the FREEMAN

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TWO SECTIONS • SECTION ONE

Is McCarthy Guilty of "McCarthyism"?

An Exchange Between

Towner Phelan *and* Senator McCarthy

Editors: John Chamberlain • Henry Hazlitt • Suzanne La Follette

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Editorials

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A WORD ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTORS

TOWNER PHELAN is Vice President of the St. Louis Union Trust Company and author of its monthly *Letter.*

SENATOR JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY began his career as a lawyer and was a circuit judge in Wisconsin when America entered the war. He then served in the Marine Air Corps, and received a commendation from Admiral Nimitz, and other citations. He was elected to the Senate in 1946.

KENDALL FOSS, who wrote "Berlin's Free University" for the *Freeman* of March 26, does free-lance writing in Munich. He was with INS and UP in Europe before the war, and later with *Time.* The theory described in Mr. Foss's article was broadcast by Herman Akhminov over the BBC Russian service in December. "It was almost impossible to understand it even in Germany," Mr. Foss writes, "because of the violent Soviet jamming, which was much stronger during his broadcast than in the periods just before and after."

JOSEPH H. BALL, U. S. Senator from Minnesota from 1940 to 1948, is an authority on the subject of labor relations and labor legislation. He is now editor of the *Joe Ball Washington Letter.* His writing experience began in 1927 with reporting for the Minneapolis *Journal;* and from 1929 to 1940 he was with the St. Paul *Pioneer Press and Dispatch.*

CHEN SHU is the pseudonym of a distinguished Chinese scholar who lives in the United States.

STERLING MORTON, chairman and director of the Morton Salt Company, serves on many business and civic betterment committees in his native Chicago. He was president of the Illinois Manufacturers Association in 1942-43. "Although a former editor of the *Nassau Literary Magazine* of Princeton," he writes, "it is over forty years since I have had an article in a magazine of general circulation."

HENRY BESTON is the author of "Herbs and the Earth," "The Runaway Tree," "Northern Farm" and other books. He was editor of the *Living Age* from 1919 to 1923.

the FREEMAN

NEW YORK, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1952

THE FORTNIGHT

President Truman's plea that foreign policy be kept out of the 1952 campaign had more behind it than the natural hope of any bungler that his victims will be noble. It had also a warranted expectation, based on past campaigns, that the Republican Party would oblige. And there is no question that a sizeable fraction of the Republicans are eager to do so—all those "me tooers" who are ready to accept defeat if it means the continuance of the calamitous policies which have reversed, in six brief years, the world positions of Russia and the United States. It was time for a Republican candidate to indict the Administration which, having brought the nation into grave danger, demands the right to continue to guide its destinies. Senator Taft's fighting speech of January 26—and former President Hoover's impressive review of our international position on January 27—have made it pretty difficult for the Republican Party to evade this issue again, no matter who its nominee is. Senator Taft has put the other Republican candidates squarely on the spot; and in so doing he has rendered a great service to the American people, who have the right to choose their next President on the basis of his attitude toward an issue which involves their survival as a nation.

It **was not a necessary part** of General Eisenhower's military duties in Europe to recommend a political revolution—the calling of a "constitutional convention" to arrange a European federation. We are obliged to assume, then, either that he did this at the prompting of the State Department or that it is in effect his own first declaration of broad policy or opinion since he announced his availability as the Republican candidate for President. Considered in the latter light, his statement, though it has already received thoughtless endorsement by leaders in both parties, is unlikely to add in the long run to his reputation for practical statesmanship. It is, rather, one more illustration of what seems to be a national psychosis —our tendency to substitute daydreams for a foreign policy.

Suppose, by some wild chance, that our latest daydream was realized. What would it in practice mean for us? We have twice within the last generation had to fight a horribly costly and bloody war against Germany. Is there any assurance that a European federation would be soundly based on the reserved rights of the individual and the reserved powers of the states? Is there any assurance that a regime hostile to America would not some time dominate the new federation and turn its huge manpower and industrial power against us? What sense does it make deliberately to build up a huge potential rival and antagonist? Haven't we already done enough of that in our policy at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, and in the Marshall mission to China?

If political federation is possible, and makes any sense, why not propose one now that would include *all* the NATO countries, especially ourselves? Our statesmen don't suggest that, of course, because they know that American opinion is completely unprepared for it, and that it would raise problems—economic, political, even linguistic—of immense and all but insoluble difficulty. So if we are wise, we will put this in the realm of daydreams for the future, and concentrate on securing moderately friendly, peaceful and workable foreign relations in the present.

But whenever any American official advises *Europe* to adopt this sort of daydream solution, and to abandon overnight the loyalties of centuries, he is immediately hailed by most of the press here for his "boldness," "courage" and "vision." Paul Hoffman made an easy reputation in precisely this way. The truth is that it takes no great originality or courage to indulge in these daydreams. They are, in fact, an attempt to escape from reality. It would be an immense gain, for example, if we could now induce Europe to relax its restrictions on foreign trade to a degree no worse than that which prevailed in the thirties. If we had already insisted, in return for our generous handouts, merely on a halt to further national inflations and on the abolition of import prohibi-

tions and exchange controls, Europe would be immensely ahead, economically and politically, of where it is today. But by substituting eloquent insistence on remote and visionary reforms, our officials have failed to secure moderate but easily attainable reforms.

Meanwhile, whenever our present Administration has to face an immediate problem in foreign policy, of no matter what importance, the last thing it seems to think of is solving it on grounds of principle. Confronted with the seizure of four American soldiers, it did not hesitate to pay blackmail. Entangled in a stalemate war in Korea, through its own bungling, it now seems willing to make as humiliating concessions as it thinks public opinion will tolerate in order to try to get out before election. When a crisis breaks out in Egypt, our officials act as if no principle whatever were involved, and as if Egypt had not tried unilaterally to break a solemn treaty with Britain. The *New York Times* tells us, for example, in a Washington dispatch dated January 26: "The United States . . . was reported today to be urging moderation *on both parties* in the violent Anglo-Egyptian dispute." Thus, as with Iran, our officials treat the treaty violator on the same basis as the treaty keeper, even though it means failure to support our most important ally or to protect our own vital interests. For we hardly need to point out that the oil supplies of Iran and control of the Suez Canal are both vital to the Western democracies.

The effect of Mr. Truman's three annual messages —on the State of the Union, on the Budget, and on the Economic Report—is to leave the ordinary citizen with a feeling of profound helplessness. Mr. Truman, in time of already dangerous inflation, can think only of still more government spending, still more schemes to bribe the voters with their own money, still more and bigger deficits. The $85,400,000,000 of expenditures that he recommends for the next fiscal year is equal to *twenty-five times* our total Federal expenditures in 1929, to more than *ten times* the average annual expenditures even of the Franklin Roosevelt regime before we were actually involved in World War II, and is almost equal to the average annual expenditures ($91,000,000,000) of the three peak-spending years (1943-44-45) when we were actually engaged in total war. If Congress is seriously concerned about inflation, it will deal with this budget in the only way it can be dealt with. It will adopt the Coudert resolution. It will send the budget back to Mr. Truman with instructions to reduce his $85,400,000,000 spending program to not more than the $71,000,000,000 that he expects to raise in revenues in the next fiscal year. No other practicable way is now open to get a balanced and responsible budget.

In a recent issue we lamented the fact that the British Government, dominated by a snobbish Labor Party for six years, had refused to import jobless Italians to mine coal the Britishers refused to mine. Now it develops that the Churchill government, which has none of Labor's snobbish scruples, has relaxed the ban on "Dagoes" or "Eyties." According to columnist Victor Riesel, more than a thousand Italians have recently left the sunny Mediterranean to work in Yorkshire and Durham. More will be recruited shortly. This is one of those sardonic turns of events that make you wonder just who is the common man's good friend, the labor skate or the proven aristocrat? We have nothing against labor skates when they are humane, and we care not a whit for aristocrats when they are snooty. We'll just take Churchill as a superior human being and let it go at that.

Our congratulations to Chester Bowles, who, during all of two months' residence in India as Ambassador, has come up with a pat answer to the question of ameliorating Indian poverty. It is not the originality of his solution (another raid on the U. S. Treasury) that impresses us; it is the speed of the Bowles investigatory processes. During our own fairly migratory lifetime we have sometimes moved to a strange American city, and it has invariably taken us two months (or even longer) to get used to the geography and place-names of a new neighborhood. But here we have Chester Bowles ingesting the inwardness of the whole strange and multifarious culture of India even before he has managed to get his family well settled in New Delhi. That he has managed to do it without the help of his old sidekick Bill Benton makes the phenomenon even more amazing.

Our congratulations to the *New Leader* on its ingenuity in wringing a defeat for Joe McCarthy out of John Stewart Service's dismissal. We haven't read anything like it since Artemus Ward's account of his famous battle in Dixie. Imagine Acheson as the Old Showman and McCarthy as his antagonist, and you have here the spirit if not the letter of the *New Leader* editorial:

> . . . I was let up finally, when a powerful large Secesher came up and embraced me, and to show that he had no hard feelins agin me, put his nose into my mouth. I returned the compliment by placin' my stummick suddenly agin his right foot, when he kindly made a spittoon of his able-bodied face. Actuated by a desire to see whether the Secesher had been vaxinated I then fastened my teeth onto his left coatsleeve and tore it to the shoulder. We then vilently bunted our heads togither for a few minits, danced around a little, and sot down in a mud puddle. We riz to our feet agin & by an adroit movement I placed my left eye agin the Secesher's fist. . . .

The Old Showman finally defeated his antagonist by managing to tip him over a cliff. And here the parallel ends; for the *New Leader* suggests that the way for the State Department to crush the Wisconsin Senator is "to clean house and put McCarthy out of business"—in other words, to hand him a total victory.

Who Fired MacArthur?

IN ITS summary removal of General Douglas MacArthur the Administration showed that it could be tough, even brutal, in dealing with an enemy. It was the misfortune of the American people that this ability was demonstrated, not against the aggressor in Korea but against the great American commander who insisted that the aggressor should be fought. For the first time in history a general was cashiered, not for losing a war, but for wanting to win it. And since that time the evidence has continued to pile up—aside from the subsequent stalemate in Korea—that this shameful action served the policy of the Soviet Union, which the Administration was seeking to appease by forcing General MacArthur to fight an inconclusive war.

Now, just who did "get" MacArthur, and why?

The three-volume record of the McCarran Committee's investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations proves that the State Department's policy on the Far East has closely followed that of the IPR, which has closely followed that of international communism. The IPR influence reached the Department through Owen Lattimore, Philip Jessup and John Carter Vincent, among others who had been closely connected with the Institute. Secretary Acheson assured the Russell Committee that Lattimore had never influenced our foreign policy (Hearings, pp. 1982, 3310-3314). The McCarran Committee record demolishes that testimony.

In an article, "The Kremlin War on Douglas MacArthur," in the *National Republic* of January, Representative Daniel A. Reed of New York adduces impressive evidence that from 1945 an important and fixed objective of Soviet policy was General MacArthur's destruction. The war was opened, he says, with a series of articles by Ben Allen in the *Daily Worker*, September 14-17, 1945. Allen contended that MacArthur was "unfit for the crucially important assignment of shaping the future of Japan" because he was making that country "a bulwark against the Soviet Union and the progressive [i.e. Communist] forces in Asia."

Mr. Reed cites an interview with Owen Lattimore in the *Daily Worker* of September 4, 1945, attacking General MacArthur's declaration in favor of a quick restoration of Japanese economy and independence. On September 20 of that same year the *New York Times* ran the following story:

> The State Department revealed today a decision for social and economic revolution in Japan. . . . In a statement, Acting Secretary Dean Acheson said that the United States Government, and not the occupation force under General Douglas MacArthur, was determining American policy toward Japan.

Acheson, it will be remembered, was quickly put in his place after that statement—which is probably the reason Japan is our friend today.

What Acheson's motives were in announcing such a policy is for him to explain. But light is thrown on its origin by the testimony of Eugene H. Dooman, who told the McCarran Committee of hearing Acheson, in the spring of 1945, outline a policy for Japan in which he "quoted virtually textually" from Lattimore's "Solution in Asia," which assumed the overthrow of the Mikado and advocated the destruction of Japanese capitalism. The McCarran record shows that this was also the policy of the Communist Party.

Now it would strain credulity to believe that the man who announced "a decision for social and economic revolution" in Japan would look with favor upon the man who thwarted that revolution. If Mr. Acheson had been converted to the MacArthur policy it seems reasonable to assume that he would not have continued to haul in as his advisers such men as Owen Lattimore and Philip C. Jessup. Therefore it is wholly reasonable to assume that Secretary Acheson, through his influence on the President, played an important role in "getting" General Douglas MacArthur.

The General's opposition to appeasement in Korea gave his enemies their opportunity. And this brings us to the testimony of Major General Frank E. Lowe, Ret., who was in Korea as President Truman's personal observer throughout MacArthur's command. General Lowe stated his views in an interview with Bill Cunningham of the Boston *Herald* (January 10 and 13), who reports him as being of the opinion that the State Department, with the collusion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Marshall, first hamstrung MacArthur and finally brought him down.

This is important testimony. General Lowe is personally devoted to President Truman. Yet he is wholly with MacArthur whom he considers "the greatest military genius that ever lived." He indorses MacArthur's every move in Korea. And he is convinced that MacArthur could have knocked out the Reds even at the time of the Chinese Communist onslaught if he had not been handcuffed by the State Department and the Joint Chiefs. He also insists that the Russians would not have come in if MacArthur had been permitted to use the air force and navy against the Chinese outside Korea. He cites the occasion on which our planes mistakenly bombed beyond the Yalu:

> And what did the Russians do? They filed a very weak letter of protest. If they were waiting to come in, don't you think they'd have come? That was all the excuse they needed.

General Lowe foresaw the break with MacArthur and tried to prevent it. He attempted to head off the Wake Island conference. His urgent cables in this and at least one other case failed to reach the President, and "he suspects the Pentagon, he wonders if an effort was made to isolate the President, at least where General MacArthur was concerned."

It is a matter of history that MacArthur, when Chief of Staff, removed George C. Marshall from command of the Eighth Regiment; and Mrs. Marshall in her book "Together" says her husband felt that his career was ruined. More important, however, is the evidence amassed by Senator McCarthy, and by Forrest Davis in the *Freeman*, proving that whatever Marshall's intentions, his actions in his high posts during and since the war have promoted Soviet far more than American interests.

General Lowe is convinced that if MacArthur had not been first hogtied and then removed, the present "disgraceful stalemate" and thousands of needless casualties could have been avoided. And Lt. Gen. William M. Hoge has been quoted as saying that, as late as June 1951, we could have driven the Communists out of Korea *if* the order had been given. Instead we entered, at the suggestion of a Soviet spokesman, the cease-fire negotiations which have dragged on for half a year while the aggressor built impregnable fortifications.

Who did "get" General MacArthur?

In Contempt of Congress

ADVANCING from one victory to the next, the State Department has just attained a dazzling triumph: Iran's Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh has graciously consented to take from us 23 million dollars. True, he refused to sign even an "implementing agreement," one of the commitments expressly required by the Mutual Security Act, but our diplomats will be darned if they will permit such technicalities as an American law to obstruct their glorious accomplishments abroad.

If Congress has specifically legislated that a foreign government, to qualify for any part of United States funds, must first give a solemn pledge of cooperation, this is just too bad for Congress. Mohammed Mossadegh, as it happens, does not like the Mutual Security Act and, between two fainting spells, so advised the State Department. Furthermore, he does not like the United States either and, if we were to annoy him much longer, would not take a penny from us. If, however, he was to do us the favor of accepting the dough, he wanted it understood that he still did not like us and would not sign any statement to the contrary.

