THE Freeman

JUNE 30, 1952 25¢

EDUCATORS VS. FREE INQUIRY

Henry Hazlitt

James Burnham:

HOW THE IPR HELPED STALIN SEIZE CHINA

Second Anniversary in Korea

Articles by Alice Widener and Wayne T. Geissinger

No man should be forced to join a union, not even by the President of the United States!

The Timken Roller Bearing Company

"The right to work shall not be abridged or made impotent"

THE Freeman

A Fortnightly For Individualists

Editors JOHN CHAMBERLAIN FORREST DAVIS HENRY HAZLITT*

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Contents

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THE FREEMAN is published every other week. Publication Office, Orange, Conn. Editorial and General Offices, 240 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N. Y. John Chamberlain, President; Henry Hazlitt, Vice President; Forrest Davis, Secretary; Alex L. Hillman, Treasurer; Suzanne La Follette, Assistant Treasurer.

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Our Contributors

James Burnham ("How the IPR Helped Stalin **Seize China**") is a philosophy professor (NYU) and political theorist turned, in this instance, into a reporter. Mr. Burnham, Princeton A. B., Oxford A. B. and A. M., is best known for his books, "The Managerial Revolution" and "The Struggle for the World." . . . Howard E. Kershner ("Except the Lord Build the House . . ."), author and humanitarian, has devoted most of his energies since 1939 to children's relief activities in Europe as, first, executive vice president, International Commission for Child Refugees and latterly Children's Fund of the UN . . . Wayne T. Geissinger ("Theirs But to Do and Die"), a Columbus, Ohio, attorney, served Syngman Rhee as adviser in 1951, having met the Korean President as a Military Government legal officer in Seoul, 1945-'46. . . . Henry Hazlitt, Alice Widener and Burton Rascoe are, of course, well known to *Freeman* readers.

Among Ourselves

Mr. Burnham's study of treason as disclosed by the McCarran investigation is, we fondly believe, as distinguished a piece of contemporary history as will appear anywhere in America this year. It is likewise our second full-length, exhaustive article in as many issues. Last time it was Dr. Melchior Palyi's convincing treatise on the failures of socialized medicine. The publication of such lengthy discussions reflects a point of view. We do not share the current notion of periodical editors that the reader is too frivolous to concentrate on a serious matter for more than five minutes. We hold that there exists among us a saving minority of adults willing, able and eager to peruse a noteworthy article on a matter of supreme import even if it takes a half hour to do so.

The *Freeman*, in short, is edited for adults from 16 to 80. That is one reason why, as of now, eighteen leading industrial corporations have seen fit to present their messages in our advertising columns. They are out to reach the saving minority of the men and women who, by and large, operate our society. They are influenced also, you may be sure, by the fact, explicit in every issue, that this magazine stoutly and unashamedly exalts the virtues of our free, fluid and tractable society and condemns its enemies at home and abroad. On that point we have the word of the board chairman of a foremost advertising agency (name on request) who wrote as follows:

> Your magazine has steadily improved and is printing the most honest political and economic thinking that appears anywhere. I am asking our space buyers to keep closely in touch with its progress.

Perhaps because of these considerations the *Freeman's* circulation has risen. without extensive promotion, by roughly 300 per cent in a year and a half. May we respectfully suggest that you study and note the advertisements appearing in increasing volume in this and subsequent issues?

Letters

Facts à la *Reporter*

The *Reporter* for April 29 last (pa 12) tells us that Father Jam Kearney got from Mr. Alfred Ko berg *all* of his material for an ar cle on Lattimore that was subs quently used by Senator McCarth A person would naturally assum from the word "all" that Fath Kearney had no personal experien of China or Lattimore's work. T truth is quite the converse: Fath Kearney spent over twenty yea (1928-1949) in China.

Father Kearney can not answ the *Reporter* immediately himsel For it will be months before he eve gets a copy of the *Reporter*, let alo gets an answer back to the State At present he is publishing a pape of his own in Singapore.

Under date of April 27 last, h did write to me that his articles o China, including the Lattimore on were all based on his direct person contact with China. This seems log cal, since the only places he has h any notable "direct contact" wi during the past 23 years have be in the Orient.

FATHER PHILIP CONNEALLY, *Los Angeles, Cal.*

Mr. Chamberlain on "Witness"

I was much impressed by Jo Chamberlain's review of the Cha bers book [June 2]. So much m viewing is simply in another un verse of discourse—as though Vo taire were to review the Confessio of St. Augustine. And say what o will, I think it something of a fe for Chambers at one swoop to ha lifted the debate from the questi whether Alger is guilty or not t whether God exists or not.

Baltimore, Md. C. P. M

John Chamberlain's review of Cha bers is one of the two best I ha read. I also liked the review by Si ney Hook in the *Times*. But M Chamberlain's had a more perso touch and, I think, a more sym thetic understanding of the man. I me the big tragedy of Chamber life was the misunderstanding h him by people who ought to be h his side.

New York City C. B. LARRA

(*Continued on page 674*)

THE
Freeman

MONDAY, JUNE 30, 1952

The Fortnight

By a deft intervention of fate, the Kremlin's crude gesture toward British neutralism, Bevanism and the City's desire for trade with the East signified by Gromyko's assignment to London, came an equally obvious cropper over last week-end. British public opinion, cheerily unperturbed by Fuchs, Pontecorvo and the two Foreign Office men who defected to Moscow without trace, may finally take amiss the Soviet Union's bald misuse of diplomatic immunity in the William Martin Marshall case. Marshall, you will recall, was arrested while hobnobbing with Soviet diplomat Pavel Kuznetzov in a London park; Marshall being a Foreign Office code clerk.

Moscow's insolence seemingly knows no bounds. The appointment of George N. Zarubin to the Washington Embassy is a deep slight. It was Zarubin who presided at Ottawa when the Soviet spy ring in Canada was unmasked. Zarubin has been in London during the Kuznetzov-Marshall intrigue. Zarubin may or may not be the spy master these events indicate. In any case he should be *persona non grata* at Washington, and he would be had we an Administration less habituated to truckling to Soviet assertiveness.

Remember our ally Mihailovich? Churchill and Roosevelt betrayed him to Stalin's creature, Tito, who framed and murdered him. Remember our allies of the Polish underground? Attlee and Truman advised their leaders to reveal themselves to the Soviet government, which promptly arrested, framed, "tried" and jailed them, with no protest louder than polite moans from the British and American fingermen. Remember our ally Chiang Kai-shek? The U. S. government delivered his country to Stalin's Chinese stooges, whom the British government recognized with unseemly haste.

Now it is the turn of Syngman Rhee and our South Korean allies. The pattern, as Mr. Wayne T. Geissinger shows elsewhere in this issue, has not changed. It is a pattern of browbeating, arrogant insult, and betrayal. President Rhee has arrested twelve members of the South Korean Assembly, one of whom is accused of murder, and eleven of whom are accused of communicating with the enemy. He has also declared martial law in an attempt to cope with guerrilla activity. He wants the Constitution changed in order that the people, instead of the Assembly, may choose their next President. What happens? Mr. Truman, Mr. Eden and Mr. Trygve Lie rap President Rhee's knuckles. Where do they get their information about South Korea? From the generals and diplomats who for the past year have been snubbing and insulting Rhee and truckling to the Communists. We may not know any more about the situation than Truman, Eden and Lie do; but the record of the West for loyalty to anti-Communist allies being what it is, we are willing to wager that President Rhee is right and that their interference in South Korean affairs is not only presumptuous but wrong.

If anything could add to the shame of Koje it would be the recently published list of questions put by the UN to the inmates of South Korean prison camps. For months the UN propaganda has had it that there would be no forcible repatriation of unwilling prisoners. Now it comes out that all prisoners are put down for repatriation unless they insist that they will forcibly resist. In other words, unless a prisoner is so desperate that he will pit his unarmed strength against that of the whole UN Army, that army will surrender him into the hands of the Communist executioners.

But that is not the worst. Here is the third degree to which the prisoner is subjected: If he indicates that he does not wish to be repatriated he is asked, "Would you forcibly resist?" If the answer is no, he is put down for repatriation. If yes, he is asked, "Have you carefully considered the important effect of your decision on your family?" "Do you realize you may stay at Koje for a longer time than those who choose repatriation and have already returned home?" "Do you understand that the United Nations Command has never promised to send you to a certain place?" "Do you still insist on forcibly resisting repatriation?" "Despite your decision, if the United Nations Command should repatriate you what would you do?" Unless, says the *New York Times* dispatch, the prisoner answers this last question—assuming he holds on until it is reached—with a threat of suicide, escape or a fight

to the death, he is listed for repatriation. Is there anyone who can still contend, in the face of such infamy, that the UN is a great moral force?

Former Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee, reports the UP, told the House of Commons that the trouble in Allied prisoner-of-war camps in Korea probably would not have happened if the British were running the camps. This is not just "probable," as Mr. Attlee put it with the ingrained modesty of a British Socialist, but absolutely indisputable. Even more, if the British Labor government had been running not only the camps but also the war in Korea, there would be no prisoners-of-war to trouble us. In fact, there would be no war at all, but a pact of abiding friendship with a Red Korea.

How much logical prowess does it take these days to teach history at Harvard? The thing can now be measured. Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. began an article on Eisenhower's speech in Abilene with the fascinating statement that the General reminded him of no political figure so much as of Henry Wallace. Eight paragraphs later, he concluded with this: "The readiness of the Republican Party to accept the Eisenhower of Abilene is the first test of its alleged maturity. If it fails this test . . . it merits no consideration for the larger responsibilities of governing the country." By all rules of logic, and to make any sense at all, this statement would imply that Dr. Schlesinger approves of Henry Wallace. But he does not, he says emphatically. All of which goes to show how history is being taught these days at Harvard.

Why do so many sincere anti-Communists hate Senator Joe McCarthy? Personally, we think it a matter of pique, or of wounded *amour propre*. Here the boys, from Sidney Hook on down to Arthur Schlesinger, had been carrying an anti-Stalinist torch, honorably but without any important results. Then a wild man from Wisconsin, a pop-off guy with a gift for dramatizing the issue, muscled in on what had been an intellectuals' preserve. Action followed. The role of the IPR was limned without mercy; the Great Dog Lattimore was forced to bay the red harvest moon; John Service departed from Foggy Bottom. It was enough to burn any good intellectual up to see Joe carrying off something that had never been carried off before.

Let it not be said, however, that we deem Joe McCarthy incapable of making a mistake. He made a foolish one recently when he took Bill Benton in particular and the State Department in general to task for sending to England "obscene literature which followed the Communist Party line, such as Edmund Wilson's 'Memoirs of Hecate County.'" Now Mr. Wilson's book may or may not be obscene (it seemed to us a dour and joyless book designed to scare any young man or woman completely away from thoughts of lubricity). But whatever is to be said about the allegedly pornographic passages of "Memoirs of Hecate County," there is nothing in the book that makes even the remotest connection with the Communist Party line. Mr. Wilson has been anti-Stalinist from away back, and Senator McCarthy should know as much.

P.S. Mr. Wilson is, of course, something of a Socialist. Senator McCarthy might legitimately twit Bill Benton and the State Department for using tax funds for sending a Socialist's literature to socialist England. Coals to Newcastle and all that, with us Milquetoasts picking up the check.

Those who believe in the necessity of price controls are making a big whoopdedo over the fact that the price of spuds skyrocketed the day after OPS removed the potato ceilings. But, as Ralph Waldo Emerson said, why so hot, little men? Few people are buying potatoes at the high prices; they are buying spaghetti, noodles and rice instead. Soon the grocers will have potatoes to burn on their hands, and soon the price will collapse. We are doubly sure of this for the reason that we know our own motives. Here for years we have had a garden devoted to the finer things of vegetable life—to such things as cherry tomatoes, Carmelcross corn, chives, okra and ice-box watermelons. This year, scared by the artificial potato shortage, we took five rows ordinarily given over to leeks and scallions and filled them with potatoes. Next autumn, along with our friends who reacted to the OPS "crisis" as we did, we'll be stuck with those potatoes at a time when Aroostook spuds are all over the place. What makes it particularly galling is that we don't like potatoes much anyway. We sure wish Mr. Ellis Arnall's wise guys would stop monkeying with the market.

What happens when the state, to "help" the tenants, prolongs rent controls? The roof falls in. And any one who doubts ought to read the UN European Commission's report on its rent control survey in the afflicted countries of Europe. "As long as there is a true housing shortage," concludes the Commission, "it will be difficult to get rid of rent restriction; yet as long as the freezing of rents persists, the housing shortage is exaggerated." Just as they used to say in frivolous Vienna about the security of a Hapsburgian civil servant: "He makes no living at all, but he will make that for life."

The Supreme Court has decided in a 7-1 vote that a bus or trolley line has the Constitutional right to inflict radio music and commercials on its captive audience of riders. If buses or trolleys ran over private streets, or if (to put it into more technical language) they did not constitute a natural monopoly under the control of the State

we would be prepared to see merit in the Court's decision. But just why a public conveyance which gets its franchise from the city hall as the agent of the people should be allowed to assault the privacy of thousands of citizens daily must remain a complete mystery to a libertarian magazine. It's bad enough on the train when the passenger next to you insists on talking when you want to sleep or read a book, or when a smoker blows smoke in your face outside of the restricted area of the smoking car. But to be forced to listen to hotcha music when you may want to look over the baseball scores or ruminate on the countenances of fellow passengers is too much. We recommend, as penance, that the judges of the Supreme Court be compelled to listen to soap opera when they are pondering briefs and reworking the citations of their clerks into the deathless prose of their opinions. (Justices Douglas and Frankfurter, who did not vote for radio in buses, may be excepted.)

The President's Steel Strike

The President, for the second time, is attempting to settle the steel strike, which he and his advisers are responsible for starting, by seizing the steel mills. The first seizure he accomplished on his own. Now that the Supreme Court has clearly defined his powers, he is appealing to Congress for the authority to do what he had recently done without authority.

Mr. Truman's message to a joint session of Congress on June 10 is far from the State document it pretends to be. In it he again expresses his disapproval of the Taft-Hartley Act and repeats the same specious reasons for his unwillingness to invoke the emergency provisions of that law. What he fails to do (and the failure must be deliberate) is to disclose to Congress fairly and unmistakably why he prefers the seizure he is asking for to a law that is already on the statute books.

If the United Steel Workers obeyed the law, which the President's message implies they might not, the strikers would go back to work under either seizure or Taft-Hartley. But there is a vast difference in the conditions under which they would return to their jobs. Under the Taft-Hartley procedure, existing wages and working conditions would prevail until a new agreement had been reached. Under the President's seizure proposal, he wants the authority to fix wages and working conditions; in other words, to put into effect the recommendations of Mr. Feinsinger's Wage Stabilization Board. It is this difference which is the source of the President's preference for one method against another for ending the steel strike.

Nor is this all. The President is equally naive or misinformed in arguing that it is unfair to ask the steel workers to wait the 80 days required by the Taft-Hartley Act after they had already waited 99 days for the decision of the Stabilization Board. Aside from the fact that the WSB fiasco was of his own making, the President ought to know that the steel workers are better off working than striking. He should know, also, that labor agreements arrived at after prolonged negotiations as a rule contain retroactive provisions which date back the terms mutually agreed upon. In fact the negotiations that terminated on June 9 dealt with the question of retroactivity, and there is no reason to believe that future negotiations will fail to deal with this issue.

The President hardly comes into court with clean hands when he keeps reiterating that he did all he could to prevent the strike, that he has always tried to encourage a settlement through collective bargaining, and that he has sought to be fair to both sides. The record, unfortunately, supports none of these claims. The behavior of the Administration during all of the many phases of the steel dispute shows how flagrantly it paved the way for a strike and made a settlement by means of collective bargaining impossible.

The record goes back to the ill-fated decision, made in 1951 under pressure from the CIO and the AFL, to convert the Stabilization Board into a Disputes Board. There was ample warning at the time that this was an unwise decision which would make trouble. The warnings were disregarded. It is now clear that a stabilization board would have lacked authority to pass on the union shop, an issue which is the principal obstacle today in the way of a steel settlement.

As if this blunder was not enough, the Administration made failure certain by the type of public members it appointed to the WSB. The experience of this country with administrative boards has not been a happy one in the past twenty years. But it is doubtful that the worst of them can point to so miserable a record as that established by the board to which Mr. Truman entrusted the fortunes of the steel industry and its employees. Now that the evidence is all in, it is obvious that these representatives of the public interest entertained, to say the least, most peculiar views of the responsibilities of public servants. All they succeeded in doing was to force the resignation of Charles E. Wilson, the Director of Defense Mobilization, and to precipitate a needless and costly strike in one of the country's essential industries. It was only luck that fear of reprisal kept the board from messing up the oil labor dispute as thoroughly and effectively as it had the steel controversy.

Once the dispute got out of the hands of the WSB, Mr. Truman saw to it, through his own behavior and that of his close associates, that the United Steel Workers was given every incentive to strike. He himself, on the occasion of Mr. Wilson's resignation, issued his intemperate statement sup-

porting everything the WSB did. Not long after, Secretary of Labor Tobin and Vice-President Barkley made their foolish and dangerous speeches to the Steel Workers which marked a new low in irresponsible behavior by high public officials. This public policy of inciting men to strike, in which the President and Cabinet members participate, is the natural climax of a national labor policy which has steadily gone from bad to worse.

The solution of this situation is not government seizure of an industry's plants and the imposition by government fiat of terms of work which have not been agreed to and which are notoriously unfair and unworkable. Acceptance of this policy will make all other labor settlements more difficult to arrive at and will be another and long step in the process of further fortifying the already powerful collection of labor monopolies which today determine the country's labor policy. The procedure which Mr. Truman so strongly endorses is nothing less than compulsory arbitration. At the moment the unions seem to believe that government intervention in this form will bring them great benefits. The railroad unions think differently. It is time that Mr. Murray forgot the White House and devoted himself to some simple and fair bargaining. If he does that, the strike will end, and that presumably is what his members want.

Ike on the Record

Some months ago we predicted that Ike Eisenhower would begin to lose mileage as a candidate for the Republican nomination the moment he came home and began to declare himself on controversial principles and issues. Inasmuch as his earliest supporters included New Dealers and anti-New Dealers, socializers and free enterprisers, "Europe Firsters" and two-front strategists, the tenuous rubber band binding the Eisenhower forces together was bound to snap at the first sign of political forthrightness in a personality whose triumphs, up to June 4 of this year, had been largely those of the conciliator, the negotiator and the master of military tables of organization.

Both in his speech at Abilene and in various press conferences the expected has happened: Ike spoke out on most subjects with a commendable degree of candor, and the magic of a hitherto untouchable *mystique* was thereby dispelled. This has palpably dismayed those among Ike's supporters who have been hoping for leadership from a god. For the rest of us, however, it means that at last we can do Eisenhower the honor of treating his candidacy as a politically mature and honorable proposition. In coming out of the clouds and acting as a man who is willing to lay his convictions on the line, Ike has made himself a relevant candidate for the first time.

The degree of his relevancy must depend, of course, upon comparison of his utterances with those of Taft, who has been willing to dare the hazards of candor from the beginning. There are still many foggy stretches in the Eisenhower credo. Considering the undertones and overtones as well as the omissions, the impression persists in this editorial sanctum that Ike hasn't quite done all the homework he must do if he is to compete with Taft on the issue of complete relevance to the job of housecleaning and rededication that faces a Republican President.

In his homecoming speech and in his news conferences Ike proved that he is no Fair Dealer inasfar as he has thought the subject through. Taking his stand on the Taft-written Republican declaration of 1950 (a declaration deemed too "conservative," incidentally, by such Eisenhower supporters as Senator Lodge), Ike made it plain that he believes in moving *away* from collectivism as a limit rather than toward it. This means that he is not a "liberal" in the contemporary meaning of the term, and the *Freeman* must applaud him for daring to be heterodox in a land where the badge of "progressiveness" is awarded only to those who are willing to split the difference with Communists, Wallaceites and other assorted collectivists at any given moment.

Since Eisenhower has evidently pondered the truth that the human heart can not be purified by the mere passage of laws, it is not surprising to learn that the General is against putting Federal compulsion behind such things as FEPC. A declared enemy of the process that would end by accumulating all force in Washington, Eisenhower is against the thought-control that is implicit in Federal-Aid-to-Education bills. When it comes to the subject of governmental responsibility in the fields of labor and medicine, however, the Eisenhower utterances ray out into unimpressive vagueness. In one reply to a newsman Ike seemed to be under the impression that the Taft-Hartley Act is an engine that can be used to compel people to work against their will —in brief, a "punitive" act. But the Taft-Hartley Act is no such thing: it merely provides for an injunction, under certain emergency conditions for a stated period of time, against a *union* decision to strike. This does not mean that workers, individually, must be bound to their machines; under the Taft-Hartley Act the individual can quit and go fishing any time he likes.

