

# THE Freeman

AUGUST 25, 1952

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## A MESSAGE FROM SYNGMAN RHEE

UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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### Defeat at Panmunjom


Geraldine Fitch

### China Disaster: Fact and Fable

Lawrence R. Brown

### Land Reform, Red Style

S. T. Tung




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# THE Freeman

A Fortnightly  
For  
Individualists

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\*on leave

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
## Our Contributors

The 77-year-old SYNGMAN RHEE ("A Message from Syngman Rhee") is a scion of Korean royalty, a missionary turned politician, who has fought for Korean independence since he was nineteen. He studied at George Washington and Harvard, then earned a Ph.D. in theology at Princeton. The Japanese imprisoned him for seven years. Last spring he escaped death when a would-be assassin's gun misfired, and went on last week to win a personal triumph in the first popular Presidential election in Korea. . . . LAWRENCE R. BROWN ("China Disaster: Fact and Fable") comes from a journalistic dynasty. His grandfather founded the *Rochester Democrat*; his father, Roscoe Conkling Brown, was managing editor of the *New York Tribune* under Whitelaw Reid; he himself served a stint as a *Tribune* reporter. During World War II he was assistant director, Chemical Branch, War Production Board. Mr. Brown is at work on a comprehensive history of Western thought and action and his last *Freeman* article (March 24, 1952) was "Eisenhower vs. Taft—the Vital Issue." . . . GERALDINE FITCH ("Defeat at Panmunjom") lived twenty-five years in China, two postwar years in Korea, has been twice in Formosa and recently returned from a 'round-the-world trip during which she wrote articles for NEA. A frequent contributor to magazines, Mrs. Fitch has written two previous articles for the *Freeman*. . . . DR. YOU CHAN YANG ("How President Rhee Won"), the Korean Ambassador, passed his boyhood in Hawaii, was educated at the University of Hawaii and Boston University, interned at two New York City hospitals and was, until the liberation of Korea after World War II plunged him into diplomacy, a practicing gynecologist in Honolulu. The Ambassador was a lay Christian leader in Hawaii. . . . S. T. TUNG ("Land Reform, Red Style"), a Ph.D. in agriculture at Cornell, formerly president of the National Agricultural College, Peiping, and founder of the Chinese National Farmers' Association and the Chinese Farmers' Party, tried collaboration with the Chinese Communist regime for a year and a half. He fled to Hong-Kong and is now in the United States. . . . ARTHUR KEMP ("This Above All"), Assistant Professor of Economics at New York University, is associated with Herbert Hoover in a research capacity.

## Among Ourselves

The *Freeman* will be two years old in October. We intend marking the event, holding that even so brief a survival in the stormy seas of opinion journalism merits notice. More later. . . . In the April newsletter of The Minute Women of the U. S. A., Inc. (508,000 members), the *Freeman* was described as "a magazine that can not be too highly recommended to those who would save our country from socialism." Thanks. . . . Thanks also to the Cobden Club, a student organization at 1636 University Avenue, the Bronx, New York City, for advising its members "to read the *Freeman* regularly."

Case history  
no. 36



## ***"The Case of the Wandering Operator!"***

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More and more companies located in heavily industrialized areas all over the country are finding that "wandering operators" cost a lot of money in "breaking in" time and loss of production. • We're speaking of the serious problem of skilled labor turnover that many plants face today. As the demand for workers increases, this turnover often means that men that cost a lot of money to train are going over to competing industries. • For many plants, the answer to this problem can be found in plant sites in small, up-and-coming communities in C & O's Center of Opportunity. Recent surveys made by C & O's Industrial Development Department bear this out. These surveys show that here, right next door to major markets, with adequate labor supply, favorable taxes and first class transportation, many companies can build their future and the future of their employees as vital parts of the community.


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# THE Freeman

MONDAY, AUGUST 25, 1952

## The Fortnight

Under the surface the international situation steadily deteriorates. *Item One:* Returned travelers report the British people increasingly resentful against the failure of Mr. Churchill's compromise Conservatism to bring back "red meat." This restlessness, accompanied by a rising antipathy to the United States, endues primarily to the political advantage of the crypto-totalitarian Amerophobe Aneurin Bevan. *Item Two:* World communism is rejoicing in all its organs over Jacques Duclos' release from prison by the irresolute Pinay government; hailing this event, procured by the protests of millions of French "liberals," as their greatest advance since World War II. The French Communists believe they have acquired a powerful new alliance with French "liberalism" in the current "common front." *Item Three:* Dean Acheson's absurd attempt to forge a United States-Australia-New Zealand defense bloc, excluding the Japanese, the Nationalist Chinese, the Filipinos, the Indo-Chinese, the British, Canadians and French, was grist to the Soviet propaganda mills throughout the Far East. *Item Four:* Mossadegh is set to black-mail the British into allowing him to sell Anglo-Iranian oil to Soviet countries. The State Department may be expected to exert pressure on London to allow Soviet tankers, laden with Iranian oil, through Suez and Gibraltar as a gesture of conciliation.

Syngman Rhee's reelection as President of the Republic of Korea by what the *New York Times* correspondent, George Barrett, calls "an overwhelming mandate" is significant to a far wider public than that of his relatively small and war-ravaged country. Dr. Rhee defeated the nearest of three opponents, the ex-Communist Cho Bang Am, by almost seven to one. The result can not but be a sobering reproof to the American "liberals," from Lattimore to Schlesinger, whose lightest epithet directed at Rhee was that he was "a small-time Chiang Kai-shek." Such sentiments, in ill accord with Rhee's record but compatible historically with our own short-sighted and dangerous role in Korea,

have activated much of the Administration's dealings with President Rhee. That firm, able, statesmanlike and truly progressive man has emerged from his first popular test with credit. The *Freeman* is honored to present in this issue what can be termed his post-election message to the American people, cabled us, incidentally, on the Korean election day.

Ellis Arnall, the price stabilizer, predicted that the steel wage-price adjustments would boost the cost of living \$100 per family. He thereupon resigned. A measure of Mr. Arnall's realism, integrity and objectivity is that he protested *not* the Administration's unwarranted determination to increase steel wages but the collateral rise of steel prices to compensate for the wage hike. Mr. Arnall's bias is unmistakable. He is one of those "liberals" hell-bent upon proletarianizing American society at the expense of the solvency of American business.

In accordance with sundry warnings uttered by the *Freeman*, many "liberals" who took time off to exhort the Republicans to nominate Eisenhower are now flocking home to roost in their natural political habitat, the Democratic Party. Miss Faye Emerson, we note with anticipated pain, has come out for Stevenson although she battled sturdily for Ike alongside Tex and Jinx. The *New Republic*, more brazenly than most, acknowledges that it did its utmost to nominate Ike yet blazons its cover with the blunt legend, "We Are For Stevenson." One wonders if the Luce publications, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* will stay hitched.

This is how the sophisticated British public is being informed on our forthcoming Presidential elections: "[Stevenson] believes that Eisenhower will be a good President," writes Mr. Alistair Cooke in the *Manchester Guardian*. Stevenson also deems it his "palpable duty to break for ever the dominance of the Republican Old Guard. But he believes that Ike will break it better from within, and on foreign policy, which he regards as the real issue of the campaign, their aims are practically



indistinguishable." This should have clarified everything for Mr. Cooke's faithful British readers, except perhaps why Governor Stevenson is not running on Ike's ticket.

**A**nxious to elect a Republican President, we are increasingly worried about the kind of support General Eisenhower is receiving from Walter Lippmann. The other day Mr. Lippmann, whose column gets curiously and curiously, contended that "the most needed of all the changes is to restore the control of our great policies by the *civilian* authorities"—which, to put it mildly, is a quaint way of promoting a *General's* candidacy. Fortunately Governor Stevenson, too, has one campaigner too many: Mr. Truman is raring to take to the road.

**W**e look to the *Wall Street Journal*, perhaps the most thoughtfully edited newspaper in the United States, for insights into American life unavailable elsewhere. For instance, the *Journal* recently reported estimates by the Movers Conference of America that 36 million, or roughly one-fourth, of our countrymen will shift their *lares* and *penates* from place to place in 1952. The figures are startling, summoning, as they do, images of our highways cluttered with crawling queues of vans as Mr. and Mrs. America move ever to greener pastures. This mass movement has, however, deeper significance. It bears on politics, as what doesn't this year? How many of these 36 million (two-thirds of whom are by the law of averages eligible voters) will lose their franchise? The standard interval during which a citizen may establish voting residence in an American state is one year. Obviously a family that moves any time in 1952 will not be able to acquire voting privileges by November. Could this American propensity for shifting home base account in part for the growing discrepancy between eligibles and voters in national elections which concerns all right thinkers?

**T**he sterile pessimism of thought under a Fabian society was never more flagrantly demonstrated than by Bertrand Lord Russell in a recent *New York Times Magazine* article. His lordship, who views the variegated, teeming and vital American society with genuine distaste, sets as his ecumenical goal "a world government with a monopoly of armed force . . . an approximate equality as regards standards of life in different parts of the globe . . . and a population either stationary or very slowly increasing." It is evident that Lord Russell in reality is pining for "1984" and the secure and egalitarian monotony of the prison state.

**A**Dallas correspondent encloses a newspaper clipping that reports Sheppard Field, Wichita Falls, Texas, alive with Yugoslav aviation trainees, the Communist (Soviet) star resplendent on their blouses. The Yugoslavs, we are told, have "the run

of the field, even the restricted areas!" This item is commended to the appropriate committees of the Congress. Is it good public policy to train Communist airmen of any ilk in the usages and techniques of the United States Air Force?

**T**hose flying saucers seem unaware that the Air Force has officially and scientifically explained them away. In one strange form or another they continue to startle casual watchers of the August skies and show up in mysterious "blips" on radar screens. Their activity furnishes entertaining diversion during these dog days. But in one case it brought a result which we found less than entertaining.

That was the failure of the Air Force to send up interceptors until two hours after "unidentified objects" had appeared on the Washington radar screen, when some officers who just happened to visit the radar post learned of the "blips" and telephoned the base at Newcastle, Delaware. The Air Force later explained that the first report had been sent to its Flight Center at Middletown instead of its Pentagon command post. Presumably that made the delay O.K. But suppose the "objects" had been enemy bombers. Would they have obliged by waiting around until the Air Force got its communications unsnarled? Possibly the high brass could learn something by boning up on the story of Pearl Harbor.

**N**ostra culpa: Igor Bogolepov has gently chided the editors for a revision in his article, "The West Betrays the Russians," issue of August 11, describing the British government of 1921 as Tory. As everyone, even a *Freeman* editor, should know upon due reflection, Lloyd George was still at the helm in that year and Bonar Law did not succeed him until 1922. Also, through a typographical error in the column "Our Contributors," we postdated Mr. Bogolepov's graduation from Petrograd University by ten years. He was graduated in 1923.

**I**t's an ill drought that brings no good. The Administration, playing both ends against the middle with the weather the Lord sent, solemnly assures the farmers in the drought-stricken states of a merciful rain of government checks and accepts credit in the rest of the country for bumper crops.

**D**eeply impressed by the articulate and general British criticism of American racial discrimination, we are happy to learn that our fair-minded British friends are always ready to notice the beam in their own eye. For instance, the distinguished Singapore Swimming Club got itself recently into a bit of trouble: the Sultan of Selangor was barred from the Club's St. George's Day Dinner, and the chap was embarrassed. The Singapore Swimming Club lost no time in correcting the *gaffe*. It voted at once to receive any color of guests, including

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Sultans, "on the first Tuesday of each month." We realize that the situation is touchy way out in Singapore and that, in fact, we might be called upon at any minute to help the British carry the white man's burden in the Crown Colony. But aren't they overdoing it? The first Tuesday of each month?

President Truman has vetoed a recommendation of the Tariff Commission to reduce the import of Italian garlic. Strong believers in both earthy spices and free trade, we find ourselves in the unaccustomed position of applauding Mr. Truman. Moreover, we would like to take exception to the ironical undertone in the *New York Times* comment that this "is probably the first time in American history that a President has written a state paper of about 2000 words on garlic." Judging by what is known of Mr. Truman's previous writings, we are on the contrary delighted that the author has at last found a subject matter to match the characteristic fragrance of his style.

## Far Eastern Munich

The news from Korea is mixed. Under Mark Clark's energetic command, the United Nations forces bomb North Korea's strategic grid. Old Baldy shifts back and forth between the hostile ground forces. At Panmunjom the dreary farce runs out, hopefully according to Admiral Fechteler, forbiddingly according to General Van Fleet. Meanwhile President Syngman Rhee, triumphantly re-elected, and his ambassador, You Chan Yang, afford in this issue of the *Freeman* the only note of optimism concerning the future of that unhappy and embattled land.

If the fruits of Panmunjom are the necessary fruits of collective security, then they are bitter fruits indeed. Since the negotiations began fourteen months ago our forces have suffered 40,000 casualties. We absorbed without retaliation evidence that the imperial Soviet forces had tortured and slaughtered thousands of our men, their captives. We have endured with only perfunctory disclaimers the savage beat of world-wide propaganda accusing us of waging war with the grossest inhumanity by the use of disease-laden bombs.

The *Freeman*, noting no study or recapitulation of our concessions at Panmunjom in the general press, asked Mrs. Geraldine Fitch, an authority on the Far East, to compile for us the record of our diplomatic defeats since the "truce" began. In her report Mrs. Fitch calls the negotiations "a Far Eastern Munich," and with that characterization we are persuaded to agree. If you wish to know how steeply American diplomacy has descended since the days of Cleveland and Hay, Roosevelt and Root, read Mrs. Fitch's definitive record of our

quibbling, evasiveness and surrender in the conference tent at Panmunjom. It is a sorry tale.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the eloquent Briton representing his government in the United Nations, endorsed the Korean stalemate the other evening on TV as a preventive of World War III. So it may seem to minds called upon to vindicate collective security and to men whose nations are not bearing the burden of an ignominious war. To us what has happened in Korea since the recall of MacArthur, especially what has happened at Panmunjom, is the least honorable chapter in the long history of America's relationships with the outside world.

