being brought back to his father in Peking.

The Russian Revolution had been an exciting and degrading experience. Some of us had hoped that Kerensky could produce a democratic government, with wide representation for the peasants, workers and the middle-class merchants and intellectuals. We hoped for a government by choice of the people. We had conceived of a vital Russia, in the heartland of Europe and Asia, spreading the rays of representative government in all directions.

John Reed was not a Bolshevik. He was not a Marxist of any breed. Often he and I would argue the future of Russia, and where he and I differed was only that he believed that Russia, no matter how organized and by whom, would become a free country and would spread freedom while I feared Marxism more than Tsarism. Tyranny is ugly in any form, but infinitely uglier when gilded by high ideals, for then to oppression is added falsehood.

Trotsky, I think, understood this, but not Lenin who was as orthodox and doctrinaire as an Orthodox monk. He was a rather rotund little man, cold in manner and speech, with twinkling eyes. I saw him often in the Smolny Institute where we gathered daily to capture wisps of news. (I was then editing the *Russian Daily News*, a British-owned, English-language newspaper in Petrograd.)

Stalin was not much then, and we used to see him, too. A short, pockmarked activist, he was in charge of minority nationalities. He could not tell us too much. Men like Kamenev, Chernov, Tseretelli, Zinoviev seemed more important and newsworthy.

But all of them, no matter of which political party, gave the impression of having no understanding of human liberty. Most of the leaders had been educated in German universities and had come under Hegelian influences even before they were Marxists. They were absorbed with details of organization and operation of the power of the state and the authority of their political parties and fractions, but they were not deeply concerned with the right and capacity of the individual human being to live his own life and to form the pattern of his own activities. They would make the perfect world, but they had no intention of permitting man to develop his own capacities.

That to most of us foreigners was disappointing because we did not understand such a brand of democracy. Not being Marxists, we were not so concerned with struggle as with liberty; not so conscious of class as of the individual. Perhaps we were seeking a Thomas Paine in a Marxist world only to find that little more was being done than to substitute serfdom to the State for serfdom to a dying—if not already dead—nobility.

Even among the Western-educated intellectuals, there were none or few who sparked over human liberty. Those who were not Marxists were Royalists, and that is one reason for Kerensky's failure. *"Svoboda,"* liberty, was just a word—it had no roots in the Petrograd of 1917-18. It was an exotic plant unsuitable in this environment.

AND YET, one could sense a terrific and even terrifying power among the Bolsheviks. They had managed their October Revolution with the precision of a staged play. I recall the night that the Kronstadt sailors took Petrograd. Some of us walked the streets early in the evening and encountered, for the first time, Trotsky's Red Army at work. They told us that we need not worry until long after midnight, as nothing would happen. So we went to a concert where Glazunov conducted, and although we could hear cannon and machine-gun fire about town, we knew that things would be slow.

I saw the Winter Palace fall, practically without an effort. Kerensky had gone to Gatchina and was a refugee. Trotsky had done an amazing job of organization in the garrisons and workshops right under Kerensky's nose. The middle-of-the-road Mensheviks were paving the way for the Bolsheviks, although the right wing could have had a majority had it possessed the courage and discipline to accept responsibility. But these right-wing Socialists fought each other rather than the Bolsheviks, and at the Constituent Assembly they were told to go home, and went. That was the end.

It was difficult for one as young as I was then to accept the defeat of great ideals for which he had made some sacrifices that then seemed to be Himalayan. Youth soon learns to accept defeat and to absorb its emotional responses. Crossing Siberia in the early spring, when the ground is covered with

white snow and the air crisp and the pines pungent, turns nostalgia into romantic curiosity. Soon such cities as Tomsk, Irkutsk, Chita, Harbin fill the eye and mind.

But all the time one wonders what is happening back there—what are the Bolsheviks doing to human beings? What is Lenin doing? What is Trotsky doing? There is no news. One travels forward as in a vacuum. No one knows anything. There are no newspapers that print news; we had, none of us, ever listened to a radio or known of its existence. We were in Siberia, cut off from all the world. Occasionally in a village we would see the expropriations at work, for the Terror had begun. But the peasants and the village priests could only say, "What will be, will be." No resistance was apparent until we reached Chita, which the Czechs held.

In such an atmosphere, the little voice begins to ask whether there might be some truth, some little truth, some little hope, in what these men are doing back there. And another little voice fights for rejection; it speaks of age-long traditions, of lessons of life drilled into the mind of the child by his father, the ideal of a God, of a law of life, of gentleness and charity and humility, of the Natural Law—the revealed law of God in the Ten Commandments—and most of all, it shouts, "Thou shalt not murder!"

It was difficult to know what to do with one's life at such a moment. Perhaps had I remained in Russia, I should have ended as a Bolshevik or been purged, killed, murdered for thinking unorthodox ideas or speaking out of turn.

Instead, I was in Peking. And from the day I first saw the barracks of the American Marine Corps in the Embassy Compound in Peking, the flag flying high, I could not compromise with anything. It had to be a life devoted to opposition to Marxism. It could not be otherwise after the tyranny I had witnessed.

What's Happening to Our Magazine Fiction?

By **FRANCES BECK**

A PINCH of something new has been added to this country's magazine fiction. That field of escape literature, so long and so well guarded by the iron bars of editorial taboos, now appears to be wide open to the clever propagandist who can wrap his "message" in the colorful cloth of fiction.

The "message" may constitute the entire theme of the story; or it may be only a single paragraph, even a line, skilfully inserted. Often it wears a religious cloak, a mantle of goodness designed to conceal the bony skeleton of propaganda. But whenever and wherever this propaganda-slanted fiction appears in a magazine, the discerning reader is struck, either uneasily or pleasantly, depending upon his own point of view, with the peculiar fact that the slant is always in the same direction.

There is, of course, no law against the use of fiction as a medium for the dissemination of political, racial, or religious propaganda. Certain writers of novels and plays have used it for that purpose for quite a long time. In these instances the public was neither surprised nor very much offended, for most of such material was rather plainly labeled by jacket blurbs, press reviews, or the reputations of the writers, publishers and producers. Some of it was badly written, some beautifully written, but all of it was written with the obvious hope that people would listen to the writer's "message" and come over to the writer's viewpoint. It was, in its way, honest. It did not slip up from behind to give you a hypodermic shot while you weren't looking; it did not nibble at you from the fiction pages of popular slick-paper magazines.