As for medicine, Ike seems to have been unconsciously seduced by the semantics of Oscar Ewing; he believes that "every American has a right to decent medical care." This is a use of the term "right" that is in consonance with all the modern confusions; it implies that there are certain boons in nature that even the most shiftless can count upon irrespective of their willingness to work and save toward contributing to the sum total of wealth that is to be set aside as insurance. But nature, as

William Graham Sumner pointed out long ago, provides no such boons. What Ike should have said is something like this: "I hope every American has enough charity in his heart to be willing to help those who can not provide decent medical care for themselves." That would put the responsibility where it belongs: on those who have the wherewithal to give voluntarily to those who have been dogged by misfortune. Incidentally, this is a responsibility which has been shouldered by virtually all American doctors for decades. We already have a voluntary "socialization" of medicine that is a vast cut above anything provided by Bevanism in Britain, or by Bismarckian legislation in Germany.

It is in the field of foreign policy and the ancillary local Communist issue that Eisenhower appears at his most naive. He is against the retention of Communists, fellow-travelers and pinks in sensitive government agencies, but he seems to be under the impression that Senator Joe McCarthy has somehow slandered large numbers of innocent government servants. We are not saying here that McCarthy has never made a mistake in judgment, but can anyone read Mr. James Burnham's article on the IPR (see page 643 of this issue of the *Freeman*) and still maintain that "McCarthyism" is a menace to American institutions? If Eisenhower means business about driving Communist infiltrators from Washington he must inevitably run the risk of being smeared as a "McCarthyite" himself.

Eisenhower doesn't want to deal in "personalities." But the diplomatic and military debacle in Asia, which Ike admits to have been a debacle, was caused by human beings— i.e., by "personalities." To deal with consequences in Asia, Ike must be willing to isolate the causes. This means that he must isolate living people, if only to remove them from positions of continued nuisance and influence.

Although he is indelibly associated in the American mind with the defense of Europe, Ike has given a bare indication that he is no "one-front" man. We seem to catch from his utterances a lurking awareness that Russia has a central military position that can be exploited in any one of a number of directions. True, Ike hasn't developed that awareness into a viable two-front diplomatic and military program. He hasn't yet spoken out on the subject of how American energy can best be deployed to stop communism wherever it may seek to break into the free world's perimeter. On this score Taft has been much more searching and satisfactory. Ike can learn, but only if he can free himself from the shallow *New York Herald Tribune* view of world affairs that seems to bemuse the minds of his current backers. In the now increasingly unlikely event that he is chosen over Taft at Chicago we must hope that he will free himself in time to be an effective alternative to the Democratic candidate for the world's most crucial job.

The Unity Gimmick

Walter Lippmann's estrangement from the American political system (see "Mr. Lippmann's Encyclical" in the issue of April 7) is fast growing into what the other great Walter of American journalism might call a sizzling Renoperation. It is always sad to see a marriage break up, but what makes Mr. Lippmann's private turmoil downright scandalous is the language he keeps using in public.

As our readers (and his) will remember, "the disunity and distrust in American politics are becoming insufferable"—to Mr. Lippmann, that is. He will no longer "be dragged through the stinking mess of shyster politics" or face "all the many issues that Truman and Taft have managed to snarl up so that they are insoluble and irreconcilable." And Mr. Lippmann, as Winchell would say, carries the torch for General Eisenhower precisely because the General's candidacy carries, for Lippmann, the promise of a virile naiveté which might abolish politics.

So far, so good. Lately, however, the romance is getting hotter than befits a political columnist who, after all, is professionally obligated to retain at least the pretense of rationality. The other day, for instance, Mr. Lippmann praised the General's Abilene performance with these disturbingly incoherent words: "I find it deeply reassuring that . . . he has left himself entirely uncommitted for the great issues of war and peace which lie ahead of us."

And why is the General's refusal to commit himself on the great issues of war and peace not merely "reassuring" but "*deeply* reassuring"? Mr. Lippmann's answer to that one would have flustered the Mad Hatter: "For what Eisenhower is offering the country is not the messianic 'leadership' of one who knows the way." The country, to be sure, has been asked before to elect leaders who did not know the way; but never before has such ignorance been presented as the clinching credential for leadership.

In fact, we first thought that Mr. Lippmann, in one of his famously rare tries at humor, was ribbing the General and us. But that saving possibility was eliminated by a heroically suicidal admission which, should it sink in, might cost Mr. Lippmann his job: "Nobody knows the way. Those who pretend they know are fools or knaves." Now which of the two is a political columnist who shows the way thrice a week?

But as there must be method even behind such madness, we looked hard for the motive of Mr. Lippmann's self-destruction—and found it. His disgust with a nation which sometimes dares disagree with a Lippmann has reached a point where he bets his all on "unity," that lowest gimmick of megalomaniacs who want to put something over on a paralyzed people. If rascals like to wrap them-

selves in the flag, as we all learned in school, totalitarian egotists love "unity." And there is of course no better way of establishing it than to rob the people of their chance to express themselves on conflicting policies. Lippmann is infatuated with Eisenhower because he expects his candidate to do just that. But though it be unpardonable insolence even to consider such a calamity, Walter Lippmann might be mistaken. Both the General and the electorate may yet speak up on "the great issues of war and peace which lie ahead of us." Our political system, in other words, may yet survive its separation from Walter Lippmann.

When the Press Was Free

A Veteran Journalist who goes back to the Hall-Mills case, the Dayton, Tenn., monkey trial and the Peglerian "era of wonderful nonsense" in general dropped by the other afternoon for a cup of oolong and a chin over the decay of a once noble profession. "I have," he observed, "been reading some startling intelligence in the daily prints about our craft. I note that on the one hand the Newspaper Guild has adapted from Big Tim Sullivan the lucrative idea of an annual 'racket,' to which they sell tickets at a ponderable price to clients of the reporters and columnists concerned. The latest 'racket' took place at the Astor, 2000 persons, or so the press reported, laying it on the line for an evening with the ornaments of journalism and assorted stars from Broadway.

"I note further that on another level of our craft, or trade, the Overseas Press Club indulged the bourgeois passion for a state dinner with black ties, solemn speeches and the general effects of an NAM banquet at the Waldorf.

"I shall not elaborate the origins of these occasions in Tammany Hall and the upper reaches of the managerial class but shall hurry on to the social significance exemplified at each of these clambakes. The Guild, unashamedly leftist, pinned laurels on a number of professional gentlemen and ladies of one sort and another. Upon whose brows were these laurels pressed? Dean Acheson, who declined to turn his back on Hiss; a couple of reporters, Oliver Pilat and William Shannon, who, laboring mightily with invective and epithet, browned off Joe McCarthy in a series of articles in the *New York Post;* a cartoonist, Bernard Seaman, who regularly execrates capitalism in the ILGWU newspaper *Justice* and, among others in the entertainment arts, José Ferrer.

"The Overseas Press Club, as befits their black-tie elegance, bestowed their well-bred plaudits upon 'liberals' whose leftism is of the Welfare State variety. As it happens the recipients of these awards were uniformly gentlemen of press and radio who sneeze when the Messrs. Truman, Acheson and Marshall clear their throats. I enumerate: Elmer Davis, a hack of New Deal/Fair Deal palace journalism if ever there was one; Edward R. Murrow and those gifted partisans, the Alsops.

"I do not quarrel with the fact that these professional organizations are afflicted with the prevailing sickly mood of leftist-liberalism. I do think it important to notify the newspaper readers of New York City and the hinterland that their news and comment is in general passing through the sectarian minds of the gentlemen (and ladies) who comprise these trade associations."

The Veteran Journalist stirred his tea reflectively. "One hears," he went on, "increasing complaints about the subjectivity, the slovenliness and downright bias of latter-day journalism. Is it any wonder? The cleverest dodge of the Soviet agents designated to subvert the arts and crafts of public communication was when they led poor old Heywood Broun into the CIO and converted the Guild into a lively incubator of communism. I hear that the Communist grip on the Guild has been broken. That I permit myself to doubt. The political awards at the last Page One Ball would in no way displease the managing director of Tass.

"I can not help longing for the good old days when reporters would have rejected with equal disdain a Tammany Hall racket and a black-tie, upper bourgeois state dinner. In those days the journalists of New York City carried canes as a badge of their trade, they wore Brooks Brothers clothes, dined at the best speakeasies (frequently on the cuff), read Spengler, Mencken and Marx and wore their individualized independence as a proud banner. If assigned to cover the annual dinner of the Texas Society or the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, they dined first at Jack Bleeck's to dissociate themselves from the proceedings to which they must temporarily lend their presence, then proceeded haughtily to the feast as the dishes were being removed. They had a judicious contempt for their city editors, they treated their publishers with amused indulgence. They had a ripe detachment from the shenanigans of the tycoonery and the politicos (to lapse into Menckenese) but they felt themselves an elite and they labored with the utmost seriousness to tend the flame of objectivity and fair dealing. They were, if I may say so as shouldn't, *men,* not units in a leftist-liberal herd taking its directions at one or two removes from the Politburo. They had *noblesse oblige,* they took their whiskey straight, they saw through the sham of the do-gooders as they saw through the mendacities of the political and economic reactionaries. Above all, they gave both sides of a story, if it meant staying on the phone half the night to allow a fellow under attack to give his version of the controverted facts.

"They were free men, and in those days the press was free."

How the IPR Helped Stalin Seize China

By JAMES BURNHAM

When Mr. Burnham was asked to do an objective study of the McCarran Committee record on the Institute of Pacific Relations, he was uncommitted on that controversial subject. The result of his inquiry not only vindicates a widely slandered investigative body, but constitutes an unanswerable indictment of the IPR and of the U. S. policy-makers who allowed themselves to become the catspaws of its pro-Soviet element.

I began to read the transcript[1] of the McCarran Subcommittee's Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) along with several novels which had been salvaged by critical winds from the year's publishing tide. The Hearings, even for drama and narrative, had them all beat hands down. The unretouched record of investigations or courtroom doings is a literary form of some intrinsic merit, and here form shapes a content more various and compelling than any which the novelists had managed to capture. Few characters in recent fiction are more bursting with life than this transcript's sly and indefatigable Edward C. Carter, whose memory adjusts itself with such affable flexibility to the documents that he discovers to be in the Committee's possession. Here is Fred Field, the spoiled rich boy slumming in treason; the marvelous and volubly precise Eugene H. Dooman, new to me, Foreign Service of the old school, whose sentences still quiver with indignation at the ride out of the State Department which he believes that the IPR crowd gave him; Whittaker Chambers, as always open and dignified; and worried Louis Budenz, who has never quite understood what was happening at Politburo meetings.

Benjamin Mandel, the Committee's research director, gives rather the impression of an electronic calculator as he unfailingly produces the clinching letter or file. Senator Eastland, taking a Mississippian's occasional privilege to break party ranks, explores a promising anti-Acheson rift of ore exposed by Counsel Robert Morris's steadily picking axe. Like a dinner bell, sharp and authoritative, Owen Lattimore's commands, launched from his letters, sound through the reaches of the IPR universe. The Committee room is like a revolving stage as the scene shifts without curtain fall from Honolulu to New York, Washington, Tokyo, Yosemite, Moscow, Chungking, Mont Tremblant, or Sinkiang. Elizabeth Bentley, Joe Kornfeder, Hede Massing, Karl Wittfogel, and the other ex's are driven once again around the ledge of their smoke-shrouded purgatory.

The 1700 pages of these first five parts of the record are only the beginning, but they are enough to lead from confusion to meaning. The persons, incidents, events, like the tiny balls of those little glass-topped puzzles which we get for children's Christmas stockings, settle, at the investigation's tapping and tilting, into their proper holes and against their natural background.

But the game, here, is not a child's. These are chips that are going to be cashed in the end. Carter walks his tightrope over an abyss which only *he holds cheap who ne'er hung there*. The theme of this investigation is no casual fable, but the destiny of our time.

Origins of the IPR

The acknowledged origins of the Institute of Pacific Relations are sufficiently humble, even banal, though a partial obscurity overhangs the exact circumstances of its birth. It apparently developed out of a kind of publicity and promotion scheme started by a group of Hawaiian businessmen in the early 1920's, which it was soon proposed should be extended to include "representatives of the various peoples around the Pacific rim." Pursuant thereto, a conference was held in Honolulu, July 1-15, 1925, for which organizing committees in a majority of the participating countries had been nominated by the national councils of the Young Men's Christian Association. This conference set up the Institute of Pacific Relations. In structure, the IPR was a loose federation of national organizations, each with a national council, under an international board—called the Pacific Council—and an International Secretariat. The Pacific Council seems to have been largely honorary. The principal official purposes of the International Secretariat were to prepare the international conferences which were held at intervals of approximately two years, and to publish various books and pamphlets.

Persons at the 1925 conference came from Australia, Canada, China, Korea, Japan, New

[1] Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, First Session, on the Institute of Pacific Relations. Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. (These cover only those Hearings held during 1951. The Record of the 1952 Hearings is currently being issued.)

Zealand, the Philippines and the United States. National councils, or more informal groups, were then formed for these countries. At the second conference (1927), Great Britain came in, and somewhat later, India. The most notable recruit made a tardier formal entrance. By unanimous decision of the Institute's 1931 international conference, held at Shanghai, the Soviet Union was invited to join. The Soviet scholars were coy, and it was not until July 1934 that a group of them formed the Pacific Institute of the USSR. In September 1934, Mr. E. C. Carter, who in 1926 had become the chief IPR administrator, "welcomed the USSR as a new member of the International Institute for Pacific Relations" (Hearings, p. 190).[2]

Of its tasks and purposes, the IPR states, with that fluid rhetoric which coats so much of the IPR literature:

> The Institute of Pacific Relations is an unofficial organization which aims at the improvement of the relations between the peoples of the Pacific area.
>
> The Institute functions as an international shock-absorber, fact-finder, and interpreter. It centers its efforts upon a study of the conditions of the Pacific peoples and the discovery of the facts that underlie the chief areas of friction in this region. . . .
>
> The Institute holds biennial conferences, stimulates research, and disseminates information.

In furtherance of these, and other aims, the IPR, especially its American branch, grew rapidly and prospered. Edward C. Carter proved something of an organizational genius, with a hand and eye adept at combinations. By 1928 Frederick Vanderbilt Field was at his side. This new name, with its family connections, was a password that helped open the checkbooks of the wealthy, and of their foundations. Kate Mitchell, Harriet Moore, William Mandel, Miriam Farley, and such dynamic associates as Owen Lattimore kept a firm hand on research and publications.

Harvest of the Innocents

No rival was in sight. The field was almost virgin, and rushed up to meet the plow. The names of the great and the respectable flowered from the letterhead. At the tap of Carter's wand, money flowed, in small drops and big streams, with a couple of million from the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations, an admitted $62,000 from Frederick Field, and sums in the thousands from Juan Trippe, Henry Luce, Jerome Green, Brooks Emeny, and dozens of prominent business corporations. A quarterly journal, *Pacific Affairs*, and the fortnightly *Far Eastern Survey* were successfully launched. The biennial conferences were held on a grand scale, in China, Japan, Canada, Hawaii, and the United States. IPR activists plied the air and sea in droves, not only to attend their own conferences, but as researchers, preparers, administrators, and honored guests at the meetings of others. Research grants were found for young persons, male or female, who wrote reports, articles, or books on—and often in—Japan, the Philippines, India, China, Turkestan, or Mongolia. Shelves groaned under the volumes of the IPR family. The lecture circuits were hot with the load of IPR speakers.

The IPR functioned also as a kind of fraternal order that might be called "The Boosters and Knockers Club." The ritual of the club was simple. What the activists boosted was each other, and what they knocked was anyone—even another IPR member—who was outside, or stepped partly outside, their ideological circle. John T. Flynn has recorded the process in "While You Slept." He shows the predominance of club products among the books published on the Far East during the forties,[3] the grip that the club members had on the Far East book-reviewing columns of the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *New York Times*, the *Nation*, *New Republic*, and *Saturday Review of Literature*; the back-scratching joviality of their reviews of each other; and the hatchet jobs they unfailingly did on the few outsiders who managed to get a heretical volume published.

Interest in the problems of the Pacific was growing spontaneously in the universities, and was easily stimulated and guided. Throughout the United States, and to a considerable extent elsewhere,[4] the views on Asia—and not alone on Asia—of an entire generation of students and teachers were formed by IPR texts. The IPR writers did not restrict themselves to IPR publications. Wherever there was, or could be roused, a call for a review or article or memorandum on the Far East, the voice of the IPR was 90 per cent certain to be heard. If the same law applied as for aluminum or zippers, the IPR would certainly have been declared a monopoly under the Sherman Act.

The IPR was not a single unit, but a complex of interrelated activities. The tangle is not easy to unravel. Its design is reminiscent of the Insull utilities system, also a product of the twenties. Some IPR elements, like its magazines, were simple subsidiaries. Others, like some of the research and publishing units, seem to have been set up as parallel centers. Some, like *Amerasia*, were organ-

[2] Fraternal relations with the Soviet Union had not stood on this prolonged ceremony. "I did, Senator," Carter testifies (Hearings, p. 11), "seek the cooperation of Communists in the Soviet Union. . . . Following the visits of people sent by the committee in Hawaii in the early days . . . I went with Roland Boyd, Jerome Greene, and others to Moscow on our way to the Kyoto Conference in 1929 and sought contact with Russian scholars who were specializing in the Far East, urging them to participate and to form a national council of the IPR in the Soviet Union. I backed them. I tried to get money for them. . . ."

[3] In the period 1943-9, of thirty books dealing with Far Eastern politics, Flynn estimates that twenty-three had the seal of the IPR fraternity. But Flynn erroneously puts David N. Rowe's book "China Among the Powers" on his "pro-Communist" list. He also includes George E. Taylor's play "The Phoenix and the Dwarfs," which I have not read, but, on the basis of Taylor's general position, would doubt belongs there.

[4] In India last spring (1951), I did not see a single private library that was not loaded with IPR books. Indians with pro-Communist, anti-American, and neutralist views on China invariably cited IPR authors as their authorities.

ized with nominal independence and interlocking directorates. Sisterly outfits like the China Aid Council or the American Russian Institute were closely tied in. There were looser associations with groups like the Foreign Policy Association, various magazines and the trade departments of certain publishers, among whom Little, Brown and Company was conspicuous. The thinner, but functioning, lines of the IPR cartel stretched very far indeed.

Far-Flung Battle Line

It was in the war and the three years following the war that the IPR went through its major period of blossoming, or rather harvest. No effort was too great for IPR to give to the cause, no sacrifice of time and personnel too heavy. G-2 and OSS thankfully swallowed the research and intelligence cooked by its busy young associates. Its good friend, Lauchlin Currie, sat in the White House. To help him with his war burdens, IPR sent British-trained Michael Greenberg, who later shifted to the Board of Economic Warfare, where he met ardent IPR-er William T. Stone. Duncan Lee roamed North China for the OSS. Harry Dexter White was next to Morgenthau in the Treasury. Colonel, then General, Evans F. Carlson, long an IPR intimate, proved as vigorous a speaking as a fighting Marine. So concentrated an IPR focus did Washington become during the war that, for the convenience of all, a local office was opened there under Rose Yardumian. Busy John Fairbank, while on overseas duty, used Currie's White House address as his own. IPR-member Mary Price, sister of the Mildred Price who was executive secretary of the China Aid Council of the American League for Peace and Democracy, observantly helped Walter Lippmann as his private secretary (and helped herself, according to Elizabeth Bentley, to his files). The IPR was always ready to help good fellows get together, as Executive Secretary Edward C. Carter so successfully did in Washington for traveling "Tass correspondent" Vladimir Rogov, or Soviet Ambassador Oumansky.

Carter surveys the scene in a letter to G. E. Hubbard of the British Political Intelligence Department, dated January 5, 1942:

> In spite of the war, or rather because of it, the IPR is busier than ever. We have had to let some of our staff go to various Government jobs but have managed to fill all vacancies so that on balance both the American Council and the Pacific Council Staffs are stronger that ever. Lattimore is of course an asset in Chungkiı.g, though he is not technically on the IPR staff. Michael Greenberg and Mrs. Dobbs are carrying on *Pacific Affairs* well within the Lattimore tradition. Ch'ao-ting Chi is secretary-general of the ABC [American-British-Chinese] stabilization fund in China. . . . Friedman is now in the Treasury in Washington. Rosinger is in the office of the India Government Trade Commissioner. . . . Sherman has gone to the Tariff Commission, and Miss Ellen de Jong, to Military Intelligence. [Hearings, p. 481.]