## HST Won't Outlaw Them

The first trial of Communist leaders under the Smith Act lasted nine turbulent months, and in the end the defendants were found guilty of conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the U. S. government by force and violence. The third has just ended, after six months, with the same verdict. A fourth is still dragging its way through the courts. A fifth and sixth are scheduled for the near future. And the question inevitably arises, how long must the taxpayers continue to defray the expense of these interminable and unedifying spectacles, while the foreign conspiracy headed by the defendants is permitted to mask as a legal political party? Is the U. S. government against subversion, or merely against individual subversionists—if they are Communist Party officials?

There is a mass of incontrovertible evidence that the so-called Communist Party of America is an anti-American conspiracy directed by a foreign power. It is to be found in the records of these trials, in the testimony of former Communist Party members and former Soviet officials before state and Congressional committees, and in official Communist publications, both Soviet and American. Indeed, the most striking thing about the international Communist conspiracy is that unlike any other conspiracy in history—except Hitler's—it has been proclaimed from the world's housetops by the conspirators themselves. The U. S. government, which in spite of all this evidence continues to respect the fiction that the Communist Party is a political movement, none the less tacitly recognizes its foreign, subversive character in its "loyalty program," whose purpose is to screen Communists and pro-Communists out of Federal agencies—although in the observance its effect has been rather to keep them in.

There is also an ever-increasing mass of evidence that espionage in behalf of Soviet Russia is an important function of every Communist party. As Boris Souvarine says in a pamphlet sent us from Paris on the trial last February of 29 Greek Communists and collaborators for military espionage:

The revelations of the Athenian trial dramatically confirm that *every* Communist Party conceals, behind its organs of propaganda, clandestine organisms trained for sabotage, mutiny and espionage.

The Greek Communist defendants, indeed, frankly described their training for such activity. Only recently several Swedish Communists were also convicted of procuring military information for the Soviet Union. And surely the world has not forgotten the Gouzenko revelations of wartime Soviet espionage in Canada and the ensuing trial, the Fuchs and Kuznetsov-Marshall cases in England, the Rosenberg and Hiss cases in the United States.

What is it that makes Western governments, and a large section of public opinion, so tolerant of treason in the face of this accumulation of evidence that all Communists are committed to it? This tolerance—even condonation—of the most socially menacing of all crimes is the enigma of our age, which Rebecca West has aptly characterized as the Age of Treason.

The Hiss case produced the most extreme demonstrations of this attitude. Not all the piled-up evidence which convinced 21 jurors of Hiss's guilt could turn the anger of left-of-center opinion—including such powerful organs as the *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune*—against this man who had acted as a Soviet spy, and away from his chief accuser, who had sacrificed his career for his country's safety. Even Hiss's absurd "forgery-by-typewriter" contention (which Judge Goddard demolished with cold logic in rejecting his appeal for a new trial) was snatched at by the McLiberals as desperately as if their own lives and fortunes had been at stake.

This fanatical tolerance of treason has induced a sort of schizophrenia in our "liberal" publicists and our Federal Administration. Forced by Soviet propaganda and aggression to admit that the Kremlin is our implacable enemy, the McLiberals still can not bring themselves to *believe* it. They admit that Soviet agents have infiltrated our government agencies and cultural institutions, but regard those who expose them as more dangerous than the agents themselves. The conclusion forced by their anti-anti-communism is that in the depths of their hearts they still cherish the myth that communism offers the way to a brave new world. The argument that they are concerned about abuse of the right of free speech by would-be character assassins is mere rationalization. If they were so objective they would have been convinced by *proof* of Hiss's guilt, and by the overwhelming *proof* amassed by the McCarran Committee that "Owen Lattimore was, from some time beginning in the 1930s, a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy." They are still pro-Hiss and pro-Lattimore; and they are at this moment, with the aid of the Democratic Presidential candidate, busily fashioning their own character-assassination of Joe

McCarthy into a weapon against the Republican ticket and campaign.

It would be futile to expect of this Administration any anti-Soviet action which would not reflect this schizophrenia—so tragically reflected in the Korean war and the whole ineffectual containment policy. An Administration determined to protect the American people would ask Congress to outlaw the Communist conspiracy, no matter in what guise it presented itself. This Administration prefers to placate aroused Americans with trials of Communist leaders whom the party can easily replace. Destruction of the party's legal superstructure would render its underground activities far more difficult and dangerous, and would scare off those innocents who contribute to the party's financial strength and unsuspectingly further its treasonable activity. It might even chasten the "liberals." But this Administration will not act because, after all, it is "liberal" itself.

## Olympic Shell Games

That some people can leap higher than others was known and generally conceded long before the Olympic Games. Nor is it anything to wax hymnical about. What made the Olympic Games a meaningful event in the Hellenic world, and justified their revival in ours, was the awareness of precious cultural bonds among nations which, in the words of Herodotus, met every four years at Olympia in order to celebrate "common temples and sacrifices and like ways of life."

Consequently, the barbarians of the ancient world were excluded from the festive meetings. But the barbarians of the twentieth century were invited to the Olympic Games at Helsinki, and virtually dominated them. This journal, normally but little concerned with sport events, wants to go on record in protest against the breach, not of competitive etiquette, but of a noble civilized code.

When the contagious enthusiasm of the late Baron de Coubertin inspired the modern world to revive the Olympic Games, an inherited common code of ethics was so self-understood among the nations that its acceptance was hardly stressed as the ineluctable prerequisite to participation. Since then our world has become divided morally even more than politically. The common civilized code of honorable conduct has been gradually replaced by a code of ruthless purposiveness on the other side, and a cynical code of expediency on ours. And what once was the joyful celebration of "common temples and sacrifices and like ways of life" has degenerated into a frivolous competition of muscular prowess.

Fortunately, as the U. S. team happens to have won the Helsinki Games, our editorial sneer at the affair contains no trace of sour grapes. In fact we

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too, applaud the U. S. team of attractive young people who are coming home with shiploads of gold medals; but we hope they won't mind if we tell them that they were sent on a deplorable mission.

For, contrary to the thoughtless bards of the metropolitan press, we consider the Helsinki fraternization between American youth and official representatives of Red China and Soviet Russia a disgrace. On the U. S. team may have been some youngsters whose less privileged brothers were at the very same time being shot at in Korea by the very same Red armies that sent their paid gladiators to the phony feast of brotherhood. Maybe we are kill-joys, but for us there was too much killing in Korea to warrant joy over Helsinki. Our prevailing sentiment, in fact, is shame. We are ashamed of a national stupidity that puts sentimental platitudes about the internationality of sport above the most elementary sense of honor, above loyalty to principles and to men dying in defense of those principles.

By the same token, we are proud to correct another dereliction of the metropolitan press. To our knowledge, none of the newspapers which so exuberantly editorialized on the blessings of friendly competition among belligerents has reported this remarkable fact: Mr. Avery Brundage, the U. S. representative on the Olympic Committee, resisted the admission of Communist teams to the Helsinki Games. He argued his case forcefully before the Committee at its 1951 meeting in Vienna and, though he remained a minority of one, may thus have yet salvaged the concept of the Olympic Games: there was at least *one* statesman of the Olympiads who remembered that the feast was meant to celebrate a moral code rather than nimble muscles. And we are proud that he was an American.

Had the U. S. press done its duty and amplified Mr. Brundage's voice of wisdom and dignity, America might have escaped the ignominious moral defeat of Helsinki—a defeat which no amount of Olympic gold medals can long disguise. Before the court of conscience forty medals of gold weigh no more than thirty pieces of silver. And what adds historical significance to the scandal of Helsinki is precisely the moral callousness it betrays—the witless expediency which, in sports affairs as well as those of state, washes the last grains of honor out of our body politic.

For it was expediency and, we have a hunch, some State Department pressure that overruled Mr. Brundage's wise refusal to let free men fraternize with disciplined members of Stalin's armies. It was expediency, contemptible expediency, that made our press hide even the elementary fact that our team was meeting, not amateurs from behind the Iron Curtain, but select employees of State sport organizations which, by official status, are intrinsic parts of the Communist armed forces.

We had to blink at all this—or so argue the

advocates of expediency—because the non-Communist world would never have understood an American decision not to meet Korean sharpshooters in friendly play. The non-Communist world, we are told, would have thought that we were either afraid of superior Communist talent or, even worse, wicked warmongers determined to make the East-West abyss forever unbridgeable. This is the same hapless cynicism that prevents us from winning the Korean war; the same suicidal mania that throws American support to sworn foes of America in Asia and Europe; the same bottomless stupidity that caters to "neutralism" all over the world.

In demonstrable truth, nothing hurts America's reputation abroad so much as the increasingly sickening display of our sweetish "reasonableness." The world is tired of genteel cookie-pushers. The world is yearning for moral guts. That U. S. amateurs managed to outdo Red Army professionals by a few unofficial points will impress the non-Communist world considerably less than how easy it was for the hardboiled Communist sport diplomats to make us renege on our faith, our moral commitments, on the very concept of the Olympic Games.

Mr. Avery Brundage, by the way, has been elected President of the new Olympic Committee that is to prepare the 1956 Games in Australia. We sincerely hope that our praise is not going to embarrass him in his delicate new position; but we hope even more fervently that America, by 1956, will have caught up with his insight of 1951.

## *Fair Wind from the West*

This is the season, the summer doldrums, in which the winds of gossip toy with the hopes, presentiments and destinies of the candidates. There is no news from the rival camps in Denver and Springfield, designedly no news. The press agents lay their snares, Dr. Schlesinger ("Jehovah's Little Messenger" in Morrie Ryskind's immortal jape) moves in on Adlai, a delegation of Methodist bishops calls on Ike; but the strategy of the onrushing fall is still masked, the candidates cryptic. One can believe anything of Ike and Ad in August.

A fair wind from the Rockies has, however, wafted us tidings which we welcome. We hear that General Eisenhower, aroused by the gravity of his tactical situation, is girding for the hustings with a care and concentration similar to that which he expended upon planning the Normandy invasion. He has, as a colloquial correspondent wrote us, "put on his fighting clothes."

He intends, without descending to personalities or footless argument, to discuss the issues and not, as his self-appointed laureates, the Alsops, have given us to believe, conduct another "high level" campaign à la Dewey upon the abstractions of peace and prosperity. We hear that he proposes to

take a rounded global view of our military dangers and responsibilities, as MacArthur and Taft have both urged, and to that end has nominated Representative Walter H. Judd (Rep., Minn.) as his Far Eastern brain-truster. No man in public life has a deeper insight than Walter Judd into the moral, strategical and psychological factors involved in our disastrous retreats in eastern Asia and our present peril there.

We hear likewise that General Eisenhower has rejected the persuasions arising from a poll by Dr. Gallup to the effect that corruption is the main issue. As he should, because of his extraordinary experience in the day-to-day handling of international affairs, Eisenhower proposes to bear down heavily on our world situation and to affix blame where blame is due for our present defensive plight. He intends also to examine the whole deplorable breakdown of the rearmament program, about which far too little is published or heard, and raise pertinent inquiries into why we lag in the air, in the training of pilots, and in general in munitioning our own war effort and those of our allies. He will not, naturally enough, backtrack on the western European policies he has helped administer. On the burning issue of Soviet infiltration of our government, a subject concerning which he can plausibly plead ignorance, he intends deputizing his Vice-Presidential candidate to carry the issue home to the Administration with his blessing. Senator Nixon, who was, in truth, Alger Hiss's nemesis, has a staunch record on that issue. To him McCarthyism is not, as it is to such Eisenhower backers as the *New York Times* and the *Herald Tribune*, a horrid word.

Eisenhower plans, moreover, the closest liaison and consultation with Senator Taft in what the military term the "highest echelon." He assures friendly visitors of his genuine admiration and respect for his defeated rival.

The *Freeman* can only hope that its expectations have not been unjustifiably raised. General Eisenhower wants to win the election. There are obstacles to that desire which must be overcome. He can not have failed to note that there has been since the Republican Convention an alarming withdrawal of eminent and leading Republicans from politics. That of General MacArthur was not only alarming but distressing, as was that of General Wedemeyer, who has assured friends he intends taking no part in this year's campaign. These and others less illustrious who have vowed themselves to silence in 1952 are not expressing pique because their man lost. They represent a body of doctrine that appeared to have lost at Chicago. That body of doctrine may or may not be the majority opinion in the Republican Party. In any case it must be consulted if we are to rid the nation of the dubious statesmen, plunderers and leftist-liberal agents of disintegration who have for so long distressed us.

## Turn on the Burma Road

Little Point Four is growing fast and we wonder how much longer we shall call a big, strapping program by such a childish low digit. The government of Burma, for instance, has only contempt for Henry Wallace's baby-talk about that daily quart of milk. It nurtures considerably bigger ideas—but let us get the news from Reuters at Rangoon:

The Government opened a conference of experts here today [August 4] to lay long-range plans to turn Burma into a Welfare State in which each of the 18,000,000 Burmese would get assurance of a house, a car and a steady income.

No garage? Also, we miss any mention of free toupees. Otherwise, the Burmese Government seems to have gone to it with acute foresight and truly modern techniques. The way to launch a Welfare State, as we should know, is to find a brain trust at the start, and we were pleased to learn that no less than 600 Burmese experts qualified.

Reuters did not tell whether they discussed the construction of roads to accommodate 18,000,000 cars, but then we recall that Burma has at least one. Meticulous attention was paid, however, to the problem of financing a car, a house and a steady income for each of the 18,000,000 Burmese. "An allocation of about \$15,000,000 a year will be made to meet the program," cabled Reuters.

Now eighty cents a year per Burmese is better than nothing, but perhaps not enough, even in Burma, to buy a car and a house and a steady income. So the Prime Minister came up with the only satisfactory idea the Welfare-State school of thought has produced anywhere:

He said Burma would accept financial aid from any quarter—including Communist China and the Soviet Union—to pay for the plan.