Whereupon the State Department, in an Achesonian version of Machiavellianism, shrewdly shoved 23 million dollars down Mr. Mossadegh's throat and, obviously in an attempt at teaching backward Iran a lesson in democratic fundamentals, told him that the United States Congress could go hang. No pledge required, Mossadegh!

Now ordinary citizens have gone to jail for far less flagrant contempt of Congress. But then, Mr. Acheson is not ordinary, nor does he even seem to consider himself a citizen; rather, he seems to be claiming extraterritoriality for himself and his Department, perhaps on the theory that, as an outstanding figure in the United Nations, he is covered by that illustrious organization's collective privilege. An interesting theory, no doubt, and personally we would not be surprised at all if the United Nations, protected by the universal indifference that shrouds their doings, had indeed resolved in one or another of their labyrinthine covenants that the United States Congress was without jurisdiction over the State Department. However, Congress might want to know. And Mr. Acheson's bargain with Mossadegh—a blatant violation of American laws, provided the U. S. Constitution has not yet been repealed by the UN—presents an opportunity to find out once and for all.

A thorough Congressional investigation of the Iranian scandal is also advisable for an even more urgent reason. This country seems to be in for a violent new attack of *delirium trumans*—that dangerous fever which is caused by excessive consumption of tax money and leads to ever madder spending excesses. The other day Ambassador Chester Bowles came home from India, ostensibly to consult with the Department, but actually, we are afraid, to tenderize the American public for one of the most fantastic schemes of modern times—the hallucination that Mr. Nehru's "neutrality" could be purchased for 1000 (one thousand) million dollars. Already the press drums have started beating all over the country, the noble-minded ladies' clubs are swamped with "All-Aid-to-India" rhetoric, and the Iranian precedent, if not reversed by Congress, may well provide a convenient technique for sidestepping "reactionary" legislation.

The State Department, in short, has at last acquired a consistent foreign policy: To avoid conflict, punish your friends and reward your enemies. This is, in fact, an elaborate version of the idea of tribute which, only a few weeks ago, evoked some opposition among such old-fashioned Americans as the editors of this journal. Rather than pay ransom for individual Americans, the responsive State Department now seems to have decided to pay ransom for the nation as a whole: the greater the anti-American animosity of a foreign government, the more American dollars shall it receive.

Conversely, the government of Pakistan has just been penalized for its pro-American bias. The same day Iran was persuaded to pocket 23 million dollars, Pakistan's many times more justifiable request for Point Four aid was cut down to 12 millions. Said an official spokesman in Karachi: "Pakistan's pro-Western attitude is apparently so taken for granted that we seem to have been left out. But now that the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in competitive economic wooing of India, I suppose the money will be pouring in there."

Yes, the world is catching up with Mr. Acheson's sophistication. If he can get away with his contempt of Congress, and Mossadegh with the 23 illegally obtained millions, no foreign government in its right mind will be able to afford friendly feelings for the United States.

What Are We Arming For?

THE OTHER day, Senator Robert A. Taft inserted in the *Congressional Record* a speech Mr. Gardner Cowles, the publisher of distinguished mid-western papers, had delivered on his return from a trip around the world. Of course, Senator Taft's courtesy does not imply his complete agreement with Mr. Cowles's observations. But any statement intelligent enough to arrest Mr. Taft's attention deserves serious thought. And an additional reason for us to discuss Mr. Cowles's position is the fact that we find it rather disturbing.

The crux of Mr. Cowles's argument is his contention that the United States armament is growing too big. "We need constantly to remember our objective is to prevent war, *not to win one.*" The italics are ours, and so is the dread that on this peculiar epigram hangs an unhappy confusion, and one quite characteristic of our age. The profoundly decent and humane civilization of continental America, so ably personified by Mr. Cowles, attaches a putrid and even obscene overtone to the mere word "armament"; and this is much to the country's credit. Less to its credit is the increasingly apparent failure of excellent Americans to comprehend what a resented historic necessity makes them do.

An armament whose objective is *not* to win a war strikes us as the irresponsible act of irredeemable fools. The dirty business of producing and carrying arms, in itself a hateful negation of man's dignity, can be justified on just one ground: that a nation, dedicated to the supreme values of its existence, is willing to fight rather than let these values be overthrown by superior force from abroad, and is resolved to win. A moral case can be made for Gandhi's position of non-violence, the radical rejection of physical resistance against evil. A moral case can be made for a decision to gather the very maximum of effective force in defense of good. But no moral case can be made for an allegedly prudent, actually frivolous attitude of mister-in-between—the attitude of the unfortunate French people in the thirties.

The Maginot Line, it will be remembered, remained unfinished because the French, a thrifty people, decided that the job had cost just about enough. So they stopped; and through the gap swept the German flood—inescapably and deservedly. The national malaise that has kept France shaking ever since was brought on not so much by defeat as by the creeping national shame over this horrendous fact: that a "prudent" nation had found its honor and its freedom to be worth just so much, and no more. And indeed, is there anything more frivolous than to dabble in the deadly business of armament without the ultimate will to stake one's *all* on victory?

Unless our objective is to *win* a war which Soviet arrogance might make inescapable, a single dollar spent on arms is an insult to our national intelligence and should be an immovable burden on our personal conscience. Moreover, it is a most imprudently spent dollar. For the only rational justification for diverting any part of a nation's capital from productive efforts to armament is the essential insurance effect: to remain productive, a nation needs confidence that its accumulated savings can be successfully protected; and if the insurance premium is not big enough to guarantee *full* protection, it is *totally* wasted.

But, contends Mr. Cowles, we seem to be spending *more* than such a safety premium. "The United States and the United Kingdom together are currently spending nearly three times as much as Russia on armament." Mr. Cowles arrived at this estimate by assuming that Russia's annual national income equals 100 billion dollars and that she spends one-fourth of it on armament. Even if we were to grant the correctness of these figures (but how can any one really know?), we still could not overlook three fatal errors in Mr. Cowles's comparative account.

One, the economy of the USSR, since its inception a war economy, has been spending one-fourth of its annual income on armament *for more than three decades, uninterruptedly*; while the combined 75-billion-dollar effort of the United States and the United Kingdom is not even a year old. Two, not included on the Soviet side is their empire of satellites—the productive combine of 200 million people in Europe and 400 million people in Asia. Three, and most misleading, the estimate assumes that a dollar spent on armament in the West equals a dollar spent in Soviet Russia. (But a tank produced by union labor in Detroit is of course at least three times as expensive as one manufactured by miserably underpaid Soviet slaves.)

Remains Mr. Cowles's repeatedly stated conviction that "Russia is more cautious today, that she is less willing to take a risk which might bring on an all-out world war." This may be true. And then again, it may not. But can Mr. Cowles, can anyone, sanely shoulder the colossal responsibility of inviting the American people to stake its survival on the correctness of his hunch? "No one really understands the Russians," warned Mr. Cowles at the start of his speech; and this admonition, evidently including the speaker, should go far in persuading the nation not to bet its destiny on Mr. Cowles's side of the argument.

With Senator Taft we share the suspicion that the cavalier approach of the Pentagon bureaucracy is wasting hundreds of millions of dollars on armament frills. With Mr. Cowles we share the desire to support Senator Taft's gallant crusade against such waste. With all Americans who have at last realized that communism is the ultimate denial of everything America and civilization stand for, we share the conviction that this nation must be strong enough to win any war it may be unable to prevent.

Liars for President

It has been said often enough of late that the world is in a state of moral crisis. The "something for nothing" philosophy has gained its ascendancy over the minds of millions, and politicians everywhere are expected to be quite without principle in their kowtowing to any sizeable body of constituents who decide that the State owes them a living out of the public purse. No doubt the realistic commentator must recognize the situation for what it is and make allowances for it in his calculations. But when our leading moralists virtually condone lying and breach of faith in high public office then it can be truly said that we, as a nation, are in danger of losing our way.

Take Mr. Walter Lippmann, for example. Twenty-five years ago he wrote a book called "A Preface to Morals," in which he praised the insights of the great religious seers. But today he can take the misleading promises of a Presidential candidate without even so much as a quiver of revulsion. He doesn't think it matters what an office seeker says during a campaign, for he has "a very low opinion of the value and significance of modern political declarations." He thinks they are "almost invariably synthetic and contrived . . . designed to make the noises which are believed to be popular . . ." And he continues, with scarcely an intimation of reproof: "There is no dependable connection between what the brain trust and the ghost writers persuade the candidate to say and what in the face of events he does when he is in office:—see, for example, the campaign speeches of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932."

Superficially considered, Lippmann's cynical observations might be said to have a Swiftian or a Menckenian gloss. But the true satirist works from a sense of moral outrage, and one does not gather that Mr. Lippmann is even dimly bothered by the fact that many of our public figures have become chronic dissemblers. Lying, to Mr. Lippmann, is just "campaign oratory." He accepts it as such and discounts it almost 100 per cent. In Mr. Lippmann's estimation there is virtually nothing to be gained by asking Eisenhower, for example, to declare himself on foreign policy, or the domestic budget, or inflation, or farm subsidies. As for Harold Stassen's recent outline of political faith, it "does not throw even a glint of light on what he would do if he were elected."

If Mr. Lippmann wishes to accept the prevalent political morality for what it is, that is his privilege. But in that event it should be thoroughly understood that he speaks as a political scientist and not as a moral leader. A true moral leader would be very much disturbed by breach of confidence in high places, or by any unwillingness of a candidate to be truthful about his beliefs. If it is true that Eisenhower, as Mr. Lippmann says, "knows more about the overriding issues than any of his rivals," then there is no reason in the world why he should not be expected to be candid about those issues. The voters have a right to expect candor. And Mr. Lippmann, as a presumed moral leader, should be the first to say so.

The fact of the matter is that only since 1933 has it been deemed impossible for a Presidential candidate to speak the truth about his principles and their practical application. Although political demagogy is as old as ancient Athens, if not older, the idea that an American President should not be held at least to a reasonable standard of philosophical consistency is a relatively new thing under the sun. When Herbert Hoover was President, he stood by his guns in the matter of Prohibition despite its growing unpopularity. Calvin Coolidge had few problems, but he always remained true to his Vermont character. Of Woodrow Wilson, it can be urged that he broke faith after 1916 with his followers who had loved him because "he kept us out of war." But Woodrow Wilson campaigned in 1912 on a detailed platform of the "New Freedom," and when elected he went immediately about the business of translating his promises into legislation.

Instances might be multiplied. William Howard Taft was personally a standpat character, but he was elected in 1908 as the political heir of Theodore Roosevelt's insurgency, and he consequently allowed the anti-trust activity inaugurated in T. R.'s second term to proceed uninhibitedly. McKinley, in 1896, fought the campaign out on the issue of the gold standard, and, once elected, he kept his word to those who had turned back Bryan and free silver at the polls. Grover Cleveland, who believed that a public office is a public trust, vetoed bill after bill that did not square with his stated convictions and his conscience. When he was charged in the midst of a peculiarly dirty campaign with the paternity of an illegitimate child he did not deny it. He was a man foursquare, and the American people responded to his habit of candor by giving him two terms in the White House.

What is it in the modern air or the modern temper that accounts for the easy view that a public man can not be held to his word, or even be expected to give his honest word honestly? That is a large question that involves basic philosophical and religious attitudes, and it is not going to be settled this year or next, certainly not in the heat of a political campaign. But the fact that it is a large question does not rid our moral leaders of the responsibility of doing what they can to keep it alive. Even from a purely pragmatic point of view the commentator who thinks honesty and courage are beyond us as a people may be making a huge mistake. Witness the tremendous admiration evoked by Captain Kurt Carlsen, who stuck by his ship for all those storm-tossed days on the Atlantic and then turned down a Hollywood contract that would have lifted him out of character. The response to Carlsen's behavior might well be taken as a cue by our politicians. Who knows, maybe simple honesty in 1952 might be the best politics after all.

Is McCarthy Guilty of "McCarthyism"?

In our issue of September 24 Mr. Towner Phelan, in the course of an article on left-wing character assassination, adversely criticized Senator McCarthy also. The stir which followed this criticism moved us to invite Mr. Phelan to elaborate his charges in order that Senator McCarthy might be offered an opportunity to reply. In fairness to Mr. Phelan it must be stated that his article was received before the statement of the Gillette Committee's investigator concerning Senator McCarthy's Wheeling speech.

I. Mr. Phelan's Criticism

IN VIEW of the storm of criticism stirred up by my article in your issue of September 24, entitled "Modern School for Scandal," I believe that I owe your readers an explanation.

The whole purpose of my article was to point out that the "liberals," who are neurotically screaming their heads off that they have been smeared, invented the smear technique, have had a near-monopoly of smearing, and object to it *only* when it is turned against them. In attacking pseudo-liberals for smearing, I wanted to make it very clear that I was not defending Senator McCarthy but, in fact, am opposed to his methods. I wanted to make this point for three reasons: first, I think that he has used unethical tactics; second, I think that he has hurt the anti-Communist cause; and, third, I attempt to make my articles as objective as possible and that involves recognizing the faults of those who are on our side.

I want to make my articles objective both as a matter of principle and because that is the most effective way to appeal to fair-minded and intelligent people. In addition to those people who view McCarthy as a hero and those who equate him with the devil, there must be a large group of people who represent neither extreme. Those people should be on our side and, in my opinion, McCarthy's tactics tend to alienate them.

Being a member of the anti-Communist team and having as my prime purpose to attack the pseudo-liberal defenders of Communists, I expressed my strong disapproval of McCarthy only for the purpose of avoiding the implication that I approve or condone his methods. More than 95 per cent of my article was devoted to exposing the hypocrisy of the "liberal" smearbund. I did not attempt to document my disapproval of McCarthy because to have done so would have meant that a large portion of my article necessarily would have been given over to a discussion of McCarthy; whereas, my object was to expose and pillory the left-wing smearers.

I feel no purpose would be served in preparing what would necessarily be a long and detailed bill of particulars setting forth my reasons for regarding McCarthy's tactics as objectionable. I will limit myself to a few illustrations.

McCarthy is exceedingly careless with his facts. For example, on February 9, 1950, at Wheeling, McCarthy said, "I have here in my hand a list of 205 . . . names made known to the Secretary of State as being *members of the Communist Party* and who, nevertheless, were still working and shaping policy in the State Department."[1] In Salt Lake City, he changed the number to 57 names. In other speeches he placed it at 81 and 106. In his speech of March 30, 1950, he attempted to reconcile the 205 "members of the Communist Party" with the 57 figure. He said the 57 figure represented "individuals who appear to be either card-carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party." He said that his Wheeling figure of 205 was based on a letter that Secretary of State Byrnes wrote Congressman Sabath nearly four years earlier (July 26, 1946). But since he flatly asserted at Wheeling that the 205 were "members of the Communist Party," his explanation fails to explain.

Were these 205 "members of the Communist Party," as McCarthy charged? Byrnes's letter said that a screening committee in the State Department recommended against permanent employment of 284 people who had been transferred to the State Department from other government agencies and that 79 of these people had been dismissed. McCarthy's figure is derived from subtracting 79 from the 284. The screening committee recommended their dismissal for a variety of reasons. Some were viewed as of doubtful loyalty and, no doubt, included "members of the Communist Party." The dismissal of others was recommended because of legal restrictions on the employment by the State Department of aliens and of citizens naturalized

[1] See *New York Times*, February 12, 1950, p. 5.

within fifteen years of their employment. Forty of the 79 who were dismissed were bad security risks and the other 39 were aliens or had not been citizens for a sufficiently long period to qualify.[2] Therefore, for McCarthy to brand as Communists the 205 who were not dismissed in 1946 hardly accords with the facts. In criticizing McCarthy's "phony" statistics, may I point out that, in a number of published articles, I have been as critical as is McCarthy of the Administration's failure to clean house of Communists, but I have not resorted to his tactics.