In the case of Frederick Field, who in his spare time was writing a regular column for the *Daily Worker*, Army Intelligence for some reason or other turned down his request for a commission in spite of Carter's persistent recommendations.

Owen Lattimore was everywhere, advising Chiang Kai-shek, escorting Henry Wallace through the perils of the East, dropping in at the White House, and with the aid of IPR stalwarts Joseph Barnes, John Fairbank, and William L. Holland, directing Asiatic affairs for the Office of the Coordinator of Information, later Office of War Information (OWI). Then, earlier and later, IPR-minded officials were enthusiastically supported by the IPR-blessed stalwarts of the China press corps: Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Nym Wales, Jack Belden, Israel Epstein, Guenther Stein, Harrison Forman, Anna Louise Strong, Ted White, Annalee Jacoby, Philip Jaffe, Mark Gayn, Max Granich.

Smiling on the lot, in the field as well as from the home desks, was the IPR wing of the State Department: John Stewart Service, John Carter Vincent, John P. Davies, Jr., John K. Emmerson, Raymond T. Ludden, Julian R. Friedman, Laurence Duggan, Lawrence Salisbury, Philip C. Jessup. One other State Department friend of the IPR, Alger Hiss, who did not confine his interests to the Far Eastern sphere, has become well known to the general public in recent years.

At war's end the good work continued, when, for example, IPR-intimates Miriam Farley, Andrew Grajdanzev, and T. A. Bisson went out to Tokyo to help SCAP democratize Japan, and Owen Lattimore trotted along as economic adviser of the Pauley Mission. Japan was not a new interest for IPR. A national council had long existed there. Kinkazu Saionji, one of its principal members, and a secretary of the IPR Yosemite Conference (1936), became a member of Prince Konoye's "breakfast club" (or "kitchen cabinet," as we should call it). Hotsumi Ozaki of the Sorge spy ring, another delegate at the Yosemite Conference, became Konoye's chief aide in Japan's China Section.

Extending the Revolution

Contrary to the expectations of orthodox Marxism, the Communist world revolution began not in one of the highly industrialized nations, but in relatively backward Russia. The Bolshevik strategists were aware that the revolution must be either extended or defeated. Granted the geopolitical position of the new Soviet Union, astride the Eurasian heartland, and thrusting toward both western Europe and the mass-populated Asiatic coastlands, two basic strategic alternatives, not necessarily in conflict, presented themselves.

One was the advance to the West. This meant the attempt to supplement Russian space, raw materials and manpower with Western machines and technology: in short, the Communist conquest of

Germany. This strategy was dominant in 1918 immediately following the Russian Revolution, and during the early twenties. The defeat of the German revolutionary attempts in 1923 signified the temporary failure of this technological or Western strategy.

But, Lenin reasoned, the route to Berlin may lie through Peking and Calcutta (the order is Lenin's). The world revolution could triumph by conquering the huge territories, resources and mass populations of Asia, and then taking the advanced nations from the rear as it were, after having cut off their bases of supply, reinforcement and renewal. "In the last analysis," Lenin wrote in 1923, "the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India and China, etc., constitute the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe."

This second (quantitative or Eastern) strategy, for which the decisive theater is China, had been formulated in 1920 by the Second Congress of the Comintern, in the form of Lenin's "Theses on the National and Colonial Questions." By a creative leap from doctrinaire Marxism, the Communist Manifesto's guiding slogan, "Workers of all countries, unite!" was transformed into: "Workers of all countries *and oppressed peoples*, unite!" The existence and leadership of the Soviet state, with its International, were declared to overcome the sociological gap resulting from the absence of a large colonial proletariat, and to guarantee that the colonial revolutions would be part of the world proletarian (Soviet) revolution—if, and only if, the colonial revolutions were achieved in their final stages under the leadership of the Communist Party.

In 1920, a Congress of the Oriental Peoples, with 1891 Asiatic delegates, met at Baku. Comintern agents were sent East. The Chinese party was officially founded at Shanghai, in May 1921. Early in 1922 a new Congress of Far Eastern Revolutionary Organizations met, under Zinoviev's presidency, in Moscow and Petrograd. During this same period, the foundations were laid for the revolutionary institutes in which tens of thousands of Asians (perhaps 30,000 to 40,000 Chinese among them) as well as thousands of Russian and international operatives were trained for leadership in the Eastern revolutions.

Soviet Far Eastern Strategy

The Chinese party grew fast, but almost at birth, when it had neither trained men nor experience, was confronted by the revolutionary upsurge which began in 1925. Borodin was sent from Moscow to direct operations. The party was ordered into the Kuomintang. Chiang, however, was reasonably informed even then about Communist intentions. When he had assured his own victory by the occupation of Shanghai in April 1927, he executed a number of the leading figures among his momentary allies. The Comintern shifted suddenly to an extreme tactic, called for immediate Soviets, and in December 1927 sacrificed nearly 10,000 lives in the abortive three-day Canton commune.

This action marked the end of that phase. On a world scale there set in the "Third Period" of the Comintern, when ultra-revolutionary, "no-compromise" slogans masked a general retreat for recuperation, building "socialism" at home and preparing for the rounds to come. In keeping with the world tactic, the Communist Party of China kept itself separated from the Kuomintang, and defined Chiang as reactionary and fascist. It established a little "Soviet China" in central China, with a varying amount of territory and varying numbers of peasants and armed groups under its control. Meanwhile, active penetration—"extension of the revolution"—went forward in Mongolia and Sinkiang.

Even the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 could not shake the Chinese party loose from the intransigent Third Period line. A new tactic had to await a new international turn, which came with the inauguration of the era of the Popular Front, proclaimed by Dimitrov at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935. Many of the parties, including the Chinese, had been set in motion along the new line by mid-1934. The Communists of China rediscovered some merit in Chiang. They called for a united front in "the patriotic war" against the Japanese "imperialist aggressors," and so on. They became friendly to foreign journalists.

This united-front-against-Japan line continued, with twists and ups and downs, until 1944. The Communists did not give up their independent organization, territorial control, or army. They continued their undermining of Chiang's position and prestige. But they worked indirectly, with double-talk, and did not attempt a major campaign for the conquest of state power in all China.

The next phase, foreshadowed in 1943, opened on a world scale in 1944. Hitler's defeat was assumed to be assured, and the Soviet problem became the maximum exploitation of victory. In Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece, the Communists turned their guns away from the Nazis and against their non-Communist national rivals. Elsewhere, they adopted the line: through coalition governments to the weakening of all competitors, and where possible to state power. In France and Italy the negative half of the policy, and in eastern Europe its entirety succeeded. In China the new turn meant the destruction of Chiang and the Nationalist regime through the same initial stage of a call for unity and a coalition government.

In August 1945 the Soviet's six-day war against Japan gave the Chinese Communists a safe northern flank, supplies, sources of recruits, and expert aid. In 1947, after suitable political and psychological as well as military preparation, the campaign

began that swept the Communists into power throughout all but scattered pockets of the Chinese mainland. From the point of view of the Kremlin, the present phase then started with the effort to consolidate power in China, the protective-diversionary military operation in Korea, the political drive to neutralize Japan, and the preparation for the conquest of Asia's one major food-surplus zone, the Southeast.

The Eastern strategy was farsighted and brilliant. There were errors in its tactical application, especially in the period 1925-28, but Moscow learned from experience, and in the end has triumphantly concluded this "pivotal campaign" of the world revolution, or nearly so.

One "external" condition, however, was a prerequisite to this triumph. In order to conquer China, effective "interference" by the Western powers, and in particular by the United States, had to be prevented. In the IPR, Moscow found the principal instrument which it could manipulate to realize this inescapable condition. Through the IPR, Moscow saw that it could, sufficiently to its purpose in Asia, blind the eyes, becloud the mind, and weaken the will of the West.

"In order to conquer China, effective 'interference' by the Western powers, and in particular by the United States, had to be prevented. In the IPR, Moscow found the principal instrument which it could manipulate to realize this inescapable condition. Through the IPR, Moscow saw that it could, sufficiently to its purpose in Asia, blind the eyes, becloud the mind, and weaken the will of the West."

A Valuable Cover Organization

From the evidence so far assembled, we can not be certain at just what point the Communist penetration of the IPR began. Several ex-Communists define the IPR as a "captive" rather than a "front" organization. "We have to distinguish according to Communist parlance between captive organizations and fronts. Communist fronts are those created by the Communist Party itself. Captive organizations are those penetrated successfully and taken over" (Budenz testimony, Hearings, p. 516). Frederick Field joined the IPR staff in 1928, but it is not yet known when Field became a Communist. The penetration was already well established, Budenz states, when he joined the party in 1935. Alexander Barmine testifies that in 1934 or 1935 his superior in the Soviet military intelligence, General Berzin, told him, "We had some important planning developments in connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations" (Hearings, p. 203), and indicated that the IPR was by that time well under control. Testifying from personal knowledge (Hearings, pp. 187 ff.), Barmine also identifies three of the Soviet Communists later assigned to the Soviet affiliate of the IPR—Voitinsky, Arosev and Svanidze—as important figures in the international Soviet intelligence apparatus.

On the basis of numerous indications, not all of them given in the Hearings, I am inclined to think that major Soviet infiltration and influence date from about 1931. This precedes by three years the formal adherence of the Soviet Council to the IPR complex. Formal adherence was dependent, however, as we have seen, on the shift in the general Comintern line to the Popular Front tactic, and perhaps also on United States diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, which did not occur until 1933.

From the Comintern point of view, the IPR simultaneously served a variety of purposes. The evidence suggests that there were several groups of Communists and agents working within the IPR framework, and that these groups were independent of, in part even unknown to, each other. The most direct and obvious use for the IPR was as a "cover shop" (also known in the language of the trade as an "umbrella" or "roof"). "The idea was, as I was explained, that the IPR being an organization who can carry research work, who can open branches around the Pacific in the countries where we were not yet recognized—the Soviet Union at this time has no embassy all around the Pacific area—with this difficulty about contacts, the idea which I was given was that that is the idea, undercover work when you can have legal reasons and innocent reasons to travel to do specifically military research and reconnoitering work and gathering of information materials. . . . You have reason to keep the foreign members of the military network on the job, you can send them from one area to another. . . ." (Barmine, Hearings, pp. 203-4.)

Ordinary Communist Party members as well as intelligence agents could, of course, be conveniently sheltered beneath the hospitable shade of what "the [Soviet] Intelligence Division considered . . . a very valuable cover organization." (Barmine, Hearings, p. 204.)

Among those whom we now know to have been thus "covered" by the IPR were several of the key operatives of the spectacular Sorge espionage network, based in Tokyo: Guenther Stein, Agnes Smedley, and the two Japanese whom I have already mentioned, Ozaki and Saionji. Stein was active in IPR affairs at least from 1936 (Hearings, p. 376), and wrote many articles and reviews for the IPR publications. Through his IPR connection he was made publicly respectable as a journalist and given a legitimate motive for residing or traveling in the Far East. While Stein was educating the American public by his articles in *Pacific Affairs*, Max Klausen, one of the radio operators of the Sorge network, was transmitting from a sending station established in Stein's Japanese residence to the

Soviet relay station in Khabarovsk. For Stein the IPR was much more than a passive shelter. A 1942 IPR office memorandum (Hearings, p. 378 ff.) comments on "circulating Guenther Stein's stuff in Washington": "When I [W. W. Lockwood, of the IPR staff] mentioned it to John Fairbank [then head of the China section of OWI] he expressed a great interest in seeing it and summoned together his China staff, who all voiced a similar interest. John also suggested that his office might be asked to trade certain information in return." In 1943 (Hearings, p. 385) we find W. L. Holland of the IPR office, "glad to send . . . our latest radio letter from Guenther Stein in Chungking" to Richard H. Sanger of the Economic Intelligence Division, Board of Economic Warfare, "in reply to his letter." As so often, the lead had been given by the more dashing phrases of Owen Lattimore, who writes as early as 1939: "Guenther Stein, who is by long odds the best economic journalist in the Far East." In 1950 Stein was arrested for espionage by the French police, and has since disappeared from sight.

Agnes Smedley's history is similar to Stein's, though longer and more sentimental. After being covered with liberals' tears when her role in the Sorge ring was "prematurely" disclosed in 1949, she retired to die in London. She willed her ashes to Chu Teh, commander-in-chief of the Chinese Communist Army, and they now rest in glory at Peiping.

Ozaki, whose IPR membership was more useful for world travel than a fake passport, was hanged with Sorge by the Japanese in 1944. Saionji was also convicted, but because of his powerful family connections was let off with a jail sentence. Ozaki and Saionji were the principal Japanese representatives at the IPR's Yosemite Conference in 1936. Indeed, the Soviet international services had reason to be repeatedly grateful for the IPR's biennial conferences. These were invariably the occasion for an elegant sub-convention, a trouble-free get-together of Communists and Soviet intelligence agents from all over the globe, relaxed in the sterilizing cushion of innocent professors, naive big-shots, and official welcomes.

Social Bureau and School for Communists

A similar service to the Comintern was provided by what might be called the "social-secretary" aspect of IPR activities. For example: in the winter of 1943-44, the important Soviet intelligence agent Vladimir Rogov took a trip around the world, from Moscow through the Far East and back to Moscow, under the guise of a Tass correspondent. In August 1943 Rogov, in an article published in the Soviet periodical *War and the Working Class* (reprinted in Hearings, pp. 128-30), had foreshadowed the 1944 turn in the Comintern line insofar as this applied to China. It seems probable that his trip was made as an international representative assigned to communicate the new line to operatives in the various nations he visited. He was due in Washington in January 1944, and Edward C. Carter obligingly relayed the news in a telegram to Alger Hiss at the State Department: "My friend Vladimir Rogov, Tass correspondent, en route Moscow to London. Will be Washington Wednesday. . . ." Or again, we find Carter, in a letter dated March 31, 1938, inviting Philip C. Jessup "to a little dinner of a dozen of my friends" which he has arranged for Soviet Ambassador Oumansky at the Century Club —to give "the Bolshevik view" not, oddly enough, on some burning problem of the Pacific, but on the Moscow Trials (Hearings, p. 889). Mr. Jessup accepted "eagerly and gratefully."

A more routine use of the IPR as a "cover" is illustrated by the case of William Mandel, whose research and writings on the Soviet Far East were sponsored by the IPR. Similarly, Harriet Lucy Moore and Kathleen Barnes could make their trips to Moscow as scholars engaged in IPR research. All three have declined to answer the Committee's questions on their Communist connections.

A further use for the IPR, as for all fronts and captive organizations, was as a recruiting and training ground. Young people were taken on from the universities, and placed in the office or given research grants. Bathed in that pro-Soviet atmosphere, and under the watchful eyes of Frederick Field, Harriet Moore, Kathleen Barnes, and the rest of the party fraction, they absorbed Communist ideology and techniques, and were often developed into stalwart party members or outright agents. They were then ready to be sent into government agencies, university faculties, or to foreign posts. From the evidence given at the Hearings, Lawrence K. Rosinger, T. A. Bisson, Andrew Grajdanzev, Julian Friedman, Rose Yardumian, and not a few others could be cited as samples of various stages of this process.

The Process of Infiltration

I have stated that from the Communist standpoint the main strategic use of the IPR was to block effective resistance by the Western powers, in particular by the United States, to the Communist conquest of China. This objective entailed a massive psychological, or propaganda, campaign. Public opinion in the United States and in Europe had to be molded in the shape of ideas and attitudes which would hide the truth about Communist Far Eastern strategy, maintain ignorance of how it could be countered, and weaken the will to resist it. Moreover, Communist technique does not leave ideas unattached. In order to help carry out the line of action implicit in the propaganda, the Communists in the IPR sought, with the success of which I have already remarked many instances, to place themselves, and their friends or dupes, at posts of leverage in governmental and private in

stitutions. Conversely, they sought to get rid of specific individuals whom they found sticky. The examples of Adolph Berle, Stanley Hornbeck, Eugene Dooman, Joseph Grew and Patrick Hurley, all condemned in the *Daily Worker*, attacked in IPR writings, and in due course eased out of the State Department, prove that in this hatchet work they also did not altogether fail (see especially the testimony of Dooman, with supporting documents, Hearings, pp. 703 ff.).

A few more examples will show the organizational skill of the personnel placement. Lauchlin Currie (who, according to Elizabeth Bentley's testimony, himself collaborated with her espionage ring) was, during the war, a confidential assistant at the White House, with the ear of the President, and was assigned to watch over Chinese affairs. Michael Greenberg went from the IPR office to become Currie's assistant. Greenberg was educated at Cambridge University in England, and even in his undergraduate days was known as pro-Communist. Karl Wittfogel testifies to his communism as early as the mid-thirties, when he knew Greenberg personally in England. The identification as of later dates is made by other witnesses.

The Communist allegiance of Julian R. Friedman is testified to by Mrs. William Harry Widener and is corroborated by several other witnesses. Friedman worked for some years on the IPR staff. In the latter part of the war he suddenly appeared in the remarkably apt post of assistant to John Carter Vincent, when Vincent was chief, first of the China Division, and then of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs; and Friedman acted as deputy to Vincent in the powerful Far East Subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee

Elizabeth Bentley testifies that during the war, Mary Price, working as Walter Lippmann's secretary, was in fact a Soviet espionage agent who made the documents from Lippmann's files available to the Soviet network.

I have mentioned that the IPR opened a Washington office as a wartime convenience, which was put in charge of Rose Yardumian. After fading from sight for a few years, she turned up in 1950 as one of the editors of the *China Monthly Review*, published in Communist China's Shanghai. Rose is also the sister-in-law of Guenther Stein.

The pro-Communists in the IPR were greedy, and did not limit their appetite to China and the Far East. They begin to pay for this too revealing vice, since it negates the virtuous talk about a band of innocent scholars united through a "common interest in the problems of the Pacific." During the war there was hardly any problem beyond the active interest of an IPR-er, whether keeping America out of war before June 1941, or getting an immediate Second Front thereafter. In 1940 Frederick Field, resigning temporarily his key post as secretary of the American Council of IPR, marched off to become chairman of the American Peace Mobilization, the Communist front organized to denounce the "imperialist aggressors" (i.e., Britain and France), and to picket the White House. He went as a hero should, with the plaudits of the council's Executive Committee, Philip C. Jessup, chairman, ringing in his ears: " . . . it was moved that a minute be drafted indicating the committee's acceptance of the resignation with great regret. The minute should include an appropriate appreciation of the distinguished service which Mr. Field had rendered during eleven years of service. . . . The hope was to be expressed that when his new task was completed, it would be possible for him to resume active leadership in the work of the American Council." (From the minutes of the Executive Committee meeting of September 18, 1940, Hearings, p. 123.)

Even before the war it was not unusual to find such tasty dishes as a defense of the Moscow Trials served up in the far-ranging IPR publications, or in the book of an IPR author. I have already referred to the Oumansky dinner arranged by Carter on this subject, which was in its day so altogether crucial from the Soviet viewpoint. In March 1938 Carter spoke along with the Soviet representative Troyanovsky in the New York Hippodrome, at a meeting chaired by Corliss Lamont, which defended the Trials. Many an IPR name appeared on the open letters and circulars which in those days upheld the good name of Special Prosecutor Vishinsky. In his magazine, *Pacific Affairs*, editor Lattimore wrote of the Trials, "That sounds to me like democracy."

Red as a Rose

We ought here to consider a query that is often raised. How can the IPR be described as a "captive organization" or "cover shop" or "front" when so many respectable characters were connected with it, such a slew of non-Communists on its board of trustees and lists of contributors, so much non-Communist (and even some anti-Communist) copy in its publications? The answer to this was given at the Hearings:

> The very function of *Pacific Affairs* or the IPR was to have a non-Communist appearance and a non-Communist approach, but carrying the burden of the Communist viewpoint always [Budenz, Hearings, p 551].

Now as a matter of fact there were an awful lot of Communists in the IPR—too many for correct conspiratorial technique, as several of the ex-Communists observe.