This is known in diplomatic circles as propositioning the U. S. State Department which, so far, has never failed to respond to exotic blackmail. The Premier realizes, of course, that Communist China and the Soviet Union, whose 600,000,000 citizens own somewhat fewer than 600,000,000 houses and 600,000,000 cars, will be in no hurry to turn Burma into a motorized Shangri-la. He may even know that by no means all 155,000,000 Americans are assured of a car, a house and a steady income.

But what does this matter? From where a Burmese stands, the Mysterious East is America. He won't even try to understand that strange American mind. All he knows, and all he cares, is that beyond the seas there is a mint which issues dollars at the drop of a threat.

Frankly, we do not expect those 18,000,000 cars to roll on the Burma Road by tomorrow, but we offer odds that a Special Task Force is already hard at work in Foggy Bottom to accommodate the getting Burmese, whose Premier's name, by happy coincidence, is U Nu.

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# A Message from Syngman Rhee

*By cable, Seoul, August 5, 1952*

On behalf of the Korean nation, I am happy to take this opportunity offered by the *Freeman* to express to the people of the United States our solemn gratitude for the generous spirit and clear vision which have made possible this union of free peoples battling together on our soil to halt and turn back the aggression of the Communist imperialists.

Without the courage shown by President Truman in dispatching instant aid to us, the Red Armies would long ago have destroyed the bastion of freedom which we are determined to maintain. Our people have endured every sacrifice that modern war demands of its victims in order to render our own full share of service to the common cause. So long as we stand together in cordial understanding, we are assured of final victory.

Democracy has come in our day to have two meanings, both essential to the continuance on this earth of individual and national freedom. In international relations it means a decent regard for the sovereign independence of nations, combined with a spirit of cooperation in working within the framework of the United Nations toward the goal of collective security based upon justice and law.

The Republic of Korea was organized under the sponsorship of the United Nations and will work in the future, as it has in the past, for the decent goals set by the unfettered majority of its members. Our great hope is that we may soon be received into full membership of that body.

International democracy can only function so long as individual freedom is maintained within nations. My program for Korea is to advance the cause of essential democracy within our country by

every means in my power. Thus far we have achieved notable progress even though our handicaps have been severe.

We adopted a program of land reform which has wiped out landlordism and has granted to every farmer ownership of the land he cultivates. We have established and protected union organizations and the right to strike.

We have extended the ballot to all adults, women as well as men, with no restrictions. With the nationwide support of our entire population, we have amended our Constitution to grant to the entire electorate the right to elect their own President, and we have strengthened democracy further by converting our unicameral National Assembly into two chambers. Even prior to the adoption of these Constitutional amendments, a major and far-reaching step toward a wider basis of democracy was taken in Korea when local autonomy was instituted and elections were held in April and May of this year. Over 17,000 local officials, including members of local legislative councils, were elected by nearly seven million voters, 89 per cent of all those eligible to vote. We have quadrupled educational facilities. And even under the very shadow of Communist attack, we have allowed full freedom of criticism and discussion in the press, restricting censorship only to military matters.

We in Korea have paid a tremendous price for national and individual freedom. We know the value of both kinds of democracy. We mean to keep our people free, both internally and internationally. The record will clearly show our determination and our success in achieving both these goals.

SYNGMAN RHEE, *President, Republic of Korea*

## How President Rhee Won

**By YOU CHAN YANG**

*Korean Ambassador to the U. S.*

You in the United States who have had democracy for 177 years may sometimes forget how you got it. And a nation so enlightened and informed as the United States may find it difficult to understand how democracy must operate—if it is to exist at all—in a country with mass educational facilities as limited as they are in Korea. When these two factors are properly considered, the true significance of the recent tremendous democratic advances achieved in Korea may be better appreciated.

The roots of American democracy grew from the theory of John Locke that all men are born equal, and from the far older preaching of Jesus that all men are sons of God. Even with a long historical

background of this kind of teaching, the original thirteen colonies found it difficult to unite and to yield their individual powers to the central government. Your Articles of Confederation proved inadequate and had to be revised into a new Constitution eleven years after your independence was declared. Shay's Rebellion had to be suppressed. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 marked a very serious effort to break your early union apart into a consolidation of relatively separate states. Among early United States Presidents, Jefferson and then Jackson carried on running battles with the Supreme Court. Your nation not only underwent a tragic civil war, but also

through the years adopted successive Constitutional amendments which together have drastically changed the pattern of government established by the founders. And during the early years of your history, conservative nations abroad pointed to the American experiment as a dangerous trend toward anarchy. Yet your leaders, despite bitter criticism, went steadily ahead with their program of insuring a government of, by, and for the people.

The political developments in Korea during this past spring and summer have similarly wrought changes in our Constitution which have notably increased democratic control. Significantly, these changes were voted into law on July 4. The date for the epochal 163 to 0 vote in our National Assembly, approving four amendments to our Constitution, was not merely coincidental, for the spirit which from the beginning has animated our democracy has been nurtured by your own example.

The four amendments which were unanimously adopted provide: (1) that the President of Korea henceforth shall be elected by all the voters, rather than by the members of the National Assembly; (2) that the National Assembly shall be converted from one to two chambers; (3) that Cabinet members henceforth shall be nominated by the Prime Minister and shall be subject to confirmation by the Assembly; and (4) that the Assembly may, by majority vote, dissolve the Cabinet at will. The first two amendments have been sought by President Syngman Rhee ever since our government was inaugurated on August 15, 1948. The latter two have long been advocated by some members of the National Assembly.

Wherever democracy is honored in fact, and not merely in words, the first amendment must be applauded as a vital step toward insuring the reality and survival of government by the people. The virtue of the second amendment is attested by the experience of the national and state governments of the United States. The third and fourth amendments are compromises won by Assemblymen and give the direct lie to those who charge that President Rhee dictatorially dominated the Assembly. In my own judgment, the present lack of a responsible two-party system in Korea will make the fourth amendment unworkable and will lead either to its repeal or the development of such a system.

Foreign opinion, as expressed both in official statements by the UN Secretary-General and by several heads of State and in extensive newspaper and radio commentaries, has generally approved of the goals represented in at least the first two amendments, but has been harshly critical of the methods leading to their adoption.

This criticism was based largely upon an unfounded fear that President Rhee intended to utilize the power of the police and army to enforce adoption of his program by the Assembly. His proclamation of martial law in the Pusan area was particularly attacked. In retrospect, even the harsh-

est of his critics must be aware of two vital facts: First, that the power derived from martial law was not so utilized; second, that a succession of serious guerrilla outbreaks, and widespread demonstrations resulting from public disapproval of the Assembly's resistance to the amendments, made necessary the temporary imposition of martial law.

### The Koreans Are Democratic

Only the uninformed can believe that political methods in Korea could possibly parallel those in the United States. Your people are educated in 1200 colleges and 600 junior colleges. You have some eighty million radio sets and seventeen million television receivers. Newspapers and magazines bring detailed discussions of political and social issues into virtually every American home. Motion picture newsreels are viewed by almost eighty million Americans weekly. And you have a long tradition of democratic participation to fortify the determination of your voters to control their own political destinies. The situation in Korea is not comparable in any significant respect.

Nevertheless, the Korean people have proved themselves to be devotedly democratic. In our first national election on May 10, 1948, 92.4 per cent of all our registered voters went to the polls to cast their secret ballots. On May 30, 1950, the percentage was 87 per cent. And in the local and provincial elections of April and May, 1952, 89 per cent of all registered voters went to the polls to elect 17,558 officials. Such high percentages have never been achieved in the Western democracies. Moreover, all of our elections have been under the observation of United Nations officials, who have certified to their fairness.

Another significant fact is that what Korea lacks in facilities for nation-wide debate of the issues, it makes up with an intensive, grass-roots democracy. Over 70 per cent of our people live in small villages, where public opinion is potent, candidates are known to all their neighbors, and democracy on the village level is centuries old.

President Rhee's problem was to find a way of bringing the national issues comprised in his proposed Constitutional amendments to the attention of the people. His views were not suddenly developed when the time arrived for the Presidential election in the National Assembly. When the Constitution was adopted, in July 1948, he and others in the Assembly declared that direct election of the President should be sought as soon as the people demonstrated their ability for self-government. On December 22, 1950, in an interview with Ansel F. Talbert of the *New York Herald Tribune*, President Rhee declared that, "Personally, I prefer a bicameral legislature and direct election of the President." In November 1951, he submitted his two proposed amendments to the Assembly, and he advocated them again in a press conference on

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March 2, 1952. Because of the limited scope and disruption of Korean news media, these methods of presentation were not adequate to reach the masses of the people.

When the National Prosecuting Attorney uncovered evidence that several Assemblymen had accepted bribes to vote for a President who would favor a political coalition with the North Korean Communist regime, these Assemblymen were arrested. Thus the people of all South Korea became aware of the struggle precipitated in Pusan, and at once began to make very manifest their support of President Rhee.

In the May 10, 1952, election of 378 members of Provincial Assemblies, only ten members of the Anti-Rhee Democratic Nationalist Party were elected. The seven Provincial Assemblies all adopted resolutions supporting the demand that the President be elected by the people. Sixteen hundred local communities adopted similar resolutions. Committees sent to Pusan to present these resolutions to President Rhee and to the National Assembly were inaccurately described in some press reports as "mobs." Finally, while many Assemblymen remained at home, thus preventing formation of a quorum, President Rhee indicated that he might call a national plebiscite to let the people themselves decide whether the Assembly should be dissolved and new Assemblymen be elected to carry out the people's will. Since it was perfectly apparent that the people were strongly in favor of the proposed amendments, the Assembly finally capitulated.

### Government by the People

The destructiveness of the war, the long delay in UN plans for assisting in Korean reconstruction, and the dragging truce talks have all had inevitable political repercussions in Korea. President Rhee has long been recognized, both inside and outside of Korea, as the only Korean statesman who is qualified to deal effectively with the serious international problems confronting our country. His determined fight for the reunification, rehabilitation and independence of our nation has won for him the affection and confidence of our people. On the other hand, his insistence upon land reform and his fight to prevent the rise of a privileged class have resulted in winning for him the ill-will of certain segments of the landlord, business and commercial groups. These groups, in control of the National Assembly, would rather deprive the nation of his leadership than be themselves deprived of opportunities for special privilege. Furthermore, Communist and other foreign influences that wished to dominate Korea could affect the Presidential choice much more easily if the President were to be elected by 183 members of the Assembly than if he were elected by the people.

As all the facts of the Korean political developments are reviewed, I believe it will be evident that

President Rhee has successfully led a notable crusade for basic democracy, and that those foreigners who have criticized him either have not understood the problems or have misinterpreted his purposes. Now that the new Constitutional provisions have been adopted and the Presidential election has been placed in the hands of the people, President Rhee has been thoroughly vindicated. But, far more important, essential democracy in Korea has been safeguarded and notably advanced. History will hail the events of this past spring and summer in Korea as being fully as important for our nation as was the revolutionary change in the United States in 1787, when the admirable American Constitution was adopted to replace the unworkable Articles of Confederation. Such changes never come about easily. They can not come about at all unless a nation has a truly great leadership which is genuinely responsive to the deeply-held convictions of the masses of the people.

### In Praise of War

People have always damned war and praised peace. When Ben Franklin said: "There never was a good war or a bad peace," most people agreed with him. Yet neither peace nor war is good or bad in itself. We don't praise a night in which criminals quietly rob and kill. On such a night we prefer the noise of police at work to silence. There comes a time like that when war rates more praise than peace. The noise may be damnable—but no one can damn it without damning the silence that preceded it.

All peace is bad just before war begins. On the side of the attacked the leaders appease evil. On the side of the attacker there's every crime known. But once the war begins, hope comes back. Hope says this evil on both sides will be purged by fire from the earth. War is never as bad as the peace that begins it; and when, and if, it brings back hope, we can say even war is good.

What do we call a good peace? Define peace as the absence of war, and you leave a vacuum which any evil may rush to fill. A good peace is one that sets no value on itself. A good peace goes to war at the drop of a hat. A good peace warns all would-be disturbers of liberty: "Gentlemen, you realize this means war!" There's a peace that won't have to go to war, at least not to big war.

It sounds paradoxical, this warlike peace; but we can see its precedent in history. The Pax Romana and the Pax Britannica never lasted so long from desire for peace, but from desire for international law and order which both Romans and British willingly enforced. The Pax Romana and the Pax Britannica really cry, *pax in bello*, peace in war: peace that skirmishes, patrols in unending vigilance and makes threats of war. They showed us the longest, most benign periods of peace the world has ever seen.

THADDEUS ASHBY



# China Disaster: Fact and Fable

By LAWRENCE R. BROWN

*A well-known Freeman writer shows, by analyzing the State Department's China White Paper, that it proves the guilt of Acheson and Marshall.*

The capture of China by the Soviet Empire may prove to have been the greatest disaster that ever befell the American people. Some of the ruinous military consequences are already upon us, and only political illiterates expect them to be confined to Korea. Yet public discussion of an event so ominous has been conducted on an intellectual level that would disgrace a high-school debate on some trivial subject. It is understandable that Soviet hirelings should seek to vilify everyone who discusses the loss of China. It is less easy to understand why many Americans try to evaluate a national catastrophe as though it were a municipal sewer scandal. They snatch at the childish inventions of Soviet propaganda as though it were important to them not to know what did happen to betray China to the Soviet Empire. Perhaps it is, lest they see how they themselves have been fooled.

Chiang was corrupt, a friend of grasping landlords. We aided China immensely, but Chiang sold the arms we sent him. The Communist victory was inevitable and anyway not too important. Everyone knows that Europe, not China, is necessary to Soviet expansion. On this last point our gullible intelligentsia rises to true genius. It is even better informed on the strategy of Soviet world imperialism than Lenin himself.

In a later article I shall discuss our alleged aid to the Nationalists and show, solely on the basis of facts set forth in the White Paper itself, that China received no military aid from the fall of 1945 when Acheson became Under Secretary until the fall of 1948 when Congress forced a little assistance much too late to matter. Here I shall discuss our policy, again exclusively from this single source. The limitation may leave out many facts, but those to be found are beyond dispute.