Further evidence of McCarthy's carelessness with the truth is supplied by his allegations, both on the floor of the Senate[3] and as a witness before the Tydings subcommittee,[4] that former Under Secretary of State Grew had been forced to resign because he had *insisted* on John Stewart Service's prosecution. Mr. Grew wrote that he had authorized the arrest of six men, including Service, without knowing their identity and that he had resigned for personal reasons only.[5] Such carelessness with the truth is evidence that McCarthy makes reckless charges; it discounts any charges he may make which are supported by evidence.

YOUR readers have taken me to task particularly for my statement that it is "despicable to attack Marshall's patriotism." Forrest Davis says: "Who is Marshall, or any other public servant, that his patriotism can not be brought into question?" With this statement, I agree fully. I did not mean that it is despicable to attack Marshall's patriotism if there is a *valid* reason for doing so. I meant that it is despicable to attack the patriotism of Marshall, or anyone else, without *reasonable* grounds for doing so—and I do not think that such grounds exist in the case of General Marshall.

Senator McCarthy's 60,000-word speech on "The History of George Catlett Marshall" is well documented and makes an impressive case that Marshall's decisions were, on the whole, disastrously bad from the standpoint of American interests and promoted the interests of the Soviet Union. With this thesis I am in complete agreement. But I do not think that because Marshall's policy decisions were disastrous, it raises a question as to his patriotism. Those who betray their country do so either for personal financial gain or by reason of disloyal political beliefs. If General Marshall had a history of affiliation with left-wing causes and was tainted with the pro-Soviet pseudo-liberalism of the 30s and early 40s, then I think that McCarthy would have had cause to impugn his patriotism. But in the absence of any evidence of such left-wing affiliations, I think it fantastic to regard General Marshall as a possible traitor.

From a careful reading of McCarthy's speech, I feel that he wanted his readers to think that Marshall is a traitor but did not dare make such a charge. On page 1 of the reprint from the *Congressional Record* of McCarthy's speech, he speaks of "a conspiracy so immense and an infamy so black as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man." On page 31, he identifies Marshall as one of the conspirators by referring to "Marshall's faithful *co-conspirator*, the Under Secretary of State, Acheson." On page 11, McCarthy asks:

> The question arises . . . in whose interest would he [Marshall] exercise his genius? If he was wholeheartedly serving the cause of the United States, these decisions were great blunders. If they followed a secret pattern to which we do not as yet have the key, they may very well have been successful in the highest degree.

This insinuation is scarcely mitigated by McCarthy's statement on page 12, "I do not propose to go into his motives." On page 15, speaking of Marshall's insistence that the Russians be brought into the war against Japan, McCarthy says:

> Was this a sincere endeavor by the master of global strategy to advance American interest? . . . Or was it another in the baffling and frightening pattern of General Marshall's intervention in the course of the great war which conduced to the well-being of the Kremlin? I leave you to judge. . .

This is another insinuation that Marshall is disloyal. On page 18, he says: "Let me assume for the moment that Marshall's judgment in World War II was clouded by no ulterior objective, no hidden thread of purpose which could not reach the light of day." On page 21, he says: "Marshall remained at the President's elbow, a trusted adviser able to overshadow the loyal and foresighted counsel of Admiral Leahy." This suggests, of course, that Marshall's advice was disloyal. These insinuations are multiplied throughout the speech and their cumulative effect creates the unmistakable impression that McCarthy looks upon Marshall as a traitor but does not dare to say so in plain words.

IN MANY instances—perhaps a majority—the people McCarthy attacks should have been attacked, but the methods he uses are unfair and, because they are unfair, tend to boomerang. Let us take the case of Owen Lattimore. When McCarthy referred to him on March 27, 1950, as "the top Soviet espionage agent," he made a statement which the evidence does not support. In my opinion, this charge was unfair, and it weakened, rather than strengthened, the case against Lattimore. It would have been entirely proper and far more effective for McCarthy to charge that there is a great deal of evidence which raises grave doubts as to Lattimore's loyalty and to set forth the mass of evidence which would substantiate this charge. It includes *hearsay* evidence by Louis F. Budenz and the former Soviet General, Alexander Barmine, that Lattimore is a Communist. Hearsay evidence is not admissable in court and does not prove Lattimore's guilt. But such evidence, from the former editor of the Communist *Daily Worker* and from a former Soviet General, does constitute reasonable grounds for doubting Lattimore's loyalty.

[2] *Congressional Record*, March 30, 1950, p. 4435.
[3] *Ibid.*, February 20, 1950, p. 2046.
[4] Transcript of Tydings Committee Hearings, p. 130.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 1179.

The evidence includes Lattimore's long service on the editorial board of the notorious *Amerasia* magazine during the years when Frederick Vanderbilt Field was its chairman. It includes many other episodes in Lattimore's career. There is a vast difference between the case McCarthy made against Lattimore and the case Eugene Lyons made against him in his article in the *New Leader*, entitled "Lattimore—Dreyfus or Hiss?" Lyons's article was a fair, devastating, and wholly convincing indictment of Lattimore. Because McCarthy's charges were exaggerated and unfair, they aroused sympathy for Lattimore and were ineffective.

THE TWO periodicals that have done most to expose communism are the *Freeman* and the *New Leader*. In the May 21, 1950, *New Leader*, Norbert Muhlen shows how "liberals," fellow-travelers, and Communists have created a huge mountain out of the small molehill of McCarthyism and have been able to build up a gigantic "fake" issue as a result of McCarthy's tactics. Muhlen says:

> Having finally come around, in recent years, to recognizing in Communism an enemy rather than an ally, many former fellow travelers suffer from bad consciences. . . . With McCarthyism for a target, the "non-Communist liberals" can prove that they are fighting "the enemy on the Right" as bitterly—or more bitterly—than "the enemy on the Left." . . . Even if "the enemy on the Right" is only a phantom, they experience a feeling of relief at being able to show that they "haven't sold out to the Right"—their loud opposition to McCarthyism restores their political peace of mind like a potent pill. . . . If the Communists can make liberals think McCarthyism is as much of a threat to freedom and justice as Communism, if they can divert the energies of liberals from the true and worldwide danger of Stalinism into a fight against a phantom ogre, then they will have achieved very much indeed.[6]

Muhlen was trying to debunk the fake issue which he calls "the phantom of McCarthyism"—a fake issue which McCarthy gave the left wing by the tactics he uses. Muhlen says: "Some of his charges were not based on facts, others wildly exaggerated, and still others badly presented and therefore hard to prove. His careless technique cheapened and discredited the responsible resistance to Communism."[7]

I have expressed disapproval of McCarthy's methods because I want my own attacks upon Communists and their "liberal" camp followers to be free of any possible implication that I approve of his methods. I have no desire to help the left wing build up the blatant faults of McCarthy into a gigantic false issue and therefore shall write nothing further on this subject in the *Freeman*.

TOWNER PHELAN

[6] Norbert Muhlen, "The Phantom of McCarthyism," the *New Leader*, May 21, 1951, p. 18.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

II. Senator McCarthy's Rejoinder

I AM deeply grateful to the *Freeman* for the opportunity to answer the attacks made on me by Mr. Phelan in the issue of September 24 and in this issue.

Mr. Phelan has used no new smear phrases. Many of them had been invented by Owen Lattimore and all have been parroted over and over and over by the *Daily Worker*, as though it were a broken record. The left-wing elements of press and radio know them by heart: "reprehensible tactics" . . . "smearing innocent people" . . . "wild charges" . . . "objectionable tactics" . . . careless with his facts" . . . "reckless charges" . . . "hearsay evidence" . . . "exaggerated and unfair" . . . "badly presented" . . . "careless technique" . . . "blatant faults of McCarthy."

In this issue Mr. Phelan attempts to document his case against McCarthy by giving four of what he apparently considers the worst examples of McCarthyism.

He first picks up the Wheeling, West Virginia, speech and employs the "numbers game" used by the extreme left-wing, quoting their case almost verbatim. He does this despite the fact that he knows, or must know, what McCarthy said at Wheeling and despite the fact that the completely unfriendly Gillette Committee sent an investigator to Wheeling, whose investigation completely and publicly exploded the false "numbers racket." For example, eight of the nine witnesses from whom he got statements fully confirmed what I have always said about the Wheeling speech—namely, that I discussed the 205 individuals who, according to a letter from Secretary of State Byrnes to Congressman Sabath, were being kept on the State Department payroll despite the fact that the President's own screening board had declared them unfit for government service.

Neither at that time nor at any time since have I claimed that Secretary Byrnes gave me the names of the 205. I informed the President in a wire the following day that I did not have the names of the 205 but that he could get the names by calling in his Secretary of State and asking him how many of the 205 were still on the State Department payroll and why they were kept on despite the decision of the President's own board that they were unfit for government service.

The Gillette investigator confirmed the fact that I told my audience that night at Wheeling, and informed the President by wire the next day, that I had the names of 57 who were either members of or loyal to the Communist Party. Those names were offered to the President and subsequently given to the Tydings Committee. A sizeable number of additional cases were given to the Senate and the

Tydings Committee since that speech in Wheeling two years ago.

Strangely, Mr. Phelan—some of whose writings indicate an ability at intelligent, original thinking—uses the completely timeworn and (to any person with even average intelligence) thoroughly discredited argument that because McCarthy does not control and keep static the number of dangerous individuals in the State Department, he is not worthy of belief.

Phelan's Case No. 2 is that I falsely stated that Ambassador Grew had been forced out of the State Department after his insistence upon the arrest of John Stewart Service. To him this is evidence of "reckless charges" and "carelessness with the truth." According to Phelan the basis for this charge against me is that Grew had stated that he resigned for "personal reasons."

Overlooked is the fact that Grew is one of a long line of loyal anti-Communist State Department employees who have resigned because of "bad health," "personal reasons," etc.

Forgotten is the fact that Louis Budenz, the former editor of the *Daily Worker*, testified that the Communist Party decided in 1942 that the State Department had to be cleansed of all anti-Communist elements, and that "as early as at least 1944 the Politburo laid plans against Mr. Grew."

Forgotten also is the testimony of Adolf Berle, an intelligent anti-Communist, that there were two groups in the State Department—the pro-Communist group headed by Acheson and Alger Hiss, and the anti-Communist group of which he, Berle, was a member, and that therefore, his (Berle's) career ended in the State Department.

Forgotten is the testimony of Earl Browder that toward the end of 1942 the policies toward China which the Communist Party had advocated "were in fact adopted by the State Department" (page 687, Tydings Hearings). These Communist objectives, of course, could not be gained if men like Joseph Grew, Eugene Dooman, Adolf Berle, etc., were in control of the State Department.

But Phelan thinks that it was "reckless" of McCarthy to believe all of the uncontradicted evidence that Grew was one of the anti-Communists forced out of the State Department. From what mysterious sources does Phelan get his information, which is contrary to all sworn testimony?

ANOTHER case cited by Phelan to show that McCarthy's methods are "unfair," "reckless," etc., is the case of Owen Lattimore. Phelan claims that the evidence does not support the statements which I made about Lattimore. Therefore, let us review briefly the evidence against Lattimore.

Incidentally, Phelan objects to the use of the "hearsay" evidence of Louis Budenz and Alexander Barmine. If Mr. Phelan is not a lawyer, he should have consulted one before he made this legal pronouncement. The law is crystal clear that where a conspirator is testifying about the activities of a co-conspirator, such evidence is not hearsay, even though the rule might otherwise apply, and is admissible in a court of law.

The evidence presented to Senate committees or on the Senate floor in the Lattimore case was as follows:

1. Testimony by Alexander Barmine, a former Russian general who was in Soviet Military Intelligence for 14 years, that Lattimore was one of their trusted men.

2. Testimony that party line changes were transmitted from Moscow to the American Communist Party via Owen Lattimore.

3. Testimony that Communist orders to Communist leaders bore Lattimore's secret symbol "XL."

4. Testimony that Lattimore was a member of a Communist cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) and that his task was to recruit Communist writers to sell the State Department and the American people the Communist Party line on China.

5. Lattimore's admission under oath that he used the Soviet diplomatic pouch to get information to Moscow.

6. The affidavit of William Foerster that the Communist spy Sorge sent by messenger a sealed envelope to Lattimore which he would not risk sending through the mails.

7. Unquestioned evidence that Lattimore was co-editor of *Amerasia*, which J. Edgar Hoover has been quoted as having referred to as a "tool of Soviet espionage."

8. Testimony that Lattimore's wife lectured at the Communist Tom Mooney Labor School in San Francisco.

9. Evidence that Lattimore had jointly purchased a half interest in property in the Hiss colony in Vermont with a man of many Communist fronts and then sold it to Ordway Southard, once a candidate for Governor of Alabama on the Communist ticket, and that while it was a valuable piece of property, Lattimore claimed that he had never known this Communist but gave him possession without even asking a one dollar down payment.

10. Lattimore's admission that he traveled in China with three individuals, two of whom have been named by government witnesses as Soviet agents and one of whom has been named as a Communist; that he lived in the Communist headquarters in China for an extended period of time and while there lectured Communist troops.

11. Proof that, while head of the Pacific Division of OWI, Lattimore stated that he wanted one of his staff retained "even if he is a Communist" and by letter ordered the staffing of the China Desk with employees from a Communist source.

12. Proof that Lattimore advised the Communist-front IPR to "keep behind the official Chinese Communist position" and to back Communist Russia's "international policy in general but without using their slogans."

13. Evidence that on June 18, 1941, while Germany and Russia were still allies, before Lattimore

went to China, he spent an "illuminating two hours" with Russian Ambassador Oumansky.

14. Evidence that in August 1949 Lattimore, upon request of the State Department, submitted secret instructions "For the Guidance of Ambassador-at-Large Philip Jessup." Those instructions follow the Communist line on Asia in all major aspects.

15. The statement in Wallace's book, "Soviet Asia Mission" (page 172), that Lattimore and John Carter Vincent were toasted by a high Soviet official (President of the Executive Committee of Siberian territory) as the men "on whom rests the responsibility for the future of China."

16. Lattimore's statement in the Sunday *Compass* of July 17, 1949, in which he praises the State Department for allowing China to fall "without making it appear that the United States had pushed them," and his advice on the same date and in the same article (before the Korean War) that "the thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall but do not let it appear we pushed it." This is the key to the State Department's *modus operandi*.

17. Lattimore's writings which so consistently follow the Communist line and which were referred to by the Communist *New Masses* (May 8, 1945) as "must" reading "not only for our San Francisco delegates but for every one of us."

In spite of all this evidence on Lattimore, Phelan uses Lattimore's case as one of his four cases to prove justification for all of his smear phrases.

PHELAN'S final case is that of Marshall. He explains why he considers my history of Marshall as "despicable." His reasoning here is unusual and illogical beyond anything which I have read for many a day. He states, for example, that my "History of George Catlett Marshall" is well documented and makes an impressive case that "Marshall's decisions were, on the whole, disastrously bad from the standpoint of American interests and promoted the interests of the Soviet Union." He then states: "With this thesis I am in complete agreement." He then castigates me for giving a "well documented" picture of this man whose decisions "on the whole promoted the interests of the Soviet Union."

While I did not discuss the question of Marshall's patriotism, Mr. Phelan puts forth the unusual argument that Marshall's patriotism could not be questioned unless he "had a history of affiliation with left-wing causes and was tainted with the pro-Soviet pseudo-liberalism of the 30s and early 40s." This is an unusual confession of lack of knowledge on the part of Mr. Phelan. Perhaps he should be reminded that Alger Hiss did not have "a history of affiliation with left-wing causes," that the only Communist front to which Hiss belonged was one to which Marshall also belonged and in the same capacity—namely, the IPR.