> There were a number of discussions within the Politburo that while they were pleased with the success that IPR was making in its contacts and in the infiltration and its influence in governmental agencies and in agencies of public opinion, they constantly criticized the IPR comrades for not spreading out more—that is, they felt that the In-

stitute was too much a concentration point for Communists; that control could be maintained without such a galaxy of Communists in it [Budenz, Hearings, p. 667].

Mr. MORRIS. Were you ever warned against associating with the Institute of Pacific Relations?

Miss BENTLEY [Elizabeth Bentley, identified as formerly a Soviet espionage agent]. Yes. . . . As a matter of fact, I think Mr. Golos' [Golos was Bentley's superior in the espionage apparatus] phrase was: "It was as red as a rose, and you shouldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole" [Hearings, p. 437].

Many of the IPR names given above are identified as Communist by one or another witness in these or other Congressional hearings. But the political nature of the IPR was not determined by the exact percentage of card-holding Communists among its members, or of specifically Communist ideas among the millions of words of its publications. Political effect is a question not of passive arithmetic quantities but of a dynamic equilibrium. The political tendency of an organization is decided not by the inactive, non-conscious, objectless members, but by those who are conscious, active, dynamic, who know what they want, who keep their eyes on the main issues and the key posts.

". . . if the Communists did not conquer China by means of the IPR, it is doubtful that they would have conquered without the IPR. The IPR immobilized the sole force that could have blocked the process. For this achievement, which has no real parallel in its field, the Communist manipulation of the IPR must be acknowledged a political masterpiece."

Within the IPR complex the Communists, and they alone, were politically conscious. They took care, moreover, to have one of themselves, or a pliant collaborator, at the critical positions within the organization. For most of two decades Field was on duty in the central office, and his relations there with Carter seem always to have been amiable. Harriet Moore, for a considerable period, was chairman of the nominating committee. Rose Yardumian ran the Washington office. Liaison with the CIO was entrusted to Len De Caux, the wartime publicity director of the CIO, who has also refused at the Hearings to answer questions concerning Communist affiliation. The Comintern-trained Ch'ao-ting Chi (now an official of the Chinese Communist government) kept a steady hand on the pulse of the IPR's Chinese associates. The Soviet agent Ozaki was at the core of the Japanese affiliate.

The net result of the Communists' dynamism, political sophistication and organizational adroitness was simply this: no matter how many non-Communists were associated with them in the IPR, the main over-all political weight and incidence were under Communist control. In political effect the IPR functioned as an instrument of Soviet policy.

Repetition Is the Soul of Propaganda

The propagandistic task was not very complicated. Ninety-five per cent of what was said and written—true or false—didn't really make much difference. It was only necessary to reiterate endlessly a very few basic ideas and to supplement these, from time to time, with a few special notions that would harmonize with the given tactical tune in the Far East. The Chinese Communists are not "really" Communists (after 1934, that is), at least not like Russian Communists, but liberals, populists, agrarian reformers, "native radicals," patriots, and so on. Chinese communism "springs out of the Chinese soil and Chinese history." The Chinese Communists are honest, incorruptible, efficient. They liberate the peasants. *The true and genuine Chinese revolution is the movement led by the Communists.* (This last is the crucial idea, and is introduced for all colonies and dependent nations, and indeed for all countries whatsoever. The only true-blue revolution is the movement, whatever it may otherwise be, which is led by Communists, and this movement is good, democratic, progressive. All anti-Communist movements are stranglers of the revolution, reactionary, fascist-minded, bad.) The Chinese government is only "the Nationalist government" and later "the Kuomintang clique." Chiang and his associates are grafters, reactionaries, agents of foreign powers, oppressors, hated by all the people—with the degree of denunciation or faint praise adjusted to the tactical requirements of the moment. Finally, hammered in by a thousand variant formulations: the Communists are the wave of the future; they are inevitably going to win, and Chiang is headed for the ashcan.

These are the perennial themes of the books, articles, reviews, lectures and conversations of the IPR activists. It was not necessary to the Soviet strategy that the Communists should be explicitly supported, or that conventional Communist language, in the manner of *Pravda* and the *Daily Worker*, should be employed. As so often, Owen Lattimore gives an authoritative summary. (Budenz, Hearings, p. 523, mentions concerning Lattimore: "It was particularly stressed in the political bureau that his great value lay in the fact that he could bring the emphasis in support of Soviet policy in language which was non-Soviet. And they consider that a very valuable asset.") In a letter to Carter, dated July 10, 1938, Lattimore comments with unaccustomed frankness on certain IPR activities (Hearings, p. 40):

I think that you are pretty cagey in turning over so much of the China section of the inquiry to Asiaticus, Han-seng, and Chi. They will bring out

the absolutely essential radical aspects, but can be depended on to do it with the right touch. For the general purposes of this inquiry it seems to me that the good scoring position, for the IPR, differs with different countries. For China, my hunch is that it will pay to keep behind the official Communist position far enough not to be covered by the same label —but enough ahead of the active Chinese liberals to be noticeable. . . . For the USSR—back their international policy in general, but without using their slogans and above all [*he adds with characteristic bravura*] without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience.

Let us add that the "China section" referred to here by Lattimore was indeed in competent hands. "Asiaticus" is the Comintern operative Heinz Moeller, who was writing as early as 1927 in the Comintern's official journal *Imprecorr;* Chen Han-seng, whose best-known pseudonym is Raymond D. Brooke, has a long clear record of publication in Communist-front magazines, and is identified by Wittfogel as a party member; Chi (also known as Hansu Chan) is the Communist Ch'ao-ting Chi whom we have already noticed.

Nor did the paladins of the IPR leave it to truth to rise unaided. When in June 1947—to take a small but normal example—Little, Brown and Company sent Edward Carter a pre-publication copy of Israel Epstein's "The Unfinished Revolution in China," he promptly replied to Miss Ford, the publicity director of the firm:

> ...I think it's of the utmost importance that you devise some means of getting it read at an early date among others by Secretary of State George Marshall, Senators Vandenberg, Morse, and Ives, John Foster Dulles and John Carter Vincent of the State Department. . . . Would it be out of the question for you to consider at an early date printing a cheap paper cover edition for maximum circulation in India, the Philippines, and China with the expectation that some orders would come in from Indochina, Siam, Burma, and the Netherlands East Indies? [Hearings, pp. 464 ff.]

Lattimore himself gave the push in the *New York Times:* ". . . From Edgar Snow's 'Red Star Over China' to Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby's 'Thunder Out of China' the list of names is distinguished, and most of these writers won their distinction . . . by what they had to say about China. Israel Epstein has without question established a place for himself in that distinguished company. . . ." It was Samuel Sillen who gave the tip-off for the readers of the *Daily Worker*:

> We have had many excellent books about China in the past few years—books by topflight reporters like Harrison Forman, Guenther Stein, Agnes Smedley, Theodore White, and Annalee Jacoby. At the top of this list belongs a book published today, Israel Epstein's "Unfinished Revolution in China."

Through repeated testimony and many documents, the Hearings establish Epstein's long Communist history. On March 3, 1951, his assignment presumably finished and the Senate investigation shortly to begin, Epstein sailed away from our hospitable shores on the same Polish ship "Batory" by which Gerhardt Eisler jumped bail.

The United States Immobilized

The IPR functioned, then, as an instrument of Soviet policy in the sense that the effect of the predominant IPR "line" was such as to aid Soviet interests, and almost never such as to oppose Soviet interests. From the Soviet point of view, the IPR fulfilled its mission. True enough, the over-enthusiastic workers in the IPR did not get quite everything that they sought. In spite of a most strenuous effort (which included a personal session between Lattimore and the President), they failed, for example, to persuade the United States government to liquidate the Japanese emperor. Though they blocked an effective American policy of massive but controlled aid to Chiang, which could have smashed the Chinese Communists, they did not swing all the positive support to the Communists that in one way or another they advocated. Still, the masters of the Kremlin are not utopians. It is probable that the IPR results were well beyond their prior calculation.

It would be ridiculous to say that through the IPR the Communists conquered China. That conquest was accomplished by painful years of building cadres, forming armies, spreading a program. It needed the systematic support of the Soviet state in all forms: money and supplies, agents, guidance, the diplomatic triumphs over the Western statesmen at Teheran and Yalta, the Manchurian interventions of the Red Army. Nevertheless, if the Communists did not conquer China by means of the IPR, it is doubtful that they would have conquered without the IPR. The IPR immobilized the chief opponent, the United States, the sole force that could have blocked the process.

"Sincere pacifist and humanitarian attitudes of 'friendship between all peoples,' when uncritically held, are a favorite broth for wide-awake Communist bacilli. These still more heartily breed on that jellyfish brand of contemporary liberalism—pious, guilt-ridden, do-goody—which uses the curious dogma of 'some truth on both sides' as its principal sales line. Such liberalism was particularly relevant to the IPR operation since its exponents . . . have always made a great show of 'anti-imperialism.'"

For this achievement, which has no real parallel in its field, the Communist manipulation of the IPR must be acknowledged a political masterpiece.

Ignorance, Emptiness and Greed

How did it happen that the IPR took everybody in? Or, phrasing the question more carefully, how did it happen that a policy favorable to Soviet interests prevailed in the IPR, and through the IPR won over, to one or another degree, nearly everyone in private life, journalism, business, universities, or government, who was concerned with Pacific affairs? Because, let us be quite clear about it, nearly everyone was taken in. To pretend that only the Far Eastern Division of the State Department or "the Administration" or "New Dealers" were duped is as factional a distortion of the record as the pretense on the part of the Far Eastern Division and the New Dealers that they were not duped. Even those like Freda Utley, Paul Linebarger, George Taylor and David Rowe, who have since openly revised their views and are now sharp critics of the IPR past, were once, by their own frank admissions, swept partly along with the IPR current. Few of the anti-IPR Congressmen were heard so loud in the land in the days before the Chinese horse was stolen; and Senator Homer Ferguson of the McCarran Subcommittee himself served his seven years (1936-43) as an IPR member. The only heretics—a few isolated individuals, and the tiny sects of dissident Communists who had studied early Comintern history—were cut off from living relation to the mainstream of American life, and made not the smallest impression on official or general public opinion.

There are diverse causes of this catastrophic gullibility. Here as on other political issues it would be an error to suppose that Communist belief is the sole reason for pro-Soviet views and actions.

To begin with, Americans are such babies in these matters, so immature, naive and trusting, that most of them do not know how to recognize a pro-Soviet policy, organization, or action even when their noses are pushed into the middle of it. Moreover, not only Americans, but most Westerners have been immensely ignorant of the most important political facts of our century—the facts of totalitarianism, especially Communist totalitarianism. On the basic problems of the Pacific area Americans have been not only ignorant, but without any coherent policy. With respect to Pacific affairs, there was thus a vacuum of both knowledge and perspective, which the IPR, having no rival, tended to fill almost by inertia.

The novelty and cogency of the problems of the Pacific for the Western world generally, called for some such organization as the IPR to decide what to do there. There were individuals who felt this need, and who had talent, industry and enthusiasm ready to be enlisted. The IPR seemed to answer the need, and from a subjective point of view the Communist core of the IPR answered it most fully. No other answer was offered.

The IPR, and especially the Communists within and using it, offered an exciting field of work, particularly attractive to young people, who were put on the staff or given research grants and writing fellowships. There were fresh knowledge to be won, interesting visitors from overseas, trips to conventions, field investigations in distant places, excitement, and a sense of mission. They were not wise enough at first to notice that the research was often sloppy, the literature a cover for propaganda, the visitors secret agents, and the mission treason. The Communist fraction gradually absorbed many of them, and then usually dispatched them to some associated venture, or into a post in government or education.

The Communist task was made easier by the existence within our society of ideological media which are an apt culture for Communist infection. Sincere pacifist and humanitarian attitudes of "friendship between all peoples," when uncritically held, are a favorite broth for wide-awake Communist bacilli. These still more heartily breed on that jellyfish brand of contemporary liberalism—pious, guilt-ridden, do-goody—which uses the curious dogma of "some truth on both sides" as its principal sales line. Such liberalism was particularly relevant to the IPR operation, since its exponents, though they ordinarily have had only a missionary tract's acquaintance with colonial peoples and problems, have always made a great show of "anti-imperialism."

When this dilute liberalism gets a seasoning of semi-Marxist theory, as from even such respectable cooks as the early Charles Beard, or the Harold Rugg of the nationally read social science texts, or the academically ubiquitous sages of Teachers College, then the receptive young appetite seldom even tastes the bitter Communist pill. As Jules Monnerot has neatly summed up the anti-Communist dilemma: "The Left is infected by communism, and the Right can not understand it."

Less ideological yeasts were also at work, and these should by no means be minimized. From the beginning, the IPR has attracted big money from rich individuals, and from major foundations and business corporations. I have already referred to testimony presented by William L. Holland, active for twenty years in IPR affairs (Hearings, pp. 1217, 1236-38), which shows that the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations have contributed more than $2,000,000. Substantial individual contributors have included Thomas W. Lamont, Frederick Field, Joseph E. Davies, Gerard Swope, Juan Trippe, Jerome D. Green, Henry R. Luce, Arthur H. Dean. Among the corporate contributors are listed International Business Machines, J. P. Morgan and Company, Shell Oil, *Reader's Digest*, Matson Steamship, American and Foreign Power, and the British Lever Brothers. Pro-communism and naiveté, though they account for the appearance of some of the individuals and institutions on this list, are not sufficient to explain why all of them gave material

support to an organization the activities of which were in net effect favorable to Soviet and international Communist aims.

The truth is that in both Britain and America, and in other Western nations also, substantial business and financial interests have all along been pro-Soviet to one or another degree, not out of pro-Communist belief, but for what they have considered to be sound economic reasons Some businessmen and bankers have thought that, at least for the short run and perhaps even for the long pull, they could make money by doing business with the Soviet Union. A few of them like Joseph E. Davies or Thomas Lamont plastered on, for a while, a set of "liberal" or mildly pro-Communist ideas to cover their naked economics. As a rule, though, it is only in the non-business and eccentric younger generation that communism sinks at all deep. But you don't have to be a Communist to be willing to shake hands with Stalin.

It would be insulting to these eminent men and their advisers to suppose that all of them were ignorant of the true political role of the IPR. Like so many of their counterparts in, say, Czechoslovakia, they were walking voluntarily toward the guillotine set for their own necks.

Ignorance, then, emptiness, ideological mildew, and greed were all allies of the Kremlin in relation to the IPR. Recognizing these elements, and assigning them due weight, we must at the same time assert flatly—bizarre as it sounds to American ears—that there was also a continuous and resolute conspiracy. I have tried to give some indication of the source and meaning of this conspiracy, and of how it operated. I do not think that a reasonable man will doubt its existence if he will read any considerable portion of the record of this investigation. If, besides reading, he has also directly observed at the hearings themselves the evasions, squirmings and circumlocutions of the conspirators and their dupes, then any last shred of even theoretical doubt should be removed.[5]

I stress again that the primary political question is not whether x or y was or is a disciplined Communist. Perhaps it is the truth when Owen Lattimore declares under oath that he was never a Communist, and when Carter and Vincent swear that they never had any inkling of any Communists at all in the IPR, except for a tiny suspicion that Frederick Field was "fairly left-wing." This would in no way alter the pro-Soviet facts of the IPR history, or negate the role which these gentlemen played in that history. Were they and their associates honest but naive idealists? Victims of circumstances and their time? Representatives (as according to Alistair Cooke) of an entire generation once glorious but now on trial? If so, they are of course eligible for pardon, as let us hope we all are. But their fellow citizens and mankind today suffer the grievous results of the actions in which they shared. To deserve forgiveness, and to aid in charting a more prudent future, they have an accounting to make. It is all very well to take frequent refuge from responsibility in the search for the causes and explanations of conduct. But it is the occasional duty of a moral man to judge as well as to comprehend.

[5]Of active members of the IPR family, the following refused to testify on the grounds of self-incrimination concerning their Communist connections: James S. Allen, Kathleen Barnes, Harriet Levine Chi (formerly wife of Ch'ao-ting Chi), Hugh Deane, Jr., Frederick V. Field, Mary Jane Keeney, Philip O. Keeney, William Mandel, Harriet L. Moore (Mrs. Gelfan), Mildred Price, Lawrence K. Rosinger, Helen Schneider, Daniel Thorner, Catesby Jones. Many others identified by sworn testimony as Communists had left the United States, and could not be called as witnesses.

The Sore Still Runs

Is it not, though, a waste of energy to squander so much concern on the past? Whatever the former sins of the IPR, we have all learned now, have we not? Recriminations are futile. Do not patriotism, the presence of danger, and the claims of good sense all demand that McCarthy-lion shall lie down with Jessup-lamb?

How much has been learned, let the following facts bear witness:

Not in 1930 or 1940 or 1945, but for the period ending December 31, 1952, the Rockefeller Foundation has allocated $50,000 to the Pacific Council of the IPR (Hearings, p. 1237). In October 1949, not in 1942 or '43, the Department of State paid Lawrence K. Rosinger as a consultant so that he might participate in a round-table discussion on American policy toward China, at which discussion, by the statements of others present and by the evidence of the transcript, he and Owen Lattimore were the most active and frequent exponents of the views that there prevailed (pp. 1551 ff.). In the winter of 1949-50, not during the war against Nazism, the Rockefeller Foundation paid Lawrence K. Rosinger $2000 to enable him to attend a special New Delhi IPR conference (p. 1237). The same Rockefeller Foundation granted "$6000 or $9000" to Rosinger so that he might assemble and write part of a book which, under the title "The State of Asia," was published by Alfred Knopf "under the auspices of the American IPR" in the spring of 1951 (p. 1167). It was not in halcyon prewar days, but on October 10, 1951, that William L. Holland, present secretary-general of the International IPR and executive vice-chairman of the American IPR, and IPR activist since 1929, testified under oath concerning two of Rosinger's books, published under IPR auspices:

> I do know with all sincerity and submit to the Committee that any honest appraisal of these books . . . would show that they are truly scholarly and balanced pieces of work (p. 1171).

On January 29, 1952, Lawrence K. Rosinger, subpoenaed to testify before the Subcommittee, declined on the grounds of Constitutional privilege to reply to a hundred or so questions, the answers to which might have had some bearing on his relation to communism or Communists.

If this refusal to testify is taken together with his positive identification as a Communist by sworn witnesses and the convincing evidence of his own pro-Communist career and writings, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that Rosinger's actions have for many years advanced the interests of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless it is this same man who, right up until the last period of the Senate inquiry, was the cherished darling of the IPR. Indeed, even in the period since Rosinger's refusal, the spokesmen and leaders of the IPR have not repudiated him. Quite the contrary: in testimony given two months after Rosinger's refusal, Messrs. Lockwood, Holland and Greene of the IPR phalanx still defended him.

The IPR sore, it would seem, is still running.

Douglas—Fa' Down Go Boom!

By BURTON RASCOE

Candidate William O. Douglas came a cropper with his left-wing backers when Justice William O. Douglas voted for the Constitution. But the Justice is still the Red-haired boy for all that.

William O. Douglas, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, awoke on Tuesday morning, May 13, to discover that he was no longer the Presidential candidate of the Communist Party, the American Labor Party and various assortments of "liberals," including a faction of the sadly split Americans for Democratic Action.

Mr. Justice Douglas, the previous day, had made the mistake (in the eyes of the "liberals") of asking Solicitor General Philip B. Perlman some impertinent and reactionary questions. The Hon. Mr. Perlman was arguing, before the full bench of our highest court, the right of the President to seize the steel mills. He said the President enjoyed this power by grace of the Constitution and under statutory mandate conferred upon him by the Congress. Mr. Justice Douglas said, in effect, "Never mind the Constitution; it is up to us to decide what the Constitution says. You say there is a law. What law?" Mr. Perlman said, "All the laws." Mr. Justice Douglas persisted, "Name one." That challenge stunned Mr. Perlman. His mind went blank.

As far as the proponents of the "Draft Douglas" campaign were concerned, their hero might just as well have yelled at that point, "Hooray for Mark Hanna!" dug a copy of the *Wall Street Journal* from beneath his judicial robes and started scanning the stock market quotations. They hadn't had such a blow since the "treachery" of Justices Jackson and Frankfurter in siding with the majority in upholding the Smith Act.

Late in the afternoon of that blue Monday, directives went out from the Communist Party's Politburo headquarters to local cells all over the country, calling off the "Draft Douglas" campaign. Next day the *Daily Compass*, which for many weeks had been carrying a two-column "Draft Douglas" department, dropped it like a hot potato. The cooling of the "liberal" press on the Douglas-for-President campaign was quick and zeroic.