After the Japanese surrender, American policy toward China naturally changed. The new policy first appears in the White Paper in the President's directive to the Marshall mission of December 1945, revised and approved by Marshall himself:

Specifically, I desire that you endeavor to persuade the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China. . . . In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders . . . you may state, in connection with the Chinese desire for credits, technical assistance in the economic

field, and military assistance . . . that a China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a proper place for American assistance along the lines enumerated. [pp 605, 606].

The struggle between the Soviet-supported Communists and the Chinese government is smothered under the phrase "major political elements" (though there were only these two), and the world-wide Soviet aggression is described as "civil strife." But there is no ambiguity about the refusal of military aid so long as the Communists chose to continue attacking the Nationalists. So long as that went on, "civil strife" would continue and China would not be a "proper place" for aid. Notwithstanding latter-day screams that this could not have been our policy, the above is the official document and what it says is what our policy was. Nor is its validity as the source of policy destroyed by the widely prevalent belief that aid, after all, was given. The directive was never violated.

## A Project of Interest to Stalin

It was no mere paper declaration. A week before the final draft was completed, the State Department had the War Department direct General Wedemeyer, the American commander in China, that:

Pending the outcome of General Marshall's discussions with Chinese leaders in Chungking . . . further transportation of Chinese troops to north China, except as north China ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will be held in abeyance. [p. 607]

Manchuria was then occupied by the Russians, so permission to move troops there was meaningless. But the removal of the Japanese had left north China a vacuum into which the Chinese Communists were trying to move. It was by gaining north China that they were later able to occupy most of Manchuria as the Russians withdrew, carefully "abandoning" arms for their use.

Late in December Marshall arrived in China and on December 31 the Chinese government accepted the first item of his directive, a conference of the "major political elements." It agreed to a meeting of the Political Consultative Conference. This was in furtherance of a project pressed upon Chiang in June 1944, when Henry Wallace, accompanied by John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore, had urged him to "reach a settlement" with the Com-

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munists (p. 555), a project which, according to Wallace (p. 550), was of "keen interest" to Stalin.

The PCC was composed of government representatives, Communists and representatives of Communist-front organizations, and a few no-party delegates. It met on January 10, 1946, and on January 31 issued a series of recommendations. These are important even today, because of the use made of them by the Chinese Communists and the role they came to play in State Department documents and publicity. If they did not represent American policy, they served as an excuse for it. For example, on August 10, 1946, Mr. Truman sent Chiang a letter containing this language:

A far-sighted step toward the achievement of national unity and democracy was acclaimed in the United States when the agreements were reached on January 31st by the Political Consultative Conference. Disappointment over failure to implement the agreements of the PCC by concrete measures is becoming an important factor in the American outlook with regard to China.

### Blueprint for Communist Control

Let us see what constituted this far-sighted step toward unity and democracy. The PCC recommendations first required the existing Chinese government to abdicate and place supreme power in a State Council on which only half the councilors could be Kuomintang members, the other half to be Communists, members of Communist fronts, and a few no-party men. Resolutions would be passed by majority vote, but changes in "administrative policy" would require two-thirds. Councilors were to be appointed in the following manner:

The appointment of State Councilors by the President of the National Government will be made on the nomination of the different parties concerned. In case he does not consent to the candidature of any given individual, the party concerned may nominate another one for the office. When the President . . . nominates any individual with no party affiliations . . . whose candidature is opposed by one-third of the other nominees, he must reconsider the matter and make another nomination.

Since the Communists could thus control the appointment of no-party men, they would effectively control half the council. In addition, seven or eight ministries were to be transferred to non-Kuomintang, that is, predominantly Communist control.

This State Council was supposedly to be a temporary government pending the meeting of a National Assembly to adopt a constitution, but the ratio of Communist strength in the proposed assembly was not even determined. All that was decided was that a three-quarters vote would be needed to adopt the projected constitution (p. 611). Since the Communists would have had effectively half of the "temporary" State Council, either the proposed Assembly would have given them more power or it would never have adopted a constitution. This is elementary in Communist tactics.

While the PCC was developing these resolutions, Marshall worked on military matters. A truce was arranged between the Chinese government and the Communists, to be supervised by a military Committee of Three—Chang Chih-chung, representing the government, Chou En-lai, representing the Chinese Communist Party, and Marshall, Chairman and Advisor. This Committee drew up a document recommending "the integration of the Communist forces into the National Army." (p. 622) A certain number of both Nationalist and Communist divisions were to be demobilized and the remaining units organized into a group of armies to be stationed at various points throughout China. However, the "integration" was to be unique in history. The Communist divisions were not to be placed under the government, even a government half controlled by the Communists, but were to remain under the direct command of the Communist Party. The pertinent provision reads:

The Commander-in-Chief shall have the power to appoint and relieve all subordinate officers provided, however, that in the event it becomes necessary . . . to relieve the commander of any Communist-led unit or any Communist officer holding other position, the Commander-in-Chief shall appoint in the place of the officer relieved an officer nominated by the senior Communist member of the government. (p. 622)

It was also arranged that the United States Army would give up-to-date military training to ten Communist divisions for a period of three months.<sup>1</sup>

At that time China was just emerging from ten years of war with Japan. Its industries were crippled, its production far below the prewar level. To make matters worse, much of the essential industry and the best coal mines were in north China, and in Manchuria which the Russians still held. Russia also controlled Dairen, chief port of access to these areas. The Chinese Communists were conducting open war against the government, with discreet Russian assistance. Our policy in this situation was to demand that the Communist Party, as a party, be given a veto power in the top government organ of state, a number of functioning ministries, and permission to maintain a separate army. The only aid Washington offered was military training to the Communists.

In his letter prefacing the White Paper Acheson denies the plain meaning of his own documents: "The . . . objective of assisting the National Government, we pursued vigorously from 1945 to 1949." Back 600 pages in the book and four years in time, Marshall's directive reads otherwise. And everything that follows agrees with that, not with Acheson.

It is important to note that the early period of Nationalist success, before the Communists had established effectual communication with the Russians, was the only period when the Chinese Com-

<sup>1</sup>Acheson's attempt to get approval for this last step failed (*Congressional Record*, May 15, 1951, pp. 5509-10).

munists and the American State Department were zealous for the suspension of hostilities. Chou En-lai summarized the situation in a note to Marshall dated September 21, 1946:

The extremely serious situation at this moment, as I see, has gone far beyond the scope that it can be resolved by a discussion on government reorganization. . . . Instead, the key to it rests with . . . a prompt and immediate cease-firing. . . . As the matter now stands . . . we find ourselves facing a state, which can only find a parallel in days prior to January 10, if not even worse. The only proper approach toward disentangling the many complexities lies therefore in effecting prompt cessation of hostilities . . . [p. 657]

With the collapse of mediation—by Communist decision—and the appearance in north China and Manchuria of powerful, Soviet-supported Communist armies, the Communists and the State Department lost all interest in mediation or in a suspension of hostilities.

The White Paper concludes its discussion of these negotiations with the remark that by November 1946, "It appeared that the Communist Party had, in effect, rejected American mediation." Then why was the embargo against Chiang not lifted? Though the State Department realized where the blame lay for the failure of mediation, there was no change in our policy. The embargo was continued until May 1947, and no aid was sent until after the Congressional intervention in 1948.

### A Step Toward "China's Destiny"

The essential political fact that emerges from the confused negotiations, battles and truces of 1945, 1946 and 1947 is that the recommendations of both the PCC and Marshall's military committee became at once and remained the verbal program of the Chinese Communist Party and the announced policy of the American State Department. Further, it takes no great political insight to realize the consequences of the legalized division of sovereignty called for by these recommendations. A government, part of whose state apparatus and army are legally the property of a cohesive, disciplined, foreign-controlled party, is no longer a government. At best it could be only an interim fiction pending the conquest of full power by that party.

Nor was this political triumph hidden from our State Department. One of its officials in China, John Paton Davies, had advised it in November 1944 that "a coalition Chinese Government in which the Communists find a satisfactory place is the solution of this impasse most desirable to us." Yet Davies was convinced, and had so informed the Department, that the Communists were "the force destined to control China." Obviously to Davies a "satisfactory place" in the government for the Communists was merely a step toward achieving their "destiny." Since the means satisfactory to him were also satisfactory to the Department, one

can not avoid the question whether the Department shared his concept of China's destiny.

Finally, the question arises whether the State Department could have been ignorant of the consequences of its policy. It could not. It had General Wedemeyer's long-suppressed report on conditions in China, filed in September 1947. Wedemeyer stated that "very little" in military equipment had been furnished China after September 1945. (It can hardly be thought coincidental that Acheson had become Under Secretary of State August 16, 1945, and had promptly begun removing from the Far Eastern Division those officials whose heads were being demanded by the American Communist press.) Wedemeyer reported other important facts. The Chinese government as of September 1947 had 16,000 motor vehicles immobilized for lack of replacement parts. The U. S. had contracted to supply such parts but had voided the contract. There was a great shortage of ammunition. Military equipment furnished before September 1945 was, like the motor vehicles, becoming increasingly useless because the U. S. withheld replacement parts. The U. S. had agreed before September 1945 to supply the Chinese with an eight and one-third group air force, but after September had broken the agreement. The remnant of the Chinese air force was becoming increasingly non-existent, again because the U. S. refused replacement parts. (p. 811-12)

The ghost that stalks through Wedemeyer's picture of the ruin of Nationalist China is not only denial of aid, but Marshall's embargo. This was imposed in August 1946 when the Communists were clamoring for American pressure on the Nationalists to stop their drive against Kalgan, the most important Communist stronghold in north China. It was lifted in May 1947 when the conditions pictured by Wedemeyer had almost destroyed the Nationalists' military power. Wedemeyer's report did not move the State Department. China still received nothing.

On the basis of the Department's own published record of its dealings with China, it is thus impossible to argue that it was ever the Administration's policy to aid the Nationalists or that it ever did aid them. One argument, to be sure, is left to the Department's apologists. They could say that they believed the real welfare of China and the United States would be served by forcing Chiang to give the Communists control over parts of the legal army and government of China, and therefore offered him his choice between granting this status to the Communists and being conquered by them. They could argue that they thought this scheme, of "keen interest" to Wallace, Stalin, Marshall, Vincent, Lattimore and Chou En-lai, was that best calculated to guard China and the western Pacific from the world-conquering ambitions of the Soviet Empire. It is an argument which I myself do not find particularly convincing. I think Mr. Davies' logic is much better.

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# Defeat at Panmunjom

By GERALDINE FITCH

*An inquiring reporter, told by our Ambassador to Korea that all the concessions at Panmunjom had been made by the Communists, began looking them up for herself, with these depressing results.*

Here is a day-by-day record of the truce negotiations in Korea between the great United Nations and the representatives of North Korea and Red China.

April 1. Apparently no progress in sessions on prisoner exchange.

April 2. Talks still at a standstill.

April 3. No progress in subcommittee talks on Item 3.

April 4. Meetings still stalemated.

April 5. No progress reported.

April 6. Peiping radio broadcasts statement promising, in effect, that if prisoners are returned no disciplinary action will be taken. . . . Talks still stalemated.

April 7. Talks at virtual halt.

April 8. No progress. Communist correspondents at Panmunjom continue to hint possibility of "trading" the enemy's insistence on Soviet membership in inspection teams for the right of Communists to build military airfields in north during truce. Prisoner exchange committee continues in adjournment.

The record begins, continues and ends on the same note of "no progress." To be sure, this was last April. But day-by-day proceedings in August 1952—four months later, and over a year after cease-fire talks began—are practically the same.

A baker's dozen of concessions have been made by the United Nations since the cease-fire talks began. As they have been spread over a year, I think few Americans have noticed how many times we have yielded to Communist demands or conceded our own demands in the face of their truculence and refusal to budge.

When I was in Korea last January, I was invited by Sir Arthur Rucker, able deputy director of UNKRA (United Nations Korean Rehabilitation Administration) to a reception for Army, UN and diplomatic personnel. A few others of the international community of Pusan were included. As I greeted our Ambassador, Mr. John J. Muccio, a friend of China days, I asked: "When are we going to stop making concessions at Panmunjom, and take a firm stand?"

"Concessions?" he counter-queried. "What concessions have we made?"

I mentioned one or two that came to mind, but Mr. Muccio said, "They are making the concessions—not we," and I pressed the point no further. But I began to look them up.

When the truce talks began in June 1951, on-

the-spot opinion was that the Chinese Communists were being routed, as the North Koreans had been six months earlier. Lieutenant General Hoge, returning from command of the Ninth Corps in Korea to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, said that the Communists were defeated in Korea at the time Russia's Jacob Malik suggested cease-fire talks looking toward an armistice. General Stratemeyer, retiring, stated that the Communists were so badly mauled after their two offensives that we could have gone back to the Yalu. My husband, in Korea at the time, felt the same way. We had every reason for being firm, for laying down just and reasonable conditions, setting a time limit for consideration, discussion and agreement, and announcing our intention to resume fighting as the alternative.

Today we are thirteen months and as many concessions weaker than when the truce talks began.

A day or two after my conversation with Ambassador Muccio, Air Force Brigadier-General William P. Nuckols, chief negotiator, said:

Every major concession during the talks has been made by the United Nations command. We have been doing all the giving and they have been doing all the receiving.

## Points in a Far Eastern Munich

Here are points yielded to the enemy by our side. I may have missed some, but here are enough to give every appearance of a Far Eastern Munich, a peace-at-any-price finish to the war that was not a war.

1. The UN proposed to hold the negotiations on the Danish hospital-ship *Jutlandia*. The Reds insisted on Kaesong. *Kaesong it was.*

2. When the neutrality of Kaesong was "violated," the UN forces proposed Songhyon. The Communists insisted on Panmunjom. *Panmunjom it was—and is.*

3. The UN proposed prisoner exchange as the first order of business. The Reds insisted on a cease-fire first. *Cease-fire it was.*

4. The UN said "withdrawal of foreign troops" was a political issue, not military. The Communists insisted on including it in "recommendations to the governments concerned." *It was so included.*

5. The UN forces demanded possession of Kaesong, below the 38th Parallel. The Red occupiers insisted on keeping it. *They kept it.*



6. The UN insisted on the right to continue fighting until an armistice was signed. On November 27, 1951, they agreed to drawing a cease-fire line with a thirty-day clause.