Prior to the Welfare State and "red herring" era, the editors of popular magazines would not touch a piece of controversial fiction with a ten-foot pole. Anything that might possibly be interpreted as propaganda for or against any particular political party or ideology, or race or religion, was taboo. Editors were adamant about this, as every seasoned writer knows, and nobody broke the taboos and got away with it. In those days propaganda fiction was confined between the covers of books and to the stage and screen, and you could take it or leave it.

Today it is not quite that simple. Today's fiction reader, long accustomed to the absence of controversial propaganda from the formerly innocuous fiction pages of popular magazines, turns to them purely for entertainment, or, if you like, for escape. His guard is down and he is vulnerable. Unarmed, unwarned and unsuspecting, the escape reader, whose habit is to identify himself with the story's main character, becomes the perfect set-up for the fiction-writing propagandist.

It has been said that one picture is worth more than a thousand words. If that is true, then one paragraph of fiction can be worth, for propaganda purposes, more than a whole page of facts, for fiction is, actually, word pictures with the additional factor of reader identification.

The new propaganda fiction has shown up in some very surprising places—for instance, the

Saturday Evening Post (July 22, 1950). In this case the editorial blurb writer makes sure the reader approaches the story ("The Congressman's Temptation" by Dana Burnet) with the desired viewpoint by giving it this introduction:

> The offer was big, and he'd take it in a minute, if he could only still the voice of his conscience . . . and his wife.

We know right away that "the offer" is going to be bad, and that his conscience and his wife are going to win him away from evil.

Thus prepared, we proceed with the story of a Congressman named Robert Midgate, whom we must assume to be a Republican since he is opposing a foreign aid bill. The "offer" about which he wrestles with his conscience and his wife, has to do with his candidacy for the Vice Presidency of the United States as the running mate of a Senator Shaftsbury who "was the acknowledged leader of the conservative wing of Robert's party, a man who might well be its next Presidential candidate."

Shaftsbury, the story says, is a man who believes that the Lord helps those who help themselves, and who thinks the United States should go back to minding its own business and mending its own fences. (The reader has to be careful not to confuse him with Senator Robert A. Taft.) Peggy, our hero's wife, wants none of "isolationist" Shaftsbury or his program, and believes that the Lord helps those who help others. This pious sentiment, combined with what the editor has already told us about Peggy being hand-in-glove with Robert's conscience, settles for sure the matter of what's good and what's bad.

Robert, through the combined efforts of wife Peggy and his guardian angel, comes to realize at last that Shaftsbury and his program are in league with the Devil. He says a virtuous no to the Senator's offer, and emerges as a simon-pure internationalist with a halo around his handsome head and Peggy's passionate kiss upon his purified lips. After being Robert Midgate through about 5000 words of author Burnet's smooth writing, the reader ought to know that all good people are "internationalists." And if that isn't propaganda, what in heaven's name is it?

A MORE recent example is presented by the *Woman's Home Companion* (of the Crowell-Collier group) in "The Celebrity" by Laura Z. Hobson. Mrs. Hobson, it will be remembered, is the writer who gave us "Gentleman's Agreement," which undoubtedly stirred up more animosity between Jews and Gentiles than anything that has been written in many a decade.

In "The Celebrity" Mrs. Hobson's (and the reader's) hero, one Gregory Johns, a noble, intelligent and sincere young man, skyrockets to fame and fortune as the author of a novel called "The Good World." The author had to go to a great deal of trouble and use many thousands of words to get to the real pitch, which is disclosed in the concluding installment in the issue of September 1951. By showing the "deep earnest agreement" and "passion of longing" with which "men and women in every state of the Union, in every walk of life" accept the idea of world government (which is the theme of her hero's novel), Mrs. Hobson obviously hopes to convince the reader that United States sovereignty is an evil thing which should be eliminated as quickly as possible by the establishment of a world government in which this nation would become only a state. How's that for propaganda?

In *Redbook* (a *McCall* sibling) of October 1951 authors Hal and Barbara Borland ("God Give Us Men!") have their soul-searching hero, U. S. Senator Randy Hale, speak this pregnant line to an unethical colleague:

> You can't tell me that you really believe anybody can cut taxes and keep the government functioning in these times.

Ergo, high taxes and high government spending are right and necessary. Propaganda or not, such sentiments should be highly pleasing to an Administration that confiscates about a third of our income and keeps the government functioning to the tune of a national debt of around $260 billion.

BUT THE prize for propaganda (or for sheer idiocy) goes to the *Ladies' Home Journal*, which, like the *Saturday Evening Post*, belongs to the Curtis Publishing Company.

In this one, the author, Grace Boynton ("River Garden of Pure Repose," September 1951) goes all out in such a frantic effort to make a saint of her heroine, Jane Breasted, that in the end, when Jane dies, the reader expects her mortal remains to ascend straight into heaven.

And Miss Boynton and the *Journal's* editors evidently expect the reader, who somehow is supposed to have been spiritually reborn, to accept communism or any other national enemy with the same gentle compassion displayed by the saintly Jane when she received with open arms a known Communist underground agent, persuaded an American conscientious objector (presumably on non-combat duty with either the U. S. Army or the Red Cross; the author doesn't make it clear) to smuggle this Communist agent to safety, and later tried to hide, protect and aid in the escape of a spy for the Japanese.

This sort of thing evidently made a hit with the *Journal's* editors, for they lavished praise upon author Boynton and her work, describing the be-kind-to-Communists-and-enemy-spies opus as the "Enchanting story of a great Quaker woman who lived in the China of yesterday and *today*." (Italics mine; reasons for use will be obvious to anyone who reads the story.)