On May 14, Mr. Justice Douglas made a fresh bid for "liberal" support as a Presidential candidate; not for the immediate future, perhaps, but on some quadrennial future occasion. The bid was not deliberate, of course, for it is to be assumed that he had engaged to address the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (CIO) convention in Atlantic City on that date in response to an invitation extended some months before the steel case came up. But the fact remains that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court deserted the bench in the midst of arguments in a case involving one of the most momentous decisions in our history, in order to deliver an incendiary address which could not have failed to give Stalin & Co. confidence and delight.

That address, entitled "Revolution is Our Business," was an economy-size package of practically every major dosage from the Communist propaganda pharmacopoea since 1942, namely: (1) American dollar aid, agricultural and industrial machinery, food, etc., political support, and UN recognition for Mao Tse-tung and the other Kremlin-directed torturers and assassins who have taken advantage of our State Department policy from Yalta to Koje; (2) kick the British out of Hong Kong, Chiang Kai-shek out of Formosa, the French and Dutch out of southeastern Asia and the Malay Peninsula, give aid and comfort to the Moscow-directed "agrarian" and "peasant" revolutionists wherever they meet resistance in the Near, Middle and Far East; (3) repeal the Smith and McCarran Acts, abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities and all controls over the Communist conspiracy; and (4) intensify the propaganda effort to revive and strengthen the wartime coalition of Communists, New Dealers, One-worlders,

National Education Association leaders, etc., by creating the myth that there are "powerful and ruthless forces" determined to "kill the public school system," "stifle free speech" and "hound good men out of public office" by "character assassination."

Appropriately enough, the delegates to the ACW convention promptly adopted resolutions calling for the repeal of the Smith and McCarran Acts, the abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, support of the Benton resolution to unseat Senator McCarthy; condemning efforts "to weaken the Walsh-Healy Act"; blasting the Defense Department's purchasing policies; and pledging support of the steel workers in all their strike demands, whatever the Supreme Court might decide.

The *Daily Worker*, the *Daily Compass* and numerous "liberal" papers featured the speech. But the "Draft Douglas" campaign had fallen into a coma on May 12; it breathed its last on June 2, when Douglas lined up with the majority in upholding Judge Pine's denial of the President's claim to "inherent powers" to seize anything he had a mind to.

Mr. Justice Douglas may, or may not, have been shocked to learn from Ogden Reid's "Red Underground" column in the *New York Herald Tribune* on Sunday, May 18, that the Communists had only been playing him for a sucker, and that months ago full directives in the "Draft Douglas" movement had gone out to local commissars from New York Politburo headquarters, commanding that a loud noise be made demanding Douglas for President but telling the commissars, privately, not to take the campaign seriously or allow the faithful to do so. They were to use Douglas, his "liberal" voting record in Supreme Court decisions, his speeches and books, for propaganda purposes only. They were instructed to command party hacks to sell as many copies as possible of Douglas's "The Black Silence of Fear" at five cents a copy.

Alger Hero

There is every indication that "Bill" Douglas was sidetracked into the Supreme Court against all his aims and desires for what he considers bigger plums in politics and that, still only 54 (he was the youngest man appointed to the Supreme Court since Story, who reached the bench at 32 in 1811), he is restive and ambitious. His story is out of Horatio Alger, Jr. Son of a roving Presbyterian preacher from Nova Scotia, he was born October 1898 in Maine, Minnesota, and brought up in Yakima, Washington, where he peddled junk, ran errands and sold newspapers while attending public school. He worked his way through Whitman College in Walla Walla, and later through Columbia Law School. Upon graduation he attracted the attention of Dean Harlan Fiske Stone who hired him to teach law at Columbia. He resigned to teach with "Bob" Hutchins at Yale and there specialized in corporate reorganization and bankruptcy, in which highly specialized field his knowledge and ability attracted the attention of Herbert Hoover, who assigned him to study the cause of bankruptcies. Thence he moved to the Securities and Exchange Commission; and then, almost by osmosis, he was eased into the Supreme Court by Roosevelt in 1939, probably on the theory that he was the only man around FDR who could read a corporate statement and understand it.

From his first days on the Supreme Court bench, Douglas started hamming it *à la* Will Rogers—slouch felt Western-style hat, rumpled jeans, feet on his desk; ostentatiously using a private spittoon, chain-smoking at hitherto chaste Saturday sessions of the full bench, he-manning it on fishing, hunting and mountain-climbing trips (camera man always present), making demagogic speeches in the short and simple idioms of the illiterate; and being in all things the furrowed-browed, tan-jowled man of, by, and for the "cummun people." As a measure of the man's appalling ignorance of general ideas and his appalling lack of common sense, one may take his misgauging that good taste and sense of the appropriate which is part of the makeup of the average American citizen, schooled or unschooled. That average citizen could tolerate a road-show Will Rogers in Congress or the White House; but the one high office in which he expects dignity, gravity, taste and decorum is that of a Supreme Court justice. Mr. Justice Douglas has given him as much cause to wince at his hammery, such as wearing a Roy Rogers hat to solemn confirmation or inaugural ceremonies and tucking in his judicial robes to reach the spittoon while listening to pleas before the court, as at his "liberal" judicial opinions.

Among these was the majority opinion which held that it is permissible for Federal OPA agents, without a warrant, to batter down a man's door, search his place and seize OPA coupons as evidence for conviction of violation of OPA regulations.

Douglas was on the "war effort" bandwagon in upholding the convictions of Yamashita and Hamma, Japanese-American citizens whose loyalty was later established. He had been a jumping interventionist long before Pearl Harbor, made speeches saying, "The sons of freedom have taken sides [with Stalin] against tyranny. . . ."

By 1946 Douglas had been thoroughly indoctrinated by the Hiss-Lattimore-Vincent-Currie-White-Jessup-Acheson group in the foreign policy making echelons of the State Department and the White House. So when the President called him for an hour's chat about taking Ickes's post in the Interior Department, Douglas was inflamed with his present mission to aid the "agrarian" revolution in China and support the "enlightened" Mao Tse-tung against the "feudal" Chiang Kai-shek. He

turned the job down. His naivete and gullibility have not diminished or ameliorated, as his recent speeches show:

> Who are their [the peoples of the Near East, Middle East and Indo-China] champions today? The underground Communist Party. Why aren't we in America standing in the villages of the Middle East and Asia saying we are for economic justice and social justice and we are going to help you, the peasants, achieve your revolution? . . . What have we been doing instead? We have been supporting corrupt reactionary regimes, putting money behind governments that are vicious governments, wasting the wealth of America, trying to underwrite the status quo. . . . Revolutions are in the making. . . . The most powerful things in the worlds are ideas. . . . What is this hold that communism has on people? Mostly ideas.

The record of Mr. Justice Douglas, in dissenting from the Supreme Court's decision upholding the Smith Act, in his opposition to the McCarran Act and the House Committee on Un-American Activities, his proposals for sharing our atom bomb stockpile with Russia and cooperating with Mao and Stalin in increasing and perfecting the Kremlin's control of all Asia, is straight out of the Communist Party's propaganda directives from 1942 to the present time. Not even his "conservative" assents, as in the steel seizure, offset his almost perfect record from the Kremlin's standpoint—from his prevention of the deportation of Harry Bridges to his suggestion that the Constitution be amended to yield sovereignty to the UN in all matters of world significance, such as the use of the A-bomb.

Occasionally Douglas has shown signs of growing up. But his wayward juvenility of mind and colossal ignorance of everything except voting-stock setups, corporate finance and bankruptcy give us cause to remember and rejoice that we owe a debt to Bob Hannegan. When Roosevelt was told he couldn't have Wallace as his running mate in 1944, he said he would accept either Douglas or Truman. Hannegan vetoed Douglas.

Koje, 1952

When in the night the news of Koje came:
Of death bought off, of pleas unmanly mild,
Of blackmail tamely suffered, then reviled,
The news had worse than sadness, it had shame.
This was the savor of our modern fame:
The sickly comfortism we proclaim;
Our sighs for welfare and to be secure;
Our pouting lack of patience to endure.
At Koje free men bargained death away.
How grave that all the watching world should see
That slaves were those who risked their lives that day,
While freedom's men sought lesser jeopardy!
Yet wisdom and our older heroes say
That men who would be easy won't be free.

C. P. IVES

Except the Lord Build the House . . .

Look at the opening statement of the United Nations charter:

> WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DETERMINED:
>
> to save succeeding generations . . .
> to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights . . .
> to establish conditions under which justice . . .
> to promote social progress and better standards . . .
>
> AND FOR THESE ENDS:
> to practice tolerance . . .
> to unite our strength . . .
> to employ international machinery . . .
>
> HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.

Then, by way of contrast, look at the opening statement of the Mayflower Compact: "In the Name of God, amen." A little later we find the phrase ". . . for the glory of God and advancement of the Christian faith."

To continue with our investigation into our truly American preambles, look at the Articles of Confederation which begin with these lines: "Whereas we all came to these parts of America with one and the same end, namely, to advance the Kingdom of Our Lord Jesus Christ and to enjoy the liberties of the Gospel in purity."

And then go on to the account of the first meeting of the General Assembly of Virginia, which contains these lines: ". . . for as much as men's affairs do little prosper where God's service is neglected, all the burgesses took their places in the choir till a prayer was said by Rev. Mr. Buche, the minister, that it would please God to guide and to sanctify all our proceedings to His own glory."

Finally, read the Declaration of Independence, which acknowledges the Creator as the source of life and liberty, relies upon "the protection of Divine Providence" and is written in a spirit of reverence and with an appeal to the right as established by God.

It would seem that great success came to the United States as long as our fathers acknowledged the leadership of God and sought humbly to follow Him. Now men have set up the United Nations without acknowledging dependence upon God or seeking His leadership. This was done, of course, at the behest of the Moscow atheists, but to ignore God at the demand of the Communists is worse than treason. "We ought to obey God rather than men" *(Acts 5:29)*.

"The stone which the builders rejected," must become "the head of the corner" before much can be expected of the United Nations.

"Not by Might nor by Power but by my spirit, sayeth the Lord of Hosts" *(Zach. 4:6)*.

HOWARD E. KERSHNER

Second Anniversary in Korea

1. War of Appeasement

By ALICE WIDENER

The Freeman *signalizes the anniversary of the war in Korea with two articles: A student of Soviet strategy shows how U. S. policy invited Communist attack, and a former adviser to President Rhee shows how U. S. policy betrayed our South Korean allies.*

It is now two long years since Americans began to pay in blood for the fatal Roosevelt-Truman-Acheson-Marshall Asiatic policy, which led to the Soviet-inspired aggression against the Republic of Korea in June 1950. Now, in June 1952, the United States is still embroiled in the first stalemate war in its history; a war in which stalemate is the deliberately chosen official policy; a war that has already cost 108,431 American casualties and more than twenty billion dollars. No wonder horrified and bewildered citizens all over the country are asking: How did we get into this ghastly mess?

A study of documents such as the White Paper on China, the Wedemeyer Report on China-Korea, the Forrestal Diaries and the transcripts of the so-called MacArthur Hearings has led this writer, for one, to believe that we are in the Korean mess mainly because the State Department during the crucial period 1944-1951, turned a deaf ear to the sound advice of our wise and successful Far Eastern military commanders.

Only a few months after V-J Day, for example, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, commander of U. S. Army forces in Korea, warned the State Department about the dangerous situation there. That this warning went unheeded is proved by the entry of February 15, 1946 in the Administration-censored Forrestal Diaries:

> Hodge feels that . . . the North and South will never be united until Russia is sure that all Korea will be Communistic. . . . He urges that these ideas be passed to the State Department *and that it be impressed on State that he must be kept informed and that it might be worth while to consider some of the information and recommendations which he has sent in.*

But perhaps the most momentous instance, before June 1950, of disregard and suppression of wise counsel from a Far Eastern commander was the treatment accorded the now famous Wedemeyer Report of 1947. That report, the result of a special mission undertaken for Secretary of State Marshall, explained precisely how the United States might keep China, Formosa, Korea and Manchuria from falling under Soviet domination. Administration suppressed Wedemeyer's advice on China until after that country was conquered by the Communists in 1949. His advice on how to prevent civil war in Korea was suppressed until nearly a year after the war had started.

General Wedemeyer called his report "China-Korea" in order to emphasize his prefatory statement that problems in the two countries "are inextricably mingled." But when the State Department finally released the section on China in its White Paper of 1949, Secretary of State Acheson and his editor-in-chief Philip Jessup appended to page 764 the footnote: "All references to Korea have been deleted from General Wedemeyer's report itself as irrelevant to this paper."

General Wedemeyer's Warning

During a recent interview with General Wedemeyer, I asked him whether he believed—in 1947, 1949 or 1952—that the Korean situation is irrelevant to that of China. And his answer was: "Strategic consideration of China would of necessity be incomplete without an analysis of strategic factors —political, economic and psycho-social—in contiguous areas which would, of course, include Korea."

Even the Democratic National Chairman has conceded that Korea is today the paramount issue in the public mind. I suggest, therefore, that all Americans re-examine General Wedemeyer's practical recommendations about the areas contiguous with China. If Truman, Marshall and Acheson had been less secretive, we would have known five years ago that Wedemeyer had warned and advised the Administration:

> The peaceful aims of freedom-loving peoples in the world are jeopardized today by developments as portentous as those leading to World War II. . . . Events of the past two years demonstrate the futility of appeasement based on the hope that the strongly consolidated forces of the Soviet Union will adopt either a conciliatory or a cooperative attitude, except as tactical expedients. . . . Soviet literature, confirmed repeatedly by Communist leaders, reveals a definite plan for expansion far exceeding that of Nazism in its ambitious scope and dangerous implications. The situation in Manchuria has deteriorated to such a degree that prompt action is necessary to prevent that area from becoming a Soviet satellite. . . .

> The military situation in Korea . . . is potentially dangerous to United States strategic interests. The creation of an American controlled and officered Korean Scout Force, sufficient in strength to cope with the threat from the North, is required to prevent the forcible establishment of a Communist Government after the United States and Soviet Union withdraw their occupation forces.
>
> It is recommended that the United States provide as early as practicable moral, advisory and material support to China and South Korea in order to contribute to the early establishment of peace . . . and concomitantly to protect United States strategic interests against militant forces which now threaten them. . . . It is recognized that any foreign assistance extended must avoid jeopardizing the American economy.

Today a Manchuria-based Soviet jet air force and Red Chinese Army are jeopardizing both United States strategic interests and the American economy.

At the so-called MacArthur Hearings Secretary Acheson told the Senators: "Certainly our course in Korea has paralleled the recommendations of General Wedemeyer." The only recommendation not carried out, he said, was the call for an American-officered scout force; but actually American officers served with Koreans in the field.

With this statement in mind, I asked General Wedemeyer if there was a real difference between the kind of military force he had recommended for South Korea and the kind that was actually established; also whether it was true that *only one* of his recommendations about Korea was not carried out. General Wedemeyer gave his answer in writing:

> The policy of too little and too late in connection with military aid in terms of equipment or military trainers and advisers in South Korea contributed to the lack of effective military forces in that area when the Communist aggression occurred in June 1950. Unfortunately, other recommendations pertaining to Korea were not carried out, including "continued interim occupation by U. S. Army forces in Korea." That is, retaining American forces there until effective South Korean ground forces could be created to cope with any situation presented by North Korean forces.

The war eventually launched by Kremlin-inspired North Koreans was, as most modern historians agree, the inevitable result of the Truman-Acheson delineation, in January 1950, of the American defense line in the Pacific as passing only through Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines. Knowing that Korea was not only outside this line but also excluded from the boundaries of General MacArthur's Far Eastern command, the Communists felt free to attack South Korea. When Acheson tried to defend his disastrous invitation-to-attack policy at the Senate Inquiry, he failed to point out that Wedemeyer had advised in 1947:

> A Soviet-dominated Korea would constitute a serious political and psychological threat in Manchuria, North China, the Ryukyus and Japan, and hence to United States strategic interests in the Far East. It is therefore in the best interest of the United States to ensure the permanent military neutralization of Korea.

The only military neutralization which the Truman Administration ever carried out in Korea was the wartime neutralization of United Nations offensive power, and also of anti-Communist Chinese Nationalist forces on Formosa.

Generals MacArthur and Wedemeyer never shared the fear of Administration apologists that a UN victory in Korea might provoke the Kremlin into launching World War III. Unlike the Administration generals, these two great Far Eastern commanders have always been keenly aware of the true nature of communism. They knew Stalin's views concerning strategy and tactics and were familiar with his declaration that Communists must know

> . . . when the enemy is strong, when retreat is inevitable, when to accept battle forced upon us by the enemy is obviously disadvantageous, when, with the given alignment of forces, retreat becomes the only way to ward off a blow against the vanguard and to keep the reserves intact.

The object of this strategy, Stalin explained, is "to gain time, to demoralize the enemy, and to accumulate forces in order later to assume the offensive."[1]

Time Is on Stalin's Side

At the end of my interview with General Wedemeyer, I asked him whether he believes that Stalin's concept of strategic retreat still guides Kremlin policy, and whether it was applicable to the Kremlin-directed Chinese forces in Korea and Manchuria in 1951—when, according to General MacArthur, Lieutenant General William H. Hoge and the President's observer, Major General Frank E. Lowe, the UN could have won the Korean war. Here is Wedemeyer's answer:

> This is in my judgment a very sound strategy for any major power to follow. It is certainly well adapted to the strategy of the Soviet Union which accepts recessions, retardations or temporary defeats but always retains the plan to return to the offensive when the developing situation permits. This strategy is applicable to the Kremlin-inspired Red Chinese forces.

The Administration leaders have not, however, been willing to deliver a decisive blow against the Soviet Union's vanguard forces of Red Chinese. And so the Communists have not been forced to retreat in order to keep their reserves intact.

The Administration's sievelike policy of "containing" communism is based on the premise that time is on our side—this in total disregard of General Wedemeyer's warning that in the Far East

[1] "Foundations of Leninism," by J. Stalin, pp. 97-98. International Publishers, New York City.

"Time works to the advantage of the Soviet Union." Certainly time has worked to the advantage of the Soviet Union during the phony, Kremlin-instigated Korean truce talks. Under cover of those fake negotiations, Stalin has been able to mobilize vast reserves of men and material in his Manchurian sanctuary, threatening the UN forces with catastrophic defeat. And if defeat comes, what force can prevent his legions from carrying the war to Japan and Formosa? Two years after the beginning of the Truman-Acheson War of Appeasement, Americans must face the terrible truth pronounced by the great commander whom the Administration deposed because it could not bend him to its purposes: "In war, there is no substitute for victory."

2. Theirs But to Do and Die

By WAYNE T. GEISSINGER

The Republic of Korea was the first nation of the free world with sufficient courage to stand up and fight when confronted with the armed aggression of the Communists. The South Koreans would not compromise their principles and knuckle under to the Red invaders. Since they refused to humiliate themselves, the representatives of the United Nations have been doing it for them. Daily the Communist noose tightens around the South Korean Republic, our fighting ally.

During my eight months in Korea as consultant to President Syngman Rhee and adviser to the Director of Public Information I saw the United Nations twice refuse to grasp the military victory that seemed assured, in order to play a losing game of "global politics" with a barbarian foe. As an American familiar with the situation and free to speak with no restrictions other than his own conscience and sense of patriotism, I want to tell the American people what the present policy of frustration and compromise is doing to the Republic of Korea.

When Russia's Jacob Malik made his cease-fire proposal in June 1951, the success of the Ridgway-Van Fleet "Operation Killer" had the North Korean and Chinese Communists in desperate circumstances. Their supply lines were being battered from the air, and their ground troops systematically chopped to pieces at comparatively small cost in lives to the United Nations forces. "We had the Chinese Communist Army completely licked last June and could have gone all the way to the Manchurian border if the order had been given," Lieutenant General William H. Hoge, Commander of the Corps in Korea, told the United Press on January 9, 1952, after his return to the United States.

Shortly after Malik's offer had been made known to him, President Rhee issued a statement, concurred in by the Cabinet and the National Assembly, outlining the conditions under which the Republic of Korea would agree to cease-fire talks. President Rhee and his government, like Generals MacArthur, Hoge and Lowe, believed that the Communists were on the verge of defeat. Therefore he interpreted Malik's proposal as an admission of impending defeat and responded accordingly. He demanded the withdrawal of all Chinese Communists to points beyond the Yalu and Tumen rivers in the north, and the disarming of the North Korean Communists as conditions precedent to negotiations. These demands were entirely logical and conformed to the situation at that time.