7. The UN forces during the fighting took islands off the northern coast which would have served as good "sentinels" during an armistice. The Communists insisted the UN give them back. *Back they went.*

8. The UN Command stood for behind-the-lines inspection by joint UN-Communist military teams; the Communists proposed inspection by neutral nations. They call Red Poland and Red Czechoslovakia neutral. *The UN agreed.*

9. The UN dropped the demand for aerial observation of rear areas.

10. The UN proposed inspection at 12 ports of entry. On rejection by the Communists, the UN retracted to six ports, then four, to be inspected by neutrals.

11. The UN accepted limitations on rotation of troops during an armistice.

12. The UN insisted on no construction of new airfields or reconstruction of old ones, but conceded limited rehabilitation of North Korean airfields with all the inherent danger of military buildup under cover of "civilian use."

13. The UN insisted that three remaining issues were "rock-bottom principles" on which there could be no compromise: (a) Russia unacceptable as a neutral for truce inspection; (b) a ban on military airfield construction; and (c) no involuntary repatriation of prisoners. After secret sessions from which even newsmen were barred, this became "Operation Wrap-Up," with the elimination of Norway by the UN for the dropping of Russia (leaving anything-but-neutral Poland and Czechoslovakia), and retention of 60 per cent of the prisoners by the UN in exchange for relaxation on airfield construction. Thus the UN yielded two basic principles and compromised on a third.

### Compromising the Uncompromisable

Today while America dozes through the midsummer heat, and dreams of peace just-around-the-corner, the UN—again in secret sessions and frequent stalemate—argues the last issue with the Communists: the repatriation of prisoners. Here again we had within our grasp a most powerful propaganda victory. We had discovered the Achilles heel of the whole Communist claim to represent the peoples of Asia. Out of 170,000 Korean prisoners, 100,000 refused to return to their Red masters. Even more significant, 15,000 out of 20,000 Chinese Communist prisoners voted for our side and petitioned in blood to be sent to Formosa.

Their choice was not simple. It was made on the basis of questions proposed by the Communists, which promised nothing and warned the prisoners that they might not see their families again and

were listed for return unless they had indicated that they would "forcibly resist repatriation." How violent must a man become in order not to be sent back to certain death?

On this uncompromisable principle what basis can there be for further, and secret, sessions at Panmunjom? How can we consider "rescreening" or "redefinition" of prisoners, or letting an uncertain India decide which prisoners are to be returned and which to stay, which are to die and which to live? Yet negotiations continue over the non-negotiable.

Shortly before General Ridgway was transferred to Europe, he admitted in a press interview:

They [the enemy] had a chance to dig in, resupply themselves greatly, both on the ground and in the air, and establish a strong zone of defense in depth where they once had a slim line in front of us.

He added that the UN forces were "losing their keen edge" without the pressure of major fighting to keep them tuned up. Just how, in view of these facts, could the man supposed to know most about what was going on in Korea feel optimistic about the chances for an armistice? General Ridgway added, "Encouraging signs of their willingness to come to an agreement have been multiplying greatly." Two months later the truce-talkers were merely haggling over the correct translation into Korean of the term "United Nations." Yet as recently as the last week of July 1952, Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations, returning from a Far Eastern tour, was optimistic about an armistice. So we continue to hope against hope.

### Piecemeal Surrender

Why are we retreating from our original position of strength all along the line? Does the present Administration insist on peace at any price before going out of office? Is it piecemeal surrender?

And if a cease-fire is effected, what will it be worth? President Truman has publicly stated that promises of Communists are worthless. Are we willing to sacrifice our national honor for a scrap-of-paper armistice?

The will to win the war vanished with the abrupt dismissal of General MacArthur. The UN resolution of October 1950 for the reunification of divided Korea—the only means of restoring its economy—has been forgotten long since in talk of stalemate and of return to the 38th Parallel. At one time Secretary Acheson said "a truce at the 38th Parallel would be a decided victory" for our side, though later he announced that the Parallel is "an indefensible line" which can not be agreed upon as a cease-fire line. Official sanction of an artificial dividing line on or near the 38th Parallel—heretofore not recognized by the free world as anything but a temporary expedient for accepting Japanese surrenders in World War II—will make the Iron Curtain a permanent fixture.

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## This Is What They Said

For it is worth remembering, and worth reminding the young—before the ex-Communists pervert history any further—that not many people did pay attention to them [when they were Communists], even twenty years ago when what was then the American way of life (many people thought it was the only way) had come pretty close to breakdown . . . In the "intellectual" world the infection was stronger than elsewhere, yet even this turned out to be no more than a temporary nuisance.

ELMER DAVIS, *Saturday Review*, June 28, 1952

I say to you there is no more honest man in America than Harry Truman. No one is more determined to stamp out every single instance of dishonesty in the government service.

CLARK M. CLIFFORD, address to the Democratic Committee of Wisconsin, October, 1951

I was convinced that Russian cooperation would be a great assistance to us in rehabilitating and unifying China after the war.

CORDELL HULL, *Memoirs*, 1948

### Even Malik?

I have told many correspondents who have written me on this subject that I doubt very much if anyone serving in the UN ever goes to a meeting without a prayer in his heart.

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, "My Day," July 29, 1952

### You Takes Your Choice

In opposition to most of the ideas by which American politics are supposed to be governed, victory in both [Presidential nominating] conventions went: not to the pros but to the amateurs.

JAMES RESTON, the *New York Times*, July 27, 1952, Section 4, page 3

Now there begins a month of quiet planning for the extensive campaign ahead in which the candidates will shift their appeal from the politicians who ruled the conventions to the people themselves who decide elections.

W. H. LAWRENCE, same paper, same date, Section 4, page 5

The Freeman invites contributions to this column, and will pay \$2 for each quotation published. If an item is sent in by more than one person, the one from whom it is first received will be paid. To facilitate verification, the sender should give the title of the periodical or book from which the item is taken, with the exact date if the source is a periodical and the publication year and page number if it is a book. Quotations should be brief. They can not be returned or acknowledged.

THE EDITORS

The Koreans knew—and we should have known—from the futile US-USSR negotiations after the war that nothing would come of negotiations with Communists. We should have remembered that every time a cease-fire was effected in China by the Marshall Mission, it was used by the Chinese Communists to strengthen their position. Now the Koreans, whose land has been laid waste, whose cities and towns have been bombed to rubble, whose casualties outnumber ours ten to one, see the great United Nations willing to call "quits" and leave them ruined, with sky-rocketing inflation such as destroyed National China.

If we violate our principle of "no involuntary repatriation" we can not expect the people of either Asia or Europe to believe us next time. All south-east Asia is watching to see if we can defeat the Reds. If we can't, then it is useless for the Asiatic countries to rely on us. They will know all too well that they had better come to terms with communism, or try neutralism.

A truce today—any kind of a truce, even the most favorable to us under existing conditions—will appear to the peoples of Asia as a defeat of the free nations. Their reaction will be the natural one of self-preservation. They will hop on the Red bandwagon.

But the resources of the free world are not exhausted. Americans know the difference between stalemate and victory. We know, or should know by now, what it will take to win. With our majority contribution in troops and supplies, we can give leadership which the UN will follow.

On July 24 the official Peiping radio declared without qualification that "the Chinese and North Korean peoples absolutely can not accept the retention of any of their captured troops." This was good news to our side. Their mistake may prove our salvation. Their refusal to agree to any arrangement that would leave some of the prisoners in our hands leaves us free to retract our concessions. If we make a firm offer, set a time limit and give the Communists fair warning of the alternative, we may recover our lost initiative and something of our dignity—if not our prestige among the peoples of Asia.

## So Sure of Life

(Translated from the Chinese)

But there is one, they say,  
So sure of life,  
That the claw of the tiger,  
The horn of the buffalo, or the point  
of the sword finds him not.  
And why?  
Because he walks at peace  
With life and death.

TAO TE CHING

# Land Reform, Red Style

By S. T. TUNG

*"Agrarian reform" in China is sheer theft, says a Chinese writer, and is creating the chaos to be followed by collectivization.*

The rosy illusion that depicted the Chinese Communists as mere "agrarian reformers" has been shattered by their aggression in Korea. Yet many misinformed people still think that Mao's government is engaged in land reform, and owes to this its military and political successes. Some even believe that massacre, extortion and other crimes carried out in connection with the Communist agrarian policy are justified because land reform is a good thing for the masses, even if it hurts the "wealthy few." They conceive of Nationalist China as a country where a handful of feudal landlords ruthlessly exploited and oppressed the poor tenant farmers.

In their opinion the most effective way to fight communism is to imitate the Communists by enforcing land reform. Such an attitude is as dangerous as it is widespread, since the false land reformers have won control over 470 million people in China and are trying to capture the other Asiatic countries by the same hoax.

This misunderstanding arises not only from ignorance, but from persistent and widely circulated propaganda. In the foreword of the Chinese Communist land law and in the speeches of Mao and his henchmen appears the following statement, which contains as little truth as their assertion that the United States is entirely controlled by a few Wall Street capitalists:

The landlords and rich farmers who constitute less than 10 per cent of the rural population own from 70 to 80 per cent of the agricultural land [of China], and ruthlessly exploit the farmers. The farm laborers, poor farmers, middle farmers and other people, who constitute over 90 per cent of the rural population, own together only from 20 to 30 per cent of the agricultural land.

Not only are the percentages fabricated, but the terms used to classify the rural population are purely Communist inventions. There has never been a census of the ownership of farm land; never has the rural population been classified, or classifiable, into these categories. China has no "landlord" class; no such word is in our dictionary.

As far as scattered investigations by government offices and private and public institutions show, land distribution in China presents a very different picture. The most ambitious attempt to determine the distribution of land ownership was undertaken by the Land Commission of the Nationalist Central Government before the war with Japan.

It covered 1,750,000 families in 163 *hsien* over 12 provinces. Nearly 80 per cent of the land was shown to be in the hands of owners of less than 100 *mou* (about 16 acres). Almost 99 per cent of the families were such small owners, while only 1.34 per cent of the families owned 100 *mou* or more, and only 18.32 per cent of the land belonged to such owners. In contrast, about four-sevenths of the land in Great Britain belongs to big landowners who have 1000 acres or more each.

## From the Poor to the Poor

Most of the landowners in China are the common people—farmers, small merchants, artisans, workmen. There are, to be sure, a good many rich people in China, but very few of them own much land. The bulk of their wealth is in city real estate, bank deposits, shares and interests in business, gold bars, etc. Land is so minutely divided and its ownership so widely diffused that it is technically difficult to buy large tracts, even if one has the money. Collection of rents from a large number of small tenants widely scattered over bandit-infested country is no easy matter; that is why many city people having some land in the country were eager to sell it even at a loss.

The objective of the "land reform" carried out by the Communists is not the breaking up of large estates and their division among the farmers. It is the indiscriminate confiscation and redistribution of the land of all the people—not only the few big estates, but also the tiny properties of small owners who have earned them by the hardest and meanest labor. It is this great majority of the landowning population that is really hurt by the "land reform," because their little farms are all they have. These small owners are the most industrious, thrifty, resourceful and competent elements of society.

The Communist Land Law provides that all land is to be redistributed equally to all the people, irrespective of age, sex and other distinctions. And the property to be confiscated includes work animals, farm tools, "surplus food" and "surplus rooms." This law is rendered more drastic by the provincial governments in the regulations governing its application, which greatly increase the list of confiscable things. "Food" is interpreted to include such products as cotton, tobacco, hemp, tung oil and teak; "work animals" to include chickens and ducks;

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"room" to include furniture, books, clothes, also bricks, timber and stones not yet used in construction. No one would dare to question the regulations.

To state it plainly, Communist land reform is just another name for robbery. No wonder the people resort to sabotage—cut their trees, tear down their houses, kill or maim their animals, destroy their furniture and tools, burn their grain and other products, and even destroy canals and dikes and permit water to flood their fields. Faced with this desperate revolt and sabotage, the Communists resort to the most ruthless punitive measures. This is one reason why so many people have been arrested and executed.

The landless and propertyless elements, including the idlers, spendthrifts and incompetents, have obtained something at the expense of the industrious and thrifty; but their gain is neither permanent nor without a price. Judging the Communists by deeds rather than words, it is clear that their "land reform" is not meant to help the poor. If that were their intention, they would better give cash, silver, gold or goods, which the poor most need and could actually spend or consume, and which the Communists have in plenty. Many poor people wonder why the Communists don't give them such things, instead of things both unsaleable and unconsumable. It is because the Communists want these things for themselves. If the land and its improvements could be carried away, or easily converted into cash, the Communists would want them, too. The furniture and tools of the country people are clumsy and of little value—that is why they are given to the poor. But farm products are all commandeered by the Communists, who either take them to the cities for their own consumption or send them to Russia and other countries in exchange for munitions and other commodities.

This is why Communist "land reform" is secretly called the "bone policy." The Communists take all the meat and leave only the bone to the poor. And for your piece of bone you must obey orders, go to meetings and rallies, spy for the Communists, even become cannon fodder for them.

If the poor could retain the land, there might be some benefit for them in Communist land reform. But the Communists have made it plain that they intend nationalization of land and collectivization of agriculture.

### Facts vs Propaganda

Even now, when the land still belongs nominally to the people, they get no real benefit from it. Taxes, assessments and "voluntary contributions" are extraordinarily heavy and diverse. After the greed of the Communists has been satisfied, little is left for the use of the cultivators. They will be kept alive, just as the farm animals are, as long as there is sufficient food after the needs of the Communists have been met. To give them land is, in fact, to

assign them only to compulsory labor on the land.