A protest lodged with the *Ladies' Home Journal* brought the following reply (in part) from its managing editor, Laura Lou Brookman, with respect to the publication of "The River Garden of Pure Repose":

> Jane Breasted, the American heroine who was a Quaker missionary, does indeed seem to us to be a truly Christian character who went about as far as it is humanly possible to go in following the teaching of Jesus Christ in the Sermon on the Mount; "But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you."

I wonder whether the managing editor of the *Ladies' Home Journal* would have applied her "Christian" forgiveness to the Nazis a few years ago.

By coincidence or otherwise, the *Journal's* book reviewer, in the same issue, has this to say of Communist-sympathizing novelist Thomas Mann:

> A vote as to the greatest living novelist today would almost without question put Thomas Mann at the head of the list. And now there is *no* excuse . . . for not reading the world's greatest writer, because "The Holy Sinner" . . . is completely fascinating . . . a story . . . of unforgettable beauty and superb humor.

Why do they do it? Why do the American publishers of such fine old periodicals permit their pages to be used in this manner? Are they simply naive, or don't they even read their own magazines? Do they really want the Welfare State, then socialism, and eventually communism? Or do they, knowing that we have been beaten over the head with accusations of intolerance, bigotry, prejudice, discrimination, materialism, imperialism, nationalism and isolationism until we have acquired a national guilt complex, believe that we, the public, are so anxious to atone that we welcome this pinch of strychnine?

And if it is now all right to publish propaganda fiction in popular magazines, *why* is it all slanted in the same direction?

Non-Partisan

A countryman, both old and wise
in cognizance where error lies,
contrived to open both my eyes;

I was advised that ignorance
involves prohibitive expense:
"Look on both sides of any fence!"

And so, I left my world of dream
where everything deserves esteem;
eventually, I came to deem

such terse advice sagacity—
and so, henceforth, inevitably,
the curious may discover me

alert, aloof, and open-eyed,
interested in either side
whatever fence I sit astride!

SJANNA SOLUM

From Our Readers

On Senator Taft's Candidacy

No doubt, as you say in your issue of November 5, Senator Taft's announcement of his candidacy was a "sober speech." But do not sobriety and sanity usually go together? And it seems to me that we have been getting little of either from the present Administration. Your editorial seems to suggest that the menace of communism calls for a departure from both.

More importantly, Senator Taft's definite characterization of the war in Korea as "Truman's War," implying that it might have been avoided but for President Truman's thought that "here is an opportunity for glorifying President Truman," is sound; and I should have expected that you would agree with it.

Berkeley, California — CHARLES B. COLLINS

How to Stop Usurpation

"Rebellion in the Potato Fields," by Stanley High (*Freeman*, October 8), reports a most serious criminal trespass, a courageous defense, and a legislative invitation to the Executive Government of Iowa to institute criminal prosecution of the guilty conspirators. But nowhere does there appear even a hint of such a prosecution being contemplated.

If the Governor of Iowa chose to make himself an immortal figure of history, he would only need to accept the invitation implied in the resolution adopted by the Iowa Legislature condemning the United States Department of Agriculture for its attempted tyrannies. In such a case, conducted by the People of the State of Iowa under the management of the Attorney General directed by the Governor, the McKinleys would merely be complaining witnesses, along with hundreds of others whose farms have been taken from them in the degree that they are told by the U. S. Department of Agriculture what to raise and how much, when to plant and where, and threatened with heavy penalties for disobedience. . . .

When Charles I of England exceeded the authority of a king, the English Parliament tried, convicted and punished him. When the ministers of Charles II exceeded their legal authority, they also were tried, convicted and beheaded. It is a basic rule of law that an act by an official beyond his authority is not an official act, but is a personal trespass for which the individual is liable. The legal action is not brought against the office or the official but against the individual who pretended to illegal authority.

Just one such prosecution by the governor of any state in the name of the people of his state, brought in the state courts against *particeps criminis* involved in such a conspiratorial trespass as the attempted enforcement of Order 60 of the United States Department of Agriculture, legislated to the limits, holding the arrested parties in

the state prisons until the litigation was finished (such of them as could be caught within the bounds of the state), would teach Federal officials a decent respect for their oaths of office and would go a long way toward preserving state authority, even if desperate endeavors were made to prevent action by the state courts.

Detroit, Michigan — ROYAL D. ROOD

The Acheson-Marshall "Third Force"

For some time I have suspected that Acheson & Co. may have gone into this "limited" war gamble in Korea for reasons other than those alleged, namely: that the situation in the U. S. was building up for a depression and a war scare was needed to change the domestic picture and get more power into their hands—à la Roosevelt; a repeat of the Maestro's performance. Incidentally, this would also help to rearm the U. S. and such of the Allies as might go along. This may explain the illogical shenanigans in relation to the Korean war.

The whole thing can be best understood if the Acheson-Marshall group is understood as a *Third Force*, a Statist group with its own interests and program standing *between* the right and "left," whose interests often run parallel to those of the super-Statists of the Marx-Lenin-Stalin variety but more recently tend to *diverge* because of the latter's power drive.

The "Third Force" Statists tend to be driven, too, and also play with the "Right" for protection against the "Left." It is important to understand the character of this group. It is a mistake to say that Acheson followed the "Party line" 100 per cent. I am sure there is no proof for that; even if Acheson were a secret Party member that would, considering his position, not be his role. That also tends to be the mistake of Senator McCarthy in his otherwise excellent speech on George C. Marshall.

It is obvious, of course, that the Third Force Statists are easy marks for the infiltration activities of their ideological brethren, but we must learn to differentiate lest our politics be too brittle and our charges "beyond belief."

The Statist tree has many branches. The Statists are the Reactionaries of the twentieth century, with the "Third Force" branch as their "liberal wing." These "liberals" can be worked on, not by being nice to them, but by merciless criticism separating them from the wolves. In most cases their "treason" is not premeditated, but a by-product of their "opinions." They are dangerous, to be sure, and as long as they can not be moved out, their power should be whittled away.

Detroit, Michigan — JOSEPH ZACK

"Foeman to Double-Talk"

The *Freeman* is a foeman to cockeyed thinking and double-talk. . . . Congratulations on a really fine magazine.