The United Nations Commission in Korea was horrified by Dr. Rhee's forthright proposal. The United States Ambassador, John J. Muccio, leaped into his shiny limousine and rushed "up the hill" to remonstrate with the President pending the arrival of reinforcements. General Ridgway, the Supreme Commander, flew in from his Tokyo Headquarters. General James Van Fleet, Commander of the UN Forces in Korea, arrived in Pusan by plane and Deputy Commander General John B. Coulter joined the parade from his Rear Headquarters near Pusan. Following a conference, these four top men representing the Allied Powers, the U. S. Army and the State Department piled into the Ambassador's car and went to see President Rhee.

The discussions at this historic meeting have never been made public. General Ridgway conferred privately with the President. It was reported at the time that Ridgway prefaced his remarks with, "Mr. President, I have been directed to inform you . . ." Although I was not present at the meeting I was in the courtyard when the official party departed after the usual fanfare and photography which attends the passage of "top brass." Ambassador Muccio introduced me to Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet.

In my discussion with Dr. Rhee following this conference I gathered that the UN was going ahead with the proposed negotiations regardless of what the Republic of Korea thought, and that he had been requested to refrain from saying or doing anything which might upset the proceedings. He was deeply disturbed by the political aspects of the situation and resentful of the thinly veiled suggestion that he wear a muzzle.

Anyone who knows Dr. Syngman Rhee at all, knows that he will not back away from a fight or compromise his principles. The whole history of his fifty-year struggle for a democratic, independent Korea has been a record of heartbreaking

frustration saved from failure by his indomitable courage and refusal to concede defeat. There isn't a better man in all Asia with whom to confront the Communists at a conference table if the United Nations want to negotiate a decisive peace. Instead, the UN has chosen to silence Dr. Rhee and to brand him as uncooperative, belligerent, intransigent and, according to General Ridgway, "feeble." The first three adjectives belie the fourth, and are precisely the attributes most needed by the UN delegation at Panmunjom. The Communist negotiators have done well on all three counts.

President Syngman Rhee was 77 years old in March of this year, but he is vigorous both mentally and physically. I wore myself out trying to keep up with him, and he is almost twice my age. His frequent visits to the front lines, his trips to hospitals, orphanages and relief centers and the constant demands of ceremonial obligations keep his staff tired, but the President sails through his rigid schedules with aplomb.

Koreans Took the Hard Way

The Korean people were stunned by the turn of events. They had been the first of the free nations to accept the armed challenge of the Communists, though they knew that defeat meant death. They could have made a deal and become a satellite as did eastern European nations when confronted with Communist aggression. Such a course would have kept the peace, if peace at any price is ever permanent. At least the South Koreans could have saved their own skins by sacrificing individual freedom and national independence. Instead they fought, and they have suffered three casualties for every one among the UN forces. They have become a nation of refugees, homeless and impoverished, with a civilian death-toll estimated at more than a million. Their country is a bombed and gutted ruin. Yet there is no record of any complaint by the South Koreans. To them, these unfortunate conditions were the price of victory. When that victory appeared within their grasp they felt that they had earned the privilege to speak and be heard, and to be represented on a basis of complete equality in any conferences or negotiations which affected their future and their country. They couldn't understand why their President and their leaders did not have equal representation on Allied councils.

Although the UN representatives were perfectly willing to sit down with North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung and with General Nam Il, they would not permit more than one South Korean general to sit in with them. Through the "negotiation device" the Russians maneuvered the UN into recognizing the unlawful and barbarian People's Democratic Republic of Korea as a proper bargaining agent, thus giving them a *de facto* status of legality while Russia pulled the strings.

Throughout the summer of 1951 President Rhee issued statement after statement warning the UN and the free world against the policy of appeasement and compromise inherent in the very fact that negotiations were being conducted. The deliberate unreasonableness and the studied insults of the Communist "peace" team made a mockery of the negotiations from the beginning. President Rhee and other government spokesmen urged that the UN wake up to realities and break off the talks before the Communists had so strengthened their forces that they could never be driven out. So far as I could tell, few if any of these warnings were ever published outside of the native-language press in South Korea. However, during this same period plenty of stories from Korea reached the American papers—stories highly critical of the so-called "Rhee regime," the fighting qualities of the South Koreans and the attitude of the South Korean government in connection with the peace talks. The *Christian Science Monitor*, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* were consistently anti-Rhee at a time when President Rhee was talking sense and lots of it from both American and Korean points of view. Rightly or wrongly, Rhee was publicized as "dictatorial" and "autocratic," when such a characterization could help no one and served merely as grist for the Communist propaganda mill.

The Communists thus gained on two fronts at the "peace table." They rebuilt their shattered forces while the UN representatives talked and sweated. This was according to plan. They also cashed in heavily on the foreseen tendency of the UN to push its South Korean allies into the background. This second advantage may prove to be the more valuable to the Communists if a truce is finally signed. "Face" is a very important factor in the Orient, and the South Koreans have certainly lost face in Asia as the result of the UN attitude toward them in connection with the peace talks. At a time when the free world is fighting desperately to acquire support for democracy in Asia, the UN has managed to turn the defense of Korea into a sort of "white man's war," which is the surest way to alienate Asian sympathies. It lends credence to Communist propaganda that "democracy, Western-style" is simply the fascism of capitalism and will lead to the commercial exploitation of the Asiatic countries. "Do you want to become another Korea?" is the question thrown at the Oriental nations threatened by communism.

Private citizens in South Korea are beginning to wonder what the future holds for them as a result of the UN negotiations. I talked with many businessmen in Pusan who stated openly that they expected to see their country under Communist domination within a year or two. They were almost unanimous in their belief that the negotiations would end in a compromise leaving Korea half-democratic and half-Communist, coupled with an

agreement giving the Communists proportionate representation in the government. "Through this device," one merchant told me, "the UN will be able to say that 'unification' was achieved. We know, however, that once the Communists get a foothold in our government they will pull down from within that which they were unable to destroy by naked force."

A member of the Seoul Rotary Club, which now meets in Pusan, gave me another view prevalent among South Koreans. "We were the first nation to take up arms against Communist aggression. We did not provoke the war but we did not flinch from it. We refused to compromise or form a coalition government with the Communists from the North. There is no hope that a decisive solution of Korea's problem will be achieved through negotiation. You can not successfully work out a compromise between communism and democracy because there is no common basis for agreement. We know that the Communists will return to fighting before they will compromise, and we are not sure that the UN will. Therefore we fear that all the compromising will be done by the UN. If that is the case, what can we people do who have supported our government and opposed communism? We can see what is happening to the middle classes in China. They are being systematically eliminated because they are not likely to become pro-Communist. I have a large family and I can have a good business after the war is over. If you were I, how long would you continue to fight communism under the present circumstances?"

The late S. Y. Kim, then editor of the *Korea Times*, asked the $64 question: "Why did the UN stop winning and start talking?"

Less than a month after the initial sessions at Kaesong, a mass demonstration against the "cease-fire" talks occurred in Pusan. It was generally thought in UN circles that the demonstration resulted from remarks by President Rhee in opposition to truce talks. Reports of its size varied; but enough people were involved to worry the UN representatives. Shortly thereafter General Ridgway came to Korea and met President Rhee somewhere in the vicinity of Seoul. The subjects discussed were not divulged, but it later leaked out that the General had warned the President against saying or doing anything which might upset the applecart at Kaesong, for the interesting reason that the UN forces had proceeded as far as was possible without additional troops, supplies and equipment. The President did not quote General Ridgway, but he did say that he was astounded by the General's disclosures and that they did not conform to the information available through South Korean intelligence sources.

As the negotiations move into their thirteenth month of futile and indecisive wrangling, the basic issues for which the South Koreans and the United Nations are struggling are still unsolved and almost untouched upon. What has become of the UN's war objective, adopted in resolution form and still unchanged, that aggression shall be repelled and Korea unified under a single independent, democratic government? Would those who contend that victory can be achieved through stalemate think that the promised unification of Korea is possible by such means? Or have we thrown overboard our announced objectives in our eagerness to "get off the hook" in Korea? If we have, then we should advise our fighting ally, the Republic of Korea, that the ship is sinking and it's each man for himself.

THIS IS WHAT THEY SAID

Harry S. Truman's single most valuable quality is his knack of picking good men. . . . His greatest asset is that he knows what he doesn't know, and his highest virtue is his humility.

JOHN GUNTHER, "Inside U. S. A.," 1947

[U. S. entry into World War I. will] help relight the lamps of civilization and make the moloch of Kaiserism and Czarism and military and hereditary one-man government of civilized nations back up and crumple up and shut up for all time.

PAUL G. HOFFMAN on May 14, 1917, quoted in the "Thirty-five Years Ago" column of the *Los Angeles Times*, May 1952

We held to our overmastering belief that the National interests of the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China do not fundamentally conflict.

BERNARD DE VOTO, *Harper's*, November 1943

To bring about government by oligarchy, masquerading as democracy, it is fundamentally essential that practically all authority and control be centralized in our Federal government . . . The individual sovereignty of our states must first be destroyed.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, radio speech, March 2, 1930

Under Two Heels

To negotiate with Hitler is to betray the future —not only the future of those who are resisting his challenge and of those who are living under his heel, but . . . our own future and the future of Germany itself.

DEAN ACHESON, Town Meeting of the Air, January 13, 1941

The United States is ready and will always be ready and willing to negotiate [with Stalin] with the sincere desire to solve problems.

DEAN ACHESON, before UN General Assembly, September 20, 1950

Award to Mr. Ascoli

By ALFRED KOHLBERG

When as children we played a game called "Pin the Tail on the Donkey," the awards included not only first and second prizes, but a consolation prize as well. In the field of journalism the Pulitzer people have long been taking care of the first prize, but it seems to have been left to me to award the consolation prize. The Kohlberg Consolation Prize in Journalism for 1952 goes uncontestedly to Max Ascoli, publisher of the *Reporter,* for his China Lobby feature. Mr. Ascoli not only failed to pin the tail on the donkey; he couldn't even find a donkey to pin his tale on.

In spite of vague hints about hundreds of millions of dollars (not Chinese) spent by the China Lobby, the *Reporter* was able to trace and nail down a grand total of $115,000 spent by the Chinese government for public relations during the past eleven years, an average of $10,000 a year. Yet reportedly $212,000 was spent on newspaper advertising, $160,000 on direct-mail solicitation, and an unknown amount for radio spots to advertise two April issues of the *Reporter* featuring the story of the China Lobby.

I fail to understand either the economic or ideological reasoning behind Ascoli's expenditure of more than $400,000 to advertise this exposure of $115,000 spent by the Chinese. However, one bit of publishing thrift on Mr. Ascoli's part must be noted for whatever it is worth, as an offset to the overall extravagance. Nobody, but nobody! (to steal a phrase from Gimbel's) missed seeing the picture of "the mysterious Chinese gentleman" featured in the *Reporter's* newspaper ads and in its million direct-mail brochures; yet he was not mentioned in the articles. It is reported that his name is George K. Leung, and that Ascoli paid him $1,000,000 (People's Liberation currency, equal to $35 U. S. currency) for the privilege of using his picture.

The articles themselves are a collection of errors of admirably colossal magnitude. They are best summed up in the *Reporter's* own pages: "Our report on the China Lobby is the kind of job the *Reporter* likes best to do. Here, as always, our goal has been to be thoroughly objective, and never impartial." In just one reading of this "never impartial" report I counted 36 factual errors in matters known to me, without the necessity of checking to sources.

I could easily correct these errors of fact here, one by one, if I felt (a) that they merited the honor of refutation, or (b) that anyone had read the issues to the bitter end—anyone, that is, except myself and Owen Lattimore, and possibly May Miller. For those who tuned in late it should be explained that May Miller was Organizing Secretary of the Communist Party of New York State (35 East 12th Street, or pick up the telephone right now and dial ALgonquin 4-5705). On March 1, 1949, she issued a now famous secret order addressed "To all Sections and Counties: Dear Comrades:" reading:

> PROGRAM FOR ACTION ON CHINA POLICY
>
> As suggested by the New York City Action Conference on China Policy, January 29, 1949
>
> PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
>
> *1. Demand a Congressional Investigation*
> Of the Chinese lobby in Washington. One of the largest spending foreign influences in our capital; Not registered as foreign agents.
>
> Of the billions of dollars of private accumulation deposited in American banks and investments by Chinese officials and individuals.
>
> *2. Demand a new China Policy*
> An end to all forms of American intervention in China and of plans to aid any elements and remnants of the Kuomintang. Preparation by our Government to recognize the government which the people of China are now establishing.
>
> Planning now by our authorities for genuine and self-respecting cooperation with the people's government in China, including normal and friendly trade relations free of any political conditions.

Max Ascoli, on the "Author Meets the Critics" television program, denied that he had ever seen the much publicized order quoted above. It is true that in his issue of January 3, 1950 (two days before British recognition) he had called for recognition of Red China; and he backed it in the same issue with articles by a stable of so-called experts who agreed. Included were three of the McCarran Committee headliners: Edgar Snow, Deerk Bodde and John K. Fairbank.

In its press release the *Reporter* stated: "Like most readers, we knew just enough—the gleanings of cocktail gossip, syndicated columns and a few indignant editorials—to suspect it would be very difficult to know more." The *Reporter's* suspicions proved correct. Except for the previously mentioned $115,000 in recorded payments there is nothing in its 48 pages of verbiage that is not adequately covered by the above quotation from the Communist Party of the State of New York (Check at ALgonquin 4-5705).

Having spent quite a sum of *my own money* on the financially unsuccessful *Plain Talk,* I had smugly considered myself some sort of record holder as the country's Class Z publisher. Therefore it is with a sympathy bordering on empathy for Mr. Ascoli and confrères, who tried so hard and spent so much to produce so little of real benefit to *their* Lobby, that I humbly award my meager booby prize. Nightly I pray for long life and continued financial strength for Max Ascoli and the *Reporter.* If anything happened to them I would again rate as America's most incompetent publisher.

Educators *vs.* Free Inquiry

By HENRY HAZLITT

What is censorship? In the view of the New York Times's *education editor it seems to be any query into subversive teachings in American textbooks.*

A front-page article by Benjamin Fine, in the *New York Times* of Sunday, May 25, throws an unintentionally brilliant light on the dangerous state of mind that most of the country's "educators" and their defenders have now got themselves into.

"A growing censorship of school and college textbooks in this country," Mr. Fine begins, "is causing America's leading educators serious concern." Now "censor," if Mr. Fine will look up the word in a dictionary, means primarily "an official empowered to examine written or printed matter . . . in order to *forbid publication* if objectionable." [My italics.] Mr. Fine's article fails to cite, however, a single instance in which a textbook was actually suppressed. By "censorship" he turns out to mean merely (1) that in some cases a required textbook has been withdrawn and another substituted, or (2) that some people have had the presumption to criticize some textbooks. In short, in the name of defending "free inquiry," Mr. Fine and the educators he quotes are in fact denouncing free inquiry into the quality and nature of the textbooks required in our schools and universities.

In Mr. Fine's vocabulary every criticism is an "attack." "The attacks," he writes, have been based on the ground that the texts "contain subversive passages." He seems to imply that none of the textbooks under criticism contains subversive passages, and that even if it did this wouldn't be a reasonable ground for using another textbook.

"In some instances," he goes on, "librarians have been persuaded to remove textbooks or not to order materials that might create a controversy in the community." This seems to imply that failure to order a book is tantamount to its suppression. I can think of hundreds of cases in which libraries have failed to buy conservative books and in which colleges have failed to use conservative texts, but I can not recall Mr. Fine's ever expressing any concern about these.

"Self-appointed committees," he continues, "are being organized in many areas to 'screen' the books used by colleges." The adjective "self-appointed" seems to imply that in Mr. Fine's opinion no one has the right to speak or act on his own initiative in matters that concern the public welfare.

"Books that have been in use for years suddenly become suspect when an unfavorable review appears to print." Does this mean that long use is itself a conclusive argument in favor of retaining a textbook, no matter what errors it may be proved to contain?

"Most state education departments," Mr. Fine resumes, "report that they have legally constituted committees to screen books for subversive leanings or other unfitness. It is the growing number of voluntary censorship groups that is causing concern." This clearly implies the statist doctrine that only what government does has a right to be respected. It is enough, apparently, if a state education department consents to investigate itself. Only voluntary initiative on the part of citizens is to be feared. And once more the extreme word "censorship" is used to discredit criticism.

The Loaded Vocabulary

Mr. Fine then launches on a summary of five numbered "*Times* findings, based on nation-wide reports."

"1. A concerted campaign is under way over the country to censor school and college textbooks." This implies that it is wicked for citizens to act in concert. Again Mr. Fine uses the unwarranted word "censor" to attack the right of criticism.

"2. *Voluntary* groups are being formed in nearly every state to screen books for 'subversive' or un-American statements. These organizations, *not accountable to any legal body*, are sometimes doing great harm in their communities." [My italics.] The disparagement of voluntary activity, and the implication that there should be a "legal body" to control or suppress this freedom to criticize, are too clear to require further emphasis.

"3. Librarians are intimidated by outside pressures in their choice of books. . . . They meekly accept the requests of the self-appointed censorship groups." Again the loaded vocabulary—"self-appointed," "censorship," etc. The implication is that it is wicked for anyone to act on his own initiative. There is also the implication that librarians are omniscient but cowardly, and that left to themselves they would know precisely what books to buy or not to buy on all subjects.

"4. Several textbooks and other materials have already been removed from school or college libraries and are effectively on 'the blacklist.'" What Mr. Fine seems to refer to here is not the actual removal of books from libraries but merely the

substitution of one required textbook for another. But whether even the removal of a book from the shelves, in order to make room for another, is to be deplored or applauded obviously depends in each case upon the merits or demerits of the particular volume or volumes concerned.

"5. The attacks on the 'subversive' school texts appear to be part of a general campaign against public schools and other educational institutions." This can hardly be described as anything but a typical smear technique. It is an attempt to discredit the motives as well as the knowledge and judgment of those who presume to criticize a given textbook. Any objection to a passage in a book is denounced as an attack on "education" itself. That the real menace to our educational system may come from some of those within it, or from the doctrines endorsed by some of the textbooks criticized, is a possibility that Mr. Fine appears never to have considered.

An even more extreme attitude is evident on the part of some of the educators he quotes. Thus Dr. Robert C. Armstrong, director of the Public Education Association, is quoted as declaring that "complaints against textbooks come from three major sources." Dr. Armstrong summarizes them this way: "First, the *ultra-* or *super*-patriots who for the most part are plain, ordinary, *uninformed*, good-hearted American citizens . . . Second, a group composed of organized minorities, usually racial or religious . . . Third, there are full-time complainers like the Zolls and the Crains who are zealous to make the literary world over in their own images"—instead of in Dr. Armstrong's. So Dr. Armstrong disposes of all criticism, to his own satisfaction, by personal ridicule of the critics.

Apparently suspecting that he has been a bit one-sided, Mr. Fine at one or two points puts in a little window-dressing of tolerance. "The educators generally agree," he concedes, "that the citizens should be concerned with what is taught in the public schools or colleges. But, they insist, this interest must be honest, and not based on *self-interest* or a desire to exploit the present fear of communism for *selfish* ends." [My italics.] Here he manages to imply that none of the present critics of textbooks is either honest or disinterested. Not once, in fact, does he admit that a single criticism made by any "self-appointed censor" has been in the slightest degree justified.

An Ominous Symptom

I have analyzed Benjamin Fine's article at such length because it is an ominous symptom. He is the educational editor of the *New York Times*. He refers to his conclusions as "the *Times* findings." This article is not his first in the same tone. His quotations imply that his article accurately reflects the views and attitudes of those who dominate our educational system today. If this is true, then there are the gravest reasons for concern. For his article reflects on the part of those who now dominate our educational system a bias, an arrogance and an intolerance that in themselves constitute a serious threat to freedom.

All criticism of present educational practices or texts is being lumped together and dismissed in advance as if it were necessarily ignorant, uninformed, prejudiced. Existing textbooks are being treated as if they were necessarily the last pronouncements of pure science. Favorable references to socialism and communism in economic textbooks are unfailingly defended, if not as the conclusions of science, then at least as an "adventurous openmindedness to new ideas." Expressions unfavorable to socialism or communism, on the other hand, or in favor of free enterprise and American traditions, are condemned as the products of closed and senile minds. One has only to cite the treatment meted out to William F. Buckley, Jr.'s book, "God and Man at Yale," as an example of the way in which the most fully documented criticism is either dismissed or misrepresented as a sweeping charge of "communism" and an attack on education itself.