Communist propaganda maintains that "land reform" has increased production since the farmers, no longer subject to "feudalistic exploitation," are willing to work harder. The truth is that the Chinese farmer has always been peculiarly hard-working. Now, on the contrary, the farmers can not and will not work to their full capacities. There is a shortage of farm equipment and animals because of sabotage. There is a shortage of manpower because the Communists maintain a large army and "people's militia" and draft millions of men for public works. And then, the farmers no longer have any incentive to produce. Who would want or dare to make money, now that the Communists have denounced wealthy landowners as enemies of the people? Moreover, the prospect of collectivization has become common knowledge through the Communists' own propaganda.

The Communists have pictured the tenant farmer as a miserable victim of the landlord, who bled him white. If this were so, why did so many tenant farmers solicit the privilege of being exploited? The truth is that they rented the land with the object of making money, and generally they succeeded. They were willing to work hard to obtain high yields, for the land rent in the majority of cases was a fixed amount. Sharecropping was limited to some of the farms of the very small landowners, and the more the tenant produced, the more he would get proportionally. Where the fields of owner farmers and tenant farmers adjoined, not even an agricultural expert could tell the difference.

Under the Communists the farmer's economic status has not improved, even though he does not have to pay rent. In accordance with the "land reform" program, each person receives from one to two *mou* of land, the average family getting about seven or eight *mou*. From the produce of this area the farmer has to pay taxes. Now, the tenant farmer of the past commonly cultivated about thirty *mou*. Even if he had to pay one-half of his harvest for rent, he still had the produce of fifteen *mou* for his own use.

The Communists redistributed the land on the basis of persons per family, irrespective of working capacity. As a result, some families have too little land to keep everyone fully occupied, so labor is wasted; others do not have sufficient manpower, so the land is wasted.

In pursuing the policies of land confiscation and agricultural collectivization, Mao's government is simply following the Soviet Union blindly without understanding China's real land problem. The most serious aspect of this problem is not the unequal distribution of the ownership of land, but the lack of enough land to take care of all the people. This is the root of the poverty of the Chinese farmers. No matter how the Communists redistribute the land, they can not find a way out of the dilemma. Nor will collectivization provide a solution.



Mao's agrarian policy will intensify the Chinese land problem because the Communists are creating chaos and making it impossible for the people to live in peace and work the land in the best fashion. They take land from good farmers and put it into the hands of bad farmers and of those who have never farmed. Even if a farmer offers his land to the Communists, he can not escape persecution for having been a landowner. The Communist purpose is not just to divide land, but to destroy all who may have some popularity or prestige in the community. The more important leaders are executed, others are mercilessly humiliated. The Communists are building up the rogues and ruffians to become their catspaws in the community.

The mass executions and confiscation of properties go on despite the Communists' solemn pledges that they would protect the lives and properties of all people, irrespective of class, religious belief and occupation. But when one reflects on such Communist double-talk as "liberation," "new democracy," and "peace," the monstrous persecution behind the facade of "land reform" is not surprising.

## The Economics of Freedom

### The Next Depression

By LEO WOLMAN

The members of the research department of the CIO have now joined the respectable company of economists who foresee a business decline, or recession, or depression in 1953 and 1954. The CIO forecasters are not quite as forthright as this statement may imply. What they say in their Economic Outlook of June 1952 is that there "are signs of economic danger ahead" next year and the year after.

To see any danger ahead at all is a great concession from a body of opinion which ardently supports the most extreme policies of full employment and whose economic views have been fully accepted by the government of this country. Why, then, should we look for trouble? The precipitating influences, so they say, will be the leveling off of defense expenditures sometime in 1953 and the reduction of business spending for new plant and equipment from its current rate of \$25 billion a year.

If this should happen, the argument runs, then we shall be left with a rising volume of output of civilian goods and insufficient consumer income to absorb it. Since business can not be counted on to reduce prices, it follows that sales, production and employment will fall and unemployment will rise.

This, in brief, is the nub of the union argument. It runs true to form. It is not only a forecast of things to come but also a disclaimer of responsibility for them. For, if we do have a depression,

the union economists have done their duty by warning us of the impending threat and by showing us how the threat can be dissipated. This we can accomplish by raising consumer income, presumably through still higher wage rates and government spending, through preventing the "inflationary general price level" from becoming "frozen into the economy," and through causing business to cut prices.

That the men and women who presumably advise CIO officials on economic policy should continue to exploit this theme is one of the weird phenomena of these times. It is as if the authors of these theories had shut their eyes to the plethora of data bearing on the course of economic events and the wealth of experience with like periods in history. They fail to observe that bad business, lasting for more than a year, in textile and allied industries was in part the result of deliberate decisions by consumers to reduce purchases they could afford to pay for. They fail to note that the existing rates of taxes on business may well be an important factor in scaling down business expenditure for plant and equipment. But above all they are unable to explain how it is possible to raise, say, steel wages and at the same time reduce steel prices.

Whether a decline in business and the economic adjustments made necessary by it come in 1953 and 1954 or not, it is not too early for the economists of organized labor to begin thinking about the proper course of action for their clients to take. They might profitably put in their time figuring out how, in such a contingency, prices can be cut, if that is what they think needs to be done.

### Corn God

One tiny shard and a piece of corn  
I found in the tender fields,  
Of sweet grass and clover,  
Sweet basil and thyme.

One tiny shard  
On the hillocks of timothy  
I found and held to  
Measuring the distance of time.

O soft before Yum Kaax,  
Grand god of corn,  
Giver of life-bread and maize.  
Youth with corn halo  
Scatter your cereal grains  
On the head of the Mother.

Lord of the forests,  
Lord of the growing grain,  
Lord of the August corn,  
Peace and fruitfulness  
Supple the ground.

RENE L. HOWELL

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# This Above All

By ARTHUR KEMP

*The only living former President of the United States was 78 on August 10. Volume III of his Memoirs will be published on September 2. The near concurrence of these events prompted an associate to write the appreciation of Mr. Hoover that follows.*

THE EDITORS

Historians will seek to explain Herbert Hoover—his accomplishments, his victories, his defeats, his methods of thought and action. They will seek the reasons why he has been hated by some, loved so deeply by others, and respected by those who neither loved nor hated him. Many have asked me, "What is Herbert Hoover like?" This is intended as a brief answer by one who has worked closely with him and has tried to observe objectively.

The outstanding characteristic of Herbert Hoover is integrity; not in the sense of financial and intellectual honesty, but in that of completeness, the consistency of the whole individual. Nowhere is it better expressed than in "Hamlet":

This above all: to thine own self be true,  
And it must follow, as the night the day,  
Thou canst not then be false to any man.

Herbert Hoover has lived that advice. It explains in part the loyalty of his associates. The Hoover Administration had no counterpart of General Johnson's sharp break and subsequent bitter invective, of Ray Moley's "After Seven Years," or Jim Farley's "The Roosevelt Years." Instead, among the Hoover associates (who shared at least as much bitter as sweet) one finds that loyalty and respect which stem from devotion to common principles.

Another characteristic is Mr. Hoover's deep faith in the dignity and conscience of each individual human being. Over thirty years ago he called it American Individualism. In a time less devoted to semantic gymnastics, some called it Liberalism—a belief in the maximum political, religious and economic freedom for each individual consistent with like freedom for every other individual.

This individualism involves a deep political faith. Vigorously opposed to all forms of collectivism, he has fought the substitution of that vague collective morality called "social good" for individual responsibility, and rejected the degrading symbolism of "the common man."

Collectivism has grown in strength during his lifetime. A lesser man might have compromised his convictions to float easily and comfortably with the tide. Many have. I doubt, however, that the thought ever occurred to Herbert Hoover. His vision has always transcended any reasonable expectation of his own life, with confidence that the future will

yet bring forth not further oppression of human liberties but their enhancement.

His individualism has enabled him to retain a detached, objective point of view, free from bitterness, invective or rancor. Losing battles against the spread of statism has shaken neither his faith nor his principles; it has merely reinforced his determination. His defeats are those of a man supremely confident in the ultimate success of his beliefs. To the individualist, victory or defeat is not personal; he seeks a general principle, valid for all times and places and for all men. That confidence is contagious; it is sincere; and it is the stuff of which greatness is made.

Other characteristics have been ascribed to Herbert Hoover—"a card-catalogue mind," a tremendous capacity for facts, an extremely orderly mind, and so on. This is but part truth at best.

Mr. Hoover's mind is more than a reservoir of facts arranged in an orderly and logical fashion. He uses the scientific method, constantly searching for knowledge, basic knowledge, to build and extend the structure. That knowledge is obtained first by preparing a mental statement of the problem and its possible solution, then by collecting pertinent data, measuring, recording and summarizing; and finally by comparing the results with the preliminary statement, modifying and refining it. This is the end product, so to speak—the plank that is fitted into the superstructure. His tools are logic and mathematics, not emotion.

Economy in time is one of his major characteristics. Herbert Hoover learned early in life what some learn too late, and others never: that time is man's scarcest possession. His conversation, his work, are to the point. Some call it gruff, tactless, or even rude. It is none of these, but the habit of saving time and a dislike of triviality. He is forthright in action and straightforward in conversation, and he appreciates reciprocity. He has no patience with the intellectual "stuffed shirt" who prefers a paragraph to a sentence, or polishes his prose with Roget's Thesaurus. He is equally ill at ease with the intellectually "cute"—the fellow who wraps his thought in riddles and ties it with tangents. "Fuzzymindedness" grates against his every fiber; logical, rational thought, on the other hand, stimulates him.

These characteristics are enhanced or modified, of course, by a host of secondary factors—unswerving loyalty to his associates, a rare capacity to judge men, a guileless, direct and candid approach, and that mark of true maturity: a complete willingness to be judged by his own standards.

Herbert Hoover still has faith in the dignity of man, in his right to freedom—religious, economic and political. As long as he lives, he will oppose the concentration of power of *all* kinds. Nor will his influence end with his life. There are those of us who confidently believe that Herbert Hoover is not behind but very much ahead of his time.



## Arts and Entertainments

By WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM



What TV is going to do to the tribal rites of American politics I still do not know. But I do know what TV coverage of the two national conventions has done to me: it has kept me for ten days enthralled, to my growing but helpless anger, by a spectacle of immense force and profound vulgarity. One particular shot that seems to have escaped the attention of other critics, but will remain unforgettable for me, may explain my morose hunch that TV's impact on America's political future will be as degrading as it is inexorable.

A minister was giving the nightly invocation, and the TV camera was conveying the sudden hush of reverence even ward captains sense when the Lord is invoked. But then, just as ceremonial mention was made of Love, the cameraman took the cue and, whoosh, switched to a young lady in the aisle who was indeed a peach.

The cynical imagination of an Ambrose Bierce could not have invented the incident. It identified, with an almost disarming frankness, the inherent nature of the medium. TV has unlimited means of reference, but its formative instinct is "entertainment"; and so it can not help being vulgar. It must vulgarize what it touches. And though only a few years ago such a feat would have been deemed hardly possible, it will succeed in degrading even politics. The two conventions have shown, at least to me, that this country tends to deteriorate into a government of, by and for the entertainment industry. True, TV will take you to the innermost councils of national politics but they will no longer be worth a look.

The entertainment industry proudly boasts that already its staggering power has determined the recent convention results—a boast which, I am sorry to concede, is on the whole correct. Specifically, there can be little doubt that the TV hurricane forced the Republican Party to drop the nomination of Taft who, if the convention had been sovereign, would indubitably have emerged as its authentic choice.

Congratulating itself on such a stunning victory, the press (and by "press" I mean, in this era of modern communications, televised as well as printed journalism) has claimed that it functioned merely as the faithful guardian of the people's right to impose the popular will on party councils. This, I hope to show, is cant.

For the problem in hand, it does not matter at all whether or not the nomination of Taft would have been in the best interest of party and country.

What alone matters here is the spurious claim that a crude entertainment industry has the Constitutional right to make party business impossible. I challenge this presumption on two grounds.

One, the contention that the Constitutional freedom of the press was involved is sheer hokum. The press has the Constitutional right to publish all the information it can gather, but every citizen has the equally privileged right to release only so much information as suits him. TV had no more right to sit in on meetings of Republican committees than I have to sit in on policy conferences of the CBS Board of Directors. If Walter Cronkite and his colleagues wanted to expose some alleged machinations inside the Republican Party, they were perfectly free to employ all the sleuthing ingenuity at their command. But TV's claim that its presence at private meetings of party groups was granted by the Bill of Rights is plainly insolent.

Secondly, our political system, to function properly, needs effectively organized and sovereign political parties. But to be sovereign, and effective to boot, a political party must retain its right to privacy and, yes, secrecy. To equate that secrecy of party council with rascality is the sort of fatuousness the vulgarians of the press so characteristically misrepresent as sophistication. The American political system—and few of its aspects are more admirable—distrusts "ideological" clashes and frankly favors the skilful compromise. This entirely honest, entirely legitimate principle of "deals" requires that intra-party conflicts be handled with a delicate concern for delicate stresses. It requires that artful professionals resolve intra-party tensions undisturbed by a gallery of millions—and this is nothing to be ashamed of.

The trustees of a party's sovereignty must be able to determine their party's moves as they see fit, and with the freedom of argument that comes only with privacy of council. This includes their license to make mistakes for which, if such mistakes are serious enough, they will duly forfeit their political lives. The untrammelled right to political failure is just as indispensable to free politics as the right to private bankruptcy is inseparable from free enterprise.

To exercise a political party's sovereignty is difficult enough in a nation whose regional, social and racial diversities make every political move a veritable adventure in tight-rope walking. It is altogether impossible when the mass-communications boys noisily take over. Their voices are amplified in inverse proportion to their ability to comprehend a tense situation in its subtle context. If permitted to prevail, their urge to turn politics into brassy entertainment is bound to kill both entertainment and politics. And while, if I had to, I could manage to live without the American entertainment industry, I do not care to survive the American political system.

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# A Reviewer's Notebook

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

If Ike Eisenhower is elected President in November, our next Secretary of State will almost certainly be Thomas E. Dewey. For it was the Dewey-Brownell organization that put Ike across at Chicago, and gratitude for such an important service must assuredly be measured in something far more important than a mere ambassadorship or Attorney General's portfolio. Dewey can have what he wants, even unto the fiefdom of Foggy Bottom, the claims of Paul Hoffman and John Foster Dulles notwithstanding.