New York City — JOHN L. ROONEY



A REVIEWER'S NOTEBOOK

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

Eliot Janeway, who covered the wartime "Battle of Washington" for *Time* and *Fortune*, is a sardonic realist, and a political scientist in the tradition of Machiavelli, Pareto, Mosca and Michels. He is also a worshipful admirer of the late Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom he regards as a latter-day embodiment of Queen Elizabeth, that adept practitioner of the art of solving problems by putting them off. The combination of polar opposites in Mr. Janeway's character (the need to see the true inwardness of a situation and the boyish craving to have a hero) gives a strange tension to his work, but the result, speaking from the standpoint of literature, is happy. For the tension of opposites, of incongruities, provokes Mr. Janeway to a constant stream of witty paradox. His book, "The Struggle for Survival: A Chronicle of Economic Mobilization in World War II" (Yale, $5), deals with the so-called "dismal science" of economics, but it is full of things that would have brought Chesterton or any other professional dealer in paradox up sharp.

Paradox, expertly wielded, is a way of riveting the reader's attention. It is also a way of baffling seven out of ten people. Both Roosevelt lovers and Roosevelt haters will be considerably baffled by Mr. Janeway's curious ritual of adoration. He calls Roosevelt a great man, invoking the Lincoln comparison on more than one occasion. Yet (and this is Mr. Janeway's considered opinion) Roosevelt was as vindictive as John T. Flynn says he was. On Mr. Janeway's own showing, carefully documented, our wartime President was untruthful whenever it served his purpose, he was devious, he frequently welshed on political promises, he was a master at kicking men upstairs, he attracted sycophants as a honey jar attracts flies, and he was the world's worst administrator. Now, to call a man a prevaricator, a slippery customer, an Indian giver and an incompetent at organization would seem to be no recommendation for even the most menial of jobs. But politics, says Mr. Janeway in effect, is not as other businesses; it is a topsy-turvy world in which all values are turned on their heads. Roosevelt, slippery as a conger eel, was the best politician of his generation, and for this Mr. Janeway is willing to forgive him everything.

Mr. Janeway believes in Planning with a capital P. He thinks a Mixed Economy—or rather, a Mixed-Up Economy—is here to stay. He is attuned (or maybe resigned) to Keynesianism, to an arbitrary redistribution of incomes via the uncompromising use of the graduated income tax. Yet (and this is the strangest paradox of his book) he thinks Roosevelt was a great man for the simple reason that, as a leader of 155,000,000 people in a war against the planned society of Hitler's *dritte Reich*, Roosevelt ignored every blueprint that was placed before him. Roosevelt was the great pragmatist, the great improviser—and he played every tune, from "Chopsticks" up to the Fifth Symphony, strictly by ear. His method was to get the Planners into Washington, where he could set them off against each other and knock their heads together. When their scalps and noses were sufficiently covered with bumps and black-and-blue marks, Roosevelt would appeal over their bruised heads to the country. Washington, as the cliché of those years had it, was a madhouse, and utterly incapable of transmitting any clear line to the nation as a whole. Yet, while the madmen were playing Napoleon in Washington, the people out in the country went to work, rolled up a staggering number of tanks, guns and planes, and quite capably won the war.

Of course, there were good men in Washington, but they were philosophical policy makers and inspiriting leaders in the old sense, not Planners within the modern meaning of the word. Mr. Janeway has a keen eye for a phony and a great admiration for an able and effective man. He is contemptuous of Stettinius and Donald Nelson, he considers that Knudsen (a great mechanic) was miscast as a policy man, he has an ambivalent attitude towards Baruch (whom he calls a "gabby old sage"), he sets Felix Frankfurter down as a power-lover who masqueraded as an aloof intellectual, and he patently prefers Walter Reuther as a wartime labor leader to Sidney Hillman. On the other hand, he is lavish with his praise for Jim Forrestal (who ran the Navy Department while Knox was getting the headlines); for Leon Henderson (who never managed really to control prices but who buoyed everybody up); for Ferdinand Eberstadt (who saw, with Baruch, that priorities in the use of scarce materials are at the heart of large-scale war); for Henry Kaiser (as a shipbuilder who instinctively grasped "Roosevelt's rule that energy was more efficient than efficiency"); and for Bill Douglas (who never did get in on the war, thanks to the Machiavellian connivings and opposition of Harry Hopkins). Reading the roster of Mr. Janeway's heroes, one is forced to the conclusion that "The Struggle for Survival" proves a very definite case

against Mr. Janeway's own theories of successful wartime economic organization. For Mr. Janeway admires the smart operator, the man who can ignore the blueprint and slash viciously through the red tape. He praises Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson for bypassing Secretary of War Woodring, he cheers the understrappers who pulled several fast ones on Jesse Jones of the RFC. In Mr. Janeway's definition of efficiency, chains and hierarchies of command are made to be broken, and organization charts are something for the wastebasket, or at most to hang on the wall.

The real thesis of Mr. Janeway's book is that we won the war by making it a grab-bag for 155,000,000 Americans. Wages, despite lip-service to the principle of "equality of sacrifice," constantly rose. The farmer got rich. The Stork Club went on the traveler's expense account; the U. S. Treasury paid the Big Shot's liquor bill. Easy amortization policies enabled more than one company to come out of the war with wholly new and efficient plants. Very Important Personages saw the world at government expense, and actually had time for stopoffs in Florida or at Waikiki. With incentive blooming all over the place, the nation really managed to produce. OPA did set prices, but they were prices that took the market into account—and where they didn't, the Black Marketeer saw to it that people had enough steak and hamburger to provide the energy for a full day's work. If morals supposedly suffered because of the Black Market, that was merely proof that the very idea of price-fixing is the Biggest Immorality of them all.

Mr. Janeway calls one of his chapters "The Administration of Anarchy," and that was exactly what it was. By allowing people to make their own decisions once the government contracts had been let, we got the "spontaneous cooperation of a free people" that is Woodrow Wilson's definition of democracy. It is true that we had a big cushion of fat in 1940—fat in the form of 15,000,000 unemployed or semi-employed people, fat in the form of unused factory capacity, fat in the very grain and texture of the American soil. It is also true that next time we may not have so much fat to consume (the labor market is tight in 1951). But fat or no fat, it is not in the books that "controls," strictly applied, can release energy. The excise tax, slapped in varying proportions on all manufactures that a government needs to discourage, would be a more efficient way of channeling wartime energy.