Mr. Phelan also objects to the fact that "McCarthy looks upon Marshall as a traitor but does not dare to say so in plain words." If we are to discuss what McCarthy thinks or what Phelan thinks McCarthy thinks, and not what McCarthy has said, I fear that the patience and the newsprint of the *Freeman* would be more than exhausted.

I have studied Phelan's writings in a vain attempt to find why he, who proclaims himself "a member of the anti-Communist team" should spend so much time condemning communism generally, so little time exposing the unexposed Communists and so much time smearing, with the accepted Communist phrases, the real anti-Communists who are digging out the secret, valuable, unexposed sacred cows of the Communist Party.

Perhaps the answer can be found in his own article in this issue of the *Freeman* in which he refers to the " 'liberals,' who are neurotically screaming their heads off that they have been smeared," but who have "invented the smear technique" and "have had a near-monopoly of smearing, and object to it only when it is turned against them," plus his statement that the " 'non-Communist liberals' " are trying to establish a phony reputation of being really anti-Communist, and his approving quotation of Norbert Muhlen's statement about the "non-Communist liberals," that "their loud opposition to McCarthyism restores their political peace of mind like a potent pill."

I have never met Phelan and do not know him well enough from his writings to give the answer to why he so willingly lends his abilities to destroy someone whom the Communist Party wants destroyed. Certainly he is aware of the official proclamation of the Communist Party issued on May 4, 1950, by the national secretary, Gus Hall: "I urge all Communist Party members, . . . to yield second place to none in the fight to rid our country of the fascist poison of McCarthyism."

Why does this "member of the anti-Communist team" decide that the club has suddenly become so exclusive that anyone who uses rough and relentless tactics in fighting the Communists should be kicked out because of his single blackball?

For some time I was a circuit court judge. As every judge who has watched the witnesses hour after hour, week after week, month after month, I developed a sixth sense as to a witness's motives.

While Phelan's writings indicate that he is willing to follow the above quoted order issued by the Communist Party—to discredit and destroy McCarthy at all costs—that sixth sense developed as a judge tells me that Phelan is really anti-Communist and could and should be an important and valuable cog in the anti-Communist machinery.

JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY

CRYPTO-COMMUNIST (*at a "liberal" cocktail party*): Whatever you say, you must admit that Malik is a brilliant, resourceful parliamentarian.

ANTI-COMMUNIST (*who was invited to this party somehow in error*): The more so, since he has never had a parliament before which to practice.

MAX GELTMAN

Men Who May Kill Communism

By KENDALL FOSS

MUNICH

NOT THE bourgeoisie, as Marx preached, carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction; it is communism that can not help digging its own grave. This is the comforting, if startling, thesis of Herman Akhminov, a young Russian sociologist here, whose book "The Power in the Background" first appeared early last year and is today commanding wide attention among students of the Soviet problem.

Herman Akhminov, late of Leningrad, is a fanatical Russian patriot. He lives to free his country from its oppressors. Tall, blond, blue-eyed and 30, he has spent the years since the end of the war in Munich, studying sociology, writing and (to keep bread in his mouth) delivering groceries for the American Army Commissary.

In Leningrad, Akhminov did well enough in his studies to be admitted to the university without examination. At 19 he was drafted and made a deputy political leader in a Red Army company—the highest such position available to a non-party man—with a distinctly promising career opening up before him. Party membership and the Red Army's school for political commissars would have been the next steps.

But Akhminov's unit took part in the occupation of Esthonia after the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. The world outside the Soviet Union jarred him; even in Esthonia, the obvious facts were so unlike the tales he had heard that he began to question further. When the first hint of the coming war with Germany reached him—May 10, 1941—he started to study German furiously. A German edition of the "History of the Russian Communist Party" and a dictionary proved safe texts, attracting no unfavorable attention. When his regiment dissolved during the retreat through White Russia in the summer of 1941, Akhminov was ready to break with the past. No longer in uniform, he was caught in the forest and taken before a German captain.

"You are a partisan," the captain said, "and as such you will of course be shot."

"This information does not at all conform with my inmost wishes," Akhminov replied as grammatically as he could. A long discussion followed, at the end of which the captain gave him a Russian uniform and sent him to the rear as a regular prisoner of war. He spent the rest of the war in a camp on the outskirts of Berlin. When the Russians came close in March 1945 he took advantage of the prevailing confusion to escape, and finished the war in the Austrian Alps.

His thesis of how the Soviet dictatorship might be overthrown has been the subject of numerous book reviews, newspaper articles and radio broadcasts and has not yet been seriously challenged. Briefly, this is how it goes:

THE WORLD of today more nearly fits the prewar aims of Soviet Russia than those of any other power. Since signing up with Hitler twelve years ago, Stalin has seen his territory increase, his sphere of absolute influence expand enormously and the doctrine for which he stands spread across the backward areas of the world at sensational speed. In 1939 one-sixth of the world was Communist; today one-third is ruled in the name of Marx.

The West lost ground in the second World War and has not yet succeeded in reversing the tide in eastern Europe and Asia. The Communists gained ground not solely because their armies were on hand but also because they had a better grasp of the social processes in other countries and knew how to find and support their natural friends in the opposing camp.

On the other hand communism is waning in the highly industrialized countries of the West, where Marx predicted that it would first take hold. Plainly, another explanation than that evolved by Marx and still taught by his disciples must be sought. Strikingly enough, a realistic analysis of the factors which have brought about the rapid spread of communism also yields the clue to the way in which the Soviet dictatorship can be eliminated.

It is in industrially backward countries that the example of the backward Soviet Union has caught enough men's fancies to make them a political force. Marx declared in the Communist Manifesto of 1848 that the development of industry would destroy the foundations of the bourgeoisie, that the middle class was digging its own grave and that the victory of the proletariat was inevitable. The reverse has proved true. Industrial development has diversified the middle class and increased its strength enormously. Communism has triumphed where there was little industrialized proletariat, as in Russia, or none, as in China.

Naturally, the presence or proximity of the Red Army explains in part the Kremlin's successes in eastern Europe. But with the single exception of Czechoslovakia, backwardness and the dawning of a determination to overcome the lag stand out as the indispensible elements in the climate which permits communism to thrive. In Finland, where there was insufficient dissatisfaction with the standard of living produced by capitalism, communism failed in spite of the presence of the Red Army. In Yugoslavia, it has maintained itself despite loss of support by the Kremlin. In China it

won through civil war, without the actual presence of the Red Army.

Long before President Truman's Point Four Program was conceived, the Soviet Union was at work selecting appropriately backward areas and preparing to exploit them in its own interest. In the forgotten corners of the world the undeniable industrial advances achieved in Russia were persuasive. In one generation, Russia had remade herself into a major power by the correct application, it was said, of the principles of Marx, Lenin and Stalin.

The Soviet system, with its abolition of private property and its complete state control of men and materials, conforms to the Marxian vision. Marx, however, conceived this process in the interest of freeing the worker. It remained for Stalin to alter the goal into an open avowal of a determination to overcome backwardness. Thus Stalinism is a substitute for capitalism in achieving industrialization, and is more accurately described as ersatz-capitalism.

As early as 1925 Stalin said that "our general line must be the conversion of our country from an agrarian to an industrial basis." And again in 1931 he informed his people that "we are 50 to 100 years behind the advanced nations and we must catch up in ten years or we shall be destroyed."

Wherever the capitalistic system approached a crisis—as in Germany before Hitler—the dominant class applied the dictatorship known as fascism. Only where the ruling class was hopelessly weak and bankrupt and without a firm industrial base could the impoverished intellectuals take over in the name of a more or less theoretical proletariat.

Lenin knew that the workers and peasants could not lead a revolution. As early as 1903, in "What to Do" he had written: "Workers can not have a communist consciousness. . . . The working class of its own volition can only develop a trade-union movement. . . ." Communism was developed by the impoverished intelligentsia and is the inevitable result of their growth into a party of professional revolutionaries; but it remained for Stalin to create the Party-State—and to set new goals for this new state.

STALIN could proclaim these new goals and defeat his intra-party opponents because a new ruling class had begun to emerge in Russia and to develop interests of its own which were not the interests of the workers and peasants. The old professional revolutionaries—some of them selfless types who found their satisfactions in ushering in the revolution, some of them ambitious to escape from the propertyless class and take over the management of vast undertakings—could not begin to fill all the important positions which were opening up. Their numbers were augmented by eager newcomers drawn from the ranks of the younger intellectuals and from workers and the sons of workers who saw careers looming ahead. These were people with a stake in the new regime, supporters of the dictatorship because it gave them a chance to get ahead.

But the emergent ruling class from the start displayed two wings, and it is the existence of these two distinct, often rival, elements in the new governing group which offers an opportunity to overthrow the regime.

One wing is composed of the functionaries in the Communist Party who hold responsible party office. These people have found power, prestige and privilege directly through the party. For them, the party and its favored position are an end; their lives and their livelihoods depend upon the maintenance of the one-party dictatorship and the absence of private property. This group numbers several hundreds of thousands.

The other wing of the new elite is known as the technical intelligentsia. It numbers some ten million trained and energetic people for whom the dictatorship is a means to an end, not an end in itself. These are the people who manage industry and trade, who lead in the arts and, not least, who command the units, large and small, in the fighting forces. They are the men who have attained to privilege through ability, the new middle class of Russia. And while it is unquestionably true that the party and the secret police render their security in the enjoyment of their new positions uncertain, nevertheless the rewards are great enough to make the risks seem worth while. The fact is, however, that the technical intelligentsia, the people with the know-how, would remain in rewarding positions in any conceivable society, indeed could look forward to greater rewards and security without the dictatorship which originally helped them into the saddle.

THE DAY, says Akhminov, on which a sufficient number of the successful children of the revolution realize that they no longer need the dictatorship, will mark the beginning of the rapid decline of Communist power—a process which will eventually lead Russia back into the community of nations.

Is there doubt that a new class has come into being in Russia and is steadily gaining in self-awareness? Is there doubt that this class consists of two wings with a diminishing identity of interest; that a very large number of the important changes decreed from time to time by the Kremlin in the social structure of Russia are the direct result of the demands of one or both wings of the new elite?

The action of the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, abolishing preference for workers in admission to the party, is a partial answer. The nonworkers who operated the party—and, to an only slightly lesser degree, the manager class—could scarcely be expected to watch their sons passed over in favor of the offspring of the proletarians. In addition, Stalin had a son who was ready for admission that year. The next year, on October 2, 1940, a still more clear-cut preferment for the en-

trenched was adopted, this time one favoring both wings about equally. On that day higher education ceased to be free. In its place the mobilization of youth for skilled labor was introduced—but only for those not slated to go on to higher education. Those whose parents could afford to pay for higher education were left alone; the rest were assigned to various trades and sent to work where the State decreed.

Stalin himself is the best authority for the fact that the growing technical intelligentsia can not indefinitely be held in check by those for whom the dictatorship is an end in itself. As early as 1931, in his Six Conditions, he demanded increased authority for the technician in industry; henceforth the technical intelligentsia would not be overruled in technical matters by the party stalwarts. During the war he endowed the military technicians with a similar authority; the decisions of the commander would no longer require the acquiesence of the political commissar.

HERE Akhminov makes the point that Russia has gone far in the process of turning itself into an industrial state. By common definition, a country in which 40 per cent of the population lives in urban centers—cities of 25,000 and up—is an industrialized country. In Russia at present 33 per cent of the population is urban, as against half that number in 1926. Industrialization is producing urbanization and urbanization is producing a middle class and the middle class is slowly discovering that its interests diverge from those of the masses.

The technical intelligentsia has no great interest in the communization of the world; it is primarily interested in flourishing trade. It is the party elite that sees prestige in the spread of communism—to the point of being willing to destroy the traditional good relations with France and to assume the risks of a cold war with the rest of the world.

Above all, it is the educated second generation which, partly unconsciously, is digging the grave of the classless state. Contrary to the common opinion that the second generation, knowing nothing but Soviet life, represents the strongest bulwark of the dictatorship, the fact is that those born since 1917 are free as their parents never could be free to compare the inadequate present with their dream for the future. The older generation, remembering that the dictatorship enabled it to rise in the world, is far more inclined than the younger people to excuse its shortcomings. Educated Russians up to approximately the age of 40 think of the present as a starting point instead of an achievement, and are ripe for change.

General Vlassov, the much debated leader of the anti-Soviet Russian army within the German Wehrmacht, was well aware of the divisive developments in the Soviet Union. His program openly called for a restoration of private property and private initiative and for the introduction of truly democratic processes with two or more legal parties to assure the voters a genuine alternative. He declined flatly to attempt the organization of an army until he had received firm commitments from Hitler that his program would be supported when and if an anti-Soviet government was set up. Whether or not Hitler would have kept these promises is, of course, another matter. The significant point is that Vlassov and his advisers were convinced that this was the only way in which a sufficient number of younger Russians could be induced to waver in their adherence to the dictatorship. This view is even more correct today than in 1944.

Ersatz-capitalism is dynamic. It makes its appearance when backwardness becomes a thorn in the minds of the impoverished intellectuals and there is no middle class strong enough to oppose the revolution. It does the job of overcoming backwardness ruthlessly, expensively, yet swiftly. But it develops a new class structure of its own and becomes ripe for discard once the lag has been overcome.

If this is so—and it requires the ample pages of a book to document the many affirmative evidences—the conclusion is inescapable: where ersatz-capitalism has reached maturity, as in Russia, and begun to lend itself to the age-old aims of imperialism, it can be neutralized by dividing the new ruling class; where it has not yet fulfilled the primary task of overcoming backwardness, as in the newly communized states, it can best be rendered harmless by encouraging Titoism.

Stalin, says Akhminov, owes his phenomenal postwar success exclusively to his understanding of the social processes in other countries and his ability to exploit these forces. Who can say what the effect might be if one day the massive apparatus of the Voice of America should reveal a similar understanding and proclaim a searching, three-pronged policy:

1. America realizes that certain backward countries see in communism an alluring opportunity to overcome their industrial lags. While she does not share this view, she is perfectly willing to work with such countries peacefully in the UN or anywhere else, so long as they follow their own interests and not those of the Kremlin.
2. America realizes that there are forces at work in such countries which seek to overthrow the harsh dictatorship and introduce democratic procedures. She is ready to recognize and assist these forces when and if they show themselves capable of assuming control.
3. America knows that the social processes in Russia have produced a new elite and that this elite would like to reestablish private initiative and democracy. She wishes them well in their difficult task, and is ready to help them lead Russia back into the family of nations.

There is no measuring the effect that such words, if convincingly spoken and supported, might have on the fear-ridden prisoners of the Kremlin, inside and outside of Russia.

The Union Drive for Power

By JOSEPH H. BALL

IT WOULD be ironic tragedy if soldiers drafted to fight for freedom in Korea and Europe found on returning to civilian life that, while they were gone, they had been excluded from opportunity to earn a living in most American industry except on condition of their joining and paying tribute to some labor union. Yet that is likely to happen. To make the irony complete, workers' freedom will be sold out in the name of aiding freedom's defense.

The Wage Stabilization Board, according to the usually reliable Washington grapevine, is about ready to recommend the union shop—requiring compulsory union membership—to settle the steel and two other disputes before it. Such a recommendation, technically not binding but actually having the tremendous weight of government power in a national emergency behind it, would set a pattern that few employers could resist.

The union shop is bad when private groups agree to it voluntarily—and then proceed to enforce it against individuals. It is infinitely worse when a government agency in effect orders such a violation of individual liberty. That is very close to the kind of state tyranny we are arming against. As the late President Roosevelt said in 1941 during the union shop dispute in the captive coal mines:

> . . .The government will never compel this five per cent [of non-union miners] to join the union by a government decree. That would be too much like the Hitler methods toward labor.