Because he can have what he wants, more than ordinary interest attaches to Tom Dewey's recent book, "Journey to the Far Pacific" (Doubleday, \$4). If Dewey were not a public figure, this account of a two-month sojourn in the nations of the free Pacific would pass as a pleasant, informative travel diary. But since it is also the work of a prospective Secretary of State (and in any case an influential voice should Ike win), it must be combed for its clues to high-policy-to-come.

The really interesting thing about the book is that it is the work of an Eastern, "internationalist" Republican who also happens to be a MacArthurite as regards the Far East. On page 143 Tom Dewey sums up the feeling engendered by his stay in Formosa: "Despite all the arguments, one thing is clear: Free China and its Formosa stronghold are essential to Pacific defense. The solid line of our Pacific defense structure runs from Alaska down through Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, and the Philippines. Without Formosa, the whole chain of defense would be cracked wide open; with it, the free world holds a mighty position which both serves the free peoples of the Pacific and also keeps the threat of war thousands of miles from American shores." That sounds almost like a paraphrase of MacArthur addressing the Veterans of Foreign Wars. True, Tom Dewey has said some unsatisfactory things about the stand-off in Korea. He is not an uncritical ad-

mirer of Chiang Kai-shek, and he doubts that Chiang's army is good for much more than a holding operation on Formosa; and he had a stormy tea-time session trying to defend the Japanese Treaty against the typhoon attacks of the Generalissimo. But the broad outlines and even the details of Tom Dewey's Asia policy add up to a distinct repudiation of Achesonism.

Indeed, so specific is Governor Dewey on the subject of Truman's and Acheson's mistakes in Asia that one hopes Eisenhower will base more than one campaign speech on the substance of page 136 of "Journey to the Far Pacific." Says the Governor: "Perhaps one of America's greatest diplomatic blunders was the language of President Truman's order in December 1945, when he sent General Marshall to China. This order made it clear to the world that Chiang Kai-shek had been directed by the American Government to settle with the Communists under pain of withdrawal of all American aid. To the Communists the President's order meant that all they had to do was stall for time. . . ." Tom Dewey follows this criticism of our basic Chinese policy with some acerbic remarks on the State Department's 1949 White Paper, which "hit Formosa like an atom bomb."

What struck Tom Dewey most forcibly in his Pacific peregrinations was the fact that the Chinese are not limited to China. In Singapore, for example, there are 800,000 Chinese out of a total population of one million. Chinese businessmen keep shops in Saigon; they run the business of Malaya; they are important in the economy of Manila; they operate tea and rubber plantations and tin mines in Indonesia. Most of these out-of-China Chinese are Chiang Kai-shek partisans. But this does not mean that they are last-ditchers. Indeed, Tom Dewey's visits to Manila, Saigon, Singapore, Jakarta and way stations convinced him that if Formosa falls to Mao Tse-tung the Chinese community of southeast Asia will lose

## Lest You Forget

### A BOOK LIST FOR LIBERTARIANS

**Essays on Liberty** (Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York)

**Spies, Dupes and Diplomats**, by Ralph de Toledano (Duell, Sloan & Pearce-Little, Brown)

**The Devil's Advocate**, by Taylor Caldwell (Crown)

**The Enemy Within**, by Raymond J. de Jaegher and Irene Corbally Kuhn (Doubleday)

**Witness**, by Whittaker Chambers (Random)

heart and go over to the cause of Red China as a matter of *sauve qui peut*. This would mean the collapse of a good half-dozen economies and defense systems. Tom Dewey is for a Pacific Area Defense Pact that will include all the nations of southeast Asia. But the key to any successful defense pact is the continued integrity of Nationalist Formosa; without the presence of Chiang's troops on that island the whole cause of freedom in Asia would vanish.

When I lived in Washington, in Georgetown, I frequently saw Justice Felix Frankfurter and Dean Acheson swinging down Dumbarton Avenue on their morning walk to the doors of the State Department. What they talked about is a guess, but I know from my own talks with him that the Justice is a European-minded, specifically a British-minded, man. He has no discernible feeling for the Orient. In this matter Acheson is Frankfurter's disciple. The British aren't concerned about holding Formosa, for they have written off India and tend to think of Africa as their bastion against the Orient. (The fact that this way of looking at things consigns Australia and New Zealand to the wolves does not bother Britain's Bevanites.) But the United States is a two-front power, and Africa is important only to one of its fronts. We have no more business following the British line in the Far East than we have in following the Pied Piper. War is a matter of positions, and a two-front power can not defend its position by adopting the foreign policy of a one-front power.

To see the truth about one's position on the globe entails one of two things: either one must have an instinct for the map, or one must have traveled with one's eyes and ears open. Acheson has no instinct for the map, and he is both blind and deaf as a traveler. Tom Dewey may or may not be able to read maps, but he has certainly kept his antennae adjusted while voyaging. On his recent journey to the Far Pacific he saw and smelled Asia—the teeming millions, the effluvium of fields soaked in “night soil,” the peasants who put all their money into pigs as a hedge against the ever-continuing monetary inflation. He sensed the pressures of population; he learned about the importance of “face” as the key to controlling and directing these pressures. And as he looked down upon Japan, Korea, Okinawa, the Philippines, Hong Kong and Indo-China from the air, watching coast lines and mountain ranges and valleys unroll below him, he got a good notion of the geography of the lands subjected to the pressures of Asia's millions. The experience should prove invaluable to him if he becomes Eisenhower's Secretary of State. Certainly, on the evidence of his book, Tom Dewey is no “Europe-firster.”

The fact that Tom Dewey has learned a lot about the realities of geography and populations, how-

ever, does not necessarily mean that he has yet digested the realities of campaigning against Fair Deal politicians. To mean anything at all to our future, “Journey to the Far Pacific” must be translated quickly into some devastating campaign speeches. Ike Eisenhower must be persuaded to say the things that Dewey says about the Acheson-Truman Far Eastern mistakes. If Ike fails to be a Deweyite—and a MacArthurite—in this area, Tom Dewey's sensible views about the Far East will never have a chance to prevail in the environs of Foggy Bottom.

## Hungarian in Moscow

**My Ringside Seat in Moscow**, by Nicholas Nyaradi. New York: Crowell. \$3.75

In this book the former Minister of Finance of the short-lived Hungarian Republic pays his *devoir* to the country of his adoption with commendable realism and serviceability. In effect, Dr. Nyaradi has provided us with an expertly interpreted case history of Soviet imperialist subversion, blackmail, intimidation, deception and conquest. Through his eyes we see little Hungary, paralyzed and made helpless by the Yalta and Potsdam treaties, being gradually swallowed by the Soviet python—land, people, factories and all.

We also see the totalitarian python itself through the eyes of a trained economist and a political libertarian—Nyaradi fought the Nazis and the Arrow Cross in the Hungarian underground and then fought Communist thuggery in Moscow and in Budapest, so long as it was possible to fight it effectively.

The story is hung on the thread of Nyaradi's “mission to Moscow,” which was concerned with whittling down an impudent and baseless demand that Hungary pay Russia \$200 million. This represented the Soviet claim, under the Potsdam Agreement, to one of the Nazi assets in Hungary. The asset in question was the Manfred Weiss factory, to the former owners of which the Nazis had made a \$200 million loan, but which they had also dismantled and carted off to Germany.

Being entitled to precisely nothing, General Merkulov of the MVD, the benign if somewhat genocidal mathematics teacher who liquidated the Lithuanian intelligentsia, settled for \$21 million after seven months of haggling. During this period Nyaradi was obliged to stay at the Hotel Mokra, at \$31 a day for room and \$25 for breakfast. In the “classless” society of the Soviet capital everyone was privileged to pay a dollar a pound for white bread and five dollars a pound for butter. But this didn't bother the Politburo or other high bureaucrats, since the state paid most of their living expenses. The middle and low bureaucrats were less fortunate; they had to graft furiously in order to

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Moscow, says Dr. Nyaradi, means war. Molotov, who heads the triumphant war party in the Politburo, expected to have his war chest filled and his military preparations complete by 1951. The "peace" party, headed by Mikoyan, would have preferred to take Marshall Plan aid to rebuild the shattered Russian cities and defer the war until later.

Stalin is vulnerable where his war economy is pinched by scarcities of such things as ball bearings, machine tools, etc., which are now being smuggled into Russia on a huge scale by GUSIMSK, a branch of the MVD. Also, since Russia has become a huge military camp where everything is subordinated to war needs and everything that is shipped into the country is of direct or indirect military importance, it made no sense to give Marshall Plan aid to countries which in May 1951 were reported to have doubled their engineering shipments to Russia.

Western propaganda directed back of the Iron Curtain is a whisper, drowned out by the roar of Soviet propaganda. The gravest mistake made by the voice of the West is its failure to admit that its statesmen erred egregiously in trusting and appeasing Stalin at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam.

"The countries behind the Iron Curtain," writes Nyaradi, "feel that the West sold them down the river to the Russians, and that given a chance they would do the same thing again. . . . To these helpless people, the Western radio can achieve no real importance until it admits that trusting the Russians at Yalta was a mistake."

Dr. Nyaradi wastes little space on the frivolities of personalia or tourism. To a very considerable degree his book may well be read as a guidance text, and a good one, for repairing the deficiencies of American policy *vis à vis* the totalitarians.

JAMES RORTY

## Retribution in Wales

Marianne, by Rhys Davies. New York: Doubleday. \$3.00

Such Americans as know him at all—and there aren't enough of them—think of Rhys Davies, I imagine, as primarily a short story writer, whereas actually he has also published a long list of novels, of which only "The Dark Daughters" has appeared over here. Now comes "Marianne"—a somber, intense, powerful tale, almost luridly dramatic, which displays Mr. Davies at his best and at his worst but which is, I think, fairly unforgettable. Only a skilled and audacious writer, very, very sure of himself, would have had the temerity to choose the theme which the author handles in "Marianne"—or, having chosen it, to expect the reader's belief in

a plot so contrived and so extravagant. As it is, Mr. Davies defies almost wilfully the laws of good novel writing, and thanks to the passion that is in him so nearly gets away with it that one would not dare label "Marianne" a failure.

The scene of this odd, bitter book is an industrial town in Wales, and the principal characters are twin sisters, Barbara and Marianne, who come from a comfortably prosperous middle-class family. Despite their physical and emotional differences, the two are very close, and when Marianne, the fair and flighty one, becomes pregnant by an unknown lover who apparently has deserted her, Barbara is as ravaged in spirit as her sister. Largely because she wills it, Marianne dies in childbirth, and in her final moments tells Barbara what the latter has so longed to hear—the name of her child's father. Obsessed by a desire for revenge, and also by some warped Freudian need to identify herself with her sister, Barbara thereupon proceeds, coldly and deliberately, to track this man down.

After not too much difficulty, Barbara finds her quarry—a brash, handsome, very physical young steelworker, who is at first merely flattered by her obvious pursuit of him, but soon falls trustingly in love with her. Against her parents' opposition, Barbara marries Geoffrey, and then implacably sets to work to humble and destroy him, and to make him suffer as Marianne had suffered. Only after his death—which is almost directly due to her malign, vindictive cruelty—does she learn, with horror, that she has destroyed the wrong man, and that she has trampled, in so doing, upon her own deceived heart, since she now knows she loved her dead victim. Follows an all too pat and carefully contrived denouement in which Barbara learns the real truth about Marianne, tries to expiate her sin, and makes her dubious peace with a world which will always be haunted for her, but which, strangely enough, she hopes to find endurable.

Even this much of a résumé must surely indicate how mechanical the framework of "Marianne" is, and how greatly the author has depended on outrageous coincidence—as witness Barbara's marriage to the wrong Geoffrey Roberts. If one or two of the characters had spoken out as they ought to have, the whole plot structure would have fallen apart. Despite all this, however, and despite the stiff, elaborate poses which his characters sometimes strike, Mr. Davies has infused this improbable, theatrical story with a wounding, quickening life, so that one suffers almost unbearably with the confused, unhappy Geoffrey as blow after blow is dealt to his fierce young male pride. Similarly, the ordeal and death of Marianne, Barbara's half-demented struggle between her hatred and her love, these are facets of twisted strange experience which register very deeply and give the book an emotional depth which it seemingly should not have.

The answer, of course, is that Rhys Davies is a writer of very real caliber, and one who has always



chosen to go his own special way, regardless of rules and passing fads and fancies. This is a flawed novel he has written—it does not represent him as truly, perhaps, as his recent volume of short stories, "Boy With a Trumpet"—but it is a novel that is full of passion and feeling, that has a rich, poetic ring, and that holds one with its sheer dramatic mastery. Anyone who can easily forget "Marianne" is peculiarly insensitive. Mr. Davies is all of that good.

EDITH H. WALTON

## Valetism and FDR

**Working With Roosevelt**, by Samuel I. Rosenman.  
New York: Harper. \$6.00

**Franklin D. Roosevelt's Own Story**, by Donald Day.  
Boston: Little, Brown. \$4.00

With one publisher believing that a dozen more books about Franklin D. Roosevelt will appear by 1960, the two latest prove that very little that is fresh may be expected and not enough in any case to warrant such voluminous works. Due to FDR's own testamentary reservations some Rooseveltiana will never be made public, in our time anyhow, so whatever is positively new must come from the dwindling survivors who have known him, much of it data which FDR couldn't always have diared.

"Working With Roosevelt" is the overlong, repetitive report by his principal speech writer, Samuel I. Rosenman, who frankly calls it a partisan book. Donald Day's "Franklin D. Roosevelt's Own Story" is in the circumstances hardly that, because the chronological excerpts are largely the work of others. Recognizing this potpourri, Judge Rosenman insists that the end product is FDR throughout. That is true only by benefit of ghost. I am thinking, as the original Wilson interviewer, of some magnificent writing Woodrow dictated or pecked out on his portable Corona during World War I, which he fought with but one secretary! No assistants, no idea formulators, no wisecrackers.