As an anti-price controller, an anti-Statist, an anti-Planner, I am inclined to think Mr. Janeway makes a good case for his hero, Franklin D. Roosevelt. But it is a short-term case. For, while Roosevelt (to his credit) was no capital-P Planner, he was also (to his discredit) a short-sighted man when it came to the long-term results of policy. His offhand improvisations of the New Deal period (which consisted of spending other people's money) cheered a nation up, but they also set in motion a long-term process that must weaken the individual as the self-reliant entity a man should be. Pragmatism is all very well as an operating procedure provided one's values are good, but Roosevelt had no clear values (or, if he did, they were too anti-Emersonian for my taste). Moreover, Roosevelt never did manage to see that the war against Hitler and Japan was a war within a war, and that a greater totalitarian power would be set free to make a shambles of eastern Europe and Asia on the very day after our victory.

Mr. Janeway realizes this about Roosevelt, but it doesn't turn him against his hero. He seems to think that the challenge of one war is about all that one human being can rise to in a single lifetime. He may be right about this. But if he is right, it remains more than ever true that the people who were wrong with Roosevelt about Russia are the very people who should not be entrusted with the present crisis. They have fought their war, and they are psychologically incapacitated for fighting the next.

THE ALMIGHTY ATOM

Our Atomic Heritage, by Arnold B. Grobman.
Gainesville: University of Florida Press. $2.95

Here is a rare gem, indeed—eloquence from a scientist. Professor Grobman discloses in simple, convincing language certain revealing mysteries of genetic science, heretofore obscured by disbelief, conjecture and lack of knowledge. His wealth of factual research into currently vital phases of biological and genetical sciences is laid before the reader authoritatively. He has translated his astounding disclosures into layman's language, explaining the physical changes within the human body and to generations of progeny which result from exposure to radiations, and he includes, as the most prevalent effects of radiations, shortening of the life span, premature aging, production of malignant growths, and skin changes. He presents this shocking information as a dire warning to all mankind.

More than half the volume is devoted to explaining the scientific experiments and invaluable discoveries which relate to hereditary abnormalities resulting from meticulously controlled tests on many generations of mice exposed to various dosages of radiations. These tests were conducted at the University of Rochester during World War II, and they prove that "there is no threshold below which radiations fail to induce mutations."

Professor Grobman relates the current usages of radioactive isotopes in medical research, physics, chemistry, medical therapy, industrial research, bacteriology and metallurgy. Applications of these radioactive isotopes are growing almost daily throughout the fields of medicine, science, industry.

The author discusses the heritage of atomic energy for industry, presenting the subject with the clearest insight, conviction and economics of any similar treatise in print. He focuses the microscope of critical inspection on the uses of atomic energy in railways, aircraft, power plants and other utilities, and he gives the reader the benefit of indisputable conclusions.

In presenting in this excellent book the most spectacular of our atomic heritages, "The Bomb and Human Welfare," the author dispels with polite but firm conviction the irresponsible statements of obviously unqualified public figures—journalists, politicians and militarists; he clarifies existing chaotic thinking on the pros and cons of atomic warfare; and, finally, he proclaims his belief in establishing unassailable national strength, neighborly foreign policy, and a powerful, controlling United Nations.

ROBIN BEACH

LAURELS FOR BORROWERS

By EDWARD DAHLBERG

THE STORY of Herman Melville is the fable of the living American writer. Let no one assume that the disinterment of nineteenth-century genius means that the living are not entombed. Nothing has changed, and besides there is more profit in canonized dust than in living flesh. Those who praise Whitman, Poe, Melville, James and Emily Dickinson are promoting the same oblivion for the writer today that the author in the nineteenth century had.

One of the grim ironies of American literature is that people who can not write are almost invariably chosen to do books on those who can. The shrewd batten on our memorial dust. Poets are nowhere near as astute as critics, for who but a fool would write "Moby-Dick" or be Edgar Poe simply to be reviled and go naked of love and friends. A fool writes a masterpiece, but the pickpocket sometimes called a critic gets the cash. For a poet good writing is often an accident; for a critic it is generally impossible.

Now that fruitful learning has declined, knowledge has become an abstruse fact about Petrarch or Dante. But wisdom, which has deteriorated along with true learning, has little to do with isolated facts. A good book, says the poet Louis Zukofsky, is a form of love and trust. Melville's "Moby-Dick" is a novel about blubber, sperm oil and candles, which are facts. It is also a novel about human faith. Our critics, with notable exceptions, have dealt with this faith in a most dismaying manner.

Let us look at the Herman Melville story. Today the reading of Melville is commonplace; there is a market for Melville's notes, diaries and letters as collected by Jay Leyda in "The Melville Log" (Harcourt, Brace, two volumes, $12.50) and an audience for a theatrical work made out of "Billy Budd." But when Raymond Weaver in 1921 published "Herman Melville, Mariner and Mystic," Melville was no more than a name or epitaph in American literature. Academicians like Woodberry dismissed our greatest writer in a line or two. John Macy in "The Spirit of American Literature" gave the author of "Moby-Dick" an italicized mention in his preface. Though Constable in London had done the complete works of Melville in 1922, his books were very difficult to obtain in this country. Melville books were sold along with volumes on yachts at a salt water bookshop in New York City.

In 1922 a small and useful collection of Melville letters, edited by Meade Minnegerode, was brought out by the gifted Byrne Hackett of the Brick Row Bookshop. Then, in 1923, D. H. Lawrence's "Studies in Classical American Literature" appeared. This sibylline work was scorned by the academic Philistines like Fred Lewis Pattee who made a handsome living out of textbooks (the most menial adversary of a book is a textbook). The Lawrence study was also ignored by the college hacks who are now writing for the American Letters Series, for Lawrence had no trade value then. The Lawrence volume was so neglected that Alfred Stieglitz gave dozens of copies away to people who came to his gallery at 291 Fifth Avenue just to get it read.