The country faces today exactly what industry and other sober labor observers feared and warned would happen in the spring of 1951 when union leaders were on strike against wage stabilization. The union bosses demanded that the WSB have disputes-settling power as a condition of their return to membership on that and other defense agencies. They won; and the WSB was delegated disputes-power, including the power practically to force a union shop on all major industry.

The union shop is now a major issue in three dispute cases before the WSB involving 650,000 steel employees, 10,000 employees of Douglas Aircraft and 25,000 employees of Boeing Airplane Company. In addition, the demand of 17 AFL unions for a union shop covering 1,000,000 non-operating employees on all railroads is before a Presidential Emergency Board under the Railway Labor Act. In all cases, unions insist there can be no settlement of the disputes unless non-member employees are compelled to join the union.

World War II experience shows what will happen if union tactics succeed. The War Labor Board, industry members dissenting, adopted the policy of ordering maintenance of union membership in all cases where so-called union security was an issue. Because it did not compel any new or old employees to join the union, the maintenance-of-membership clause technically did not violate President Roosevelt's pledge. What it did was to require those who had joined voluntarily to remain members for the life of the contract.

Compulsory union membership nearly quadrupled during World War II with this government support of maintenance-of-membership clauses. The Labor Department reported that of all employees covered by union contracts, only 20 per cent were affected by compulsory membership clauses before the war, whereas 77 per cent were under such clauses in 1946. Growth under WSB direction probably would be faster; it would have most major American industry under a union shop within a couple of years. Where an employer refused to agree, the union would threaten a defense-crippling strike, get the dispute certified to the WSB, and government would do the rest. That is exactly what industry predicted a year ago.

The American people could easily prevent this sell-out of freedom at home. If they ever realized what was happening and its significance, their flood of protests to the WSB, the White House and Congress would stop the whole thing. In an election year even bureaucrats are sensitive to public pressure. The difficulty is that so few of us realize what is happening. Apparently union compulsionists are banking on our ignorance and apathy.

Compulsory union membership is wrong in principle and bad in practice. Not only does it violate the individual worker's freedom of choice, foster the growth of union monopoly which is as vicious as any other kind of monopoly, and open unions to control by racketeers and politicians; but this absolute power to "tax" a worker and make him pay the tax or lose his job gives the union compulsive power over the public and even government.

The Arguments For Compulsion

"But lots of plants already have compulsory union membership and get along all right," the casual observer may say. "What's so wrong about a union shop? Seems to me unions have won a lot of gains for workers. Why shouldn't all workers help pay the cost? Why shouldn't the majority rule in a factory just as it does in our government?"

There's only one way to answer that kind of question. That is to take a little time and go over the pros and cons of compulsory union membership. That is a broad phrase that covers all forms of so-called union security: closed shop, where em-

ployees must join before hired; union shop, where employees must join after 30 days; maintenance of membership; and the union hiring hall and preferential hiring clauses, under which union members get first chance at jobs.

The "free rider" argument is that unions bargain for all employees, not just their members, and therefore all employees who benefit should join and help pay the cost. This is dangerous nonsense. Carried to its ultimate conclusion, such reasoning would mean that everyone should be forced to join any organization by whose activities he gains any supposed benefits, and the organization, not he, would be the judge of whether the benefits were worth the cost. If that reminds you of Nazi and Communist doctrine, it should.

But the argument is also false because it assumes that only "free riders" do not join or resign from unions. This just isn't so. Among other reasons, employees may oppose a particular union leadership, may believe the union is neglecting the handling of grievances, may object to frequent or unnecessary strikes, may oppose artificial work restrictions or may disapprove of the political or other objectives of the union. Union security is in fact "insecurity" for rank-and-file members and "security" only for the union leadership against the danger of being replaced by employees who for any reason are dissatisfied with the union.

The majority rule argument goes like this: in a democratic nation, a majority makes the laws and levies taxes, but everyone has to obey the laws and pay the taxes; why shouldn't workers in a plant or industry do the same? This is alarming arrogance. We have granted our *government* power to control us by laws, and assess our taxes, subject to Constitutional safeguards and review by courts, only because essential for law and order. As free men in a free society, we have traditionally resisted and opposed any scheme by which our basic individual liberties would be controlled by others. The very argument that a union should be given the power over our lives which we have previously given only to our government, demonstrates the amount of power some union leaders would like to have. It implies that some unions claim practically sovereign power over the industrial lives of workers—and in fact substantially this claim has seriously been argued by union attorneys in no less a place than the United States Supreme Court!

Compulsory unionism is clearly undemocratic. It violates the freedom our American system guarantees minorities and individual citizens. We would ignore as ridiculous any suggestion that when a majority in a state voted Republican, all Democrats and everyone else in the state had to become members of the Republican Party, and pay dues to it—or leave the state.

It is also argued that, freed of organizing problems, the union can maintain better discipline and concentrate on cooperation with employers to the mutual advantage of both. The record proves the reverse. Industries like the construction and maritime, where compulsory membership has existed longest, if anything have more disputes and stoppages than others. What union leaders really mean is that if you relieve them of the necessity of maintaining by their actions the confidence and support of employees, by making employees' jobs dependent on union membership, leaders will be free to devote all their energies to enhancing their own power over industry, both management and workers. This is to say nothing of providing them with extra money and time for political activities.

The Arguments Against Compulsion

Its violation of individual freedom is the basic argument against the union shop. The issue is whether any man or woman should be forced under penalty of loss of livelihood to join and support a particular private organization (whether it be a church or union or any other group). If a man may be compelled to join a union in order to hold a job, the principle is established that any politically powerful group may compel minorities to join and support it. To the extent that this principle is accepted and extended Americans sacrifice their freedom and become subjects of a tyranny. The individual citizen must keep in well with the agency that controls his livelihood, or starve.

Unions originally were formed to counterbalance the control of employers over jobs and livelihood. It is ironic to find unions now seeking that very control for themselves. This situation is thus the exact inverse of the outlawed "yellow-dog" contract where the employer compelled the worker, as a condition of employment, not to join the union.

The union shop is a flagrant violation of the rights of an individual. As the late Justice Brandeis wrote in 1912:

> But the American people should not, and will not, accept unionism if it involves the closed shop. They will not consent to exchange the tyranny of the employer for the tyranny of the employees.

Labor is as essential to the production of steel as coal, or pig iron, or blast furnaces. Phil Murray and his steelworkers are asking government to give them a complete and tight monopoly control over the entire labor force of the steel industry. The steelworkers' union would control the industry as no combination of employers possibly could control it. Such monopolistic power inevitably would be used to enrich the union and the steelworkers at the expense of the whole public. To assume that a union monopoly would not use its monopoly power is to play the ostrich.

The union shop slows technological progress. It is natural, if shortsighted, for unions to oppose new machines and techniques that temporarily reduce jobs and dues. Examples are legion where unions have compulsory membership power. The building trades unions have notoriously used their monopoly power to keep prefabricated housing out of large cities, to compel obsolete methods and materials that greatly increase housing costs. Feather-

bedding and restricted production are notorious in the printing industry.

Union members are deprived of the ultimate and most effective protest against bad union leadership when the employer forces them to remain members or lose their jobs. A member of any organization knows that it is nearly always run by a small group. That is even more true of unions, because union officials control spending of funds, appointment of organizers, and the union publication. But the possibility of members simply resigning and refusing to pay dues is always a substantial check on union leaders. Compulsory membership removes that check. Even if his union is taken over by racketeers or Communists, the individual must continue to support it or lose his job.

Protection of minority rights is essential to a free society. Because 95 per cent of union shop authorization elections conducted by the NLRB from 1947 to 1951 were won by unions, proponents of the union shop try to give the impression that only very negligible minorities are involved, that only a few eccentrics would be forced into unions against their will. That is not true.

Millions of workers would be forced into unions against their will if compulsory membership were decreed by government. Of the more than 62 million employees in the civilian work force, only about 16 million are now in unions. Since the close of World War II the civilian work force has increased by about 9 million, yet the ratio of union members to the total force has actually decreased. The unions have been able to persuade only about 25 per cent to become and remain union members.

This failure to get more than one-fourth of the nation's work force into the unions is all the more significant because of the millions of dollars the unions have spent on organizing work, and the support given by government officials to their organizing efforts. The union leaders are now working for some more positive method of forcing the remaining workers to join unions. Of 400,000 eligible employees in NLRB union shop elections in steel, only 264,000, or 66 per cent, voted for the union shop. Over 20 per cent failed to vote and 14 per cent, or 56,000, voted no. Minorities of hundreds of thousands and millions are not negligible.

There are other arguments against compulsory unionism, but space prohibits their presentation here. In any event, the basic argument is individual human freedom. The history of Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Communist Russia, as well as what is happening in Socialist Britain, demonstrates the error of those who tell us that freedom can be divided and some freedoms liquidated without hurting the rest.

For twelve years we who believe in human liberty have been fighting hot and cold wars against those who practice tyranny and slavery. It has been and will continue to be a costly struggle, in both blood and treasure. But what a tragic waste all of it will be if we let the freedom which we fight to preserve abroad be weakened fatally here at home!

This Is What They Said

THERE IS no need to save the Churches of Hungary for there is no danger of their being abolished. . . . The separation of Church and State means that the State does not interfere in the affairs of the Church, but subsidizes it with large financial grants.

NEW HUNGARY, issued by the Hungarian Embassy, November 10, 1951

Rather than decry the New Deal as the enemy of national morale, we had much better pass a vote of thanks to the New Deal which rescued and stabilized the free enterprise system in its hour of acute peril.

SHIRLEY E. GREENE, Agricultural Relations Secretary of the Council for Social Action of the Congregational Christian Churches, in the *Christian Century*, January 2, 1952

As the fourth year of the Great Patriotic War drew to a close, the Soviet Army, single-handed, led by the brilliant Communist military leader Stalin, inflicted a crushing defeat on the Hitler army. . . . And it was only when it had become obvious that the Soviet Army's crushing blows were quite fatal and that the Soviet Union was capable of finishing off Nazi Germany and her satellites alone, that the Messrs. Churchills and Marshalls were compelled to hasten in the matter of opening the second front . . . two years behind time.

MARSHAL K. E. VOROSHILOV on Stalin's seventieth birthday, quoted in *USSR Information Bulletin*, February 24, 1950

. . . all the newspapers are more or less under government control in Russia.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, "My Day," July 17, 1951

Nobody Here But Us Chickens

The Foundation does not . . . support campaigns to influence public opinion.

THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, Annual Report for 1950, page 21

In 1950 The Rockefeller Foundation made a grant of $60,000 to the American Institute of Pacific Relations and another grant of $50,000 to the Pacific Council. These are both branches of the Institute of Pacific Relations, . . .

From the same report, page 210

The Freeman invites contributions to this column, and will pay $2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged. THE EDITORS

China Is No Riddle

By **CHEN SHU**

"THERE ARE 7,000,000 square miles of China with over 400,000,000 people. No one can occupy China. No one in his right mind is going to entertain the thought of trying."[1] Thus spoke Senator G. W. Malone, one of our outstanding statesmen, a man of integrity, courage and vision. Whatever Senator Malone says is listened to respectfully by millions of Americans. His view of China is an almost universal view, held by all kinds of people. From this major premise they reach the conclusion that we must take no action in China. This is our present policy, for the expert and the layman alike.

Let us examine this major premise. Is it true? If so, what are its logical consequences? If it is false, where is the fallacy? How did it gain such wide currency? To whose advantage? Why?

Is it true that the land area of China is 7,000,000 square miles? It is only 1,430,172 square miles, according to the Webster's Dictionary Gazetteer. The area of Greater China, including Mongolia, Tibet, Manchuria, and Sinkiang, is a little over 4.5 million square miles. Thus the area of China proper is somewhat less than one-half of the land area of the United States. About nine-tenths of the people of China live in China proper.

Thus China is not as vast as the popular opinion makes it to be. It is about the size of western Europe.

The millions of Chinese people appear "teeming" to us largely because no one has any reliable census figures. The "more than 400 million" generally assumed are echoes of guesses made generations ago. There could be 300 or even 250 million.

China was not always as teeming as it appears to be at this time. For example, in the glorious era of the Eastern Man Dynasty (third century B.C. to early first A.D., including the reign of Wang Mang), the empire contained probably fewer than 50 million people, less than one-half the population of its Roman contemporary in the West. The teeming appearance of China is recent, creditable to the excellent management of the early Tsin (Manchu) emperors, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries A. D.

Thus China is large but not vast, and its population is substantial but not countless. The irrational fear generated by size and numbers of the unknown has no basis in reality.

We do not want to underestimate any more than to overestimate. We want to know things as they are, with the minimum of error.

[1]From page 5 of "Desperately Needed. An American Policy Based upon the Ultimate Security and Welfare of this Nation." Extension of remarks of Honorable George W. Malone of Nevada in the Senate of the United States, April 18, 1951. Washington, D. C. 15 pp.

Let us examine another popular belief, the "mystery" of China. The "inscrutability" of the Oriental way is a useful ingredient for detective dramas, popular fiction, certain kinds of poetry and the cheaper kinds of art. There is no more mystery about the Chinese than there is about Mrs. Watkins, my apartment manager, or your neighbors or mine. True, the Chinese look different, use a different language, eat different foods and have a different history. There is no greater mystery about all this, however, than about the French or the Swedes, for example, or, for that matter, about the multiplication table. Such differences are well within the grasp of any ordinary mind, provided the mind is willing to learn and to reason. In fact, the great history of China is analogous to other great histories. The analogies are not only in political structures and fortunes but in the social and cultural sequences. Here again the question is that of reading, and comprehending what one reads. There are many excellent books on China, in all languages and for all levels of intellectual curiosity.

Having lived in China, gone to school with Chinese boys and girls, known Chinese families in their own homes, and later having worked with Chinese colleagues in America, I concluded that Chinese on the whole are neither inscrutable nor mysterious. There are differences, of course—some of them deep and thorough, as in the language and forms of courtesy—and it would be stupid to disregard them. These differences do not constitute a mystery, however, as anyone knows who has lived anywhere for any time among people of different kinds.

Thus China is no more vast than several other large countries, no more teeming than several other densely populated areas, no more mysterious than practically any other country, including our own.

LET US consider now another part of our premise, the statement that "no one can occupy China."

There are too many exceptions to this rule to permit its use even by professional journalists or experts. The present China has been occupied repeatedly throughout its known history; first by the "Chinese" operating from the Wei Ho Basin in the North; then by other people from the Northeast, North and West, who entered and held parts of China, chiefly in the intervals between the great dynastic eras. The two most important occupations were those of the Mongols (Yuan Dynasty) and the Manchus (Tsin Dynasty), in the thirteenth and the seventeenth centuries A.D. respectively. In our own time much of China was occupied by the Japanese and, recently, by Communists.

To imply that China can not be occupied because its former occupations and conquering dynasties ended sooner or later (some of them after centuries), is like saying that no one can live because everyone who tried to do so eventually died. China *can* be occupied and held successfully, for varying periods. In fact, present communication and transport facilities would shorten the time required for occupation.

The journalistic belief in the impossibility of occupying China is often joined to another belief of the same kind: that China can not be occupied because the occupier is inevitably "swallowed" by the Chinese. What is meant is the social-cultural acclimatization of the occupier or the conqueror. By the same logic a missionary may be considered swallowed if he decides to spend most of his life and energy in China. "Swallowed" is a frightening word with cannibalistic implications. The process it is intended to represent, however, is common and not especially terrifying. The practitioners of political magic would state further that, since China swallows everybody who comes there, she will also swallow Communists and we have nothing to worry about—just let nature take its course. But can we afford to wait for the problematic swallowing of Communists by China, in view of our recent experience in Europe and Asia?