Some of our "educators," in unguarded moments, even mock the ideal of freedom. Mr. Fine cites the Librarian of Congress as referring to "the shrillest and most fear-ridden defenders of the Bill of Rights." Usually our educators are more guarded, and profess to be defending "free inquiry." But under this pretense, as we have seen, they are attacking freedom to inquire into the doctrines preached by some textbooks. Under the pretense of defending freedom of speech they are attacking freedom of speech. Under the pretense of answering a smear campaign they are themselves conducting a smear campaign. They are condemning critics wholesale as ignorant, selfish, reactionary and hysterical. They themselves are free to criticize the free enterprise system. This is "openmindedness." But no one except a "legal body" is to be free to criticize *them*.

They are today's real reactionaries. Nothing has more clearly revealed the ominous state of mind of some of our present "educators" than Mr. Fine's attempt to defend them.

There is an amusing epilogue. On the following Sunday, June 1, the *Times* ran another front-page article by Benjamin Fine on the financial crisis in the colleges today. "Many college heads," he wrote, "suggest more funds should come from large industrial corporations because, they hold, business has a large stake in higher education." Business corporations, in other words, have no right to object to the oceans of ridicule poured on the free enterprise system by some of the most frequently used college economic textbooks. It is merely their duty to pay the costs of spreading the doctrines that destroy the system.

And if you can't see the logic of that, you must surely lack an up-to-date college education.

Arts and Entertainments

By WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM

This is in the way of a report to my colleague, John Chamberlain, who in his review of Whittaker Chambers's "Witness" (issue of June 2) confessed to this lack of clairvoyance: "I have spent some sardonic moments trying to visualize in advance the reviews of 'Witness' that will appear in the *New York Times*, the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *Saturday Review of Literature*. Just who on their staffs is capable of reviewing it? Who has the knowledge and the insight to do it? We shall see."

Now we have seen. Before me are twenty-odd reviews of "Witness" published in metropolitan magazines and newspapers. Others, no doubt, will follow, but being the first and therefore relatively spontaneous responses to a major jolt, these bulletins from the sickbed of our intelligentsia are significant of the state of the liberal mind. And it seems proper to review the reviewers on these pages which are normally reserved for commentaries on the state of our mass civilization.

For not even Arthur Godfrey and Milton Berle have possessed in recent years so much power over the collective mind as those literary middlemen who, pretasting the nation's intellectual nourishment, spare our intelligentsia the pains of natural digestion. In this age of streamlined half-literacy, national elections carry considerably less weight than Mr. Sulzberger's and Mrs. Reid's preference in book reviewers: Congressmen, unfortunately, remain mere messenger-boys of their constituencies, but book reviewers determine what message will ultimately issue from the people.

So I am happy to report, first of all, a new and encouraging variation of Gresham's law: good books drive out bad reviewers. Evidently sharing and anticipating John Chamberlain's apprehension ("just who on their staffs, etc."), several publications called for outside help—not all of it blessed with "the knowledge and insight to do it," but competent help nonetheless. With one incredible exception which I shall name presently, the character of Whittaker Chambers and the quality of his mind have lifted, for one purifying moment, metropolitan book reviewing to the level of civilized diction and, in a few cases, even civilized thought.

To begin with, the current gossip among New York intellectuals is mainly that Chambers has not quite outconfessed St. Augustine. And in this, contrary to the Chambers gossip of previous vintages, there seems to be some truth. But what a change of climate and reference! The man who only a year ago was excluded from the human race is now merely being denied the status of sainthood. All that happened in the meantime was a simple thing: the man wrote a book. It is enough to restore, at least for a moment, one's faith in the printing press.

But while Chambers, with one desperate thrust into his tortured self, has added his name to the short list of the century's important writers, some of his reviewers have demonstrated that they can not read. For instance, Mr. Lewis Gannett complains in the *Herald Tribune* that Chambers "still does not make clear . . . why, after he denounced Alger Hiss as an active Communist, he told the grand jury he had no direct knowledge of Soviet espionage." Now Miss Rebecca West, whose review in the *Atlantic Monthly* once more shows her to be one of the supremely sensitive intelligences of her generation, has read the same book. To her, "Witness" abundantly explains the motives of Chambers's compassionate perjury: He felt (as Miss West condenses one of the crucial narratives in Chambers's book)

> . . . under an obligation to shield Hiss from suffering, as far as was possible, so he supplied the authorities with just the amount of information which he thought would be sufficient to convince a court of law, reserving the rest and parting with it only gradually as it became evident that his calculations had been faulty.

Even more, the information Mr. Gannett failed to pick up is considered by Miss West so illuminating and so essential to Chambers's nature that she builds on it her final judgment of the author. It proves, to Miss West's scolding admiration, "the egotism of the mystic" who "distrusts all institutions" and discards legal authority "because fullness of faith persuades [him] that [he] receives direct instruction from God."

Should Mr. Gannett plead that the British, having cultivated the custom of reading for so many centuries, enjoy an unfair handicap over American book reviewers, Dr. Sidney Hook, whom the *New York Times Book Review* wisely hired for the delicate job, would immediately demolish this defense. For Professor Hook, who could not write an unintelligent paragraph if his life depended on it, sees few clarifications adding so much "credibility to his account" as Chambers's "explanation of why he did not tell his entire story at once." But before I continue my report on Dr. Hook's essay (next to Rebecca West's almost painfully penetrating job,

by far the most relevant critique of "Witness" I have found in the metropolitan press) I must, in a somewhat nauseating juxtaposition, take notice of the *New Republic's* unspeakable shame.

Whoever invented Mr. Merle Miller, its critic, was overdoing a joke. What is one to say about a writer who, having labeled Chambers's book "sickening," proceeds to speak of a man's death (*any* man's death) in these words: "Then, there was brother Richard, who after finishing a quart of whiskey stuck his head in the gas oven." This sentence, spat into a self-declared Journal of Humanism by a writer who, I am told, is a big shot in the Civil Liberties Union, strikes me as the most forceful evidence an agnostic could hold against the belief that God had anything to do with the creation of Humanists. And I strongly advise anyone who deplores the violence of a primitive revulsion against New York intellectuals to read Mr. Miller's entire review of Chambers's book in the *New Republic* of May 26, 1952. There is something profoundly revolting in the sight of a liberal journal, once edited and read by honest men, performing in the corner of nasty little boys who think they are devils, whereas they are merely tearing the legs off a fly.

However, I am glad to report that the *Nation*, in the past even more blindly committed to Hiss than the *New Republic*, allowed Mr. Irving Howe to write a negative and, I think, fundamentally mistaken, but nevertheless literate and sincere review of "Witness." It echoes the one serious concern that unifies all those twenty-odd metropolitan reviews I have seen (with the exception of Miss West's, which accepts Christian theology, and, of course, Mr. Miller's, which is void of any human reflexes)—the strange dread that Chambers's need for an absolute faith seems to evoke in liberals. This dread is sometimes expressed with tentative sympathies for the rejected need (as in the *New Leader*, by Mr. Granville Hicks), sometimes with a peculiar irritation (as in Mr. Brendan Gill's nervous *New Yorker* review), sometimes with patient dialectics (as by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in the *Saturday Review*), but it is present in every liberal response to "Witness."

Mr. Chambers, I am sure, will be grateful for this; and so am I. The justification and, I think, the glory of "Witness" is that its author refuses to view his fate in terms of such accidents as political opinions, personal misjudgments and collective fashions. Had he not refused, he would have written a presumptuous if not unnecessary book. What makes "Witness" burningly relevant to the human situation, yours and mine, is Whittaker Chambers's craving for truth—and truth, to him, is either absolute or not true. The unanimous distrust of this fundamental either-or (in fact, *any* either-or) which erupts from all liberal criticism of "Witness" lends validating fire to the critics' quarrel with Chambers—and verifies the historical importance of his book. To no one's surprise (certainly not to mine), that distrust assumes particular forcefulness and the stature of intellectual authority in Sidney Hook's critique.

Dr. Hook opposes what he calls Chambers's "doctrinal either-ors" from the position of what he calls "secular humanism." This, I take it, is a pluralism which refuses to yield an infinitely and magnificently complex cosmos to the monist's need for unifying interpretation. I am not sure that I know how Professor Hook can square such a pluralism with his professed faith in science which is intrinsically the search for the unifying, the last, the monist interpretation. (That modern science expects no better than asymptotic approaches to the ultimate whats and whys does not change its nature: science is more than ever the search for the *one*, the *unifying* causation.) But this is less relevant to the controversy over "Witness" than the unconscious honesty with which the proponents of that famously tolerant pluralism expose the absurdly illogical intolerance of their position.

Surely, to be complete and coherent, a pluralistic cosmos can not only tolerate but must *insist* on the presence of monists. For how else could it claim that it reaches to the limits of *all* possible human comprehension? And yet, all the liberal critics of "Witness" tremble with horror over Chambers's either-or. None of them, I am confident, would seriously contend that Whittaker Chambers proposes to expel from the brotherhood of free men those who are incapable of his own religious experience. All he did was to testify that it was his experience, and that he *knows* it to be his truth. But that was enough for his pluralist critics, not only to exclude him from their brand of salvation, but to pronounce him a mortal danger to our pluralist world. In short, as that rugged pluralist, Henry Ford, promised a long time ago, you may choose any color of car, as long as it is black.

On Receiving a Photograph

How can you from so far so silently,
By your mere lazy lying on the sand,
Your body that you've bared so pliantly,
Your arm-pit and your tossed-out arm and hand—
How can you, by what calm yet curving urge,
As does a lens the sun's wide-spreading fire
And makes him fierce and feverish, converge
Upon you all the rays of my desire?
Has not the earth her clefts and swelling meadows?
Is not the heaven calm with clear eyes burning?
Are not the forests dark, that your dark hair,
Like verdure brimming warmly your brown shadows,
Should bind my total will and wings of yearning,
My body's radiant dream, my spirit, there?

MAX EASTMAN



A Reviewer's Notebook

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

Godfrey Blunden is an Australian newspaperman who covered the Stalingrad and Kharkov fronts in Russia in 1943. He is also a rarely perceptive novelist, one of the few creative artists in the Anglo-Saxon world who has really managed to come to an understanding of the totalitarian mind. His "A Room on the Route" was a terrifying story of Moscow in wartime; his "The Time of the Assassins" (Lippincott, $3.50) is an even more terrifying account of what happens when the soul of a people—this time it is the population of the Russian Ukraine—is offered a choice, not between good and evil, or even between relative gradations of kindness or brutality or hardship, but simply between two sets of totalitarian masters, the Nazi SS and the Communist NKVD.

The historical lesson of "The Time of the Assassins"—that a people will ordinarily end up by giving voting preference to the home-bred tyrant—is almost incidental to the acrid irony which limns a world in which the only reward for making moral distinctions is swift obliteration. Mr. Blunden begins his story at a time when the Germans still had a chance to win the Ukrainians to their side. Kharkhov (spelled Kharkhiv in this book in the Ukrainian style) had been captured, and the Wehrmacht was not yet irretrievably committed to making its great mistake of diffusing and watering its strength by attempting to probe for the illimitable —i.e., the great reaches of Russia-in-Asia. Hating their Communist masters, the Ukrainian peasantry could have been had in 1942 and 1943 by Dr. Karandash and other separatist Ukrainian exiles who had returned home in the wake of the Nazi armies. But the Nazis were totalitarians, and no totalitarian can ever offer a true cultural and spiritual autonomy to a people. Professor Shevchenko, the professor who had kept the memory of Ukrainian traditions alive through a generation of Bolshevism, listens to Karandash in Mr. Blunden's story, but he really knows the bitter truth, that "the time for republics is over."

The Ukrainian peasantry began to learn this truth when the Nazi SS began its indiscriminate killing, looting, burning and enslaving. Having seized the NKVD files, the Nazis were able to wipe out most of the Ukrainian Communists who had dossiers. But with the lack of sympathetic imagination that totalitarianism breeds, the Germans were soon seizing anybody and everybody for labor service, for impressed military service, or (in the case of women) for duty in the soldiers' brothels. In addition to all this, the peasants did not get title to the land; the Nazis could not take time out to restore the property right in the middle of total warfare.

Mr. Blunden, in a series of flashing episodic vignettes that remind one of the earlier Dos Passos, shows how the moral and individualistic view of life tried to emerge in the Ukraine in 1942 and 1943, and how it was universally blighted and extinguished by the "assassins" on both sides of the Nazi-Soviet war. Maryusa, the teacher, might seek to protect her children as children; Olympia, the healthy peasant girl, might attempt to win her way to freedom by a pro tem exercise of the courtesan's ancient wiles; Professor Shevchenko might obtain release by telling Ukrainian fables to kids who were hungry for something besides the party line. But in a world dominated by the clash of totalitarians none of this could come to any real fruition. The price of survival in the Ukraine in 1942 and 1943 was the ability to settle all questions by use of the naked will. Fomin, the child of murdered small-time Communist functionaries, had such a will. So, too, did little Sophia, who wanted to see all Communists murdered.

Godfrey Blunden has the novelist's eye for the individual's predicament. He

Lest You Forget

A BOOK LIST FOR LIBERTARIANS

How to Keep Our Liberty, by Raymond Moley (Knopf)

Witness, by Whittaker Chambers (Random)

Back Door to War, by Charles Callan Tansill (Regnery)

The Struggle for Europe, by Chester Wilmot (Harper)

The Wild Wheel, by Garet Garrett (Pantheon)

The Great Idea, by Henry Hazlitt (Appleton)

The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency (Macmillan)

also has an historian's ability to grasp and depict the clash of great forces. He doesn't quite succeed in marrying his fiction and his history, for amid the roll and thunder leading up to Stalingrad the individual episodes of "The Time of the Assassins" tend to shrivel and get lost. "The Time of the Assassins" is bifocal, not unified, writing, and the reader is forced to extraordinary feats of agility in shifting his sights instantaneously from one type of lens to another. But Mr. Blunden's philosophical grasp is broad, and his book is most rewarding if it is approached as an exercise in sheer philosophical understanding.

It so happened that I learned of the death of John Dewey, the instrumentalist philosopher, when I was in the middle of reading Mr. Blunden on the use of the lie as a pragmatic instrument. This set up a curious train of reflection. "When you are on the side of truth, when you *possess* truth," says one of Mr. Blunden's characters, "the lie is a tactic." Since John Dewey never lied or supported liars, this must mean one of two things: either he had an absolutist (i.e., a non-pragmatic) regard for the inviolability of truth, or he was not possessed by any truth to the point of being willing to lie in its service. By extension of this reflection, doesn't it become apparent that the only people who can be trusted not to use instrumentalism to make a shambles of the world are those without philosophical purpose? Maybe it is lucky that we Americans, who are all too prone to be easy pragmatists, have not had any real convictions in the past two or three generations. If we had had a national purpose or purposes at a time when instrumentalism was taking over in our educational institutions we might have become as murderous and as lying a set of monsters as the Nazis and the Communists. By the same token, it behooves us to return to an absolutistic view of morality—i.e., that it is universally and unexceptionably sinful to lie, steal and murder—now that we are becoming purposive about the necessity of saving the Western world in the fight against communism.

Millstone

The earth is a hard round bone
whose surface grinds against the sky;

each day is a new bone in the eye
a new stone in the leg, a new pain,

and does our hippopotamus flesh flee
does the heavy organ of the mind cease?

We continue, you and I, we feed
the soft flesh of the stars.

PAUL NABB

English Theater

Theatre of Two Decades, by Audrey Williamson. New York: Macmillan. $5.00

The title of this book, "Theatre of Two Decades," promises a serious critical and historical work, concerned with at least the entire European theater. In reality, it is merely a haphazard review of English stage activities over the last twenty years which reads like a jumbo "write-up." The opinions expressed seem personal, often partial and arbitrary. The artistic personalities of leading English actors, John Gielgud, Laurence Olivier and Ralph Richardson, are by no means alive in this book.

Lack of insight is shown in the criticisms of other English actors, too. The lovable and rightly famous Edith Evans; Leo Quartermaine, that unique transcendent English realist; Claude Rains, the subtle comedian of style and generally one of the best actors of our time; Flora Robson, Peggy Ashcroft, Sybil Thorndike, Franklyn Dyall, Leslie Faber, Godfrey Tearle, Athene Sayler, Frank Vosper, Ernest Milton, Frank Cellier, and other representatives of the good facets of the English theater during the last two or three decades are either skimped or omitted. Sir Johnston Forbes Robertson, thanks to whom the acting of Shakespeare on the English stage is often done without "hamming" nowadays, is not mentioned. Lewis Casson, one of the outstanding English realistic directors, whose work has been done without the usual commercial hullabaloo, is practically passed by in this book.

The first chapter says that the nineteen-twenties saw the last flare of a dying theatrical style, that of romanticism, "sword and cloak" and "panache." As far as I know, "panache"—or, in backstage jargon, plain ham-acting—is not romantic acting at all; and, then, "the dying theatrical style" did not give place to the realistic style on the English stage in the nineteen-twenties, as our author states. Realistic acting and staging, together with its lifelike exaggeration, known as naturalistic, had already appeared in the eighteen-sixties in England, and mainly under the influence of those "aliens"whom the English have the habit of looking down upon. With the disappearance of the romantic theatrical geniuses and of the romantic *Weltanschaung,* romantic acting disappeared too, giving way to symbolism, Reinhardt's decorative realism, George Fuchs's stylization, Jessner's expressionism, Meyerhold's formalism, and my own synthetism. Ham acting, however, never died at all. We still have the "panache" style, complementing the naturalistic ham style, in modern productions.

The naturalistic ham style could be considered under three aspects in England: that of ordinary standards, of drawing room, and of comic relief.

The manifestations of the first are due to the much advertised (by the Soviets) "Stanislavsky system." As interpreted by its English and American preachers, this system, of course, is not Stanislavsky at all—though, for acting purposes, it is just as useless as the true Stanislavsky system, which is dead as a door nail now, and had indeed been faulty in its basic premises and deductions since its birthday forty-two years ago.

Such actors as A. E. Matthews, Sir Charles Hawtrey and Sir Charles du Maurier established the perfect type of English drawing-room acting, consisting in exaggeration of "refined" manners, in avoiding gestures, in talking inaudibly, and moving about nonchalantly. The method of comic relief is resorted to when an actor finds it necessary to "enliven" his part, regardless of the requirements of the character or of the play represented. Thus, we have a Caesar (in Bernard Shaw's "Caesar and Cleopatra") turned into a comedian, or Colonel Vershinin (in "The Three Sisters" of Chekhov) transformed into a funny crank for the enjoyment of those who came to the show to digest their dinners.

I remember seeing in 1920 at the Court Theater, London, "The Merchant of Venice," staged and acted in the "panache" and in all the naturalistic ham style aspects, mixed. The ecstatic reception accorded to it in the newspapers astonished me then, a newcomer to England. Sir Martin Harvey, to whom our author devotes a few pages, used in his own productions a mixture of "panache" and Reinhardt's style; while in the production of James Barrie's "Boy David," directed by me, the seventy-year-old actor, thanks to his inborn genius, succeeded in freeing himself from old-fashioned routine and creating a realistic and inspired Prophet Samuel. Mentioning *en passant* the above production, our author says that it was one of the most distinguished failures of C. B. Cochran's management. Actually, the weekly receipts of the show never fell below 3300 pounds, a pretty high figure for London in 1936, and people almost fought to get in during the last week. The play was withdrawn merely because of some complicated backstage intrigues.

Seemingly disliking Barrie, the author accuses him of "bathos" and considers "his humour out of key with our time." What a headlong statement! During the last three decades there have been no dramatists in England—and there aren't yet any—to match G. B. Shaw and Sir James Barrie in mastery, feelings, thoughts, humor and language.

Talking about directing and directors, the author seems to forget to look a little more intently into the past. She would find there that nothing really new has been discovered in the art of *mise en scène* in England in our time. In the new English productions we have Granville Barker's cosmopolitan intellectualism and psychologism, as well as the German influences over his methods, comprising the uninterrupted action of his Shakespearean productions achieved thanks to the German false proscenium; Nigel Playfair's quaint stylized *mises en scène* of English classics and of comic opera, done with the financial assistance of that remarkable man of good taste and continental culture, Arnold Bennett, and with the artistic help of a no less remarkable artist, Lovat Fraser, influenced by the Munich *Sezession* Art; Terence Grey's continental modernistic experiments at Cambridge; and Michel Saint Denis, a nephew and student of Jacques Copeau, who in productions of "Noah" and the experiments of "Lucrece" demonstrated to England the French sense of form and style and his pioneer uncle's methods of directing.