In 1928 Lewis Mumford, making an honest and cavalier acknowledgment to Raymond Weaver, published a book on Melville. Despite its flaws, Mumford's book was pioneer work, and it is not the purpose of this piece to diminish the chivalric labors of the pioneer Melville men. A tribute should also be given to Wilbert Snow, former Lieutenant Governor of Connecticut and the first Melville enthusiast in America.

In 1938 Charles Olson's rare and lovely essay, "Lear and Moby-Dick," appeared in *Twice a Year*. If I may say it, I fathered Olson's work; his "Call Me Ishmael" (Melville criticism) had come out of my own book, "Do These Bones Live," published in 1940. Lest there be misunderstanding, let it be said that one good book begets another, as Abraham begat Isaac and Isaac, Jacob. Nobody but a churl or a plagiarist tries to hide his obligation to another writer, and Olson has paid whatever debt he owes to me in a prodigal tribute in "Call Me Ishmael." Besides, there are passages in the Olson "Ishmael" volumes which the sea oracles whispered to him and him alone and which I never heard or dreamed of—and, should a reader take it that I am trumpeting a friend, let it be known that Olson and I are strangered.

I have only two purposes here: one, to tell the truth, and, two, to expose those who would take undue credit for what other men have done. The care of American literature has been preempted by the grammar beadles of criticism, and no poet or novelist who is not a part of this cabal against American literature has a chance of being heard or reviewed. The college Polonius is omnipresent; he laurels dust and corpses. But he doesn't bring the corpses to life. He is a death merchant of letters, he controls awards—and he behaves toward living talent as though it did not exist. This takes us up to the present and to the American Letters Series volume "Herman Melville" (Sloane, $4) by Newton Arvin, professor of English at Smith College and recent winner of a book industry award for his biographical study.

It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for an original writer to get into the Institute of Arts and Letters or be chosen to write for the American Letters Series. It is also better that it should be this way, for it is nobler to be a poet than to be shrewd. Poe so hated the Brahmins of his own time that he would not admit that he was born in Boston. One of his angers against the arts-and-letters boors he called "The Quacks of Helicon," and another and rougher piece he titled, "Mr. Longfellow and Other Plagiarists." If Poe were alive today he would obviously be sued for libel. But it is the verdict of time that Poe spoke the truth.

When Olson's "Lear and Moby-Dick" appeared, the title itself was a revelation. Unlike the torpid pedagogues, Charles Olson was able to pluck from the page the pith of a man. The pedagogues had not been able to discern the real portent of such Old Testament names in Melville as Ishmael, Ahab, Bildad. Despite "Clarel," a long two-volume poem based on Melville's experience in the Holy Land, the pedagogues failed to appreciate the importance of the Bible in Melville. They also missed the influence of Shakespeare on our greatest writer. The pedagogues were too busy with such wights as Freneau, Brockden Brown, William Dunlap and the Peabody sisters to pay heed to Emily Dickinson, Melville or Poe. It would have taken the bold simplicity of a Goya kitchen trollop to sweep out such gnomes as Freneau and Brockden Brown. Even today it is scarcely understood that Emily Dickinson is a bride of St. Paul, or that her letters are epistles to the Ephesians and the Corinthians. The Hebraic names of New Englanders should have been sufficient to induce the academic to revalue American Puritan scripture.

When *"Das Kapital"* became the testament of the literati, the old moral orthodoxies were replaced by cant, a feminine male, and plagiarism; the perverse is now so dominant that evil is often called good. Our Institute priests have become Goya foxes with pens in their hands. They praise the ancients for wrong reasons and neglect to look for live geniuses who may be living in Texas, the Dakota Black Hills or on Avenue A. I want to see a little band of rough, honest poets who would be willing to go out, like Sancho on his wizened ass, Dapple, to fight liars, coxcombs, plagiarists, imitators and the writing monks of the academy and the modern literary bourse.

The academic is a bibliographer and not an interpreter of books. Learning has palpably decayed; compare the frontier hardihood of a Francis Parkman, who pierced the Oregon wilderness to study the primitive Indian, with the modern academic historian whose name appears in a Chesterfield cigarette program blatantly disguised as patriotism. Everything now seems to be for sale; the modern stage is set for Professor Mickey Mouse of history, philosophy, and American literature. Instead of erudition and human wisdom, we have books like Newton Arvin's on Melville.

Arvin set himself the hard task of rewriting other men's books. Whenever he writes about space, myth, the Pacific world, the sea-prairies, or "Moby-Dick" as Christian Scripture, or the feminine in the Melville characters, he is treading the ground that Olson trod in "Call Me Ishmael." Arvin does not trouble to say that Olson was the first to publish the story of the Essex disaster, which Melville used in the "Moby-Dick" narrative, or to allude to Olson's original reading of Melville's annotated and heavily marked Shakespeare. But it is obvious enough that Arvin adopts Olson's viewpoint.

Eleven years ago the Olson view of Melville was regarded as the worst heterodoxy. Our early New England Puritan books were read by the yokel literati as though no Bible had gone before them. The literati were such dull readers that they could not see that Whitman, Melville, Dickinson, are Nazarene writers.

When Mumford observed that woman was excluded from "Moby-Dick," it scarcely occurred to him to look at "Pierre," "White Jacket," or "Billy Budd," to comprehend how close Melville came to that sin for which Sodom and Gomorrah were destroyed. But Mumford's work was generous and original compared to the later Melville essays of the academics. To prove that I am not afflicted with myopia or actuated by malice, I offer a comparison of significant items from Olson and Arvin:

From Charles Olson's "Call Me Ishmael"

"Stage directions appear throughout. *Soliloquies,* too. There is a significant use of the special Elizabethan soliloquy to the skull in Ahab's mutterings to the sperm whale's head in 'The Sphinx' (chp. LXX). One of the subtlest *supernatural effects,* the 'low laugh from the hold' in the quarterdeck scene, echoes Shakespeare's use of the Ghost below ground in 'Hamlet.'" p. 68

From Newton Arvin's "Herman Melville"

"Everyone is struck at once, of course, by the stage directions that accompany some of the chapters (*'Enter Ahab: Then, all'*); by the soliloquies . . ." pp. 154-5.