The popular fallacies about the vastness, teemingness, mystery and cannibalism of China form a potent magic spell for the gullible: "Keep Off—This Means US." A complementary view admits, indirectly, that when it comes to the USSR, occupations and conquests are permissible, "desirable for the masses," "better than nothing," as one of our best-known newspapers said recently amid abundant protestations to the contrary. Concurrently, even those who ought to know better refer to the Communists also as teeming in a vast country, with mystic powers, inscrutable, etc.—just like China.

WHY IS it that this alleged immunity of China to occupation is proclaimed endlessly by the experts? Who is to benefit by this belief? Is it to keep the people off the State Department's neck, to make them accept resignedly the mismanagement of our China policy? Since "no one can occupy the inscrutable, vast and teeming China" we are sitting by quietly while the Communists are occupying it. Hence the great gainers from the promotion of this myth are the Communists.

The notion by which our policy is influenced and handicapped is a belief in a "mystic" invulnerability of China to conquest—an argument by assertion and not by proof. The first question is: Are we as gullible as all that? The answer is: We have been. The second question is: To whose advantage is it to have us believe in the invulnerability of China? The answer is: To the advantage of the Communists who are occupying China now.

The idea was probably planted, even as the idea of the Communists in China being simple agrarians was planted, more than six years ago. It would be interesting to know by whom, how, when and where it was planted. But more important, we must face the lack of truth in these statements, the advantages they give the Communists, and we must shape our policy accordingly.

Story of a Shirt

By **STERLING MORTON**

THE OTHER day I bought a new shirt. Nothing remarkable about doing that, of course. But it started a whole train of thought, especially as to the basic differences between European and American business practice.

The shirt was of the new material, dacron. The salesman told me it was better than the nylon shirts—the kind you launder in the wash basin at night and can wear in the morning. The salesman was right. It is better in many ways.

In early June I was one of several hundred businessmen from thirty nations to attend the Thirteenth Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce at Lisbon. As at prewar Congresses, the outstanding impression was that businessmen of other countries think along entirely different lines. Their basic concept of business is entirely foreign to ours. They strive to establish cartels, to fix prices, to protect their markets, and allot quotas and customers. Free, open and active competition is abhorrent to them. Our constant endeavor to improve our products and lower the cost to the consumer is incomprehensible to them.

Now, back to the shirt. Dacron and nylon are both du Pont products. Ever since nylon has been on the market, demand for it reputedly has exceeded supply. Additional plant facilities have been built, but new uses and new demands constantly arise. Nevertheless, du Pont spends millions to develop a new product which, for many uses, is superior to and will replace nylon.

Why should any company having a practical monopoly of a fast-selling product, and as yet unable to fill the demand for it, even think of developing something better? To my European friends such action verges on lunacy. Furthermore, in the more strictly controlled countries, all the weight of officialdom would descend on the madman who proposed anything which might dislocate established procedures and perhaps call for shifts in employment and the development of new skills.

And so my new dacron shirt stands for something very important. It is a symbol of our way of life, of the restless urge for something better—that present-day version of the pioneer spirit which drives our industrialists to create ever-higher standards of living for the whole nation. No wonder the Europeans must now look to us for leadership.

Maybe this country has a really great salesman.

He should go to the Kremlin with a trunkful of dacron shirts, induce Stalin and his colleagues to give up their tight, high uniform collars and relax in comfort. That might have a most healthy effect on international relations. If, too, he could get the real story back of the shirts across to the Politburo, the results might be epoch-making. If Charlie Schwab were alive he could do it. And I believe, too, he would most pointedly and persuasively suggest that these characters weigh carefully the power and resources of a nation where such ideas are current and men are still free to act on them!

Stop That Character Assassination!

PRESIDENT Truman should be curbed against making false, loose and exaggerated statements about the number of disloyal and dishonorable civilian employees in the Federal services. At a press conference in Key West while he was on vacation, he placed the number at 195,550, saying that an FBI check had shown that 95 per cent of all Federal workers are loyal and honorable.

The President was playing fast and loose with the official figures, and not even the license allowed for exaggeration for political purposes should condone his upping a percentage of .005 to .05 when he is talking about traitors in the government.

The facts are these: On November 9, Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman announced in Washington that of the complete list of 3,911,000 Federal employees, exclusive of those in the armed services, a thorough check of 3,883,000 had been made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation since the loyalty program began; and that, of these, the report shows that 99.5 per cent are loyal to the United States of America and not engaged in espionage for a foreign power or engaged in communistic activities of any kind.

Assuming that the same percentage of loyal employees applies to the 47,415 yet to be checked by the FBI, the official figures show only 19,555 traitors in the government services and not any such wild, irresponsible and exaggerated figure as 195,550, which the President tries to make out.

BURTON RASCOE

We sometimes wonder what fate would befall a conscientious objector in peace-loving Russia.

Our Communists and fellow-travelers are quite disturbed by the disclosures made about them by former comrades who have broken away from the Party. Stalin, it seems, has the right idea about Communists: he liquidates them before they get a chance to become anti-Communists. ARGUS

From Our Readers

The Case of Mr. Couch: A Reply

Mr. Alex Hillman's letter in your issue of January 28 mentions "three basic positions" taken in my *Freeman* article about Professor William Couch. It neglects to mention the basic "position," but let us first answer his specific objections:

1. *Mr. Couch did not have full professorial status or tenure, nor were these so intended by the terms of his contract.*

The Subcommittee of the Committee of the Council of the University of Chicago Senate, composed of all full professors, said, on December 19, 1950:

> Apart from any uncertainty which may exist as to tenure, Mr. Couch was accorded other rights and privileges of academic rank through explicit actions of the Central Administration. These actions included acknowledgement of academic status as a condition of acceptance of the appointment, notification of Mr. Couch by the Comptroller's office that the appointment was an academic appointment requiring participation in the contributory retiring allowance plan, placing him on the membership list of the University Senate, and various other courtesies implying recognition of his academic status.

2. . . . *that serious questions of academic freedom were involved*:

Here Mr. Hillman confuses the facts. He brings up the issue of Morton Grodzins's book under *academic freedom* and promptly knocks it down. Neither Professor Couch nor I ever claimed the Grodzins book had anything to do with *academic freedom*. Professor Couch declared the suppression of it threatened *freedom of the press—not academic freedom*.

My article did not claim or even imply that Mr. Hutchins objected to the Grodzins book because it criticized New Dealers. On the contrary, the article clearly stated that Hutchins received a request from the University of California to suppress the book because California claimed to have a "written agreement" with Grodzins not to publish it. California couldn't produce the agreement, but Hutchins, according to Couch, insisted on suppressing it anyway, in the interests of "inter-university comity."

If Mr. Hillman wants to claim that a "serious question of academic freedom" was not involved in the firing of Professor Couch, let him argue with professors on the Board of University Publications —not with me. They said:

> We are embarrassed to be in an institution where a respected officer of professorial rank can be dismissed with only a few hours to vacate his office.

3. . . . *that Mr. Couch was "fired" brutally and without due regard for his standing.*

Mr. Hillman seems to agree with me that the professor was "fired brutally," saying: "I do think that the matter was handled rather arbitrarily and peremptorily." As to his statement that "the Uni-

versity was more than generous in making financial amends," the University was neither generous nor prompt. Professor Couch was fired on November 20, 1950. It was not until January 24, 1951—two months later—that the University made any offer to give him so much as a cent of severance pay.

The truth is that the University was frightened into making this settlement by unrest within its own faculty—which never reached the level of public demonstration—and by the fear that Professor Couch might air the whole unsavory matter in court in a suit for breach of contract.

The main point of my article, which Mr. Hillman ignores, is that if Couch had been a Communist every big university in the country would have organized committees and raised funds in his behalf. As "ex-Professor" Couch puts it:

"If I had been a Communist, or suspected of being one, or even a sympathizer, I would have had plenty of defenders. And if Mr. Hutchins had slipped into having fired me and had acted in accord with his other habits, he would have been out raising sentiment and money to attack himself for the firing."

Chicago, Illinois FRANK HUGHES

Mr. Wallace Denies

I am writing to deny that I ever said on October 5, 1951, what Alice Widener said I said ("Pattern for Confession," the *Freeman*, December 17, 1951, page 178). I am aware that the UP quoted me as saying these words, but I would call attention to a wire I sent to the UP on October 7, 1951:

> The evening of October 5, the UP and AP called me up and I gave them the following interview: "In view of the fact that the Senate Committee on Internal Security has today announced that I am to appear before the Committee on October 9 in closed session, I deem it inappropriate to comment on today's testimony." The UP story as it appeared in both the *New York Times* and the *Herald Tribune* of October 6 was totally in error and I therefore called up the UP on October 6 and repeated my interview of October 5 and asked that they put out my interview of October 5 as repeated on October 6. I was assured that this would be done. However, so far as I have been able to ascertain, the press of October 7 did not print and at no time has printed my interview as given to the AP and UP on October 5 and reiterated on October 6. Of course the phrase "today's testimony" refers to the testimony of the well-known ex-Communist, the man with the elastic conscience.

The UP neither acknowledged nor printed this wire. On October 5, before I made it absolutely clear to the UP correspondent as to what precisely was my authorized interview . . . I said something jokingly to the effect that, of course, I was not on the inside of the Communist Party in 1944 when Mr. Budenz was, and therefore could not say that I spoke from the same platform as Mr. Budenz. Having said this, I immediately said, you can not use any of this. . . . Then followed the quote as in the wire above.

In view of the facts it is obvious that Alice Widener in her article is totally unfair to me. I am sure that she herself will wish to repudiate the words which she has credited to me in quotes after quotation of the false interview.

South Salem, New York HENRY A. WALLACE

P.S. When all the facts are in it appears that what Alice Widener is really saying, is, "What a pity it is that our China policy in 1944 could not have been run by Louis Budenz who knew so much about communism!"

Mrs. Widener Replies

According to Mr. Henry Wallace's statements the United Press, the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *New York Times* were "totally in error" about him, and in my *Freeman* article I was "totally unfair" to him. Nevertheless, Mr. Wallace admits that I quoted correctly an October 5, 1951, United Press item about him which appeared in the *Times* and *Tribune*; and the fact is that despite Mr. Wallace's protest these newspapers have let the item stand without retraction.

Certainly, however, I don't wish to do Mr. Wallace an injustice. Since he has objected to the press report which quoted him as saying that his 1944 China report might have followed the Communist Party line, that he didn't know what the Communist Party line was at that time, and that he was no expert in the field, I should greatly appreciate his courtesy in replying on the record to the following questions:

1. In 1944 did Mr. Wallace know what the Communist Party line was in China?

2. When Mr. Wallace went on his 1944 China mission, was he an expert in the field of communism?

3. After Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had told Mr. Wallace that "China suffered greatly because of the Communists" and that "the Communists follow the orders of the Third International," Mr. Wallace referred to "the patriotic attitude of the Communists in the United States." Did Mr. Wallace really believe in these Communists' patriotism?

Regarding Mr. Wallace's postscript, I'm in full agreement with the formulation: "Now that all the facts are in and the Chinese Communist Army is shooting Americans, what a pity it is that our China policy during 1944-51 couldn't have been run by some one who was fully aware of and opposed to the evil aims of communism!"

New York City ALICE WIDENER

Praise for Mr. Sokolsky

Belatedly permit me to applaud your supplement containing George Sokolsky's interpretive digest of the MacArthur Hearings [September 24]. So excellent and careful a job is not only first-rate journalism but an important public service.

New York City JAMES RORTY

Manners, Arts and Morals

Notes on the Entertainment Industries

By WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM

THE AMERICAN theater is of course not dead. It is merely in a catatonic state. ("*Catatonia*: a syndrome seen most frequently in schizophrenia, with muscular rigidity and mental stupor, sometimes alternating with great excitement and confusion," states "The American College Dictionary," and I have yet to read a keener description of Broadway.) Some pretty intricate theories have been advanced to account for that condition of our stage, but personally, under the illuminating influence of middle age, I favor the simplest possible over the more ornate explanations. The older I grow, the more deeply satisfied I feel with the insight of the good soldier Schweik who, after a lifetime of brooding, decided that poverty was caused by lack of cash. And responsible for the catatonia of our theater, it seems to me, are the playwrights who either have nothing to say, or do not know how to say it, or both.

Naturally, under such circumstances the prize goes to a playwright who has nothing to say but knows how to say it—to Paul Osborn, in other words, who has tailored "Point of No Return," the season's first and, so far, only dramatic hit. Distilled from John P. Marquand's potable novel of a few years ago, Mr. Osborn's smooth cocktail can be safely imbibed even by teetotalers, as it produces a mild glow without containing a trace of spirit.

Mr. Marquand, the urbane explorer of our metropolitan fauna, undertook in "Point of No Return" a polite study of the savage American tribal custom known as struggle for status. Why Charles Gray should so frantically want to become a vice president of the excruciatingly dull Stuyvesant Bank remained a riddle even to Mr. Marquand, his creator. But then, an anthropologist is concerned neither with metaphysics nor with eschatology. His domain is the faithful description of behavior, which is just about what Mr. Marquand gave in his bitter-sweet report on social climbing in lower-upper-class America. But through the sober story of Charley Gray's sacrificial conforming with the cruel pattern shone, somehow, the elemental courage of a decent man who, once he had entered the game, was not going to break its rules, even though the rewards were rather meaningless, and even if to live by those rules meant to waste personal substance.

In short, Marquand's novel was ironical. Mr. Osborn, on the other hand, is what Broadway calls a professional, i.e., a law-abiding member of a trade association to which irony, like art, is something that closes on Saturday. For reasons an anthropologist of Mr. Marquand's ironical talents ought to investigate some day, the executives of all our entertainment industries have cast a taboo on the tangy spice which, in most other cultures, makes the necessarily drab record of human failures palatable and even succulent. Characteristically, Mr. Osborn has substituted a tried and proven national brand of cuteness for Mr. Marquand's piquant irony: Charles Gray, who in the novel achieves the stature of an almost irregular man, is cut down in the play to a mere regular fellow. And the safari into the past, which was undertaken by the novel's hero on a serious quest for the roots of his destiny, becomes in the play a cheaply sentimental journey.

BUT TECHNICALLY, Mr. Osborn has attained every Broadway professional's dream of an ultimate lulu: he has combined, in a single play, the surefire formulas of "Life With Father," "Our Town," "Death of a Salesman" and "Born Yesterday." From "Life With Father" he learned the effect of letting a delighted theatergoer recognize this or that bit of stage business as precisely the sort of thing that always happens in our house too, doesn't it, Mabel? From "Our Town" came the technique of tearing a metropolitan audience's heart with pointillist throwbacks to the simple decencies of small-town life. (But in Thornton Wilder's play the nostalgia was valid because, unlike Mr. Osborn, the author believed in those simple decencies.) "Death of a Salesman" supplied the gimmick of making businessmen, for a delicious moment of danger, shiver with nihilistic doubts about their pleasurable careers. And straight from "Born Yesterday" derived the teasing trick of bringing woman's clever animality into collision with the dumbness of economic man. How, I ask you, could a stagecoach pulled by four such legendary winners possibly miss?

It did not, of course. "Point of No Return" is now firmly established as the town's hottest dramatic hit—a hit, I must add in all fairness, which bears the imprint of professionalism not only in the disparaging sense of the term. The settings are handsome, the pace fast, and the attractive cast is led by Henry Fonda whose clean presence would brighten a funeral. With him around, one feels good. Though he strikes me, I am afraid, as the sort of actor who can play only himself, Mr. Fonda just naturally exudes the courageous kindness and manly sincerity which Mr. Marquand's novel had so clearly in mind and Mr. Osborn's play so patently fails to project.