The Rosenman details of speech composition have been pretty well known, there being no mystery about the astounding literary valetism FDR demanded. The travels, hours of work, number of carbons, endless drafts, and even the drinks being basic, two or three instances would have sufficed for the record. But on one thing Judge Rosenman is to be congratulated: he is first to document and analyze, albeit briefly and incompletely, the now-you-see-him-now-you-don't saga of the incomparable Bernard M. Baruch.

Mr. Rosenman declares that FDR became jealous in later years, when in truth he got that way upon his 1932 election. He was envious of other government heads, even of Churchill. In the holograph to "Dear Bernie" FDR asked assistance from one "of ever-present help in time of trouble"—better, he said, than all the Supreme Court put together,

which was superlative encomium—and begged him to "do it again." That in the rubber emergency. Yet because Harry L. Hopkins, also jealous of everybody of real know-how and know-when, was able to influence the President against Baruch, failure was scored in our war direction as catastrophic as any military reverse. I am not alone in regarding Hopkins's White House presence and influence as a terrible national misfortune.

One of Mr. Day's quotations, dated August 1913, tells why FDR didn't think it wise to accept membership in the swanky new Aero Club of America while Assistant Secretary of the Navy. FDR admitted, however, that it was "absolutely essential that the aeronautic arms of the Army and Navy be increased not by doubling but a hundred fold . . ." It was an early example of his occasional clairvoyance.

Some four years before Wilson became President I had front-paged Glenn H. Curtiss's original "air bombing" experiments; and FDR, as Josephus Daniels's assistant, asked me for full elaboration. At his request Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, Chief of Naval Operations, listened in. At our informal conference Roosevelt got an all-out urge for sky weapons—but he kept it secret because of the pacifist leanings of Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan. Admiral Fiske was already experimenting with his "aerial torpedo." At our chance talk the spherical bomb was rejected in favor of the finned one—at least in blueprint. Strangely, every attempt to credit Curtiss, holder of pilot license No. 1, has been avoided by publishers.

FDR was fascinated by clippings of my *New York World* series about Japan's secret naval war plans against us. Belatedly Tokyo confirmed them; thirty-one years later spelled them out as Pearl Harbor. Soon after the day of infamy was commemorated, I forwarded to President Roosevelt the March 1910 photostats as an *aide-memoire*, but some officious underling must have detoured them. The irony is that during the first World War Roosevelt told me: "Of our thirty-six listed battle-ships only sixteen are serviceable. Of our two thousand coast miles about two hundred are protected." In 1923, as quoted by Mr. Day, FDR feared that our country had seriously crippled our defenses in the Pacific by agreeing not to fortify Guam and the Philippines—more divination. He astonished me on one occasion by saying: "If I were a Japanese and war came and I could not land on American soil, I would commit hara-kiri!" A biographer could weave a whole chapter around that.

When I saw FDR after his polio attack he dwelt upon the Far East. The Shantung affair and the Washington Limitation of Armaments results troubled him. "Under the Hughes victory, as so many foolish Republicans call it, Japan is much too strong under the 5-5-3 formula. You published something about it, didn't you?" He posed this question, still unanswered: *Should naval or armed*

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strength be calculated on the basis of relative population or territorial extent? In 1921, by population, Japan would have been entitled to a navy three-fourths as large as ours but, by territorial extent, only one-fifteenth!

According to his chief ghost FDR was worried in 1937 because several of his pet "reform" plans had been declared unconstitutional. By that time his ego no longer could bear being canceled. The dictatorial streak was up and coming. Until the Ethiopian imbroglio, to my knowledge, FDR had openly admired Mussolini. FDR brooded on Mussolini's success at one-man government until revamping the Supreme Court of the United States seemed to him the answer. As to the genesis of the third term, like James A. Farley, Samuel I. Rosenman is way off. It absolutely isn't so, the judge notwithstanding, that FDR was determined not to seek re-election in 1940, "up to the day that Norway was invaded." I briefly reported the circumstances elsewhere. In fact, I mentioned the third term prospect in an experimental broadcast in 1938. Some fifty talks with FDR during twenty-five years had familiarized me with his words and acts, and by 1938 I had the hunch that he was cooking something phenomenally sizzling. I am sure the thought inebriated him. The master dissimulator may have led Rosenman and others to believe that he wouldn't run, but he kept his own fingers crossed and ate up the false advice of his janissaries who called on him to head the 1940 ticket.

Debunking all accumulated speculation about the addition of Republicans Knox and Stimson to the Cabinet, here are the facts. I was in Chicago before the 1940 convention and called on Mr. Knox, owner-publisher of the slipping *Daily News*. In his vast office Knox told me that he had been sounded for the Navy berth. Why the offer? This is why. Illinois opposition through the *Chicago Tribune* was unpalatable enough. Roosevelt, no economist but a wizard at figuring vote-catching mathematics, wasn't hankering for the added barrage of the Republican-controlled *Daily News*. So he tempted Knox, 1936 Vice-Presidential nominee, to move to Washington under his "emergency" fold, in order to emasculate a potentially dangerous critic in the Chicago area. With New Deal diplomatic policy under attack, FDR recognized the need to halt or soften the opposition. As for Stimson, he was the only articulate adversary who had been outspoken against Japan's Manchurian invasion during his incumbency as Secretary of State. So he was cannily silenced by a Cabinet post bait. It was masked bribery devoid of any non-partisan idealism, and the two gentlemen fell for it without ever knowing or suspecting!

As for Harry S. Truman, the Rosenman story rehearses the background of how he was put over but not the *why*. The truth is that the Missourian appeared to FDR as an unglamorous subordinate who would remain docile as President after Roose-

velt had resigned to become chief peace delegate. Authority for saying this rests with what FDR told me off the record in 1920: that in his opinion Wilson made a bad mistake in being both President and peace envoy. Since FDR's whole record was one of an attempt to avoid Wilson's "mistakes," is there any reason to doubt that he would have acted on his own 1920 advice?

A. R. PINCI

## Kahn in Korea

**The Peculiar War: A Reporter in Korea**, by E. J. Kahn, Jr. New York: Random. \$2.75

As is so often the case, the publisher irritates the reader by pledging far more than the author in this aptly entitled volume of 211 pages. The flyleaf hazards the claim that "'The Peculiar War' clarifies for those who are far from the scene what the men of so many nationalities are fighting for on the Korean firing line." For this reviewer, who recently completed one year and a half on the unfortunate peninsula, the claim had great appeal; but unfortunately went unfulfilled.

Jack Kahn, in his preface, is far more objective and far less pretentious about his collected writings of not quite three months in the combat zone. In fact, it is in his preface that he comes closest to clarifying the most conscious and sought-after goal of the United Nations doughboy when he writes, in reference to his relatively brief tenure in Korea, about how fortunate he was in being "able to leave the place and go home."

"The Peculiar War" is an album collection of some fourteen verbal snapshots taken by an able reporter in the late spring and early summer of 1951. By that time the war had entered the "peculiar" phase, where it has remained more or less ever since. Kahn's snapshots are just as timely today.

Kahn presents most of his snapshots with a stereoscope. His word pictures have depth in perspective, if not in cause and effect. With one exception he limits himself to a visual account of what he saw and observed, and happily without a corresponding mass of disconnected detail. Although he leads the viewer to a moral, he does not insult him by pontifical pronouncement; and the moral, or totaled sum, to which he leads is usually adequate and fair.

The unfortunate exception to this intelligent pattern comes in the final chapter, when the *New Yorker* correspondent deals with the American press in the fabled Land of the Morning (now, more suitably, mourning) Calm. It is true that our press committed its usual quota of sins in Korea, but the quota, as elsewhere, was made up of isolated instances occasioned principally by prima donna and/or youthful impetuosity. Kahn's sarcastic treatment, which includes a scornful comparison of

varied datelines from Munsan—press base for the Kaesong (now Panmunjom) truce talks—is neither profound nor tenable.

For Americans who would become better acquainted with the environs of this peculiar war half way 'round the world, many of Kahn's snapshots serve as an excellent introduction. But Americans who would better understand the cause which "men of so many nationalities are fighting for on the Korean firing line," may as well apply the required \$2.75 to the taxes required to finance that cause, however obscure.

DAVID STOLBERG

## The Feel of Rome

**Rome and a Villa**, by Eleanor Clark. New York: Doubleday. \$4.00

No guidebook this, and if you haven't at least seen Rome I don't know what you will get from it. For it is more illuminating than informational, and more rhapsodic than either. If you do know Rome, however, you will find Miss Clark's prose poems—for that is what the various chapters are—exciting reading. The illustrations, by Eugene Berman, fit the text beautifully.

The chapters are, to be sure, a rather mixed lot, which is natural enough considering they were written separately and appeared in different magazines or reviews. I found the one on Hadrian's villa perhaps the most appealing; Miss Clark has got the feel of the place, with the uneasy sense it gives one of a presence—can it be the emperor himself?—hovering about the ruins. The chapter on Giuliano, the bandit, on the other hand, quite aside from the fact that it has nothing to do with Rome, is hardly more than journalism and rather flat. Delightful and really moving is the evocation of the Roman poet Belli in the last chapter; Miss Clark is one of the few foreigners to attempt a study of this genius, whose language is the only barrier to his recognition as one of the truly great poets of his century. The initial chapters likewise—on the Campidoglio and the fountains of Rome—make arresting reading and are full of vivacity and insight. Not everyone would use the word "shocking" quite so often as Miss Clark, and many would fail to see the "indecent" in the very existence of so many fountains but such is her view and her privilege.

Indeed, the charm and the appeal of this book is in its manner, which is a reflection of the exuberance of the writer. One could make a small and exciting anthology of Miss Clark's perceptive phrases. Inevitably impressionism exacts its price, and here and there exuberance frustrates logic, sometimes even grammar. These studies are, in fact, a *mélange* of shrewdness of perception and of arbitrary caprice, sensitivity and flamboyance, rapture and—now and again—mistrust. *Pazienza*, so is Rome.

THOMAS G. BERGIN

## Brief Mention

**Leaders of Men**, by Woodrow Wilson. Edited by T. H. Vail Motter. Princeton University Press. \$2.00

This little book by Woodrow Wilson will interest those who regard most of our Presidents as illiterates. So many of Wilson's speeches were fireside chats on a higher level. Obviously Wilson was no ward-heeler, but a man of some uncommon sense and values. Of Robert Lee, and of genius in general, he said, "When you come into the presence of a leader of men you know you have come into the presence of fire—that it is best not incautiously to touch that man." Two decades ago Dwight Morrow, United States Senator, was photographed reading Herodotus, and certain Americans viewed this act of intellection with astonishment.

**War on Critics**, by Theodore L. Shaw. Boston: Stuart Art Gallery. \$3.50

Theodore L. Shaw writes that fatigue is at the bottom of esthetics, and that most of the contemporary critics have not only very tired blood, but are Barabbases besides. It is a very creditable point of view, and Mr. Shaw should receive the favors of the muses for simply making these two honorable remarks. There is so much thievery in literature at present that honesty itself is a form of genius.

**The Man With the Blue Guitar**, by Wallace Stevens. New York: Knopf. \$3.50

Wallace Stevens, who is vice president of an insurance company, has received many accolades as a poet. His "Harmonium" has been read for about a generation, and one comes to this book with the rather histrionic title, "The Man with the Blue Guitar," with abundant expectations. It is pleasant, plastic verse (see "Come Celestial Paramours") but without any great replenishing virtues.

**The Selected Letters of Thomas Gray**, edited with introduction by Joseph Wood Krutch. New York: Farrar, Straus and Young. \$3.75

Here are some of the letters of Thomas Gray. Mr. Krutch, in a platitudinous introduction, tells us that Gray had a great attachment for his mother, and desired to be buried in her tomb. Mr. Krutch points out with pedestrian sense that there is nothing low or unfilial in such a desire, but it will take more than pedestrianism to combat the idea that no man can love his mother without bearing the Oedipus stigma.

The enthusiasts of Thomas Gray had better omit the preface and go to the epistles. Says Mr. Krutch: "One notices, of course, the abstract nouns, the capitalized personifications, the tendency to use specific details only as symbols of the general." One does not notice anything of the sort unless one is a spurious, public-school Longinus.



# Letters

## Kept out of Mischief

... is fun, and "\$655,000 for Your thought" brightens the *Freeman's* issue of July 28. But is the Ford Foundation so inept after all? Twenty-five philosophers isolated on a permanent fireside in an Institute for Philosophical research at only \$25,200 per philosopher, are kept out of mischief in business and government, and what could be wiser than that?

New York City WILLIAM A. RHODES

## New Subscriber Votes "Yea"

... believers in fundamental, individual human rights should rejoice that a publication of the *Freeman's* caliber is ably presenting the case for the real progressives of this nation. As a brand-new subscriber I am quite willing to cast a favorable vote for the calm, reasonable and well-documented approach I have found in my first few issues. . . .

Wrentham, N. C. W. L. BEERMAN, JR.

## Eisenhower's Opportunity

... let me congratulate you on your splendid and enlightening editorial for Eisenhower [July 28]. One wonders whether, surrounded as he is by such stalwart Deweyites as Duff, Adams et al., any kindly constructive suggestions for the preservation of Americanism from socialism or worse can get to him.

Denver, Col. LEON V. ALMIRALL

... is not often one finds the *Freeman* alive, but it seems to me your editorial, Eisenhower's Opportunity," falls flat to that category . . . the Eastern Republicans who are Internationalists are Internationalists first and Republicans second. Many of them hold Governor Stevenson in high esteem because he is a proven Internationalist. Now, should General Eisenhower miraculously follow your advice, which would be tantamount to thumbing his nose at his whole career . . . then you may be sure that these Eastern Republicans will find a place to go and it won't be in the General's direction. If you can honestly believe that Eisenhower will desert Dulles, "bipartisanism," UN, and the prevailing American delusion of One World . . . then you are more like an editorial in *Life* or a speech to the League of Women Voters.

Phoenix, Ariz. FRANK C. BROPHY

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