Olson	Arvin
"*Structure*, likewise. 'Moby-Dick' has a rise and fall like the movement of an Elizabethan tragedy." p. 66	". . . the book has a structural rise and fall like that of Elizabethan tragedy . . ." p. 155
"The first act ends in the Quarter-Deck chapter . . ." p. 66	". . . a movement that is marked thus by the great scene on the quarter-deck . . ." p. 155
". . . the book then moves up to the meeting with the *Jeroboam* . . ." pp. 66-7	So-called second act: ". . . the meeting with the *Jeroboam* . . ." p. 155
". . . and, after that, in a third swell, into the visit of Ahab to the *Samuel Enderby* . . ." p. 67	So-called third act: ". . . the meeting with *Samuel Enderby* . . ." p. 155
"The pitch of the action is the storm scene, 'The Candles.'" p. 67	". . . the 'fourth-act' climax of 'The Candles' . . ." p. 155
"From that point on Ahab comes to repose, fifth act, in his fate." p. 67	". . . and lastly the catastrophe itself." p. 155
". . . the final chase of Moby-Dick precipitously following upon 'The Symphony.'" p. 69	"The fourth movement naturally begins with 'The Symphony' and comes to a close with the catastrophe itself . . ." p. 158
"Melville was agonized over paternity . . . he demanded to know the father . . . Kronos . . . armed himself with a sickle and castrated his father Uranus." p. 82 "Ahab's rage and hate is scaled like Satan's, the largest enemy of the father man has imagined." p. 84	". . . what, then, does Moby Dick himself . . . shadow forth? It would be easiest to say simply the father . . . who imposes constraint upon the most powerful instincts, both egoistic and sexual . . . who threatens even to destroy the latter by castration . . ." p. 172
"There is a way to disclose paternity, declare yourself the rival of earth, air, fire and water." p. 85	"Moby Dick is thus the archetypal Parent . . ." p. 173
Olson expresses the whole conflict between fathers and sons as "Kronos and Saturn . . . were overthrown by their sons . . . The new gods of Jupiter were, in their turn, attacked by other sons." p. 82	"And the emotions Moby Dick evokes in us are the violently contradictory emotions that prevail between parent and child." p. 173
(Arvin speaks of Titanism here and Olson writes of Enceladus, one of the Titans. Arvin refers to the phallic serpent-god of the Ophites, and Olson to Osiris whose phallus is eaten by the fish of the Nile. Olson writes that Prometheus fathered man.)	
"Melville's books batten on other men's books." p. 36	"Few books of its dimensions have owed so much to books that have preceded them . . ." p. 151
"Stubb's jollity and Flask's clod-like stupidity blunt the spiritual." p. 56. Both Stubb and Flask are clods.	". . . the jolly, unimaginative Stubb and the satanic Fedallah . . ." p. 154
The "compact" between Ahab and Fedallah "is as binding as Faust's with Mephistopheles." Faust surrenders his moral freedom to Mephistopheles. p. 56	". . . the diabolic Fedallah, to whom Ahab has surrendered his moral freedom, and whom Stubb quite properly identifies as the devil in disguise." pp. 191-2
Melville studies Shakespeare's craft ". . . for characterization." p. 66	"[It was] Shakespeare, the creator of character, who acted on Melville's own creativeness." p. 151
". . . to understand the Pacific as part of our geography, another West, prefigured in the Plains, antithetical." p. 13 ". . . earth-seas." p. 11	(Galena) "Images of the inland landscape, of farms, of prairies, of rivers, lakes, and forests, were to recur throughout Melville's work as a counterpoint to the dominant imagery of the sea . . ." p. 46
"The fulcrum of America is the Plains, half sea half land . . ." p. 12 "The Pacific is, for an American, the Plain repeated . . ." p. 114	"Yet it was not the lakes and the forests of the great west that sank deepest into his memory but the prairies and the Mississippi River." p. 47 "As for the Mississippi, . . . it cast a less profound spell over Melville than the prairie did . . ." p. 47
". . . lowest wages and miserable working conditions—vide 'Typee,' early chps., and 'Omoo,' same." p. 21 "The Pacific as sweatshop." p. 23	"At its worst, says E. P. Hohman in 'The American Whaleman,' the life of a whaling seaman represented 'perhaps the lowest condition to which free American labor has ever fallen' . . . he remarks elsewhere that American whaling 'had all the essential characteristics of a sweated industry.'" p. 51
"Melville makes little of the love of man and woman . . . Melville had the Greek sense of men's love." p. 45	". . . Melville, implied inevitably a Greek-like cult of physical love . . . the beauty, . . . of the men especially . . ." p. 56
"Melville likens the effect to 'that which in Genesis attends upon the beginning of things.'" p. 66	". . . . a primordial fable, the fable of the Fall of Man . . . vibrations in it of the book of Genesis." p. 294
"Melville's ethic is mythic." p. 83	". . . serious as are the moral meanings of 'Moby Dick' . . . in the end . . . one is aware . . . that [the book] can only be called mythic." p. 182

In 1938, when Olson did the "Lear" essay, the influence of Shakespeare on Melville had only been hinted. There are only two or three references to Shakespeare in Raymond Weaver's book. But in time the pioneers are honored by those who can repeat without offering proper homage. Here, for example, is Arvin's implied tribute to D. H. Lawrence:

From D. H. Lawrence, "Studies in Classical American Literature"	From Newton Arvin, "Herman Melville"
"South Sea Islanders belong to the Stone Age . . . The Heart of the Pacific is still the Stone Age . . . vast vacuum . . . the life of myriads of ages back . . . phantom, illusion-like track of reality." p. 1035 "This is a bit of birth-myth, or rebirth myth . . ." p. 1034	". . . but from the world of enlightened rationality . . . and cultural complexity backward . . . to the primordial world that was before metals, before the alphabet, before cities; . . . the pre-rational myth." p. 87

When the works of the pioneers in criticism come to be echoed in derivative books written for wider circles of readers, it might be said that education is improving. But why should the derivative books be honored while the pioneers go unsung?