A REVIEWER'S NOTEBOOK

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

If I had undertaken some twenty years ago to write a book about William Graham Sumner, the sociology professor, Stephen J. Field, the jurist, and Andrew Carnegie, the charitable tycoon, it would no doubt have been very similar to Robert Green McCloskey's "American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise" (Harvard, $3.25). But something has happened to me in the past two decades. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. may attribute my change of mind to "fear," but in all sincerity I do not think that mere visceral shock accounts for my shift in orientation. I have merely lived to see at least four major brands of Statism tried out. I have seen Leninist and Stalinist Statism murder its millions in Soviet Russia. I have watched Hitlerian Statism kill Jews by the hundreds of thousands in central Europe. I have been a witness (sometimes on the spot) to the destruction of vitality and initiative forced by Socialist Statism in Britain. And I have lived through eighteen years of New Deal and Fair Deal governments that have cut the value of every insurance policy in America at least in half. That is what has happened to me, and I wonder therefore at the insulation of Harvard University, where Robert Green McCloskey fills a chair as Assistant Professor of Government.

Professor McCloskey uses William Graham Sumner, Stephen J. Field and Andrew Carnegie as three excuses for belaboring industrial "laissez faire." He seems to think that Sumner, Field and Carnegie somehow robbed the phrases of the English common law and the American Bill of Rights of their "humane" content. Supposedly they exalted "property rights" at the expense of "human rights." They were all for protecting "free enterprise," but as the nineteenth century wore on they cared less and less for the exercise of a free conscience and free speech. In McCloskey's estimation Sumner forgot morality and ethics to promote a "dubious scientism." Field, as a Supreme Court Justice, degenerated into an apologist for corporate wealth. And Carnegie let his acquisitive instincts override his humane impulses. Thus Professor McCloskey in his conventional display of the New Academic Orthodoxy.

Professor McCloskey makes out the sketchiest of cases for his point of view. He is addicted to the Big Cliché. Let me document his superficiality in regard to William Graham Sumner, whom I happen to know something about. He argues that Sumner was, in economics, a man of untested preconceptions. According to McCloskey, Sumner's mind was "closed in youth to the entry of new basic ideas, new tastes, the opinions of others." His conceptions of capital, labor, money and trade were "formed" by Harriet Martineau's "Illustrations," which he read at the age of thirteen in a Hartford library. His ideas about "labor agitators" he supposedly got from his father, a mechanic who quit Lancashire in 1836, the year of a memorable spinners' strike, and emigrated to America.

Now of course Sumner learned something from Harriet Martineau and his father. They were the "radicals" of their day. But Professor McCloskey is utterly silly when he goes on to argue that Sumner never put his early mentors to the test of experience or the lessons of history. Sumner projected his studies of industrial organization back through the Renaissance to the days of the Roman Empire. He chewed and worried at the fascinating subject of Rome's moral decline, which seemed to him to go hand in hand with the proliferation of Roman trade controls and the increase in taxation. He posed Harriet Martineau's Cobdenism against the background of eighteenth century mercantilism. And he came to some mature conclusions that had nothing to do with "preconceptions."

Those conclusions were profoundly antipathetic to the actuating beliefs of the plutocrats of Sumner's time. Big Business in Sumner's day fought for the protective tariff. But the protective tariff, to Sumner, was a "job" or a "steal" which aroused his moral passion. He attacked the "nuisance" of the Willimantic Linen Company, which used its tariff-protected price schedule to pay 95 per cent dividends to its stockholders. In the campaign of 1884 he was acrimoniously contemptuous of James G. Blaine, the Republican candidate for President, because "all the rings and jobbers in the United States" seemed to be rallying to Blaine's support. He was against the "funny money" proposals of greenbackers and free silverites, not because he cared for bondholders, but because he cared for the "forgotten man" of the industrious lower middle class. "The reason why I defend the millions of the millionaire," he wrote, "is not that I love the millionaire, but that I love my own wife and children, and that I know no way in which to get the defense of society for my

hundreds, except to give my help, as a member of society, to protect his millions." Or, as Benjamin Stolberg put it at a later date, "you can not devalue the dollar of John D. Rockefeller without also devaluing the dollar of John Doe."

It is perfectly true, as Professor McCloskey says, that Sumner had little use for anti-trust legislation. But Sumner's defense of large aggregations of capital can not be equated with any defense of artificially maintained monopoly. He believed in striking at artificial monopolies by eradicating their causes, not by policing their results. His words on the use of a patent system to maintain monopoly sound almost like certain passages out of the works of Thurman Arnold or Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. "It is obviously most absurd," he wrote, "to establish a protective system and a patent system and then to denounce patentees and protected interests for availing themselves of the advantages which have been granted them." Finally, Sumner denounced in his most impassioned terms the idea of "manifest destiny" which was projecting the United States into such useless and unnecessary ventures as the Spanish-American War. As he put it, his patriotism was of the kind "which is outraged by the notion that the United States never was a great nation until in a petty three months' campaign it knocked to pieces a poor, decrepit, bankrupt old state like Spain." And he continued: "To hold such an opinion as that is to abandon all American standards, to put shame and scorn on all that our ancestors tried to build up here, and to go over to the standards of which Spain is a representative."

So spoke Sumner, the "old American." But Professor McCloskey will not permit his subject the honor of remaining an "old American." He insists on Sumner's "aridity" and lack of humanity; he insists that the defender of old republican virtues became a man whose values were purely "material." Material? Was it a "materialist" who said, "I'm not afraid to die, in fact I have always had a certain curiosity about death"? Was it a "materialist" who went through novel after novel in ten or twelve languages? Was it a "materialist" who, late in life, read the whole body of Greek tragedy? Was it a "materialist" who, on a picnic with a group of young women at Lake Saltonstall near New Haven, amused himself and the others on a rainy afternoon by enacting the part of Shakespeare's Juliet from memory over a cart tail in an empty barn? Was it a "materialist" who served for twenty-odd years on the Connecticut State Board of Education, riding about the state in a buckboard and sleeping in cold spare-rooms to see that the public schools were properly maintained? If these were the acts of a "materialist," then, to turn the Christian Science dogma around, all is material, even the ultimate mystery that can bring a sequoia tree out of a tiny seed, or a thinking, purposeful man out of what begins as a mere blob of protoplasm.

What Professor McCloskey does not realize is that Sumner, who occasionally said some confusing and contradictory things about "natural rights" (things that contradict the whole drift of his work), was actually "all of a piece" in his attitude toward the rights of the free citizen. The free citizen must have the property right because the right to individual ownership is fundamental to the maintenance of human dignity and spiritual freedom in society. Without the property right, the fulcrum by which one maintains civil rights disappears. The curse of socialism, as Professor Jewkes has so well explained in his "Ordeal by Planning," is that by depriving men of a base in private property it robs them of their ability to maintain themselves against the incorrigible materialism of officialdom. "Social Darwinism," which is a sin that McCloskey imputes to capitalism and to Sumner, rages at its most virulent worst in states that have called the property right into question. When the property right is weakened, every one is increasingly at the mercy of the bureaucracy, and the competition for special privilege becomes too murderous to be borne.

The trouble with Professor McCloskey is that he has only a modern bookman's acquaintance with the tradition and the society that shaped the thinking of Sumner. Raised in Yankee Connecticut, Sumner lived out his life in a community where all of the traditional American rights and freedoms went together. His mature years were spent in New Haven, and if Professor McCloskey wants to know what manner of place old New Haven was let him read Carleton Beals's fascinating "Our Yankee Heritage" (New Haven: Bradley and Scoville, $4.50). Because old New Haven was spiritually free, men poured their energy voluntarily into all sorts of curious ventures. The Millerites prayed in the public streets, and Edward Beecher and Thomas Sanford devised a way to dip phosphorous matches by machinery. Yale College turned out Congregational ministers and Eli Whitney invented the system of mass production of interchangeable parts. Willard Gibbs laid the abstract basis in mathematics for modern physics and Amasa Goodyear invented the steel tine pitchfork before his son Charles grew up to vulcanize India rubber. Capitalist James Hillhouse planted elm trees at his own expense along the New Haven streets, and Simeon Jocelyn took time out from his clock-making to invent the first pruning shears. Samuel Morse, son of New Haven's famous geographer Jedidiah Morse, invented the telegraph and Benjamin Silliman established the first university laboratory. The first telephone exchange was opened up in New Haven and the first hinged buckle was made there. Living in such a fertile society, it is scant wonder that Sumner looked upon the doctrine of laissez faire

and found it good. It added to his well-being and it didn't keep him from enjoying church music.

I had just a taste of Sumner's world during the first ten years of my life (I was eleven years old in New Haven when World War I broke out), and the memory of it has helped make me a "reactionary." I plead guilty to wishing to "turn the clock back"—to the year 1913. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who accuses me of "fear," is too young to remember that spiritually free day, but if he won't take my word for its beneficence let him ask his friend Elmer Davis about it. Elmer once wrote a piece called "Good Old 1913," and Elmer never produced a truer title.

FARM-BOY NATURALIST

John Burroughs' America, edited by Farida A. Wiley. Illustrated by Francis Lee Jacques. *New York: Devin-Adair. $4.00*

John Burroughs was the ranking American "nature-writer" of the era which followed the Civil War, remaining secure in his position till his death in 1921. In his old age he became a sort of national sage, visited and consulted by the great, his literary work, meanwhile, fading out of view before the neon glow of the age of comfort and violence. Today, save to bred-in-the-bone nature lovers, he is little more than a vaguely eminent name, and a figure more remembered as a personality than because of the written word. Feeling that both the man and his work have lasting importance, Miss Farida Wiley has now made a most skilful selection from Burroughs's writings, and Devin-Adair has published them as "John Burroughs' America."

The natural interest of Man in his environment has found literary expression in every age, and the sublimities of Genesis are one with the noble and sonorous metaphors of Virgil, but American "nature-writing" as we know it today is a literary development of the eighteenth century. It could not begin until the American as a human being had appeared in history, and the American is an eighteenth-century figure, remaining rooted in that Augustan age down to our own day. Moreover, the new figure had to possess some knowledge of the continent lurking behind the barrier beaches of the Atlantic with its fierce tensions of heat and cold, its Aztec implacabilities of light, its gigantic scale, and its powers of catastrophic violence. By the middle of the eighteenth century the American had arrived in his buckskins, his inheritance consisting neither of a society nor a culture but of a formidable part of the earth. Of Roman ruins, cathedrals, guild halls and formal gardens he knew nothing, and would have cared nothing if he had. But he did know the bluejay, the pileated woodpecker, and the sound of an August corn field, and he had had a first glimpse of the buffalo by certain passes in the Appalachians. When he was more interested in the differences between things American and things European than in their resemblances, he was ready to go ahead.

It was a genuine literary tradition which thus began. It includes great names, among them the Bartrams, father and son, of Philadelphia (Williams's famous "Travels" had a literary influence on both Wordsworth and Coleridge); and the stream flows on past Audubon and Thoreau to Miss Rachel Carson and that wise and very beautiful book of hers about the sea.

Thoreau was only in a sense a "naturalist"; he was more properly an essayist whose topic was Nature. Of the daemonic quality which is at the root of Nature he had, I think, little if any realization. His Nature has no gods, and is as innocent of sex as Robinson Crusoe. For the power and devilry which sustains and recreates life, the *rerum naturam sola gubernas* of Lucretius, he finds no place. What he has is a literary sense of the importance of an interest in Nature, and a power to make that rather austere interest come to the glow of genius. Thin work sometimes, but always the thin work of a great man; moreover, the books are completely, natively and happily American, and contain no nightingales or flowering hedges, only song sparrows and stone walls.

The work of Burroughs, his chief literary disciple, inherits the Concordian's limitations and works within them. Burroughs's "Nature" is more than ever the nature of the nineteenth-century magazine essay, being essentially a glimpse of his Hudson Valley world as seen with the eye of that pleasant old-fashioned figure, the farm-boy naturalist—may he always be with us. None of the writing gives any literary sign that this point of view was transcended during the long years of Burroughs's kindly and valuable life. What is good, and what will always be of value, is the honesty and accuracy of the observations told in prose as unpretentious as a farmers' almanac. If he continues to be read it will be because his work springs, as all good work must, from a deep and never-faltering love for his subject. His little essays may not be great writing or great thinking, but there is great feeling on every page.

Too much praise can not be given to Miss Wiley for her skill and sureness in choosing the selections. She has put together a very readable and valuable collection. In an age marked by an alienation from Nature unexampled in human history, it is pleasant to stroll with "good John Burroughs" that earth which does not hold to our human clocks but keeps the sun's hour.

The book is also particularly fortunate in its illustrator, Francis Lee Jacques. A series of black-and-white plates together with figures in the text lend their own vivid, sure, and always distinguished interpretations to the selected passages of prose. Burroughs will remain alive, I think, and to possess this book is an excellent way of having him live as a part of one's own library.

HENRY BESTON

THE FLEXIBLE ART

Selected Poems, by Muriel Rukeyser. *New York: New Directions. $1.50*

Selected Poems, by Horace Gregory. *New York: Viking. $3.00*

Winged Chariot and Other Poems, by Walter de la Mare. *New York: Viking. $3.50*

Poets more than other writers are free to find their subjects and symbols in their own time or out of it. The Moving Finger can be indicated in Eohippus, in marine cemeteries, or in the mushroom clouds that sprang up in countless verses after Hiroshima. The shades of Greece and Rome can be summoned to hover over the streets of any moderately large and corrupt city, and they will unfailingly appear. The poetic vocabulary, too, can be drawn from a wide stock; a reader can be urged to move " 'twixt wake and dream," "accidie" can await him, "even" drop its second *e*, words can be split or fused into alarming compounds, legal testimony and mathematical formulae be recorded; and so hardened is the audience that rarely will it betray surprise. Poetry, in short, as it is practiced in our current letters, is the most flexible of arts and consequently the most discouraging to many good readers who see little more of a recognizable transcription in it than in "Finnegan's Wake." The poets here assembled bear witness to this freedom. Walter de la Mare with the exception of a few lines could step out of any anthology of nineteenth-century poetry: Muriel Rukeyser and Horace Gregory, on the other hand, move in and out of the swinging doors of the thirties and forties, their scene the barrenness, sorrow, confusion, and mild hope of the intellectual living in or near New York.

This edition of Muriel Rukeyser's poems is selected from eight books, the first of which appeared in 1935. Miss Rukeyser's early poetry was strenuous with social protest:

> we vote
> death to Sacco a man's name
> and Vanzetti a blood-brother; death
> to Tom Mooney, or a wall, no matter;
> poverty to Piers Plowman, shrieking anger
> to Shelley, . . .

She walked with her father across a ruined marshland:

> . . . "this quarry means rows of little houses,
> stucco and a new bracelet for you are buried there";

She saw a boy having his hair cut by his tall, pale sister so he could go on hopelessly looking for a job next day; she wrote about the rich ladies of whom she despaired:

> one used to play the piano, one of them once wrote
> a sonnet,

and about the men who died of silicosis:

> This is the X-ray picture taken last April—
> I would point out to you: these are the ribs;
> this is the region of the breastbone;
> this is the heart (a wide white shadow filled with
> blood)—

She also wrote respectfully of Josiah Willard Gibbs and his abstruse science which is essentially so impervious to poetry and which she gallantly if inaccurately incorporated in lines with some powers of evocation as a sign of the world's unity. Miss Rukeyser's later poetry is more complicated, often to the point of impenetrability, but the issues with which she struggles are no longer to be reduced to phrases like "Not Sappho but Sacco." So she writes now of the Ajanta caves and tumultuous visions that again end in a mystic if incoherent harmony and a hope of something better to come. She is an earnest writer, and although sometimes her priestess's robes frighten the muses away she has an unstinting fund of generous emotion that can compensate for many faults.