I am sorry here to have to add a blast on my own trumpet, but it was my production of "Lear" at Oxford in 1927, and my "Merchant of Venice" at Stratford-on-Avon in 1932 that established the new technical and idealistic methods of interpreting the Bard of Avon on the stage, which are constantly used by other directors, with some variations, on the English stage now. It was I who introduced the principles of transcendent, synthetic realism onto the English stage and changed the ridiculous English outlook on the Russian character and Russian drama, beginning with the production of Chekhov's "Uncle Vanya" in 1921, following it with that of "John Gabriel Borkman," of Cronin's "Hatter's Castle," Ronald Mackenzie's "Musical Chairs," and ending with "The Seagull" in 1936.

The critical remarks of the author in the penultimate chapter, regarding opera, are justified, though too lenient, to my mind. Contrary to what she suggests, the operatic business was not much better twenty or thirty years ago than it is now. Two or three miserable rehearsals were considered sufficient for the production of a five-act opera, while the single dress rehearsal (in what dress, too!) went to the accompaniment of a jarring piano. Nobody objected to singers wearing cheap rented, or their own unsuitable, often hideous costumes, or appearing at performances without any rehearsals of "stage business" at all, or to choristers staring at the conductor and examining the audience while not singing. Nobody was surprised when the facial expressions and gesticulations of the performers were ridiculous, to say the least, the singing was off pitch, while the orchestra and the singers were both going separate ways.

The present state of affairs on our operatic stages, whether in England, Europe or America, is still very similar to that described above. Common sense, dramatic characterization and action are all sacrificed to mere vocal display. The books to which the music has been set in most cases are utter rubbish. Generally, it seems that the leaders of operatic enterprises can not decide whether the performance of an opera should be treated as an

oratorio, sung for inexplicable reasons in costume, or as a musical dramatic composition; and almost no efforts are made to help the situation. I'm not speaking, of course, of the commercial efforts to "jazz" up operatic performances by seasoning them with musical comedy stuff or by engaging dramatic star directors without any musical background to stage operas. The old operatic directors were contaminated with routine, I agree, but does one ask a writer of poetry to deputize for a flute player in an orchestra? What happened to Gluck's and Wagner's ideas, and the experiments of Gustav Mahler, the "father" of Schoenberg, Alban Berg and other German modernists; where is the heritage of Dargomijsky's "Don Juan," of Verdi's "Falstaff" and "Othello," of Moussourgsky's "Boris," of the St. Petersburg eighteen-seventy "verists" opera singers? What about the mocking descriptions of opera performances by Carlyle and Count Leo Tolstoy, various skits on operatic performances, and the few remarkable modern efforts in treating opera as a true synthesis of music, words and dramatic action, made by a couple of directors in Russia before Stalin and by the conductor Klemperer at the Kroll Theater in Berlin before Hitler?

THEODORE KOMISARJEVSKY

Art of Concealment

The Autobiography of William Carlos Williams. New York: Random. $3.75

Autobiography is the art of telling almost everything: had Shakespeare violated this canon neither his identity nor his plays would be a riddle. It is the ideal lie, for it is as much as a man dare confess without being repulsive to himself in his own soul. St. Paul could not force to his lips the lusts in his great nature; Dostoevski, a Pauline novelist, writes that crimes are hierarchic, some worse than others.

At the age of sixty-eight, William Carlos Williams has published his autobiography. He is old enough to write wise memoirs, and he has been a figure in American literature, so that we might reasonably hope to go to his book looking for maxims and parables of benefit to our lives. But Williams is an enormous deceiver, not because he tells almost everything, but because he reveals nothing of fundamental importance to the spirit. A man ought not to do a book merely to relive his past, for if he does, he is asking Circe to translate him into a pig.

The first part of the volume is devoted to the rubble memorabilia of Williams's lost youth. There were Ezra Pound, modern satyr of Attica, and Hilda Doolittle, Sappho of the imagists, his classmates at the University of Pennsylvania. Charles Demuth, painter and friend of Alfred Steiglitz, Mosaic lawgiver of the camera, was also his companion. There are the obstetrical reminiscences at the old French hospital. There was Baroness Elsa von Freytag, a dada Venus who wore a coal scuttle mounted with moons and postage stamps for a hat. She was delirious for the young Williams. Unable to wring from him more than a few kisses, which spiced her appetite without relieving it, she knocked him down with one Prussian fist.

The past that Williams divulges is a New York and Paris Sodom of the arts. There are fugitive references to the *Dial* and to Richard Johns, founder of the little magazine, *Pagany*. There is the George Antheil musical debacle. Antheil, like Sherwood Anderson, wore his hair in bangs in the Gertrude Stein fashion. The Antheil concert given at Carnegie Hall in 1926 or '27 was a bacchic insult to the bourgeoisie. There were fourteen grand pianos, a fog horn, an electric alarm on the stage. Antheil's Ballet Mechanique was a front page scandal in the New York papers, with no defenders save for Williams and the gaga zoot suiters of the seven arts.

The bizarre imagists, vorticists, objectivists and activists who were Williams's friends opposed the university and the Augean stable of newspaper culture, and they derided both commercial and academic books. But they themselves spawned verse, essays and novels more subhuman and cold than anything that has ever come off the campus or out of the commercial publishing world. Take a fleeting glance at a few of those enthusiastic, dada natures. There was Emanuel Carnevali, the nineteen-year-old Chicago Rimbaud; there was Ernest Walsh, a tubercular Irish-American poet who starved with six wardrobe trunks at the Paris Ritz. There was Ethel Moorhead, militant Gaelic feminist, who had marched on 10 Downing Street for the three freedoms: free sex, free verse, and the woman's ballot. She founded the little volcanic magazine, *This Quarter*, so that Ernest Walsh could publish his Chaucerian Americanese. In *This Quarter* appeared the early Joyce, Carnevali, the first Hemingway short story, Pound, Kay Boyle's verse, Joseph Vogel, Robert McAlmon—and Edward Dahlberg.

What has happened to these exuberant children of the arts, living or deceased—Carnevali, Walsh, Kay Boyle, Lincoln Gillespie (who came from an aristocratic Philadelphia family and who talked as Joyce wrote), Robert McAlmon, John Herman (selling Venetian blinds in New Orleans when I last saw him a decade ago), Nathan Asch, and Dr. Williams himself? Originally they had fled from trade and congealed academic stupidity to be free, deracinated writers in Paris. Then they returned to America crying out, "God is dead! Long live grammar."

Williams writes that he always has been a liar, and always will be. But a man at sixty-eight is too old to lie. Williams not only hides people who

are not successful, but he altogether conceals his own gifts. He has lost his true memory and has become a weathervane admirer. His feelings for the gifts of Josephine Herbst and Louis Zukofsky are very ardent in private, and yet in this book he does little more than prattle about Josephine Herbst, and is not even gallant enough in his hasty mention of Louis Zukofsky to assert that he started the objectivist movement to which Williams himself belonged. He has become mellow, which is another word for moldering.

EDWARD DAHLBERG

Crusader Against Waste

Economy in the National Government, by Paul H. Douglas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. $3.75

Originally delivered in substance as a series of lectures at the University of Chicago under the auspices of the Charles R. Walgreen Foundation, "Economy in the National Government" is a courageous indictment of waste in high office and a timely warning that unless we learn to balance the national budget the hell-fire of runaway inflation will surely devour us all.

By exercising certain economies such as a cut in general personnel, in the agricultural programs, in public works, in the GI education program, the military budget, foreign aid and the postal program it would be possible, the Senator argues, to save some $7.5 billion in the estimated budget deficit of $15 billion for the fiscal year 1952-53. But this would still leave a dangerous deficit of $7.5 billion dollars which the senior Senator from Illinois proposes to raise by plugging certain tax loopholes and by using the Social Security funds which are coming in (now) faster than they are going out. Here Senator Douglas sounds less convincing because he is so caught up with the magic of economics as to forget entirely the facts of political life.

Senator Paul Douglas likes the Welfare State. He doesn't quite know why he likes it but it sort of sounds nice. Then, too, all the "liberals" are for it. That is why Douglas's liberal friends were shocked when he first spoke out on the Senate floor for the need of economy in government. To these friends the word economy was an obscenity. And yet the former professor of economics at Chicago University knew that continued "government deficits feed the inflationary circle."

The overwhelming share of the national budget is earmarked for national defense. But the enormous outlay for national defense expenditures (barring all bureaucratic excesses and excrescences which are adequately described in the book) are today largely the result of inept political thinking (to be generous about it) and a thoroughly misguided foreign policy in the Far and Middle East. This the Senator fails to see. Thus one of his solutions, for example, to increase "the capital gains rates by the same proportion as we have increased individual income tax rates since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea," fails to see the political woods for the economic trees. The obvious solution of a change in the State Department—not cutting down on sick leaves for State Department personnel—so that we may avoid future Koreas and the price in lives and economic dislocation that are the inevitable camp-followers of our present foolish policies, is completely overlooked.

MAX GELTMAN

The Gray Menace

Rotting Hill, by Wyndham Lewis. Chicago: Regnery. $3.00

Gray, not red, is the authentic color of the Socialist flag. This book of sketches of life in England in 1950 is the grayest book to appear in a long time. For most of the grayness, the stifling, all-penetrating depression that exudes from it, Wyndham Lewis is not responsible. It is the effluvium of his subject matter. It is what he calls "the rot." Every letter from Labor England, every conversation with an Englishman in the years of "fair shares" has breathed the same suffocating fog. But some of the depressive quality comes from Mr. Lewis's own attitude. Despite his bitter portraiture and incisive social landscape painting, he writes with a tired, bored acceptance of the inevitability of the state of affairs, which sits strangely on the quondam editor of *Blast.*

The sketches which make up the portrait of "the rot" vary from dramatic short stories or character silhouettes to reports of conversations Mr. Lewis has had in town and country. A number of themes recur again and again. The first is food, its shortness, its badness, its *ersatz*-ness. To anyone with even a touch of the gourmet who has ever lived in England, the wonder comes how anything could be worse than English food in its palmiest days and how anything could make Englishmen even moderately conscious of the quality of what they eat. It is hard to imagine what horror must lie beneath the compulsive concern with food which permeates England today.

Then there is the problem of things, little things: the impossibility of finding a pair of nail scissors that will cut; the uniform existence of shoelaces that can not be tied in a bow (it is illegal to make them longer than 14 inches); the disappearance of safety pins; not to mention problems of shirts that shrink vigorously, buttonholes too small for buttons, heaters that won't heat, toys that fall to pieces before they leave the shop, telephones that

don't work, regulations that hold up wood for a rotting mantelpiece for three long months. It all brings back haunting memories of the domestic details of Moscow memoirs and of conversations with American Lenin School students and the wives of C.I. "reps" about their little difficulties in living in the Workers' Paradise.

These complaints may seem unimportant, crassly materialist, to our cheerful Westchester liberals. Actually they are but the material reflections of a spiritual illness—and that inner decay Mr. Lewis portrays directly as well. Rectors and government servants, with their native idealism rotted at the core by the reality of the socialist image they serve, shiftless carpenters, lazy farmers, pullulating bureaucrats, compromising intellectuals, stud his pages.

In the whole book there are only two or three attractive characters. There is a sturdy black-marketing farmer, who knows that the Emperor has no clothes on. And outstandingly there is a priest of the Church of England, fighting a gallant fight to preserve a village school and family influences from the centralizing statism of the Mid-Ladbrokeshire Education Authority.

Here at least, in a few unregenerates boldly reacting from the socialist myth, there is some hope; and the results of the last English election show that these are not a minority. But Wyndham Lewis himself, honest and courageous as is his portraiture, is one of the more discouraging aspects of his own book. He attacks Churchill as a "stooge of the Left"; but whatever degree of truth the lethargy in matters conservative of the present Conservative government may reveal in this judgment, Wyndham Lewis's own attitude is little help. Whether some hangover of the rebelliousness of his youth still prevents him from seeing any good in capitalism, or, as he half indicates, Social Credit ideas move him, he refuses to hold socialism responsible for the decay.

In a vague way he is almost as anti-capitalist as he is anti-Socialist, nearly as anti-American as he is anti-Soviet. He can quote approvingly a passage of double-talk from a UNESCO article by one of the American Communists' tame philosophy professors. Very assuredly Mr. Lewis would be shocked if he knew the political position of this professor, but equally assuredly he can be taken in by glibness only because he has not squarely faced the fact that state *enforcement* of "economic and social rights" inevitably means the destruction of both political rights and the whole complex of economic freedom.

Nevertheless, despite Lewis's theoretical obtuseness, "Rotting Hill" remains a most salutary picture of "democratic socialism" in action—an important contribution to the literature of the great mid-twentieth century "condition of the individual question."

FRANK MEYER

Brief Mention

The World My Wilderness, by Rose Macaulay. Boston: Little, Brown. $3.00

Unlike most of our novelists, Rose Macaulay benefits by letting her thoughts and moral judgments mellow in the wood. The result here is a compassionate, gently ironical, often witty tale of the present-day conflict between the prewar civilized standards of English parents and the unkempt, chaotic spirit of their bewildered sons and daughters. As in so many of Miss Macaulay's earlier novels, the author's familiarity with life on the continent is again evident; it gives her writing a perspective unknown to most of her insular fellow-craftsmen.

The story often reaches the level of high comedy, particularly in the monents when the disreputable habits of the young clash with the conventions of their more staid English relations. The children in this novel are the babes in the woods left by World War II, says Miss Macaulay. They may frighten us with their defiant lawlessness or their cynical passivity, but we must try to understand them with infinite patience, since we helped to produce them.

R. MCL.

Career Ambassador, by Willard L. Beaulac. New York: Macmillan. $3.50

In an informal and candid autobiography, Willard L. Beaulac tells what it is like to spend twenty-five years in foreign service. In his case cookie pushing in striped pants was completely absent. Mr. Beaulac's experience started in an oil port and continued afterward in Central and South America. He discovered that tactful common sense was better than protocols. He came to know at first hand the difficulties and problems of democracy in Latin America. He was Ambassador at Bogota when the Reds incited murder, arson and pillage to break up the Ninth International Conference of American States. This pattern of Communist operation he describes in detail. During World War II he held the trying post of secretary in the Embassy in Madrid, and his views on keeping Spain uninvaded and neutral are refreshing.

E. C.

Half-Century of Conflict, by Chester V. Easum. New York: Harper. $6.00

The 900-odd pages of this survey of international history cover the past fifty years. It is one of those enormous compilations of facts, without any apparent shape, which may be of some use as a work of reference; for what it purports to be, a guide to the future through study of the immediate past, it is worse than useless. Facts are never as innocent as they seem, and Mr. Easum's underlying attitudes marshal his "objectivities." When occa-

sionally the attitudes seep through to the surface they take the form, for example, of an elaborate apologia for Yalta. When they do not, they enable him to discuss the Spanish Civil War without a word about the Communists' destruction of their Spanish Loyalist allies. Mr. Easum, who is wistfully one-worldish, obviously considers himself stalwartly anti-totalitarian and anti-Soviet. Where facts stare him in the face, he is. F. M.

Humanism as a Philosophy, by Corliss Lamont. New York: Philosophical. $3.75

The one difficulty raised by Mr. Lamont's book is whether it is intended for the technical philosopher or for the literate layman. The only possible answer is: neither. Its half-baked scholarship excludes it from the serious attention of the former, and its simple-minded platitudes are an affront to the latter.

The thesis is simplicity itself. Humanism is a "philosophy of joyous service for the greater good of all humanity in this natural world and according to the methods of reason and democracy." We are told that religion is on the wane in our country, since farmers have learned to substitute tractors and irrigation for "last-minute prayers to supernatural forces." Mr. Lamont would undoubtedly agree that the Crucifixion was a "regrettable incident." The self-styled liberals for whom anything above zero constitutes fascism or dogmatism will think of Mr. Lamont as having plumbed the depths. For others, he has merely hit rock bottom.

T. R. M.

Valiant Pilgrim: The Story of John Bunyan and Puritan England, by Vera Brittain. New York: Macmillan. $4.00

John Bunyan's life, says Vera Brittain, is a mirror of seventeenth-century England. Though seventeenth-century England is not a mirror of our twentieth-century world, its nationalist imperialisms, new kinds of power and warring ideologies were as much of a witches' brew as are ours.

John Bunyan was caught up in the religious fight. He was a tinker and served in Cromwell's army. In the course of a siege a soldier who had momentarily taken Bunyan's place was killed. Thereupon the mysteries of life and death invaded Bunyan's imaginative mind, and when his first child was born blind Bunyan was overwhelmed by a sense of guilt. He despaired through dark nights of the soul and finally joined a sect of Baptists. Because he would let neither King nor Parliament tell him what to say, he was jailed for twelve years. He wrote "Pilgrim's Progress" during another and later imprisonment.

Miss Brittain is quick to throw such superstitious loosenesses as "anxiety neurosis" at Bunyan. But she loves Bunyan's Bedfordshire and can describe it well. She can also draw effective analogies between his time and ours. H. H.

Letters

(*Continued from page 636*)

Libraries and Propaganda

With reference to your article by Gomer Bath, concerning the libraries buying propaganda films [May 19] I contacted the Memphis Public Library and find that they do not have a film library.

As a matter of information, I find that the local library has recently posted a large sign, reading: "Wanted, 20,000,000 more listeners for UN Programs." In addition to this, as books are loaned the clerk at the library places a slip in each book, giving the hours of UN radio programs and the stations broadcasting them.

Memphis, Tenn. B. D. EDGINTON

"Oasis of Free Thought"

I have just finished reading your issue of May 5 for the second time, and have once more verified its indispensability to every real liberal. I especially enjoyed Mr. Chamberlain's article on "People on Our Side," and look forward eagerly to seeing articles in that series on Professors von Mises and Hayek.

Truly, the *Freeman* is an oasis of free thought in a statist wilderness.

New York City RALPH J. RAICO

The Closed Shop

I have read the Donald R. Richberg article, "Free Men vs. the Union Closed Shop" (July 16, 1951). In the Seattle general strike of February 6, 1919, with a number of other union men, I denounced the strike as Communist-inspired (I have never had occasion to reverse that opinion). In payment for my efforts, I was tried by a kangaroo court on March 17, 1919, and sentenced to 99 years suspension from the Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders Union, AFL. The International union confirmed the local.

I made quite an issue of the closed shop at that time, and for many years following. . . . It is well to point out the ethics of the open *vs.* closed shop argument. Cloak it in as much legal phraseology as you wish, it still remains under the closed shop a labor monopoly with a "goon squad" to enforce the orders of the union bosses.

Chehalis, Wash. J.G. OSBORNE

No Oxford Glasses

Argus's piece on Ascoli [June 2] is on the beam. He and Willi Schlamm are the two writers on your sheet who never don the Oxford glasses—and what a relief. Both can get your readership because they speak in the *vulgate* (and don't get haughty—Boccaccio and Dante wrote in the *vulgate* and did a helluva lot for literature).

New York City HARRY SERWER

Answering Mr. Markel

I note in your issue of June 2 a reply by Lester Markel to my letter published April 21. His letter is vulnerable on several points. . . . He complains that we shall never know whether coalition [in China] or the "contrary program" was sound because neither was tried. What? Didn't we have any China policy? Is that supposed to be a defense of the State Department?

Delta, Utah RICHARD S. MORRISON

I have been very interested in reading the defense of our disastrous China policy by Lester Markel of the *New York Times* (All the News That Fits). It would be interesting to know his opinion of the Military Intelligence Report on the Communist Party in China, dated July 1945. This report should have ended the idea of coalition with the Reds. I understand that 110 "confidential" copies were originally sent to carefully selected military and civilian heads of the government, but most of them were recalled. What did Mr. Markel think of another intelligence report dated April 21, 1945, warning against Russia's entrance into the Asiatic war, which was brought on at the time of the MacArthur Hearings? As he is only the Sunday editor of the *Times*, it seems very likely that he has never heard of either of these reports.

New York City LAWRENCE D. FORSTER

A Correction

Our apologies to Dr. Melchior Palyi for a typographical error in his article, "How Sick is State Medicine?" (*Freeman*, June 16). In his statement (p. 605) "The costs of governmentalized medicine have almost trebled . . . to more than 19 per cent of . . . national budget," the figure should have been 10 per cent.