THE LOST SPAIN

The Broken Root, by Arturo Barea. *New York: Harcourt, Brace. $3.50*

The long road back to Spain can not be traveled by those who carry the Civil War on their backs. Arturo Barea, an exile with an exile's longing and an exile's blindness, has attempted to take that road in "The Broken Root." Spain to him, however, will always remain the land he lost and the paradise he would regain. When he speaks of it, the Loyalist shibboleth betrays his tongue.

All of this is material for a novel, but not the novel he has written. In projecting a soldier's return to the land he fled, Barea could have written movingly of a man's longing for his native soil. But he has chosen instead to depict the Spain of today. Perhaps he has caught the surface manifestations, but he writes of them in clichés which anti-Fascists wore out in Mussolini's day.

There is something slightly plasticene about his corrupt Falangists, scheming Communists, noble workers, and nobler prostitutes. In "The Forging of A Rebel," his autobiographical account of the days before and during the Civil War, Barea shied away from making sharp and valid political distinctions. He has yet to define his politics or to understand the root evil of his time. So the characters in his novel—they are always characters, never people—can not even exist as symbols.

Barea never comes to grips with the fact that Spain's tragedy is timeless. Under Philip II, Primo de Rivera, Manual Azaña, or Francisco Franco—in the *siglo de oro* or the *bienio negro*—the Spaniard has seen the skeleton which walks upright in the flesh. All Spain is Golgotha; and this has made her mysticism harder, her folk music more poignant, her civil wars bloodier, her courage more heart-rending, and her knowledge of man's fate more implacable than any other Western nation's.

Unfortunately none of this shows through in Barea's book. Even bitterness is lacking. He has an adequate plot, full of incident, but the incision is never made. "The Broken Root" succeeds only in proving that an exile never returns, but the proof lies sadly in its failure—not in the writer's intention.

RALPH DE TOLEDANO

SCARECROW AND SWAN

The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats. *New York: Macmillan. $5.00*

W. B. Yeats was a great case rather than a great poet, though the supreme importance of his poetry to this century can not be denied. He always revered—and envied—the insight of the seer, but he could never quite achieve it. Instead, he sang of it and thus obtained literary contact with Dana, the ancient Irish deity, with the heroes Oisin and Aengus, the eternal wanderers seeking rebirth in the stars, and with the "pearl-pale" ladies like the lofty idols of the troubadours. Before the new century opened, he took up the heritage of the Romantic poets, Shelley and Keats, and echoed unabashed their Orientalism, which he systematically set about converting into native terms. Yeats was always the Irishman, whether surrendering himself mystically to the mood of the old magic or honoring Parnell and other patriots in verse that was free neither of sentimentalism nor doggerel. As a poet possessed by the Muse, he still remained too rational at the back of his head and at the back of his life—at least, for daily comfort.

By 1914 he was on the threshold of his artistic triumph. He could use the true singing note that was his literary gift in any way he liked. This was fully evident in 1919 when the famous "Wild Swans at Coole" gave its name to the title of a volume. In 1928, "The Tower" appeared, and leading it off was "Sailing to Byzantium," a poem whose formal assurance and lyric intensity the poet never surpassed. He was now overwhelmingly the master of his idiom. But he could never take up his lyre with the old confidence of the legendary bard. Complete belief in his words was something Yeats never had.

The paradox of Yeats was that the lyre, which should have symbolized poetry as the absolute, became numbered among the modern intellectual's "responsibilities." He perpetually sang of the oneness of "the body" and "the soul" but more as an ideal than as a fact. "The tower" and "the stair" became images of difficult aspiration both in terms of time and the poetic heights. When Yeats desired that "frenzy" named so variously in his verse as

the divine giddiness of old age and the wisdom of "the fool," he came to pray as to God for "an old man's frenzy" and to pose the wistful refrain: "Why should not old men be mad?" At fifty, Yeats was already conscious of the feebleness of old age no less than its power. He mourned the loss of the ancient social system which joined the nobility and the peasantry and which created those virile "horsemen" who were such "lovers of women." Yet, as an Irish patriot, he played with the current notion of revolution and tried to persuade himself that it meant mundane rebirth for all Irishmen.

The well-known sonnet, "Leda and the Swan," is a vivid paradigm of Yeats's attitude toward myth, love, poetry and himself. His later work (see "Among School Children") is threaded with the hardly disguised self-image of the tattered "scarecrow," at once pathetic, proud and isolated. It contains the poet-as-monster but a decayed and socially compromised monster; on the other hand, the "swan" Jupiter who mated with Leda is the poet as God, at least—so to speak—taking on God's feathers and achieving supernatural marriage. But it is significant that the sonnet ends with an ironic query of Leda's acquisition of the god's "knowledge." Idealizing women and romanticizing poetry, Yeats considered "divine marriage" as something possible to his remote ancestors, inaccessible to himself. He wrote of "Crazy Jane" as of a sibyl, but he was never "the wild old wicked man" who entered the ditch with her. His only certainty was, after all, the twanging of the lyre.

PARKER TYLER

AN "OLD PARTY" TALKS

My First Eighty-Three Years in America, by James W. Gerard. *New York: Doubleday. $3.50*

The late James W. Gerard was what Somerset Maugham would have called an "old party." His informal memoirs range from the gaslit era of Ward McAllister to the age of the explosive atoms. He seems to have known everybody, from Death Valley Scotty to Mrs. Astor, with but one exception: he never met John L. Lewis. Occupied as Mr. Gerard was during a long life, with law, big business, society and politics, his memories and comments cover a cross-section of the social order both at home and abroad.

While always a rugged individualist (as an ambassador he astonished and embarrassed the late Kaiser), he still has some tart things to say about the elder J. P. Morgan and the New Haven Railroad. Intently concerned with our foreign affairs, he subsided after a period of activity into coaching from the sidelines—and he notes, with humor, that his advice was generally ignored. When indulging his recollections—and refraining with some effort from cataloguing the thousands of notables he knew—he tells some sparkling stories. One of the best is about the Coronation, the young princesses and their Uncle David.

EDWIN CLARK