Horace Gregory is a classicist who has succeeded in domesticating his Greeks in the rigorous climate of the United States, and in this selection from twenty years of his work there is a withdrawal like Miss Rukeyser's from his early themes of a common man's view of heaven, the "empty" careers of the entrepreneur, and (a greater loss) the tenderness and lyricism of the poem to his daughter. The later poems like "Police Sergeant Malone and the Six Dead Drinkers" have moved out to a surrealist fringe, although they still indicate Mr. Gregory's dislike of the respectable suburbs. In his earlier years (they were also the years of the depression) right and wrong were plainly labeled:

> McCumber Bluethorne, millionaire, sleeps (falls
> asleep)
> after a dozen cocktails.
> Expects to die
> in the inevitable stronghold for his nerves and
> tissues.
> The bright machinery that was his mind
> falls silent.
> His factories (men in the street
> crying against him and the quick rifles of the State
> Militia
> are quiet now)

Mr. Gregory has also sought out the meaning of Emerson, tried to place the country in its seasons, heritage, and contradictions, and drawn solemn, corrosive portraits of American dreamers like the super salesman in "Two Monologues from the Passion of M'Phail" who is the self-defeated bourgeois complete with Rorschach tests and desperation. Mr. Gregory has a good deal of grace and imagination; his later poetry moves into the borderland where de la Mare has long been searching—where strange dreams and fevers compete lyrically with their resemblances in the waking world. These poems, while more baffling than those of the thirties, are not so riveted to the simple cultural structures of the days of "The Merchants of Death." For example, Mr. Gregory wrote:

> Bitter the thinking man who sees
> The careful millionaire, the red frontier

In city walls closed; and the hot mills pour
Iron for guns, starvation, war:

It was ironically by way of the hot mills preparing for war that Mr. Gregory's "cursed wind driven poverty" was to be exchanged for steak at a dollar and a half a pound. His mills now are more subtle, less subject to later write-offs:

There are rumors
That all cities are fires dropped from the sky
In a curious geography of wars:
This shaded portion of the map was Pharos:
The gods no longer walk there.

The title poem of "Winged Chariot" runs to almost half of Walter de la Mare's new volume. The remaining poems—almost all short lyrical pieces—have been, the author tells us, written over a period of years—some as long as a half-century ago. "Winged Chariot" is a discourse on the peculiarities of Time—on the time of clocks, of love, of youth, of eternity—and the author, being eighty years old and still of the inquiring disposition that has led him into the most haunted as well as the most commonplace reaches of poetry, is wonderfully skilful in his subject. In lines that form a great variety of rhyming patterns he is grave and witty and charming like an Omar moved to the twentieth century.

That star, which through the window spills its ray
On sheet and pillow when in dreams we stray—
That's not a myriad light-years far away!

De la Mare while celebrating the gardens and flowers, the significance of the visible world, has always seen its creatures, however delightful in themselves, as part of a universe far vaster than their powers of recognition, with intimations of Presences and mysteries in sky and leaf and old house that make them part of an enormous if undetected pattern. Still, he can write of Blondin walking his tightrope across Niagara,

Dead-calm 'mid inward vortices,
Where little else but danger is. . . .

the "death-defying acrobat" shielded in his own strength. He can celebrate old friendships, or Izaak Walton, and sorrow for a lost love, but he returns again and again to his theme of the Listeners and Watchers and to his view of man in whom the powers of the seen and unseen meet.

It is his remarkable ability to bring the poetic tradition up to date, to have his nymphs "doff their raiment" but at the same time be seen with the wary eye of the mid-twentieth century, that enables so many readers from children to the very old to be enchanted by de la Mare. That he leaves many of them with an intimation of broomsticks and wings and voices just out of the auditory range is also part of the ancient tribal duty of the poet. Although the present volume goes back a long way in the poet's and our time, it would be difficult to detect the aging process in what he has written, so well has he kept his fresh, far-seeing view of things together with the old styles and words.

EUGENE DAVIDSON

SEQUEL TO "SANCTUARY"

Requiem for a Nun, by William Faulkner. *New York: Random House. $3.00*

The opening section of Faulkner's new novel, a sequel to his "Sanctuary," tells how the town of Jefferson got its name. This had not previously seemed the most important question about that community, whose inhabitants, one would imagine from what Faulkner has said about them, would be occupied principally in strengthening their municipal defenses against an impending attack of fire and brimstone. The only critic who has raised the question of how Jefferson got its name is A. Wigfall Green, in the Summer 1932 issue of the *Sewanee Review*. Professor Green said, "Jefferson, probably named for the President of the Confederacy, is Oxford, in Lafayette County, the seat of the state university."

It now appears that the town of Jefferson really got its name from a frontier mail carrier, Jefferson Pettigrew of Virginia, as the result of a complicated problem involving the loss of a lock which the settlers wished to charge to the government—a solution that enables Faulkner to repeat, in his own difficult prose, the substance of many editorials on the harmful effect on the common morality of government spending. The mail carrier, a small, brave man ("imperable as diamond and manifest with portent") refused to accept this solution, and to mollify him the settlers named the town for him, simultaneously beginning to build the courthouse. The curtain then rises on the courthouse—literally, for the novel is constructed like a play, except for the long essays on the courthouse and the jail—more than a century later, and a scene in which a Negro girl is being sentenced to death for the murder of a child.

The dead child is the second child of Temple Drake and Gowan Stevens. In a few brief scenes—the defense lawyer questioning Temple and Gowan in their home as to what happened on the night of the murder, and Temple confessing to the governor in an attempt to stop the execution—it develops that the marriage of Temple and Gowan has been a bitter and uneasy one. When Gowan was a student at the University of Virginia, where he learned to drink like a gentleman, he got drunk while he was acting as Temple's escort. Temple, it will be recalled, was violated and kidnapped by a gangster named Popeye[1] and confined in a Memphis brothel, a scandal which came into the open when she was called as a witness in a murder trial. It now develops that Gowan, the butt of "Sanctuary," was a gentleman, stopped drinking, and tried to undo the damage he believed he was responsible for by marrying Temple and returning with her to Jefferson to face down the scandal.

On Gowan's part, the knowledge that his wife had

[1] According to Professor Green, the original of Popeye "is Popeye Pumphrey, a Memphis racketeer who recently (1932) attempted suicide."

been "kidnapped into a Memphis whorehouse—and loved it" has generated an increasing distrust, the physical reaction from his attempt to live up to his own concept of his obligations, swollen finally to doubt that his children are his. On Temple's part, her life in the brothel, which ironically has been sexually more circumscribed, though perhaps more eccentric, than that of the average coed of the period in question, has given her a semi-professional interest in the environment, resulting in her hiring a Negro maid who had formerly been a prostitute, and finally involvement with an underworld character, the murder occuring when the maid tries to prevent Temple from running away with him.

Faulkner's knowledge of his own country is so profound that only the boldest critic would challenge him on the authenticity of such an account. In a sense, the book seems not only to be completing "Sanctuary," but correcting it. As if self-conscious at having evoked so many melodramatic horrors over what may, after all, be commonplace, Faulkner has touched up the previous novel here and there. But as is the case with so much of Faulkner's writing, his apparent errors reveal a deeper reality. The aspects of "Requiem for a Nun" that critics have objected to—Temple's underworld pal who "looks like" her dead lover of her brothel days, and somehow resembles her husband as well; the obscene letters she wrote in the brothel, and with which she is being blackmailed—are perhaps the truest element of the novel, the substitution, in an amoral world, of codes and proprieties and politeness borrowed from romantic fiction.

If so, the difficult nature of underworld rituals may explain why the novel seems to waste a story so much better than the one it tells. The attempted reformation of Gowan Stevens, amounting almost to a transformation of the self, what must have been involved in his recurring doubts of Temple, the precise nature of the underworld interest in the young couple, any and all of this suggested material seems implicitly more dramatic than the wooden and half-ritualistic resignation of the Negro girl as she goes to her death. The prose of the novel itself—that is, the scenes in dialogue—is more intense and immediate than anything Faulkner has written recently. The play form has freed him from the intricate monologue that began with "Pylon" and has been getting worse and worse. When Faulkner does return to the monologue—in the essays on the courthouse and the jail—the results are awful.

It is impossible to imagine a worse prose style than Faulkner's has become. Beginning with the empty and pretentious prose-poetry of the moon-calf period, it has gradually been complicated by the addition of material from the historical quarterlies, incidents of antiquarian interest, interpreted backwards as literal description, and now it is really curdled with political and social comments. These sections of "Requiem for a Nun" sometimes resemble the half-hysterical and self-intoxicated humor of children making up a play or a game—"Then we'll do this," "Then we'll have a town," "This will be the jail." Presumably Faulkner means by including them to suggest that Temple Drake's tragedy has been paralleled in the history of the town, her rape the equivalent of its occupation during the Civil War, and her marriage akin to reconstruction; but if so the images are too involved to be effectively communicated.

ROBERT CANTWELL

ROMAN HARVEST

The Portable Roman Reader, edited and with an introduction by Basil Davenport. *New York: Viking.* ***$2.50***

Why should anyone read the small, pelting commonplaces of Basil Davenport on Roman civilization when he can turn to Livy or to Suetonius or to the Latin poets themselves? And why should a reader bother with a fragment of Terence and a moiety of Martial or piecemeal Lucretius when he can spend the same amount of time exploring the whole vision of a single ancient author? The mind is the higher stomach of man, and it can not sustain helter-skelter change without confusion. The intellect at its best is a pastoral milch-cow that rejoices when it has continuous meadow and pasture; uncoerced by fashion, it is not likely to forsake the cribs of Virgil's "Bucolics" to graze upon a bit of Lucretius and then rush off to Catullus and to Caesar. Jumping about is very foolish, and even mad, but this is what Basil Davenport and other anthology salesmen of letters expect the reader to do.

Mr. Davenport, having all the charming, tumid faults of our "cultivated" age, claims that his selections are "in the best English translations," but as Henry Fielding might have said, there is nothing wrong with this assumption except that it is not true. As proof of his taste Mr. Davenport chooses Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's translation of Virgil in preference to the pre-Elizabethan Gavin Douglas's. Mr. Davenport would doubtless tell you that Gavin Douglas is hard to read, but earnest reading is a task for the higher faculties, and anyone who attempts to make a book simpler than it is at its best or in its original text is a puerile sophist. The simple truth is that all great poetry is difficult to understand; besides, there is the Virgil englished by Robert Andrew in the famous Baskerville edition of 1766.

When Mr. Davenport chooses a poet's rendering of Catullus, it is no more than a single ode by Sir Philip Sidney. There are various fragments from Horace, but Christopher Smart, a poet of Samuel Johnson's time who did a lovely translation of the odes, is absent. There is a piece of Livy here, but it is not done by Philemon Holland, the Elizabethan, who also did Suetonius. The ancients included in this volume perish under the rude, myrmidon hands of Andrew Lang whose "Iliad" has left us wasted and empty. As for Dryden's Plutarch, in which the blood and marrow have been extracted from the

ancient body, just compare it with the Plutarch of the Elizabethan Sir Thomas North!

The anthologist has not hesitated to include Walter Pater's Apuleius. Pater himself is false wine and gimcrack pomegranates, and who can but wince at the thought of Apuleius being patered, for here we have two decadences rolled up into one.

Spare us, O Zeus, from easy reading. Man is by nature a stupid slattern who would rather read with his lower stomach, and he should not be indulged.

EDWARD DAHLBERG

A NEW DIMENSION

The Ascent to Truth, by Thomas Merton. *New York: Harcourt, Brace. $3.50*

Say "Thomas Merton" and you suggest to almost every hearer "The Seven Storey Mountain," one of the most widely read and influential autobiographies of the past decade, a book of which it may justly be said that it opened the way to ascent of the non-fiction best-seller lists by religious books.

The author is now a Catholic priest. When he cast his life into print, he was already a member of the strictly cloistered Trappist order. How could the story of such a person catch and hold and haunt the minds of some hundreds of thousands of American readers of all religions and no religion? The book was uncommonly well written; it vividly rehearsed a variegated career; it was many-scened and crowded with fascinating people. But its universal appeal sprang from none of these attributes. Rather, it lay in the fact that in the book one could see one's own experiences, perplexities, frustrations. It was an exact miniature of our harassed age.

Here was an alert and articulate person who, in a few years, ran the gamut of intellectual and spiritual adventure and misadventure typical of our time, and could graphically reconstruct the course: one philosophy, one set of values discarded for another, which in turn was cast aside for still another until, almost inevitably, there came submission to Marxism.

The principal aid to Marxist capture or disarming of the intelligentsia has been that, having abandoned principles and standards with any spiritual grounding or reference, the intelligentsia have been without the means to measure the fallacies of Marxist theory and the calamitous failure of Marxist practice. Such was Merton's case. His agglomeration of philosophical bits and pieces could be summed up as pragmatic and materialist. Hence he, like his peers, had no criteria with which critically to judge Marxism or any other species of materialism.

However, for Merton (but not, unfortunately, for countless contemporaries of his), this was only a passing phase. He came to grasp the content and the pertinence to life, whether personal or social, of integral Christianity. For example, he saw that the genuinely effective work for giving the Negro the human status he had been denied, was being done not by the Communists, who merely exploited the Negro's grievances, but by the radically Christian groups.

Once a Christian, he went all the way. His wish was not for a life with an oil-slick of religiosity on its surface but nothing in its depths indistinguishable from what was found in the disorientated existence of the secularist. He would give himself to silent contemplation of the Supreme Reality, spending his days and years in mystical communion with the Being from whom and to whom all being moves.

To some readers (or at least to some reviewers) this was anti-climax with a vengeance, and was contemptuously dismissed as flight from reason to illusion, from social responsibility to selfish and sterile solitude. It couldn't possibly be the solution to the dilemmas and torments of modern man. Or, if it could be the solution for a few, what did it have to do with and for the teeming rest of us who just can not fly the world?

In "The Ascent to Truth" Thomas Merton tries to answer these objections. He seeks to show that contemplation is not merely for the monastic minority, but for all men, in whatever circumstances. He wants us to see that it is possible for us, how it is possible for us.

The turmoil and the agony of our era have two principal causes. The first is the lack of truth; the second, the lack of love. These facts may be illustrated by the delusions which prevail concerning the achieving of international peace and social solidarity. It is thought that armaments will produce the first, and sharing the wealth the second. There is overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and in any case both assumptions are crassly materialistic. But there is more to man, to his nature and his society, than the materialist sees. It is for failure to perceive spiritual reality and act in accord with it that wars proliferate and the most prosperous society disintegrates.

Truth and love are at once the method and the end of contemplation. If these are the needs of humanity, then contemplation is the concern of humanity. Which is not to say that contemplation, or even the study of contemplation, is easy. No one can go effortlessly through this book, as he could "The Seven Storey Mountain." It is a work which requires work.

But anyone willing to join hands with the author will be repaid a thousandfold. At the very least, he will be intellectually stimulated, cleansed of the barnacles of materialist or positivist prejudices, brought to consider levels of being never previously scrutinized by him. At the very most, he will walk in a new landscape, with new awareness, purpose, hope. He will move in a new dimension, and if there are enough of his kind, the world can move out of the materialist morass, whether under Marxist or other auspices, where it now rots, into a dimension worthy of human beings and blessed with peace and love.

JOHN S. KENNEDY

WE ARE LOSING FREEDOM BY DEFAULT!

According to reports from Washington the Wage Stabilization Board is prepared to recommend the union shop—requiring compulsory union membership—in an effort to settle disputes in steel and other industries. If this recommendation is accepted, compulsory union membership will be forced throughout virtually every industry.

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